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A NOTE ON CONFIDENTIALITY
A substantial amount of the information and data for 
this thesis was obtained by extensive interviewing and 
receiving confidential information while undertaking field­
work in Pakistan. In order to maximize the effectiveness of 
interviews, firm assurances had to be given that the identi­
ty of the persons who were willing to provide information 
and materials would not be disclosed. Information received 
in interviews is referenced by the name of the affiliated 
institution and the year during which the interview was 
conducted.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the implementation of energy 
policy in Pakistan. It analyzes the implementation process 
by studying the implementation of major policy initiatives 
and projects during the 1947-88 period- The study demon­
strates that the implementation of public policies is not a 
straight forward administrative action. It is fraught with 
uncertainties and is affected by numerous problems which are 
difficult to be fully anticipated at the policy formulation 
stage. Policies and programs unfold as they are implemented. 
This is particularly true for Pakistan where public interest 
is not articulated at the policy formulation stage- The 
interest groups become active during the implementation 
stage to safeguard their interests. The policy in fact: 
evolves In the course of implementation implying an ongoing 
dynamic of policy development, modification, and execution. 
The implementers also exercise considerable discretion to 
affect changes in the original policy intents.
The study identifies a number of factors which influ­
enced the implementation of energy policy in Pakistan during 
the study period. The findings of the study are therefore
v
illustrative of the dominant paradigms of the policy imple­
mentation research. Nevertheless, the present study suggests 
refinements to the conventional wisdom associated with 
prominent concepts of the policy implementation literature- 
refinements inspired by the identification of implications 
in the context of Pakistan’s energy policy as well as the 
identification of additional factors critical for implemen­
tation success in specific situations. The study demon­
strates that these factors are of two categories: core 
factors; and contingent factors. The core factors are 
universally applicable, while the contingent factors are 
situation-specific. The core factors identified by the study 
are: formal policy; project formulation; implementation 
strategy; institutional structure and procedures; organiza­
tional capacity; interorganizational coordination; organiza­
tional control and accountability; and the affected inter­
ests. The contingent factors recognized by the study are: 
technology; bureaucratic politics; bureauciatic apathy and 
resistance to change; political support/ influence; related 
issues; the timing; personality interplay; international 
agencies; international poll tics/events; and bureaucratic 
corruption. The categorization of factors has an analytic 
va lue for- ituplemen tation ana 1 ysts and practi t loners .
vi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This study sets out to analyze through theoretical 
discussion and case studies the implementation of energy 
policy in Pakistan. The particular focus is on the 
identification and analysis of the factors which influenced 
the implementation of projects and programs in the energy 
sector during the 1947-88 period, that is, from independence 
in August 1947 to the end of the Sixth Five Year Plan. 
A major objective is to provide a better and more reliable 
basis for understanding the implementation of energy policy 
in this country. Due to non-availability of detailed 
implementation data on the Seventh Five Year Plan (1988-93) 
and beyond, the study period extends to the end of Sixth 
Five Year Plan. It covers a variety of policy initiatives 
and projects undertaken during the 1947-88 period to provide 
an extensive coverage of the problem.
This study of the implementation of energy policy in 
Pakistan is a pioneering study. The policy implementation
1
process in Pakistan has escaped the proper attention of
researchers so far. Even in the western developed world, the 
study of policy implementation is relatively youthful 
discipline. In their seminal study, Implementation. Pressman 
and Wildavsky noted how little attention had been devoted to 
the implementation process. Their study demonstrates that 
the policy implementation stage of the public policy process 
is full of uncertainties and that implementation difficul­
ties can render the best planned policy useless1. Since 
their work appeared in 1973, literature on implementation 
has expanded exponentially in the developed world, particu­
larly in the United States of America. However, one notes a 
paucity of rigorous research on the topic in Third World 
countries. The situation in Pakistan appears to be more 
depressing, particularly in respect of energy sector, where 
it is nonexistent. Successive regimes in this country have 
focused their attention upon what macro policy paths ought 
to be undertaken, or upon the planning and policy making 
process in order to find methods of making better policies 
by more careful alternative assessments. Consequently, the 
energy sector in Pakistan has received high priority and 
substantial financial allocations since independence in 
August 1947. The thrust of Pakistan’s energy policy has been 
from the very beginning to reduce its dependence on the
2
imported energy and the development of energy resouroes 
sufficient to sustain its targets of economic growth. 
Assessment of energy requirements has taken place in the 
light of development objectives after careful alternative 
evaluations. Pakistan’s first medium term plan "Six-Year 
Development Programme (1951-57)" allocated (Rs.470 million) 
about 18 percent of the total development outlay of Rs.2,600 
million for the development of fuel and power resources .The 
Six Year Plan was, however, replaced by Pakistan’s First 
Five Year Plan (1955-60) in 1955 when Pakistan embarked upon 
the path of planned development in a coordinated way. 
Table-1.1 below depicts the public sector outlays for energy 
resources development from the First to the Sixth Plan which 
increased from 12.4 percent of the total public sector- 
outlays during the First Five Year Plan (1955-60) to 38.2 
percent during the Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-88). Taking 
into account the private investment, the overall development 
outlays for the energy sector have increased from 11.7 
percent during 1970-78 to 17.2 percent and 23.1 percent 
during the Fifth and Sixth plans respectively0.
The implementation dynamics, however, have rendered 
the achievement of energy policy goals and targets in this 
country, over time, increasingly unpredictable and delayed.
3
TABLE 1.1
PUBLIC SECTOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT OUTLAYS
(1955-88)
(Million Rupees)
Plan*
Period
Powe r Fuels Renewables Total 
Ene rgy
Total
Public
Sector
Outlay
First Plan 575 32 607 4863
(1955-60) (11.8) (0.6) (~) (12.4) (100.0)
Second Plan 1165 128 - 1293 10606
(1960-65) (11.0) (1.2) (-) (12.2) (100.0)
Third Plan 1571 189 - 1760 13204
(1965-70) (11.9) (1.4) (-) (13.3) (100.0)
Annual Plans 10880 2961 - 13841 75544
(1970-78) (14.4) (3.9) (~) (18.3) (100.0)
Fifth Plan 28119 10597 114 38830 152610
( 1978-83) (18.4) (6.9) (0.1) (25.4) (100.0)
Sixth Plan 87400 27500 1600 116500 305000
(1983-88) (28.7) (9.0) (0.5) (38.2) (100.0)
* Outlays outside ADP (Annual Development Programme) 
financed by private investment are not included. Fifth and 
Sixth Plan allocations include the entire plan allocations. 
Figures in parentheses indicate percentage share.
Source: Government of Pakistan, The Sixth Five Year Plan 
1983-1988. pp.513 & 516.
The supply of energy has lagged behind demand. The gap 
between commercial energy requirements and production in 
Pakistan rose from three million tons of oil equivalent in 
1971 to five million in 1980 and surpassed the eight million
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t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  e n e r g y .  The w i d e n i n g  gap b e t w e e n  demand  
and s u p p l y  o f  e n e r g y  i n  P a k i s t a n  has n o t  o n l y  s t a l l e d  t h e  
g r o w t h  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  econo m y,  b u t  a l s o  has t e s t e d  t h e  
p a t i e n c e  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  t o  t h e  l i m i t s .  The pow er  s h o r t f a l l  
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megawatts. It has become a problem to live with the whole
year round instead of just during a few winter months.
Due to an ever increasing supply-demand gap, the 
Government was gripped by a sense of frustration in 1983 
when the Minister for Water and Power admitted that 
load-shedding was a ’tragic necessity’.8 The impact of the 
widening gap between demand and supply of power on the 
socioeconomic life of the country can be described as 
calamitous.
The Pakistan Times in its editorial on January 31, 
1983 commented on the situation as follows:
WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) has at
last told the truth we were dreading to hear:
electricity has fallen far short of demand and may
remain so for quite some time. Load-shedding, borne
with patience during the winter months, will have to
be continued during most of the summer when heat will
test the civilians’ power of endurance. The crisis
predicted for the last decade of the century is
already upon us. According to the latest statement,
the present cycle of load-shedding will continue
beyond March-April; it will have to be endured up to
June which is the peak summer month ... This will beocompounded by an increased demand for power .
The Khyber Mail reported on 12 June 1984 that ’nearly 
200 people were arrested’ in Ghazi, a place adjacent to 
Tarbela Dam (the largest hydroelectric power station in the
7
country), for demonstrating over load-shedding which contin­
ued for several days at a stretch.10 The Pakistan Times 
reported on 25 June 1986 that as a result of load-shedding 
in Karachi, people took to the streets and the police had to 
use tear gas to disperse them. Twenty-four persons were 
inju red .11
The Association of Cottage Industry claimed in 1985 
that gas and electricity load-shedding had caused the 
closing down of 7,000 cottage industry units, rendering
1 oabout 20,000 workers jobless . The Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry released a report in 1985 which indicated that 
there had been a 15 percent decline in industrial 
production since the introduction of gas and electricity 
load-shedding.^
The Pakistan Times, in March 1985, commented:
The citizen in Lahore, as elsewhere in the 
country, ... is submitting stoically to six to eight 
hours of disconnection in a day. This is the third 
season of hardship ... Most businesses are on the 
downturn and the disruptions in the industrial 
sector, especially reliant on heavy machinery that 
takes hours to warm up, are expected to affect the 
budget targets and the six percent growth target of 
the 6th Five Year Plan.14
8
According to a report of the Lahore Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, industrial and agricultural sectors
in the Punjab and NWFP suffered a loss of Rs. 9 billion
during 1983-84 as a resuIt of a decline in production due to
load-shedding of electricity15. The Pakistan Times reported
in 1985 an ’unprecedented drop in the production of 400
up-country steel rerolling mills owing to repeated power
supply interruptions’16. According to another news report in
1985, cement production in the country dropped by 50,000
tons owing to load-shedding of power between January and
April 1985, which caused shortage of cement in the
country . According to a survey report, the industrial
sector suffered a production loss of 35 to 55 percent during
1 R1983-84 due to load-shedding of gas and electricity . The 
Pakistan Times in an editorial in May 1985 commented:
There is no denying the fact that power shortage has 
badly affected the nation’s economy. Over a lakh 
(100,000) of tube-wells are affected, resulting in 
serious repercussions in the agriculture sector. The 
power crisis has almost crippled our business and 
industry. Reduced industrial output has scuttled. 1 9exports and foreign exchange earnings are down
On another occasion in 1985, The Pakistan Times 
obse rved:
Last year’s switch-offs affected approximately 
4,285 industrial units in the province [of Punjab] 
adversely. These units, which produce 55 percent of
9
t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s consu m er  g o o d s ,  had t o  t a k e  a c a p a c i t y
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D u r i n g  1 9 8 4 - 8 5 ,  t h e  a r e a  u n d e r  w h e a t  c r o p  i n  P u n ja b  
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c o s t s  have  i n c r e a s e d  by 50  p e r c e n t  as a r e s u l t
22o f  30  p e r c e n t  p ow er  l o a d - s h e d d i n g
The F e d e r a l  M i n i s t e r  f o r  P r o d u c t i o n  d i s c l o s e d  i n
J a n u a r y  198 6  t h a t  69  i n d u s t r i a l  u n i t s  run  by t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f
P r o d u c t i o n  w o u ld  ’ s u f f e r  a l o s s  o f  Rs .  140  c r o r e s  ( R s .  1 . 4
23b i l l i o n )  d u r i n g  1 9 8 5 - 8 6  due t o  p o w e r  l o a d - s h e d d i n g ’ .T h e  
G o v e rn m e n t  a d m i t t e d  i n  1 98 8  t h a t  t h e  s h o r t a g e s  o f  e n e r g y  
s u p p l y  had b e en  a ’ f o r m i d a b l e  p r o b l e m ’ f o r  t h e  c o u n t r y
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during the last decade or so24.
The implementation of energy policy has important 
implications for making investment decisions. The availabil­
ity of energy is one major determinant of the rate of capac­
ity expansion or the speed at which economic development 
projects can be developed. In the absence of a standard or 
general framework within which the implementation of energy 
policy can be analyzed, the investors in Pakistan generally 
base their investment decisions on the projections of energy 
policy planners and assurances of implementsrs, who are 
equally handicapped in this respect. The inability of plan­
ners and implementers as well as investors to assess, with a 
reasonable degree of precision, the realization of energy 
policy goals and targets has caused wastage of huge amounts 
of investment. The Chairman of the Water and Power Develop­
ment Authority (WAPDA), for example, assured the business 
community in 1981 that there would be "no shortage of power 
in 1983 and consequently there should be no apprehensions
on the part of entrepreneurs whether the required power for
,,25the projected undertakings would be available or not
However, in Feb rua ry 1983, the Chairman of WAPDA
(incidentally the same person) announced that a sum of
Rs. 10 billion was required annually to stave off the powe r
11
shortages in the country . The Minister for Planning and
Development assured that the Government would spend Rs.105
billion during the 1986-90 period to generate additional
3,500 MW of power by 1990 to end load-shedding in the 
27country . The authors of the Economic Survey, 1985-86,
however, believed that ’the power generation crisis is
likely to persist even beyond 1990’ . A survey released in
1985 pointed out that an investment of over Rs.5 billion was
estimated to be lying idle due to non-availability of gas
29and electricity connections.
The uncertainty about the availability of energy has 
also impeded foreign investment in this country. The 
President of Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who 
led a trade delegation to South Korea and Japan, on his 
return stated in a press conference in February 1986 that 
during talks with concerned Ministers, officials and private 
entrepreneurs, the delegation had come to the conclusion 
that they were reluctant to start joint ventures in Pakistan 
due to the energy crisis here50.
There is, therefore, a considerable interest in the 
development of an adequate framework within which the 
implementation of energy policy can be analyzed. It is
26
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important to ask what are the factors which influence the
realization of energy policy goals and targets and whether, 
indeed,there may be more predictability in energy policy 
implementation than appears at first sight. From this 
analytical perspective, the thesis aims to extend the 
existing literature on energy policy implementation by 
developing a more comprehensive framework within which these 
problems can be studied. The approach developed focuses on 
multifarious variables that influence the implementation of 
energy policy in Pakistan.
THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Numerous studies have been conducted on the imple­
mentation of public policies since the early 1970s and the 
academic literature about the implementation has expanded 
considerably. These studies include cases of implementation 
success or failure in diverse policy sectors. Various 
approaches have been suggested for the study of policy 
implementation recognizing multifarious variables or factors 
considered crucial for implementation success. It would, 
therefore, be instructive to survey the literature to find 
out what approach should be applied to study the implementa­
tion of energy policy in Pakistan. The following pages
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analyze the implementation research to choose an appropriate
approach for the present study.
The fulfillment of public policies requires that some 
one do something (or stop doing something) and that the 
actions have the desired effect. The decisions made in 
carrying out a policy are referred to as implementation, and 
the effect on the ultimate target as the impact.^ Pressman 
and Wildavsky define implementation ’as a process of 
interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared 
to achieve them’0 . Grindle suggests that ’the task of 
implementation is to establish a link that allows the goals 
of public policies to be realized as outcomes of governmen­
tal activity’ 55 . According to Paul Berman:
Implementation is the carrying out of an authorita­
tive decision, i.e., a policy choice... Implementation 
analysis is not about whether a policy’s goals are 
fit and proper, which is a matter of values; nor does 
it concern itself with how they are chosen, which is 
a study of policy-making... Implementation analysis 
is... the study of why authoritative decisions 
(policies, plans, laws, and the like) do not lead to 
expected results... it is the study of the conditions 
under which authoritative decisions do lead to 
desired results54.
Mazmanian and Sabatier, who focus their attention 
primarily on regulatory policies, define "implementation” as 
follows:
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Implementation is the carrying out of a basic
policy decision, usually made in a statute (although
also possible through important executive orders or
court decisions)... the implementation process
normally runs through a number of stages beginning
with passage of the basic statute, followed by the
policy outputs (decisions) of the implementing
agencies, the compliance of target groups..., the
actual impacts--both intended and unintended-- of
those outputs, the perceived impacts of agency
decisions, and finally, important revisions (or35attempted revisions) in the basic statute
Mazmanian and Sabatier hold that ’the crucial role of 
implementation analysis is to identify the factors which 
affect the achievement of statutory objectives throughout
-7 sthis entire process’0 . They recognize the following three 
broad categories of factors: ’(1) the tractability of the 
problem(s) being addressed by the statute; (2) the ability 
of the statute to favorably structure the implementation 
process; and (3) the net effect of a variety of "political" 
variables on the balance of support for statutory 
objectives’57. They argue that problems are most tractable 
if (1) there is a valid theory connecting behavioral change 
to problem amelioration; the requisite technology exists; 
and measurement of change in the seriousness of the problem 
is inexpensive; (2) there is minimal variation in the behav­
ioral practices which cause the problem; (3) the target 
group constitutes an easily identifiable minority of the 
population within a political jurisdiction; and (4) the
15
amount of behavioral change is modest. The ability of the
statute to structure implementation is most likely to 
succeed if (1) it incorporates a valid causal theory linking 
behavioral change to desired impacts; (2) its objectives are 
precise and clearly ranked; (3) it provides adequate funds 
to the implementing agencies; (4) the number of veto points 
in the implementing process is minimized and sanctions/in­
ducements are provided to overcome resistance; (5) the
decision rules of the implementing agencies are biased 
toward the achievement of statutory objectives; (6) imple­
mentation is assigned to agencies which support the 
legislation’s objectives and will give the program high 
priority; and (7) the provisions for outsider participation 
are similarly biased through liberalized rules of standing 
and by centralizing oversight in the hands of statutory 
supporters. According to them, "Political" or non-statutory 
variables affecting implementation include: (1) socio­
economic conditions and technology; (2) media attention to 
the problem; (3) public support; (4) attitudes and resources
of constituency groups; (5) support from sovereigns; and (6)
33commitment and leadership skill of implementing officials
In a critique, Benny Hjern, however, states that it 
is inconceivable that ’implementing officials’ have an
16
interest in keeping low the ’ability of a statute to
structure implementation’. ’Clear and consistent objectives 
in a statute’, assumed to be positively related to the 
ability to structure and to implementation success, may 
actually inhibit and hinder the implementing officials from 
using their ’leadership skills’ provided these depend upon 
relations to resourceful outsiders. The importance of such 
bilateral monopolistic relations have also been stressed in 
research on implementation success in environmental 
policy.40
Edwards41 and Larson42 identify concrete and 
operational implementation variables. Communication (trans­
mission, clarity, consistency), resources (staff, informa­
tion, authority, facilities), dispositions or attitudes of 
implementers, bureaucratic structure (standard procedures, 
fragmentation), and complexity are identified by Edwards, 
whereas, the variables considered important by Larson are 
policy goals, implementation procedures, complexity, and 
changes in economic environment.
Martin Rein and Francine Rabinovitz43 suggest that 
the implementation process should be examined in relation to 
three variables: (1) the respect for legal intent; (2) civil
17
servants’ concern for instrumental rationality; and (3) the 
general expectation that concerted action requires consensus 
both within the implementing agencies and in their external 
political system. Paul Berman44 focuses on the latter two 
variables in his analysis of the implementing stages of 
federal social programs. He emphasizes the adjustments that 
programs go through as they wind their way through federal 
bureaucracies resistant to change and local service delivery 
organizations which are sensitive to their immediate politi­
cal environments and to the desires of "street-level" pro­
fessionals. Implementation factors considered important by 
him are: clarity of policy goals; number of actors partici­
pating; implementsrs’ degree of resistance, ineffeetualness, 
or inefficiency; and degree of control exerted from top.
45Bardach provides a somewhat different approach by 
focusing on the potential obstacles to the marshaling of the 
multitude of programme elements necessary for the realiza­
tion of statutory objectives. The unifying metaphor permeat­
ing his analysis is that the implementation process should 
be ' conceived as a series of games involving the efforts of 
numerous semiautonomous actors to protect their interests 
and gain access to programme elements not under their 
control -- all within the face of considerable uncertainty
18
and the context of general expectations that something will
be attempted consistent with the legal mandate.
Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn46 provide a 
systems model of the implementation process involving the 
following factors affecting programme performance: 
(1) policy standards and resources (basically funds); (2) 
support for those policies in the political environment; (3) 
economic and social conditions; (4) characteristics of 
implementing agencies; (5) communication of policy standards 
and other decisions within and among implementing agencies; 
(6) incentives to promote compliance with policy decisions; 
and (7) the policy dispositions of implementing officials.
, 47Nakamura and Smallwood s approach explores the 
policy process over its entire length, and does not confine 
itself to the implementation stage.- However, these authors 
focus exclusively on a subset of political factors, and 
omit intra- and inter-organizational interactions. Implemen­
tation variables important to them are: specificity of
policy, technical limitations, actors, arenas, organization­
al structures, bureaucratic norms, resources, motivations, 
communication networks, and compliance mechanisms.
4P a gMcLaughlin and Radin , although they recognize the inter-
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action between policy and implementation, both focus their
analysis primarily on the implementation stage and on the 
relevant bureaucratic actors in that part of the process. 
McLaughlin considers that institutional context especially 
organizational climate and motivations of the participants 
has major impact on policy implementation.
Pressman and Wildavsky50 and Bardach51, each basical­
ly generalizing from a richly detailed case study, pay equal 
attention to the policy environment and how the emergence of 
policy later affects its implementation. Implementation 
variables highlighted by Pressman and Wildavsky are: 
multiplicity of participants, perspectives, decision points, 
intensity of preferences, and resources. An even more 
complex and systematic concept of implementation is proposed
5 9  5 3by Majone and Wildavsky ^, Rein and Rabinovitz and Fudge 
and Barrett54 who call implementation "evolutionary", 
"circular", and "interactive and recursive", implying an 
ongoing dynamic of policy development, modification and 
execution. It is argued in their writings that policy is not 
just made and implemented, it is adapted through continuous 
interaction between those making policy through legislation 
and those making policy through implementation.
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Paul Berman sees two basic implementation strategies
that can be pursued: ’programmed’ and ’adaptive’. The
programmed approach calls for "clarity, precision, 
comprehensiveness... of the preliminary policy or design 
specification' , and "diagnoses implementation problems as 
arising from at least three sources: (1) ambiguity in policy
goals resulting in or caused by misunderstanding, confusion, 
or value conflict; (2) participation of too many actors with 
overlapping authority; and (3) implementers’ resistance, 
ineffeetualness, or inefficiency' . The adaptive approach 
calls for the establishment of a process that allows policy 
to be adapted according to the unfolding interaction of the 
policy with its institutional setting, and contemplates that 
implementation problems arise because of the oversimplifi- 
cation and rigidity of goals, the failure to engage relevant 
actors in decision-making, and the excessive control of 
deliverers. Policies and programs ’unfold’ as they are 
implemented. And this unfolding can be a highly contentious, 
’political’ process, because different entities engaged in 
implementation can have very different views about not only 
what a policy is and what it intends to achieve, but also 
views about how a programme should be implemented and who 
should act in what particular ways . Stone notes; If one 
looks at case histories of implementation, the pervasiveness
21
of conflict is hard to ignore. Effective implementation is
the joint result of a combination of programme features,
coagency behavior, and target group reactions’ .
59Grindle argues that implementation is an ongoing
process of decision making by a variety of actors, the
ultimate outcome of which is determined by the content of
the programme being pursued and by the interaction of the
decision makers within a given politico - administrative
context. Implementation is, therefore, visualized as a
political and administrative process. The content of policy
determines the interests affected, type of benefits, extent
of change envisioned, site of decision making, programme
implementers and the resources committed. The context of the
policy relates to the environment in which administrative
action is pursued. Here, the power, interest and strategies
of actors involved, institutions and regime characteristics,
and the compliance and responsiveness of the public or
target groups are crucial. In the words of Grindle:
What is implemented may thus be the result of politi­
cal calculus of interests and groups competing for 
scarce resources, the response of implementing offi­
cials and the action of Political elites, all inter­
acting within a given context60.
Mileti contends that ’variables which cause or have 
an effect on implementation can be grouped into five
22
categories: (i) the policy system, (2) the community system,
(3) the jurisdictional structure, (4) decision maker 
perception of policy demand pattern,and (5) the legislative 
decision’61. ’Policy System’ includes: policy content, goal 
specificity, the policy source, and the commitment of the 
source to its policy, exhibited frequently in the form of 
resources made available to the implementing jurisdiction. 
’Community system’ refers to (1) the attitudes and
resources of target group(s), (2) characteristics of the 
jurisdiction’s population such as social,economic and
cultural environment, community values, demand for or 
against the policy, and (3) collective experience of the 
jurisdiction’s population. ’Jurisdictional Structure’ means 
the configuration of the power and decision making 
structures in a jurisdiction and its bureaucratic capacity 
influenced by resources (financial and personnel) and intra 
and interorganizational relations. Policy demand pattern can 
either be integrated or fragmented. He argues that policy 
implementation is likely to be more effective if the pattern 
is integrated. The perception of demand pattern by the 
legislative decision makers, which is the result of an 
interaction between the political pressure and their values, 
determines the adoption of a policy and the force with 
which it is implemented. Reasonable policy demand and
23
agreement upon realizable goals are an important condition
of policy success. Pertinent issues in a debate (if there is 
one) over adoption and implementation are often revealed in 
the media operating in the jurisdiction’s area. The 
legislative decision encompasses the decision to adopt and 
implement a new policy as well as the goal specificity, the 
system of implementation, and the administration of 
policy62.
Harold Wolman’s6vJ framework for explaining and under­
standing program performance identifies two distinct 
processes: the formulating process; and the carrying out
process. According to this framework, each process consists 
of a number of components. The formulating process consists 
of (i) problem conceptualization, (ii) theory evaluation and 
selection, (iii) specification of objectives, (iv) program 
design, and (v) program structure. The carrying out process 
consists of (i) resource adequacy, (ii) management and 
control structure, (iii) bureaucratic rules and regulations, 
(iv) political effectiveness, and (v) feedback and evalua­
tion. Wolman argues that program success is affected by 
’problems or inadequacies in one or more of the components 
in either the formulating stage or the carrying out stage or 
both’.
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Renate Mayntz64 holds that public bureaucracies while 
acting as agents of policy implementation have significant 
margins for disc retionary action in the fulfillment of their 
tasks. The nature of the tasks and the extent of central 
control influence the margins of discretion. The tasks 
assigned to the public agencies provide the basis for their 
existence, but their actions are largely oriented towards 
the achievement of organizational goals such as (i) domain 
extension, (ii) conflict avoidance, (iii) saving energy, and 
(iv) obtaining resources. As these goals are considered 
crucial by the public agencies for their survival, they 
receive priority attention. The output of public bureaucra­
cies is, therefore, dependent not upon the policy input only 
but largely on the actual behavior of public agencies in 
the implementation phase. Robert Levine asserts that policy 
is "implemented by program operators who may or may not be 
in sympathy with the plans, may or may not have even under­
stood them, but in any case will certainly be governed by 
their own motives and imperatives, both personal and pro- 
grammatic"65. For successful implementation, Elmore66 points 
out, the implementing agencies must learn the new policy, 
shape it and claim it.
Montjoy and O'Toole argue that an organization’s
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response to external mandates is influenced by: the ’goals'
and ’world view’ of the ’dominant coalition’; the set of 
existing routines; and the nature of the mandate. The 
’dominant coalition’ refer to ’a sizable portion of an 
organization’s membership’ who share beliefs and preferences 
and normally get their way in the direction of organization­
al activities, while a consistent set of preferences and 
beliefs about cause and effect relationships exhibited by 
such a group is termed as the ’goals’ and ’world view’ 
respectively. They hold that an organization is somewhat 
bound by its own goals, world views, and routines so that 
its ability to respond to a new mandate or to cooperate with 
another organization may be limited. These limitations may 
be overcome if the new mandate coincides with the goals, 
world view, and routines of the organization or if new 
resources are provided or if the mandate details the re­
quired action with sufficient specificity so that sanctions 
can be invoked. In intra-organizational implementation 
situations, they recognize four possible combinations 
based on two characteristics of mandates which determine the 
expected activity in respect of implementation of a policy. 
The characteristics they recognize are: (1) specificity
of the mandates and (2) the amount of new resources which 
accompany them. The mandates may be specific or vague as to
26
the expected administrative action and they may or may not 
provide new resources. These two dimensions yield four 
possible combinations as given in Figure 1.1 below.
FIGURE 1.1
CHARACTERISTICS OF MANDATES 
DESCRIPTION OF EXPECTED ACTIVITY
Provision of Vague Specific
New Resources _______________________________
Yes
iiiiii
A
1111
I1
B
No
111111
C
iiiiii
D
Adopted From: Montjoy, R.S. and L.J.O’Toole, Jr., op.cit.,
P.466.
Type A presents a situation when the mandates are 
vague, but resources are provided. This allows the highest 
degree of discretion to organizations with established 
routines, and gives the dominant coalition an opportunity to 
focus new activities in accordance with its own goals and/or 
world view. Type B (resources with specific directions) 
mandates call for agency action in a particular direction. 
If these mandates do not significantly clash with the value 
system of the organization, the agency action in the desired
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direction is the most likely outcome. Type C (vague without
resources) mandates are likely to be ignored by the 
implementing agencies. Type D (specific without resources) 
mandates force the organizations to rearrange their 
priorities and thus in the long run help increase their 
discretion in carrying out the new activities68.
The literature on organization theory suggests that 
the public sector is never a fully integrated hierarchy but 
must rather be seen as a highly differentiated macro-system 
of organizations, a net work which is more or less 
hierarchized by virtue of existing vertical lines of commu­
nication, but which is basically made up of relatively 
autonomous elements6 .^ Interorganizational implementation 
situations are, therefore, fraught with added complexity. 
Montjoy and O’Toole70 also attempted to develop a predictive 
theory in interorganizational implementation situations. 
The implementation factors they highlight are: policy 
specificity; resources; agency goals; routines; world view; 
technical requirements of the task; facilitator; perceived 
risk for implementers; and structure of interdependence. 
They used Thompson’s typology71 with some modification to 
explain the effects of the type of interdependence on the 
implementation of a policy. Three types of interdependence
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are recognized: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal. Pooled
interdependence depicts a situation when the agencies 
involved are required to provide their contributions without 
dealing with each other. Sequential interdependence occurs 
when the output of one unit is the output of another. 
Reciprocal interdependence refers to the situation when the 
units involved pose contingencies for each other. He argues 
that in situations where the inputs of two or more organiza­
tions are required to implement a policy, coordination plays 
a significant role for the successful implementation. The 
chances of success may be enhanced if coordination problems 
are conceived and solved keeping in view the type of inter­
dependence relationship. To achieve the requisite coopera­
tion, according to them, three forms of inducements are 
crucial: authority (cooperation deriving from a sense of
duty); common interest (cooperation because each participant
values the goal); and exchange (cooperation to receive in
72return something other than achievement of the goal)
Smith7'5 recognizes six stages of the policy cycle: 
(i) issues and agenda building; (ii) formulating policies 
and programs; (iii) policy form and content; (iv) policy and 
program implementation; (v) impacts and evaluation; (vi) 
policy revision and termination. In developing countries, he
29
argues, interests are not ’articulated’ and are hardly
’aggregated’ in the agenda building or policy formulation 
stage of policy cycle. Policies are inflicted upon target 
groups who are suspicious and reluctant to cooperate with 
Government authorities. The affected groups and individu­
als, therefore, articulate their interests during the policy 
implementation stage. Since public bureaucracies are respon­
sible for policy implementation, they bear the burden of 
efforts at policy modification to suit the individual or 
group needs which may subvert the general purposes of the 
policy being implemented.
Grindle shares this view and states: ’To a much 
greater extent than in the political systems of the United 
States and Western Europe, the process of implementing 
public policies is a focus of political participation and 
competition in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America’74. He argues that the policies in the developing 
countries are seldom the result of demands and pressures 
from competing interest groups or political parties for 
various reasons. They may be undeveloped or suppressed by 
official government policy. The leaders in political and 
administrative positions consider the participation in 
policy formulation process as illegitimate or inefficient.
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In author!tarian regimes, politics is detested and the
opposition is eliminated. The governments, therefore, 
initiate policies without consultation with interested or 
affected individuals and groups. Interested and affected 
groups and individuals become active in the implementing 
stage when they see an imminent danger to their interests75.
James Scott holds that a "large proportion of indi­
vidual demands, and even group demands, in developing 
nations reach the political system, not before laws are 
passed, but rather at the enforcement stage"' . Myron Weiner
states: "Organized groups largely influence the administra-
• 77tion rather than the formulation of policy
In a wide-ranging discussion of administration in the 
Third World, Riggs, concludes:
Since the clientele is unable to organize or exercise 
political influence to modify the rules, its primary 
strategy involves direct pressure upon the officials 
concerned with policy implementation, to secure 
a suspension of the rules or to speed the provision 
of authorized services78.
Hoole describes the context of Third World 
development policies and programs as follows:
Development activities frequently take place in an 
unstable and highly political setting. This will 
result in changing programs and priorities and in
31
problems in implementing and evaluating development
activities. Factors such as high turnover of
office-holders and bureaucrats, domestic conflict and
strife, an inflationary economy, uncertain funding
for the budget, changes in the international economic
order, famines, and unemployment may mean that
development planning is not meaningful, that
development activities are not implemented as
planned, that changes are made as the activity is
implemented, or that the activity never occurs.
Furthermore, many development activities involve
substantial changes in the traditional way of life
and result in resistance by the population to both79the program and its implementation
80Peter Bowden , after examining thirty articles/books 
discussing ’implementation’ problems in developing countries 
lists the following most frequently mentioned problems in 
rank order:
1. Involvement/motivation of the target group;
2. Necessity for institutional or legal change;
3. Coordination and cooperation between contributors;
4. Systems for on-site managing of the project or 
program;
5. Political will, or political consensus necessary 
for the support of the program;
6. Monitoring and evaluation leading to reevaluation 
and redesign of the project or program;
7. Knowledge and attitudes of the target group;
8. Availability of local currency funds.
p 1Another study , which documented the results of
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i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  o f f i c i a l s  i n  t h r e e  l a r g e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
a s s i s t a n c e  a g e n c i e s ,  i d e n t i f i e s  67 i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  p r o b l e m s  
u n d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e v e n  ma in  h e a d i n g s :
1.  I n e f f e c t i v e  p r o j e c t  p l a n n i n g  and p r e p a r a t i o n ;
2 .  F a u l t y  a p p r a i s a l  and s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e s s e s ;
3 .  D e f e c t i v e  p r o j e c t  d e s i g n ;
4 .  P r o b l e m s  i n  s t a r t - u p  and a c t i v a t i o n ;
5 .  I n a d e q u a t e  p r o j e c t  e x e c u t i o n ,  o p e r a t i o n  and s u p e r ­
v i s i o n ;
6 .  I n a d e q u a t e  o r  i n e f f e c t i v e  e x t e r n a l  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  
p r o j e c t  a c t i v i t i e s ;  and
7 .  D e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  d i f f u s i o n  and e v a l u a t i o n  o f  
p r o j e c t  r e s u l t s  and f o l l o w - u p  a c t i o n .
go
A s t u d y  g r o u p  o f  P l a n n i n g  and D e v e l o p m e n t  D i v i s i o n ,  
G o v e r n m e n t  o f  P a k i s t a n  s t u d i e d  9 8  m a j o r  p r o j e c t s ,  c o s t i n g  
more t h a n  R s . 5 0  m i l l i o n ,  s p r e a d i n g  o v e r  a p e r i o d  o f  f i v e  
y e a r s  ( 1 9 7 8 - 8 3 )  and f o u n d  t h a t  73  o u t  o f  98  p r o j e c t s  
e x p e r i e n c e d  d e l a y  r a n g i n g  f r o m  2 t o  35  y e a r s  co mp ar ed  t o  
t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  s c h e d u l e .  The g r o u p  i d e n t i f i e d  20 most  f r e ­
q u e n t l y  o b s e r v e d  c a u s e s  p o s i n g  c o n s t r a i n t s  f o r  i m p l e m e n t a ­
t i o n  as m e n t i o n e d  b e l o w ,  o u t  o f  w h i c h  f i r s t  10 r e l a t e d  t o  
d e f e c t i v e  p r o j e c t  f o r m u l a t i o n .  The i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  p r o b l e m s  
i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e  s t u d y  g r o u p  a r e  as  f o l l o w s :
1.  Lack  o f  p r o p e r  s u r v e y s /  f e a s i b i l i t y  s t u d i e s .
2 .  I n c o r r e c t  a s s u m p t i o n s .
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3. Lack of inter-agency discussions to settle coordi­
nation problems beforehand.
4. Underestimation of costs and exaggeration of 
benefits to show favorable benefit-cost ratio.
5. Wrong locations of the projects under political or
other pressures including organizational
convenience and preferences.
6. Change in scope made by the executing agencies 
generally without any reference either to the 
controlling Ministry or to the central planning 
agency.
7. Frequent revisions.
8. Preparation of piecemeal schemes by splitting 
major projects in small schemes with an intention 
to avoid detailed scrutiny by the central planning 
authorities.
9. Cost escalation due to inflation and frequent 
devaluation of currency.
10. Misuse of the system of anticipatory approval. The 
implementing agencies in Pakistan are permitted in 
emergency situations, for a limited period, to 
implement projects in line with overall policy 
directives without getting approval of the 
appropriate central planning authority. This 
provision was misused in a number of cases and the 
projects were not submitted for approval for a 
number of years and substantial expenditures 
continued to be incurred.
11.Shortage of funds/Delay in releases.
12.Shortage of inputs.
13. Delay in signing loan agreements/provision of 
technical documents.
14. Wrong internal priorities.
15. Non-appointment of full-time project director.
16.Slow progress by contractors contractors lacking 
requisite expertise and resources.
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17.Lack of interorqanizational coordination.
18. Disturbed political situation.
19. Natural calamities.
20. Poor management procedures/practices.
A MODEL OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that diverse 
approaches have been suggested for the study of implementa­
tion problems. It portrays that there are few hard and fast 
rules about what makes for successful implementation, and 
what works in one setting may fail in another. Some believe 
in ’programmed’ approach, while others stress that local 
factors and characteristics unique to specific implementa­
tion contexts have a strong and direct effect on outcomes. 
Some hold that successful implementation follows a general 
model of implementation that proceeds sequentially from 
given policy to project, programme, or "street-level" execu­
tion, while others argue that it must unfold in particular 
settings. Laurence J. O ’Toole Jr. , after examining more 
than 300 products covering almost all major fields of policy 
published in 40 research journals for the past ten years 
concluded in 1986 as follows:
One thing that would likely be noticed at the outset 
is the welter of views concerning the principal 
components and the operation of the implementation
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process itself. Researchers do not agree on the 
outlines of a theory of implementation nor even on 
the variables crucial to implementation success .
Existing perspectives on the implementation process 
itself can be distinguished by how "open" or "closed" the 
implementation process they envisage is, how simply unidi­
rectional or how complex it is, and how implementation is 
subsumed in the process linking policy with action. These 
views are conceptualized under two approaches for the study 
of implementation problems: the sequential closed approach; 
and the holistic approach.
The proponents of the sequential "closed" approach, 
such as Edwards, Larson, Mazmanian and Sabatier, and Van 
Horn, envisage implementation to proceed sequentially from 
given policy to project, programme, or * street-level * execu­
tion and they focus on a particular subset of the policy 
implementation process. They recognize concrete and opera­
tional variables with universal application. Many of their 
analytical variables, of course, relate to the relevant 
policies and their contexts. But, in spite of the sensitiv­
ity displayed by many of them toward politics, policy, and 
contextual variables, they essentially limit their concern 
to what happens after policy is articulated in statutes, 
regulations, or court decisions. In other words, they see
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implementation as a closed subsystem--a system that
transforms given policy inputs into actions that take the 
form of programme or project outputs. This approach may have 
pragmatic value in limiting the domain of analysis and 
enabling clear specification of a few salient variables. 
However, it runs the risk, as does any circumscribed 
analysis, of asking the wrong questions and of leaving 
important factors out of account. The variables which are 
crucial in one situation, may have little effect in another 
situation.
The "holistic" approach portrays an "open" and 
complex view of the implementation process and posits that 
policy implementation involves far more than a mechanical 
translation of goals into routine procedures. The proponents 
of this approach, such as Majone and Wildavsky, Rein and 
Robinovitz, Fudge and Barrett, Paul Berman, and Grindle, 
have argued (as discussed in the preceding pages) that 
implementation is often a contentious, highly political 
process, executed by fragmented groups of administrators 
guided by their own goals, world views and routines. Policy 
is not just made and implemented, it is adapted through 
continuous interaction between various actors. A variety of 
factors ranging from the availability of sufficient re-
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sources to the structure of inter-governmental relations,
from the commitment of officials to the reporting mechanisms 
within the bureaucracy, from the political leverage of 
opponents of the policy to accidents of timing, luck and 
seemingly unrelated events intervene between the statement 
of policy goals and their actual achievement in the society. 
The holistic approach does not limit the domain of analysis 
and recognizes the multiplicity of interactive implementa­
tion variables: contextual, organizational, environmental, 
and perceptual. This conceptualization of the policy imple­
mentation process views the transformation of intent into 
action as a continuous interactive process.
The implementation of energy policy in Pakistan has 
been studied by adopting the holistic approach. This 
approach qualifies for selection because the empirical 
research on the topic is non-existent and the implementation 
variables are multifarious. The setting is fluid and differ­
entiated exhibiting fundamental ideological cleavages and 
instability in political and administrative institutions and 
processes. Elections for political leadership are not held 
regularly and supremacy of the political sector over the 
bureaucratic has yet to be established resulting in contin­
ued defusion of policy-making and policy implementation
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roles. Thus, one can not be sure as to the particular!ty of
factors affecting implementation of public policies under 
such vacillating environment. As such the holistic approach 
is more appropriate in explaining the complexities of energy 
policy implementation in Pakistan.
While applying this approach in studying the imple­
mentation of energy policy in Pakistan, the policy process 
will be visualized to begin with the identification of 
problem(s) or goal(s) providing the impetus for policy 
development, followed by the formulation of policy which 
spell out both goals and the means for achieving those 
goals, translating them into specific programs and carrying 
out a set of operations that delivers programs to their 
intended beneficiaries. The factors/variables affecting the 
implementation of energy policy will be visualized as 
constituents of the overall environment encompassing policy 
formation, program specification and field implementation. 
The policy process will be examined with an open view and 
not against a particular list of variables. The variables 
will be identified in the light of continuous interaction 
between various actors in different situations which may 
encompass the tractability of the problem, perceptions of 
the issue-related community of organizations, institutional
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or individual actors, the clarity of objectives, the program 
design, the implementation environment, the structures, 
procedures, norms and resources of implementing agencies, 
the degree of sustained public support, the attitudes and 
resources of constituency groups, the ongoing backing of 
political and bureaucratic sovereigns, and so on.
THE METHODOLOGY
This is an empirical study. Apart from the relevant 
published research work in the books, journals, magazines 
and newspapers, the sources of information for this study 
are the official reports and records, memoranda, correspond­
ence and minute papers of the organizations responsible for 
the formulation and implementation of energy policy in 
Pakistan. The unpublished information was collected from the 
organizations though personal contacts. Interviews were also 
held with a number of officers who must remain anonymous.
The problems faced in collection of data can be 
imagined from the type of information sources identified 
above. Research into contemporary administrative issues and 
policies is fraught with innumerable difficulties. The 
public servants by training are secretive, cautious, and
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suspicious. No one likes to be quoted. They are afraid of
repercussions, in many cases quite justifiably. To find 
contacts and then create rapport with them looked like an 
insurmountable problem initially. Repeated assurances that 
their names would be kept secret, persistent persuasion, and 
perseveranee, however, paid some dividends. The cooperation 
received from the organizations varied in degree, which is 
partly reflected by the space devoted to various energy 
sub-secto rs.
Data for this study were mainly collected during 
October 1984 - July 1985, when the researcher visited 
Pakistan for this purpose, and July - December 1990. The 
data on the implementation of the Sixth Plan were mainly 
collected during July - December 1990 as the same was not 
available in 1985. The study covers the implementation of 
energy policy during the 1947 - 1988 period, that is, from 
the inception of Pakistan up to the end of the Sixth Five 
Year Plan (i.e., 30 June 1988). The case study of the Kala- 
bagh Dam project was developed on the basis of information 
available up to May 1990. The Seventh Five Year Plan was 
implemented during the 1988-1993 period. Thus, it was not 
possible to collect any useful implementation data during 
the data collection phase of this study. The public servants
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in Pakistan are highly protective in this regard. Hence the
study does not go beyond the Sixth Five Year Plan.
Since this thesis is concerned with the implementa­
tion of energy policy in Pakistan, the findings and 
conclusions are, therefore, descriptive of the dynamics of 
implementation in this sector of the national economy. 
However, their usefulness to understand policy implementa­
tion processes in other sectors is not totally irrelevant, 
as contextual variables tend to influence the organizational 
processes and behavior on similar lines.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The study is divided into seven chapters. The present 
chapter has provided a general introduction to the study and 
outlines its major parameters. It discusses the dynamics of 
policy implementation and outlines contextual variables as 
identified by various research studies to provide conceptual 
framework for implementation analysis. It also describes 
the approach adopted for studying the implementation of 
energy policy in Pakistan.
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Chapter II provides an overview of the project
approval mechanism and describes the institutional arrange­
ments for the implementation and formulation of energy 
policy in Pakistan. It analyzes the structure, functions and 
the roles of organizations responsible for the formulation 
and Implementation of energy policy in Pakistan.
Chapter III provides an overview of energy policy in 
Pakistan. It traces the evolution of energy policy from 
1947, when the country got independence, to the Sixth Five 
Year Plan, indicates the underlying assumptions expressively 
noted by the policy makers, and identifies major projects 
conceived to realize policy goals.
Chapters IV , V and VI analyze the implementation of 
the energy policy. Chapter IV analyzes the achievement of 
policy objectives, plan targets, and the implementation of 
various projects. Major focus is on the power sub-sector. 
The case studies on ’power commission’, ’rural electrifica­
tion’, ’railway electrification’, ’power losses’, ’nuclear 
power’, and ’National Energy Policy Committee’ have been 
included to elucidate implementation dynamics of energy 
sector in Pakistan. Chapter V examines the implementation of 
Kalabagh Dam Project which is considered to be the linchpin
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of future power system of Pakistan. It highlights the polit­
ical involvement of people as well as the provincial govern­
ments and international organizations in the implementation 
processes of this project of national importance. This 
represents a typical case of political polarization in a 
developing country. Chapter VI examines the implementation 
of new and renewable sources of energy. The implementation 
of biogas and solar energy projects in two provinces of 
Pakistan, namely, the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, has been 
analyzed. This represents a typical case of bureaucratic 
manipulations to show results with scant regard to the 
achievement of overall policy objectives.
The concluding chapter (Chapter VII) identifies the 
factors which influence the implementation of energy policy 
in Pakistan. This chapter presents a summary of the major 
findings of the study and considers the implications of 
these findings for those interested in implementation of 
public policies, particularly in the energy sector. It 
concentrates on how the findings of this study can be 
utilized in similar situations to formulate and implement 
public policies.
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CHAPTER II
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY FORMULATION
AND IMPLEMENTATION
INTRODUCTION
The implementation of public policies in Third World 
countries is typically carried out by the public bureaucra­
cy. In a country like Pakistan, beset with political insta­
bility, policy formulation is also substantially left to 
bureaucratic ingenuity. An understanding of the bureaucratic 
structures of the implementing organizations has, therefore, 
special relevance for implementation analysis in Pakistan.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an 
overview of the institutional framework of the organizations 
responsible for the formulation and implementation of energy 
policy in Pakistan. As policies are translated into programs 
and projects, an understanding of the project approval 
mechanism helps one to comprehend the dynamics of policy 
implementation in the country. The chapter, therefore, 
begins by providing an outline of the project approval 
mechanism.
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PROJECT APPROVAL MECHANISM
The National Economic Council (NEC) is the highest 
policy making body of Pakistan in economic matters. It is 
headed by the head of the government (Prime Minister or 
President/Chief Martial Law Administrative, whosoever is in 
charge) and its members are derived from the federal as well 
as from the provincial governments. The federal government 
is represented by cabinet ministers in charge of ministries 
dealing with finance, economic affairs, commerce, produc­
tion, industries, communications, railways, education, food, 
agriculture and cooperatives, health and social welfare, 
housing, works, labor and manpower, Information and broad­
casting, local government and rural development, petroleum 
and natural resources, water and power, Kashmir affairs and 
northern areas, and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission. The provinces are represented by the chief 
ministers, finance ministers and the chairmen of the provin­
cial Planning and Development Boards. The NEC can appoint 
any committees or bodies of experts or any officials and 
technocrats to assist it In the performance of its func­
tions.1 2 The functions of the NEC are as follows:
1. To review the overall economic situation.
2. To formulate plan with respect to financial,
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commercial and economic policies and the economic 
development of Pakistan. In formulating such 
plans, the Council will be guided by the 
principles of policy set out in Chapter 2 of Part 
II of the Constitution.
3. To approve:
(i) The Five Year Plan.
(ii) The Annual Development Program.
(iii) All Federal and Provincial Schemes.
(iv) All non-Plan schemes.
(v) Schemes in the Private Sector.
4. To review implementation of development projects
and programs during the preceding year, with2particular emphasis on major schemes.
The Planning and Development Division of the federal 
government formulates guidelines for the preparation of 
development schemes/projects in accordance with the policy 
principles approved by the NEC. The development schemes/ 
projects relating to their fields are prepared by the exe­
cuting agencies in the light of guidelines of the Planning 
and Development Division. As indicated above, the NEC has 
the basic responsibility for the approval of all development 
schemes. However, it has delegated its powers to various 
federal and provincial authorities for the approval of 
schemes falling within certain financial limits and subject 
to certain conditions as indicated in Annexure-I. These 
limits are periodically revised. The Finance Division and 
Planning and Development Division of the federal government 
play the central role for the sanctioning of all development
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schemes. The agreement of these two is necessary even in
cases where the provincial governments and ministries or 
agencies of the federal government have approval powers.0
The Executive Committee of the NEC (ECNEC) is the 
highest authority for the approval of development schemes/ 
projects. All development schemes (presently costing more 
than Rupees 60 million) which are beyond the competence of 
other authorities or do not have the approval of the Finance 
and/or Planning and Development divisions, are submitted by 
the implementing agencies to the Planning and Development 
Division through their respective Ministries/ Governments 
for approval by the ECNEC. It is also responsible for the 
day-to-day business of the NEC. The ECNEC is headed by the 
federal Minister for Finance and its membership comprises 
the ministers in charge of planning and development, econom­
ic affairs, commerce, communications, food, agriculture and 
cooperatives, housing, works,industries, production, water 
and power, petroleum and natural resources, science and 
technology, information and broadcasting, and secretary of 
defence from the federal government and the ministers in 
charge of planning and finance, the chief secretaries and 
the chairmen of the planning and development boards from the 
provincial governments.4
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The C e n t r a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  W o r k i n g  P a r t y  (CDWP) i s
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a p p r o v i n g  t h e  f e d e r a l  schemes c o s t i n g  
b e t w e e n  R upees  20 m i l l i o n  and 60  m i l l i o n .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  
P l a n n i n g  and D e v e l o p m e n t  D i v i s i o n  i s  i t s  c o n v e n e r .  I t s  o t h e r  
members a r e :  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  F i n a n c e  D i v i s i o n ;  t h e  S e c r e ­
t a r y  o f  t h e  d i v i s i o n  t o  w h ic h  t h e  scheme b e l o n g s ;  and t h e  
C h a i r m e n  o f  t h e  P l a n n i n g  and D e v e l o p m e n t  B o a r d s  f ro m  a l l  t h e  
p r o v i n c i a l  g o v e r n m e n t s .  The f e d e r a l  m i n i s t r i e s  a r e  empowered  
t o  a p p r o v e  t h e i r  own d e v e l o p m e n t  schemes c o s t i n g  b e l o w  
Rupees  20  m i l l i o n .  F o r  t h i s  pu r p o s e , e a c h  m i n i s t r y  has  a 
D e p a r t m e n t a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  W o r k in g  P a r t y  (DDWPJ w h ic h  i s  
h ead ed  by t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  m i n i s t r y / d i v i s i o n  w i t h  
m e m b e r s h ip  c o m p r i s i n g  some o f f i c e r s  o f  t h e  d i v i s i o n  and a
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r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  F i n a n c e  D i v i s i o n .
Each p r o v i n e e  has a P r o v i n c i a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  W o r k i n g  
P a r t y  (PDWP) c o n s i s t i n g  o f  C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  P l a n n i n g  and  
D e v e l o p m e n t  B o a r d  as  C o n v e n e r ,  and t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  
F i n a n c e  D e p a r t m e n t ,  and t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  
c o n c e r n e d  as  m embers .  The PDWP has t h e  pow er  t o  s a n c t i o n  a l l  
schemes up t o  and i n c l u d i n g  Rupees  60  m i l l i o n . 6
I t  i s  a p p a r e n t  f r o m  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  p a r a g r a p h s  t h a t  t h e  
b u r e a u c r a c y  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  and a p p r o v a l
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of development schemes costing up to and including Rupees 60
millions. The civil servants in the Finance and Planning and 
Development Divisions also substantially influence the 
decision making process in the case of larger schemes 
through their advice to the ministers.
ENERGY SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS
According to the Constitution of Pakistan, the 
Federal Government has exclusive responsibility for the 
exploration, exploitation, development and all the related 
matters including taxes, prices, etc. in respect of mineral 
oil, natural gas and the minerals for use in generation of 
nuclear energy. The other minerals, including coal, are the 
responsibility of the provincial governments as well. Geo­
logical survey is also the federal subject. ’Electricity’,
7is on the concurrent legislative list.
The Federal control in respect of oil, gas and power 
(including nuclear energy) is reflected institutionally in 
development policies and in funding. The National Energy 
Policy Committee (NEPC) is the highest national body which 
is responsible: (a) to review the progress of implementation 
of the current energy policies of the Government; and (b) to
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formulate short term and long term energy policies. The
Committee is co-chaired by the Minister for Finance and the 
Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources. The Director- 
General, New and Renewable Energy Resources, Ministry of 
Petroleum and Natural Resources is the Secretary of the 
NEPC. The membership of the Committee comprises the Chairman 
of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the secretaries 
of six ministries, namely, petroleum and natural resources, 
water and power, planning and development, industries, 
production, and agriculture.8 The Committee is assisted by 
the technical experts from the Directorate General of the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Energy Section 
of the Planning and Development Division, Pakistan Atomic 
Energy Commission, Water and Power Development Authority, 
Oil Companies Advisory Committee, and the gas production 
companies.9
The implementation of Pakistan's energy policy is 
mainly the responsibility of the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Natural Resources, the Ministry of Water and Power, and the 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. A few other agencies make 
marginal contributions.The Planning and Development Division 
is involved in the approval and monitoring of all develop­
ment projects/schemes. The Ministry of Finance is involved
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at the project approval stage as well as during the imple­
mentation stage in matters relating to the provision of 
finances. Details of the energy sector organizations are 
presented below.
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL RESOURCES
The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources 
(P&NR) is responsible for the exploration and development of 
oil, gas, coal and non-fuel mineral resources. The executive 
head of the ministry is the Sec retary who is a generalist 
administrator belonging to the Civil Service of Pakistan 
(CSP). He stays in the ministry on the average for about 
three years to be replaced by another CSP officer. The 
professionals working in the ministry are not considered for 
this coveted appointment. The functions of the ministry are 
as follows:
a. All matters relating to oil, gas and minerals at 
the national and international level;
b. Geological Survey of Pakistan;
c. Administration of "Regulation of Mines and Oil 
fields and Mineral Development (Federal Control) 
Act, 1948" to the extent applicable to oil and gas 
including liquefied petroleum gas and the rules 
made thereunder;
d. Federal agencies and Institutions for promotion of 
special studies in mineral resources;
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e. Administration of Petroleum Products (Development
Surcharge.) Ordinance, 1961 and the rules made
the reu nde r ;
f. Administration of the Natural Gas (Development
Surcharge) Ordinance, 1967 and the rules made
thereunder;
g . Import, refining, distribution, marketing and 
pricing of oil;
h. Petroleum concessions, administration of Pakistan
Petroleum Production Rules, 1949, import of
machinery equipment, etc. for exploration and 
development of oil and natural gas;
i. Export of gas, liquefied natural gas and liquefied 
petroleum gas, pricing of natural gas and 
liquefied petroleum gas;
j. Administration of Marketing of Petroleum Products 
(Federal Control) Act, 1974 and the rules made 
the reu nde r;
k. Undertakings wholly or partly owned by Government 
in the field of oil, gas and minerals;
l. Energy Policy and development of renewable
sources of energy.l. *10
The ministry is divided into: technical wing; and
non-technical wing. The functions of the ministry relating
to the petroleum sector are performed by the technical wing
consisting of four technical Directorates-General. The 
matters relating to the exploration and development of other
minerals, including coal, are the responsibility of the
non-technical wing. In addition to its usual administrative
functions, the coordination relating to development projects
of oil, gas and energy sector including coordination for the
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World Bank (IBRD) and IMF Review Missions is also the re­
sponsibility of the non-technical wing.11
The distribution of work amongst the Directorates-
1 OGeneral of the technical wing is as follows:
a. Pirectorate General (Oil): Import of crude oil; 
Import of products; Supply of Indigenous crude; 
Refining of crude oil; Oil Distribution, Storage, 
Movement, Marketing and Pricing; Operation of 
inland freight margin pool; Refineries; Pakistan 
State Oil Company (PSO) and Pakistan-Arab Refinery 
Ltd. (PARCO); Development Projects relating to 
Oil.
b. Pirectorate General (Petroleum Concessions): 
Exploration, Development and Operation of oil and 
gas fields; Monitoring of drilling and production; 
Agreements, Concessions, Contracts and Leases;
Development Projects relating to Petroleum
Concessions.
c. Directorate General (Gas): Purification,
Transmission and Distribution of gas; Pricing of 
gas at well-heads and consumption points; Sui Gas 
Transmission Company; Indus Gas Company Ltd.; 
Karachi Gas Company Ltd.; Sui Northern Gas Pipe­
line Ltd.; Production and Distribution of Lique­
fied Petroleum Gas; Development Projects relating 
to gas.
d. Pirectorate General (New and Renewable Energy 
Resources): Energy Planning; Energy conservation; 
Renewable energy resources (development,
demonstration, research, etc); Energy Statistics 
(energy analysis and studies); National Energy
Policy Committee (NEPC); Development Projects
relating to non-conventional energy resources. 
(This Directorate was initially set up as the
Energy Resources Cell in 1974, to act as the
counterpart to the UNDP sponsored Energy Resources 
Survey Project).
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The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources
controls a number of organizations. Those amongst them which 
are involved in the energy related activities are discussed 
below.
The Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC)
The Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC) is a 
fully Government owned company with headquarters at 
Islamabad. It is responsible for oil and gas exploration and 
development. It was established in September 1961 with the 
assistance of USSR as a result of a Government decision to 
enter directly in oil and gas exploration in the wake of 
suspension of exploration by the private companies at the 
end of 1960. The Oil and Gas Development Corporation 
Ordinance, 1961 states that ’the functions of the 
Corporation shall generally be to plan, promote, organize 
and implement programs for the exploration and development 
of oil and gas resources, and the production, refining and 
sale of oil and gas, and such other functions as the Central 
Government may, from time to time, assign to the 
Corporation.’^
The ’general direction and superintendence of the
61
affairs of the Corporation’ vests in a Board of Directors
consisting of 'not less than three and not more than five 
Directors’, one of whom has to be the representative of the 
Ministry of Finance. The Board is required by OGDC Ordinance 
’to act on commercial considerations having due regard to 
public interest generally’,14 and is guided by the policy 
instructions given to it by the Government from time to 
time. The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources ap­
points the Directors and amongst them the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors. The Chairman is the Chief Executive of 
the Corporation. The Chairman and the Directors are mostly 
the generalist administrators who are sent there on deputa­
tion for about three years term. The staff of the Corpora­
tion have slim chances of promotion beyond the position of 
General Manager which is subordinate to the Director. The 
General Managers usually have much more professional experi­
ence than their bosses. The Corporation has its own fund to 
which the Federal Government subscribes. It has considerable 
autonomy in financial matters, but the control is applied 
through the Finance Director appointed by the government who
is basically a generalist and trained not to go beyond rules
15and regulations.
The OGDC has been expanding over the years and (as of
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May 1985) has 3,432 regular employees consisting of
695 officers (including geologists, geophysicists, drillers, 
engineers, electronic specialists and production engineers) 
and 2,737 staff. Functionally, the Corporation is divided 
into following departments: Exploration; Drilling; 
Procurement; Production; Engineering; Corporate Planning; 
Technical Services; Finance; and Administration. It has also 
established an Oil and Gas Training Institute (OGTI) for the 
training of OGDC professionals in various disciplines.16
Pakistan State Oil Company Limited (PSO)
The Pakistan State Oil Company Limited (PSO) is an 
oil marketing public limited company. The Federal Government 
has a direct holding of 25.51 percent of the shares and the 
Government financial institutions own 49.60 percent of the 
shares. The overall supervision of the company rests with
the Board of Management constituted by the Ministry of
Petroleum and Natural Resources under the Marketing of
Petroleum Products (Federal Control) Act 1974. The Chief
Executive of the Company is the Managing Director who is
appointed by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural
Resou rces. The PSO was established on 30 December 1976 to
inc rease national participation in the marketing of
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petroleum products, storage and distribution.17
Pak-Arab Refinery Limited (PARCO)
The Pak-Arab Refinery Limited (PARCO) is a public 
limited company and was registered in May 1974. The company 
is a joint venture between the Government of Pakistan and 
the Emirate of Abu Dhabi with the Government of Pakistan 
controlling 60 percent of the equity capital. Under the 
project, it was planned to lay a 16 inch pipeline from 
Karachi to Multan (864 km) for oil transportation and con­
struct a refinery at the Multan end of the pipeline. The 
refinery part of the project was, however, shelved in 1978 
’until such time as the additional refining requirements of 
the country were determined and the geographical economies 
of the refinery were firmed up’.18 The pipeline project was 
completed in March 1981. The PARCO Pipeline System has the 
capacity to transport petroleum products from Keamari 
(Karachi) up to a village Gujrat near Multan. PARCO 
functions primarily as a carrier on behalf of the marketing 
companies, viz. Pakistan State Oil Company (PSO), Pakistan 
Burmah Shell (PBS), and Caltex. In emergencies, products 
from two refineries in Karachi (viz. Pakistan Refinery 
Limited (PRL) and National Refinery Limited (NRL)) can also
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be transported through 8 inch spur lines directly into the
1 ^9PARCO pipeline system.
The management of the company vests in a Board of
10 Directors including the Managing Director, who is the
Chief Executive of the Company. Six Directors including the
Managing Director and Chairman are appointed by the Ministry
of Petroleum and Natural Resources. The remaining four are
20the rep resentatives of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.
Gas Companies
There are four public limited gas purification and
transmission companies which are controlled by the Federal
Government through the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural
21Resources.These companies are as follows:
a. Sui Gas Transmission Company (SGTC): The SGTC is 
responsible for purification and transmission of 
gas by pipeline from Sui to Karachi and other 
parts of Sindh in the South.
b. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL): The
SNGPL is responsible for purification, transmis­
sion and distribution of gas from Sui and Meyal 
fields to the consumers in the provinces of the 
Punjab and NWFP.
c. Indus Gas Company Limited (IGC): The IGC is re­
sponsible for gas distribution in Sindh.
d. Karachi Gas Company Limited (KGC): The KGC is
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responsible for distribution of gas and LPG in 
Sindh and Baluchistan (excluding areas covered by 
IGC). IGC and KGC are planned to be merged 
togethe r.
Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP)
The GSP is primarily responsible for collecting and 
providing geological information about the country. Its main 
functions include: ’preparation of geological maps; mineral
evaluation; tectonic and geological maps based on the field 
investigation; preparation of reports on deposits of miner­
als; analysis of rock/minerals/sediments samples; test 
drilling operations in connection with reported existence of 
minerals in the country; and interpretation of aeromagnetic 
survey and follow up ground investigation in the mineralized 
areas of the country. Besides, its normal functions, the 
GSP also undertakes specialized studies such as studies on 
ground water, engineering geology, seismic hazard problems, 
etc. at the request of various national developmental 
agencies. The GSP is staffed by professionals such as 
geologists, geophysicists, drilling engineers and qualified 
technicians. It is headed by a Director General who is ap­
pointed by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources.
07The head office of the GSP is located at Quetta.^
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The Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (HDIP)
The Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan 
(HDIP) was established in September 1971 with the 
’responsibility of researching and suggesting conventional 
and non-conventional means of increasing the production of 
hydrocarbons (oil and gas) based on the existing sources, 
and providing testing facilities for quality control of 
petroleum products and inter fuel substitutions’.24
The main laboratories and facilities of the HDIP have 
been established in Islamabad and Karachi. Besides, three 
Petroleum Testing Centres at Quetta, Lahore and Peshawer are 
operating since 1981. The CNG Refueling Station and CNG 
Laboratory was established at Karachi in 1982. The HDIP 
Laboratories provide a wide variety of technical services 
and testing facilities and can carry out 150 tests in ac­
cordance with ASTM and IP methods. The HDIP is headed by a
General Manager appointed by the Ministry of Petroleum and
25Natural Resources.
Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation (PMDC)
The Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation (PMDC)
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is a private limited company established under the Companies
Act 1913 and is wholly owned by the Federal Government, It 
was established in July 1974 for the exploration and exploi­
tation of the mineral wealth of the country. As a part of 
its mineral development efforts, it has made substantial 
coal discoveries. The production from its coal mines in 
1983-84 was 220,416 tonnes which was about 12 percent of the
O Areported total production in the country.
The management of the Corporation is the responsibil­
ity of a Board of Directors comprising nine Directors in­
cluding the chairman, who is the Chief Executive of the 
Corporation. Two of the Directors, namely Director (Finance) 
and Director (Technical), have to be full-time. The remain­
ing six Directors are Ex-officio, consisting of Joint 
Secretary (P&NR), Joint Secretary (Ministry of Production), 
Director General of Geological Survey of Pakistan, a repre­
sentative of the Pakistan Railways, a representative of 
National Development Finance Corporation, and the Secretary, 
Department of Industries, Government of the North-West 
Frontier Province. The Corporation is, therefore, controlled 
by the generalist CSP officers. The Chairman and the other 
Directors are appointed by the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Natural Resources. PMDC is a large organization employing
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around eight thousand staff including professionals. As of
June 1984, it employed 7,619 persons, out of which 4,485
O  *~7were employed in the coal projects of the Corporation. '
MINISTRY OF WATER AND POWER
The Ministry of Water and Power is responsible for: 
’all matters relating to Power and Water Resources, Indus 
Basin Treaty, 1960, and Indus Basin Works, electricity and 
electric utilities taken over under Economic Reforms order,
no1972’ J In respect of Power, the Ministry administers two 
main Acts, namely, the Electricity Act of 1910 (modified in 
1964) and the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPOA) 
Act of 1958. The policy planning for the development of 
water and power resources of the country is its main task. 
8esides, it coordinates the activities of the operational 
organizations under its control as well as coordinates with 
other organizations of the energy sector. The organizations 
under its control submit their plans to it for submission to 
the Planning and Development Division and the Ministry of 
Finance.
The executive head of the Ministry is the Secretary 
who is usually a generalist administrator belonging to the
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Civil Service of Pakistan. The other officers of the main
stream are also generalists. However, the Office of the 
Chief Engineering Advisor is the principal advisor of the 
Ministry in respect of all matters relating to water and 
power. The main responsibilities of the Office of the Chief 
Engineering Advisor are as follows:
a. To examine the schemes prepared by the Water and 
Power Development Authority in the fields of Water 
and Power and to furnish expert advice to the 
Ministry;
b. international disputes arising out of the works 
constructed or likely to be constructed in neigh­
boring countries having repercussions on the 
economy of Pakistan and vice versa;
c. supply of technical data to and general liaison 
with international organizations, namely, Interna­
tional Commission on Large Dams and International 
Commission on Irrigation and Drainage;
d. examination of target of Power requirements on the 
basis of power surveys to be carried out by Water 
and Power Development Authority;
e. to provide technical advice on development pro­
grams of the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation;
f. rationing of electric energy supplied by the 
corporation under the Karachi Electricity Control 
Act, 1952 necessary in view of the high gap 
between demand and supply and the connected 
functions under the Electricity Act, namely, 
the inspection of electrical installations, 
adjudication of disputes and the licensing of 
contractors and electricians;
g. to provide expert advice and assistance to the 
central ministries on the engineering matters 
referred to it; and
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h. to rationalize and uniform the power rates in the 
four Provinces of Pakistan as the Secretariat29of Standing Power Rates Advisory Board. '
The Ministry of Water and Power controls the 
operations of the Water and Power Development Authority 
(WAPDA) and the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC). 
These are the two main organizations responsible for the 
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in 
the country.
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)
The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA.) is 
a semi-autonomous body under the Ministry of Water and 
Power. It is responsible for investigation, planning and 
execution of schemes relating to: ’generation, transmission
and distribution of power; irrigation, water supply and 
drainage; prevention of water logging and reclamation of 
water logged and saline lands; flood control, inland 
navigation; and prevention of any ill effects on public 
health from the operations of the Authority.'^0
The management of WAPDA is the responsibility of a 
Chairman, who is also the Chief Executive of the Authority, 
and three members, namely, Member (Power), Member (Water),
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and Member (Finance). The Member (Power) and Member (Water) 
also act as Managing Directors, therefore, executive heads 
of their respective wings. The Chairman and the members of 
the Authority are appointed by the Federal Government.31 Of 
them, the Chairman and Member (Finance) are mostly the 
generalist administrators belonging to the Civil Service of 
Pakistan. General Zia broke the tradition and appointed his 
army colleagues to the post of Chairman during his rule. The 
Chairman of WAPDA wields tremendous powers and is nominally 
subordinate to the Ministry of Water and Power.
The Authority has its own fund comprising the loans
and grants made by the Federal and provincial governments,
foreign aid and loans obtained from the World Bank (IBRD),
Asian Development Bank and other international agencies on
such terms as determined by the Government, sale of power,
32and any other sums received. The Sixth Five Year Plan 
allocation for the WAPDA’s power projects amounts to 
Rs. 61.33 billion which is more than 52 percent of the total 
allocation of Rs. 116.5 billion for the entire energy sec­
tor. The share of WAPDA’s power development in the 1987-88 
Annual Development Plan of Government of Pakistan is about 
28 percent. ' WAPDA is one of the five biggest employers of 
manpower in the country. At 30 June, 1988 it employed
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153,070 persons.
The installed generating capacity of WAPDA system as
on 30 June 1988 is 5,549 MW of which 2,897 is Hydel. WAPDA
system accounts for more than 81 percent of the total
3 5installed generating capacity (6,794 MW) in the country. 
WAPDA is responsible for generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity for whole of the country except 
Karachi and some adjoining areas.
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Limited (KESC)
The Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Limited 
(KESC) is responsible for generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity in its licensed area comprising 
of Karachi and some adjoining areas.
KESC is a Joint Stock Company under the control of 
the Federal Government. Prior to May 1984, the company 
operated as a separate entity under the overall control of 
the Ministry of Water and Power without significant 
involvement of WAPDA. Under the present arrangements, WAPDA 
has gained effective control over the KESC management. The? 
management of KESC is now (September, 1985) the responsibil-
34
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ity of Pakistan Electric Agency Limited (PEA), a private
limited company wholly owned by the Government and under the 
control of the Ministry of Water and Power. Agency commis­
sion is charged to KESC by the Government for managing its 
affairs. The Managing Agency (PEA) is run by a Board com­
prising a Chairman and four members. Member Finance WAPDA is 
the Chairman of PEA. The other members are: Member (Power), 
WAPDA; Managing Director of KESC who is the Chief Executive; 
Joint Secretary (Power), Ministry of Water and Power; and 
Financial Advisor, Ministry of Finance. The overall supervi­
sion of the Managing Agency is with the Board of Directors 
of KESC comprising 12 Directors and a Chairman. Chairman 
WAPDA is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of KESC. The 
Managing Director KESC and the Chairman PEA (Member Finance 
WAPDA) are also the Directors of the Board.36
The installed generating capacity of the KESC (all
thermal) is 1,108 MW as on 30 June 1988. Besides, the
electricity generated by the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant
(KANUPP) with the installed capacity of 137 MW is also
available to the KESC 37system.
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PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (PAEC)
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was set 
up in 1956 by upgrading the Pakistan Atomic Energy Council 
which was established in 1955, It is an autonomous 
organization under the direct control (July 1988) of the 
Chief Executive of Pakistan. The Commission consists of a 
Chairman who is the Executive Head of the Commission; four 
members, namely, Member (Admin), Member (Tech), Member
T O(Finance), and Member (Power); and a Secretary.
The PAEC is responsible for conducting research into 
and exploiting possibilities of peaceful uses of atomic 
energy in the country. Its activities include: procurement,
supply, manufacture, and disposal of radio-active sub­
stances; carrying out surveys of radio-active minerals and 
their exploitation; and establishment of atomic energy and 
nuclear research institutes. The Commission’s principal 
objectives are: (a) harnessing of atomic energy by conver­
sion into electric power; and (b) application of radio­
isotopes and radiation sources in agriculture, industry and 
medicine.
The PAEC operates one nuclear power plant, namely,
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the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) which became opera­
tional in 1972 with the installed generating capacity of 
137 MW. The share of nuclear power in the total commercial 
energy supplies in the country during 1987-88 was only 0.4 
pe rcent.40
The PAEC has set up a number of research centres to 
conduct nuclear research for application in industry, agri­
culture, medicine, etc. at various places in the country. 
The Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology 
(PINSTECH), Nelore (near Islamabad) is the main research 
institution set up by the PAEC for carrying out research 
into nuclear technology with the central research facility 
Pakistan Research Reactor (PARR) which went critical in 
December 1965 and attained its full power of 5 MW in June 
1966. The reactor is a pool type fueled with 90 percent 
enriched uranium. The PINSTECH has played a key supportive 
role in implementation of Pakistan’s atomic energy program. 
Its main contribution includes:
a. Development of potential in research and develop­
ment especially in subjects related to the pro­
grams of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission;
b. application of fundamental knowledge to technology 
through applied sciences and engineering;
c. training of scientific and engineering manpower 
for PAEC and other organizations in the country;
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d. promotion of university research through 
collaborative programs.41
MINISTRY OF PRODUCTION
The Ministry of Production is responsible for the 
overall supervision and control of the affairs of the State 
owned industrial enterprises through a number of corpora­
tions including State Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical 
Corporation (PERAC). The management of PERAC is the respon­
sibility of a Board of Directors consisting of a Chairman, 
three Directors and a Secretary who are appointed by the
Ministry of Production. The Corporation is wholly owned by
42the Federal Government.
PERAC is responsible for managing the affairs of 
state owned companies engaged in petroleum refining, petro­
chemical and related activities. It controls four such 
companies: National Refinery Ltd.; National Petroleum Ltd.; 
National Petrocarbon Ltd.; and Enar Petrotech Services Ltd. 
The National Refinery Ltd. is one of the three refineries 
operating in the country. Other two refineries, namely, 
Pakistan Refinery Ltd. and Attoek Refinery Ltd. are in the 
private sector.43
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MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The Ministry of Science and Technology is primarily 
responsible for the Government’s policy for science and 
technology. It controls a number of organizations which are 
engaged in conducting scientific and applied research which 
include: (a) Pakistan Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research (PCSIR); (b) Silicon Technology Development Centre; 
(c) National Institute of Electronics; (d) National Insti­
tute of Power; (e) Applied Research Centre for New and 
Renewable Sources of Energy; and (f) Appropriate Technology 
Development Organization.The above mentioned organizations
have been undertaking research, development and demonstra-
44tion (R ,D&D) activities relating to energy sector.
MINISTRY OF FOOD. AGRICULTURE AND COOPERATIVES
The Forestry Section of the Ministry of Food,
Agriculture and Cooperatives headed by the Inspector General
of Forests is likely to be involved for the implementation
45of energy plantation program of the Government.
The field operations in the forestry sector are
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mainly the responsibility of the provincial Forestry
Departments» The energy plantation program was, therefore,
envisaged to be implemented through provincial governments.
The Sixth Five Year Plan for Baluchistan provided for
energy ’plantation’ of 3,400 acres at a cost of
46Rs, 23.8 million. Similar plans were expected to be 
formulated by other provinces.
MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
The Ministry of Planning and Development is the focal 
point for the planning activities of the nation. The execu­
tive head of the ministry is the Secretary who is a gener­
alist administrator. The Ministry is divided into various 
sections headed by professionals in their respective fields. 
It plays a major role in the approval and monitoring the 
implementation of all development schemes/projects. Its main 
functions include:
a. Preparation of comprehensive national plan for 
economic and social development of the country;
b. formulation, within the framework of the national 
plan, of an annual plan and annual development 
p rog ram;
c. examination of development projects and program 
and their processing to secure decisions of sanc­
tioning authorities;
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d. monitoring in conjunction with Federal Ministries 
and Provincial Governments the implementation of 
all major development projects and programs, 
identification of bottlenecks and indication of 
timely remedial action;
e. evaluation of on-going and completed projects;
f. review and evaluation of the progress achieved in 
implementation of national plan;
g. identification of regions, sectors and such 
sectors lacking adequate port-folio of projects 
and taking steps to stimulate preparation of sound 
projects in those areas;
h. continuous evaluation of the economic situation 
and economic policies including examination of 
such problems as may be referred for Federal or 
Provincial advice;
i. research in various sectors of the economy to 
improve the data base and information as well as 
to provide analytical studies which will help 
economic decision-making;
j. association with Economic Affairs Division in 
matters pertaining to external assistance for 
individual projects from the stage prior to 
preliminary discussion up to the stage final 
signing of documents with aid-giving agencies;
k. development of appropriate cost and physical 
standards so as to avoid waste of resources and 
permit more effective technical and economic 
appraisal of projects; and
l . coordination of all work pertaining to a Regional 
Cooperation for Development (RCD) amongst Iran, 
Pakistan and Turkey including the Pakistan and 
Pak-Turkey Economic and Cultural Commissions and 
Indonesian-Pakistan Economic and Cultural 
Cooperation (IPECC).4'
The Energy Wing of the Planning and Development
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Division is responsible for coordinating energy planning and
plays a central role in the formulation, evaluation and 
review the energy sector programs. It is also responsible 
for the preparation of an overall demand and supply analysis 
on quarterly basis in consultation with the Ministries and 
agencies concerned. The Wing is headed by a Senior Chief.
The Government constituted in 1985 the Energy Review 
Group with the responsibility to study the bottlenecks in 
the implementation of Energy Policy and issue directives for 
their solution, and for the purposes of ’coordination and 
expedite actions on Energy Projects. Energy Wing provides 
the Secretariat for the Energy Review Group. The Energy 
Review Group is headed by the Minister for Planning and 
Development and its membership included the Secretary and 
three other senior officers of the Planning and Development 
Division. Its other membership comprised: the secretaries of
economic affairs, finance, water and power, petroleum and 
natural resources; and the chairmen of WAPDA, KESC, and the 
GGDC48. Moreover, the Projects Wing of the Planning and 
Development Division is responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of development projects including the energy 
sector. This Ministry, therefore, plays a substantial role 
in the implementation of energy policy in Pakistan.
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MINISTRY OF FINANCE
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for 
sanctioning all financial and capital expenditures of the 
Government of Pakistan and, therefore, controls the purse of 
all the ministries and agencies. Energy pricing proposals 
are submitted to the Ministry of Finance for approval, which 
has final authority in case of minor decisions. In case of 
major decisions, the approval is required from the Economic 
Coordination Committee of the Cabinet, which is also chaired 
by the Minister for Finance. The Ministry has its representa­
tion in almost all the important committees and policy 
boards of various organizations in the energy sector. It 
also plays a very important role in the project approval 
mechanism of the country. The Minister for Finance is the 
Chairman of the National Energy Policy Committee (NEPC) 
which is the supreme national body responsible for national 
energy policy formulation and coordination. By virtue of 
this, the Ministry of Finance has assumed direct authority 
in the energy policy matters, although without any 
responsibility. THe executive head of the Ministry is the 
Secretary who is a generalist administrator belonging to the 
Civil Service of Pakistan. All other officers are also the 
generalist administrators.49
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PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS * ORGANIZATIONS
The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan (as discussed 
earlier) gives the provinces the authority to legislate and 
administer laws and regulations governing the exploration, 
exploitation and development of all minerals excluding oil, 
natural gas and nuclear minerals. The execution of the 
policies pertaining to forestry also falls under the purview 
of provincial jurisdiction.
In respect of minerals, the typical organizational 
arrangement at the provincial level consists of a section in 
the Directorate of Industries and Mineral Development, 
headed by a senior officer (Additional Director Minerals) 
under the Director of Industries and Mineral Development. 
The administration of prospecting licenses and mining 
leases, collection of revenues (royalties) from mineral 
produces and rent from licensees and lessees, technical ap­
praisal of mineral prospecting and development plans of 
licensees and lessees, provision of infrast ruetu re for 
mineral bearing areas, undertaking of mineral identification 
studies and all other related matters are the responsibility 
of this section. The policy guidance is provided by the 
Provincial Departmental headed who is the Secretary to the
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Provincial Government. He is generalist administrator nomi-
• SO nally subordinate to a Provincial Minister.
For the enforcement of mining regulations including 
safety, there exists in each province the Office of the 
Chief Inspector of Mines under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Labor (mostly grouped with some other 
functional areas), headed by a Minister and below him a 
Secretary. There is only one public sector coal mining 
organization owned by a provincial government (Punjab), the 
rest being in the private sector with the exception of the 
PMDC which is owned by the Federal Government.51
The Sixth Five Year Plan contemplates the NWFP 
Government to initiate setting up small hydel stations to 
generate electricity. Agencies in Azad Kashmir and Northern 
Areas have already been undertaking these activities. The 
Punjab Government also announced in April 1986 its plan to 
set up mini hydro electric generation stations on canal 
falls indicating that investigation into the possibilities 
of generating electricity through canal waterfalls at an 
expenditure of Rs. 10.18 lakh (one lakh - 100,000) had 
already been started. The Ministry in charge for these 
schemes at the provincial level is the Ministry of
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Irrigation and Power.
The provincial governments also have a role in the 
rural electrification. The lists of the villages to be 
electrified in a particular year are prepared by the 
provincial governments in accordance with some general 
guidelines provided by the Federal Government. WAPDA is 
required to execute the rural electrification plan in 
accordance with the lists provided by the provincial 
governments. The selection of villages in the Punjab and 
Sindh is made by the Irrigation and Power Departments, 
whereas in Baluchistan and the NWFP, this is the responsi­
bility of the Planning and Development Departments.54
Punjab Mineral Development Corporation
The Punjab Mineral Development Corporation (PUNJMIN) 
is the only coal mining organization owned by a provincial 
government. PUNJMIN is under the administrative and finan­
cial control of the Punjab Government. It was established in 
1975 with an objective to promote exploration, development, 
production and marketing of minerals within the Punjab. 
PUNJMIN holds two leases for 811 acres and operates only in 
Punjab. It owns and operates two mines (Padhrar Mine and
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Dandot Mine). Total estimated annual coal production during
1983-84 and 1984-85 was 30,000 tonnes and 21,000 tonnes
respectively. It has plans to carry out further exploration
55and development activities in the Dandot area.
PRIVATE SECTOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS
The Oil and Gas Sector. The private sector companies 
have been playing a significant role in the exploration, 
development, refining, marketing and distribution of oil and 
gas in Pakistan. The Ministry of petroleum and Natural 
Resources is responsible for the framing of rules and regu­
lations to regulate the operations of the private sector. A 
number of private exploration and development companies are 
presently operating in the country independently or in joint 
ventures with 0GDC or amongst themselves. These include 
Pakistani as well as international companies as indicated 
below:56
* The Pakistani exploration and development compa­
nies are: Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL); and 
Pakistan Oilfields Limited. The Government of 
Pakistan is minority shareholder in both of these 
companies. The PPL owns and operates the Sui gas 
field which is the largest gas field in the 
country. The Government of Pakistan has no 
effective role in the management of PPL, whereas 
it nominates three out of eight Directors on the 
Board of POL in which the majority shares are 
owned by a foreign company, namely, Attock Oil
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Company Limited.
* Pak-Stanvac Petroleum Project is a joint venture 
between the Government of Pakistan (49%) and Esso 
Eastern Inc. (51%) The project was established in 
September 1954 with the objective of exploration 
and production of oil and gas. It discovered Mari 
Gas field in 1957. ESSO Fertilizer Factory at 
Dharki utilizes this gas.
* Other oil and gas exploration and development
companies presently involved in major operations 
are: Union Texas Inc. (Pakistan) USA; Occidental 
(Pakistan) Inc.; Pak Hunt (USA); Attock Oil 
Company; Crescent Petroleum Ltd. (USA); and
Phillips Petroleum Company (USA). Some more
are likely to enter the field.
* Two of the three oil refineries in Pakistan are
owned by the private sector. The private owned re­
fineries are: Pakistan Refinery Limited at
Karachi; and Attock Refinery Limited at Morgah 
near Rawalpindi.
* There are two private companies involved in the 
marketing of petroleum products (oil); Pakistan 
Burmah Shell Limited, and Caltex Oil (Pakistan) 
Limited.
* The Oil Companies Advisory Committee coordinates 
between marketing and refining companies and the 
Government in matters relating to planning and 
forecasting of petroleum requirements, examination 
of various production programs, and estimation of 
deficits and disposal of surplus.
* There also exist two private companies for the 
storage, bottling, marketing and distribution of 
LPG, which are: Burshane (Pakistan) Limited; and 
Foundation Gas (FONGAS) Limited.
* A number of service companies and drilling 
contractors are also operating in the country.
The Coal Sector. A number of private companies are 
involved in the production of coal in Pakistan. The opera-
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tions of these companies are regulated by the respective
provincial governments. As of February 1985, there are over 
242 separate leases and over 200 exploration licenses grant­
ed in the three major coal producing provinces of Punjab, 
Sindh and Baluchistan. The number of lease owners is, howev­
er, about 150. The coal is produced by mine owners as well
as by private contractors working under fixed seasonal
57agreements with mine owners. The major private sector
58coal mining companies are as follows:
a. H.M. Habibullah Mines Limited;
b. National Coal Mines Limited;
c. Mehran Coal Mines Limited;
d. Baluchistan Coal Company Limited (Gilani Mines);
e. Sindh Coal Mines Limited;
f. Noor Coal Mines Limited;
g. H.M. Iqbal Coal Mines Limited;
h. Kazi Faiz Coal Mines;
i. Indus Coal Mines Limited;
j. Amin B. Limited; and
k. Qazi AQ Limited.
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CONCLUSION
The present chapter has outlined the institutional 
framework of the organizations responsible for the formula­
tion and implementation of energy policy in Pakistan. A 
number of organizations are involved in the formulation and 
implementation of energy policy in Pakistan. Some of the 
organizations are under the federal control, while others 
are under the administrative control of the provincial 
governments. The constitution of Pakistan specifies the 
jurisdiction of the federal and provincial governments. At 
the federal level, seven ministries and a commission under 
the Chief Executive of the country are involved. There are, 
however, two ministries, namely, the Ministry of Water and 
Power and the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, 
which are mainly responsible for the implementation of the 
energy policy of the country. The field operations are 
carried out by a number of autonomous and semi-autonomous 
bodies under the control of these ministries. The Ministry 
of Fuel and Natural Resources is responsible for implement­
ing the fuels policy of the Government. The Ministry of 
Water and Power is responsible for implementing the policies 
relating to power sub-sector. The Pakistan Atomic Energy 
Commission is responsible for the implementation of the
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atomic energy policy.
The Ministry of Planning and Development plays a 
central role in the preparation of national plans. It also 
plays an effective role in the approval and the monitoring 
of implementation of the development projects/schemes. The 
Ministry of Finance plays a pivotal role in the project ap­
proval mechanism and in the provision of finances during the 
implementation. The Minister for Finance, in his capacity as 
the Chairman of the National Energy Policy Committee, 
substantially affects the implementation priorities and 
p rocesses.
Other ministries and organizations at the federal and 
provincial levels mentioned in this chapter have a minor 
contribution to make, and, in terms of their share in the 
financial allocations, their role is relatively limited.
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CHAPTER III
PAKISTAN *S ENERGY POLICY: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
This chapter traces the evolution of Pakistan's 
energy policy from 1947 to Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-88.) 
and provides the details of the policies and programs in 
respect of power, fuels and renewable sources of energy. It 
outlines the policy objectives and identifies major 
projects/schemes to achieve them.
Pakistan pursued the planned course of economic 
development by adopting the medium-term planning process 
with the launching of its First Five Year Plan for the 
period starting from 1 July 1955 to 30 June 1960. Each plan 
envisages various policies in the light of sectoral priori­
ties developed for the realization of its objectives. The 
evolution of Pakistan’s energy policy has, therefore, been 
traced in this chapter in relation to these Plans. The 
Fourth Five Year Plan was prepared for its implementation 
during the July 1970-June 1975 period. However, the outbreak 
of civil war in the former East Pakistan and consequently
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its secession rendered the Fourth Five Year Plan irrelevant
for the country- Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took the charge of the 
left over Pakistan in 1971 and interrupted the process of 
medium-term planning by taking recourse to the annual devel­
opment planning process. The five year planning process was 
reinstated by General Zia ul-Haq in 1978 with the launching 
of the Fifth Five Year Plan covering 1 July 1978 to 30 June 
1983 period. The 1971-78 period, therefore, represents a 
distinct phase and has been analyzed separately. Similarly, 
the pre-plan period (i.e., 1947-55) has also been treated a 
separate phase. The chapter also explains the background 
which influenced the formulation of energy policy at the 
time of independence.
The need for a proper energy policy was felt in 
Pakistan with the onset of world-wide oil price hike in 
1973. However, the Fifth Five Year Plan (1978-83) is the 
first official document issued by the Government of Pakistan 
in June 1978 which recognizes ’Energy’ as a separate sector. 
Prior to this, there existed solo policies for various 
energy sub-sectors. An endeavor has been made in this chap­
ter to construct an energy policy depicting the cumulative 
effect of the solo policies for various policy periods.
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THE BACKGROUND
At the time of independence, Pakistan inherited an 
extremely underdeveloped commercial energy sector. In fact, 
the economy of the country was underdeveloped. The country 
started with an antiquated agriculture and almost a clean 
slate in the matter of industries, Pakistan’s share in the 
industrial establishments of the British India amounted to 
34 factories (less than 4 per cent) employing only 26,400 
persons (less than 3 percent) out of 921 factories employing 
1,137,150 persons. Although, 20 percent of the total popula­
tion (according to 1941 census) lived in the areas which 
constituted Pakistan in 1947.1 Natural resources had hardly 
been exploited and the hydroelectric power had yet to be 
harnessed. Only two small hydroelectric power stations at 
Renala (commissioned in 1925) and Malakand (commissioned in 
1938) with total installed capacity of 10.7 MW existed in 
the country.2
The potential demand for electrical energy in the 
country was not readily apparent in 1947 due to weak 
industrial base. In larger municipal areas where it was 
required for domestic and commercial purposes, public 
companies or corporations were licensed to generate and
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distribute electricity. Most of the industries had installed
their own generating units to meet their requirements. 
Lahore, Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) and Kasur in the Punjab 
were dependent upon the electricity supplies from India.0 
The system of power supply in the country mainly consisted 
of isolated power stations serving the surrounding areas.
In 1947, total installed generating capacity of the 
country, including 34 MW captive capacity (owned by private 
industrial establishments), was 110.4 MW, About 86 percent 
(65.7 MW) of the installed capacity of the utilities 
comprised the ’small and inefficient’ thermal-elec trie 
plants. The remaining 14 percent consisted of 10.7 MW (all
Ain West Pakistan) of hydroelectric capacity.' The capacity 
per capita for the country (including East Pakistan)was a
5meager 2,85 KW. In 1948, 73 GWH had to be imported from
India to meet the requirements of the then West Pakistan
(now Pakistan) against the total generation of 141.90 GWH in
6this part of the country.
The known fossil fuel resou rces in Pakistan were also
negligible at the time of independence. In 1948, total
p roduction of pe t roleum crude and coal was 559,000 U.S,
barrels and 244,643 tons respectively.7 Oil was produced by
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the Attock Oil Company from four fields, namely, Khau r,
Dhulian, Joya Mair and Balkassar at the rate of about 900
barrels per day. Burmah Oil Company was the only other
Rcompany engaged in oil exploration in Pakistan. Natural gas 
had yet to be discovered. There was a small oil refinery 
near Rawalpindi (Attock Oil Refinery) which operated on the 
indigenous crude. In 1948, it processed less than half a 
million tons of crude oil which could meet only 10 percent
Qof the needs of the country. Whereas, 360,990 tons of 
petroleum products had to be imported in the same period to 
meet the requirements of the then West Pakistan (now 
Pakistan).10 The coal mines in the West Punjab and Baluchis­
tan though in operation since 1880, had limited production 
capacity. Imported coal, in 1948, accounted for 72.4 percent 
of the consumption in West Pakistan.11
The administrative capability of the organizational 
set up existing at the time of independence for the formula­
tion and implementation of energy policy and programs was 
minimal. At the Centre, the Ministry of Industries and 
Natural Resources, was responsible for the matters relating 
to petroleum and natural resources (including water and 
power) in addition to its work of industrial development. 
The Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP) started functioning
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under the Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources with
the skeleton staff. It was responsible for collecting and 
providing geological information about the country. Provin­
cial Departments of Irrigation and Power Development were 
also involved in the development of water and power re­
sources. The development of mineral resources including coal 
was the responsibility of the Provincial Governments. Be­
sides, a few private companies like Karachi Electric Supply 
Corporation (est.1913) and Multan Electric Supply Company 
(est.1922) were engaged in the generation and distribution
of electricity. Coal mining, oil production and refining
1 ^were in the private sector.
THE PRE-PLAN PERIOD (1947-55)
The Power Sector. From the outset, the development of 
water and power resources has been tackled in an integrated 
manner in Pakistan. The hydroelectric potential of the 
country influenced the thinking of the policy planners in 
this direction. Also, both of these sectors received 
priority attention due to the perception that agricultural 
and industrial development was dependent upon the develop­
ment of water and power resources. Moreover, the electricity 
supplies from India could not be relied upon for too long.
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The problem of water-logging posed an immediate threat for
the agricultural development in the Punjab. The work on the 
Rasul Tube-well Project, which envisaged to reclaim 300,000 
acres of water-logged land in the Province, had already 
commenced in 1944. The installation of 1,860 tube-wells, to 
be run by electricity, had been planned under this project. 
The electricity supply for these tube-wells was planned to 
come from the Rasul Hydroelectric Station being constructed 
since 1946.
The first assessment of power needs of the country
was made in December 1947.'*'^  In 1948, the Central
Engineering Authority was created under the Ministry of
Industries and Natural Resources for the purpose of planning
and regulating the development of electricity in the 
15country. The Six-Year Development Program (country’s first 
medium term planning endeavor), envisaged to be implemented 
during 1951-57, allocated about 18 percent (Rs. 470 million) 
of the total development outlay of Rs. 2,600 million for the 
development of ’fuel and power’ resources. Within this 
framework, a Two-Year Priority Plan was prepared in 1951 
which also included a Two-Year Plan for the installation of 
140 MW (all thermal) at the cost of Rs. 135 million at
various places. This was in addition to the installation of
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thermal capacity of 27 MW already sanctioned at a cost of
Rs. 25 million. A few canal-falls Hydel schemes were also
planned. The Government adopted the policy of nationaliza­
tion of private electric companies and enhancing its control 
over their operations. Towards this end, loans amounting 
to Rs.4.5 million and Rs.3.3 million were sanctioned to the 
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation and Dacca Electric 
Development Company respectively. An amount of Rs 18 million 
was also invested in the shares of the Karachi Electric
1 /ISupply Corporation.
For the purpose of developing water and power
resources, the country was divided into three hydrologic
regions: (a) the Humid Region, comprising the whole of East 
Pakistan; (b) the Indus Basin, comprising the areas drained 
by the River Indus and its tributaries and adjoining areas; 
and (c) the Coastal Tributaries and Desert Streams 
Region, comprising most of Baluchistan province. Table 3.1 
gives the details of power development schemes undertaken 
or in progress during the 1947-55 period.
In 1955, Pakistan’s installed generating capacity of 
342.4 MW consisted of 142 MW of captive capacity owned by 
the industrial establishments and 200.4 MW owned by the
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TABLE 3.1
POWER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, 1947-55
Indus Basin
Name of Scheme
Total
estimated
cost
Estimated 
expenditure 
up to March 
1955
Started
in
Status Power
1 2 3 4 5 6
I. MULTIPURPOSE PROJECTS:
(Million
310.4
rupees) 
49.0
(kw)
Warsak scheme 
Kurram Garhi scheme
267 .0 
43.4
31.0
18.3
1949
1950
In progress 
Do.
* * *
11 POWER: 515.4 223.7 ... • • . 83,342
Karachi Electric supply extension 223.6 35.5 1950 In progress 16,400
Hyderabad thermal system 45.8 0.3 1952 Do • . . .
Lyallpur steam (2x4,000 kw) 8.7 5.1 1950 Do. . ..
Lyallpur diesel (10,000) 4.6 4.2 1954 Do.
Montgomery steam (2x3,000 kw) including
transmission and distribution 16.9 11.6 1952 Do. • • • *
Dargai and Malakand hydroelectric
project and extensions 69.7 59.3 1949 Do. 30,000
Rasul hydel scheme 93.9 74.3 1946 Do • 22,000
Interlinking NWFP and Punjab grid system 9.7 9.7 1952 Do.
Gujranwala_Daska_Sialkot extension 7.8 1.4 1952 Do. . . .
Extension of local distribution system
in Punjab towns 5.3 5.1 ... Do.
Abandoned electricity schemes 7.4 7.4 1947 Completed 6,325
Nationalisation of Sind electrical
undertakings 9.8 1.5 1947 In progress 7,392
Distribution in area between Jhelum
and Wah 3.0 0.5 . . . Do. . ..
Misc. power schemes 9.2 7.8 1953 Do. 1,225
Total for Indus Basin 825.8 273.0 • • • . . . 83,342
The Humid Region
1 MULTIPURPOSE DEVELOPMENT: 598.7 37.6 • • • • • . • • .
Ka rnafuli 250.0 33.4 1952 In progress
Teesta Barrage 115.7 0.1 1953 Do.
Ganges Kobadak 233.0 4.1 1953 Do • • • .
11 POWER: 73.4 15.6 . 11,851
Siddirganj thermal 39.5 7.1 1951 In progress 5,100
Chittagong thermal 7.7 2.9 1953 Do. 3,000
Coalpara diesel 7 • B- 2.3 1953 Do. —
Chittagong distribution 2 .0 0.2 1954 Do. . ..
Diesel pool 1.6 1.5 1951 Completed 3,000
High Voltage distribution 12.9 1.3 1951 In progress
4 Small power supply undertakings 1.9 0.3 1950 Do. 751
Total for Humid Region 672.1 53.2 • • • . .. 11,851
GRAND TOTAL 1497.9 326.2 • • • . . . 95,193
Source: The table was compiled from the data in The First Five Year'Plan, op.cit., pp.348, 363
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public utilities, comprising of four hydroelectric power-
plants (capacity 62.7 MW) and the rest about 90 thermal 
stations. This trend shows that the Government pursued the 
policy of installing small thermal plants, perhaps to 
achieve quick results. The hydroelectric potential of the 
country remained still largely unexploited, although a 
modest beginning had been made in this direction.
%
The policy of installing captive generating capacity 
by the industrial establishments remained in force during 
this period. The Government gave preference to the multi­
purpose projects which would develop water resources as well 
as generate hydroelectric power. The policy to have an 
integrated grid network in the country was initiated during 
this period. The expansion of distribution system and provi­
sion of power at cheap rates also remained the basic compo­
nents of the Government policy.
Atomic Energy. Atomic energy received attention of
the Government in 1953 when the ’Atomic Energy
Committee’ was constituted in the Ministry of Industries. It
was assigned the task of making recommendations for: the
establishment of an atomic energy agency, exploration of
19radio-active minerals; and possible use of atomic energy.
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In 1954, the American exhibit "Atom for Peace" toured
Pakistan, explaining the benefits which could be derived 
from the nuclear power in the fields of energy, food and 
medical treatment. The Government of Pakistan, impressed 
by the potential uses of the atomic energy, set up in 1955 a 
Council, which was upgraded into a Commission in 1956, with 
the objective of studying and exploiting the possibilities 
of the use of the atomic energy. Organizational matters, 
training of staff and other related issues were the imme­
diate concerns at this stage.21
The Fuels Sector. The Fuels Policy of the Government 
during 1947-55 consisted of: increasing the production of 
oil and coal from the existing fields; and gearing up the 
oil exploration efforts. The Pakistan Petroleum Production 
Rules, 1949 were promulgated which made the oil prospecting 
a subject of the Central Government. These rules also pro­
vided for several tax concessions and other incentives to 
the oil companies to encourage oil and gas exploration and 
development. Since the country lacked the capital and the 
resources, the bulk of the investment was expected to come 
from the private sector, particularly from the internation- 
al oil companies. The policy of entering into joint ven­
tures with private companies and providing negotiated risk
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capital in rupees to them was also adopted during this
period.2'3
The Government envisaged an increased use of gas in
industry and power generation after the discovery of gas in
1952 at Sui in Baluchistan. However, a ’detailed policy on
the rate of tapping the gas, the place and purpose of use
and the price at which it shall be sold’ was non-existent
24till the end of 1955..
THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN (1955-60)
The country embarked upon the path of planned 
development in a coordinated way with the launching of the 
First Five Year Plan (1955-60). The policies and programs of 
this Plan were conceived in the light of development experi­
ence gained during the 1947-55 period.
The Power Sector. The First Five Year Plan gave a 
high priority to the development of power resources, and 
allocated an estimated amount of Rs. 1,100 million for power 
development including multi-pu rpose projects which amounted 
to 11.8 percent of the public sector allocation of Rs. 9352 
million or 8.7 percent of the total plan allocation of
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2 SR.s. 12,652 million. Most of the schemes in the power
sector were already in progress by 1955. The Plan received 
formal approval in April 1957, so the basic strategy for 
power development remained unchanged. The Planning Board 
preferred, wherever possible, the multi-purpose projects 
over single-purpose projects. The need to effectively organ­
ize research into water and power development was also
recognized and proper attention in this regard was 
26stressed. The classification of the country into three
regions, namely, the Humid Region, the Indus Basin, and the
Coastal Tributaries and Desert Streams Region, was formally
recognized. The Plan envisaged to supply electric power in
each region sufficient to overtake essential demands by 
27I960. Table 3.2 gives the details of the power sector
projects, including multipurpose projects having the compo­
nent of hydroelectric generation, for the Plan period.
The Plan provided for an increased use of gas for 
power generation, and a number of projects were included in 
the generation program. An increase of 426 MW (176 MW hydro­
electric and 250 MW thermal) in the generating capacity was 
planned for the Indus Basin region (Table 3.2). Power from 
Mangla multipurpose project was planned to be available 
after the plan period. More than 50 percent of the
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TABLE 3.2
POUEK RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, 1955-60
lot a 1 Est1 mated Ba1ancc
Name of Scheme est1 muted expend 1ture to complete Period of Execution Expected
cost »ip to March at the end addition In
1953 ol Plan Commencement Comp 1e 11 on capacity during
1953-60 (KW)
1 2 3 l 5 ' " 6 7
1 MULI 1 PURPOSE PROJECTS: 1,293.4 49.3 923.0 164,000
Hungla Lliiai 983.0 9TT7Ü 1955 In progress
W.irs.jk Djm 267 .U 31 .0 1949 190U 160,000
kurram Carhi 43.4 18.3 4,000
11 POWER: 904.9 176.7 199.1 2t-2,b30
Karachi electric supply extension
(Natural Cas) 223.6 35.5 49.0 1950 1962 75,000
Nuturnl gas power station, Multan 110.0 . . . 1956 1960 140,000
Hyderabad thermal system 43.8 0.3 17.2 1952 1961
Sukkur thermal system 35.8 . . . 23.6 1958 1962
Lyullpur steam (b,000 KU) 6.5 0.1 1956 1958 6,000
Lyallpur steam (2x4,000 KW) 8.8 3.1 1950 1958 8,000
Lyallpur diesel (10,000 KW) 4.6 4.2 1954 1937 10,000
Montgomerv steam (2x3,000 KU ) Including
transmission and distribution 16.9 11.5 1952 1957 6,000
Culranwaln hydel 34.0 1.2 10.5 1954 196)
SliaJlwal hydel 24.9 2.0 A.2 1934 1 961
Ch1chok1ma11 Ion hydel 26.2 2.3 1954 1 9 5 9 12,000
West Pakistan high tension grid 120.0 39.6 1956 1961
Cujranwala-Daska-Slalkot entension 7.8 1.4 1952 1 9 9 8
Kurram Curhl transmission 8.4 0.5 1956 1 9 5 8
Rasul hydel 93.9 74.3 1946 1 9 5 9
Malakand rural extension 40.4 32.3 1949 In progress
Nationalisation of Sind electrical
undertakings 9.8 1.5 1947 1960 . . . .
87.5 4.5 55.0 1954 In progress 5.650
Total (1 + 11) 2,198.3 226.0 1,122.1 426,630
The Humid Region
111 MULTIPURPOSE 483.0 37.5 90,000
Karnafull project 250.0 33.4 1952 1 9b0 80,000
233.0 4.1 143.4 1953 In progress 10,000
IV POWER 127.8 14.2 78,831
Slddlrganj thermal power project 39.5 7.1 1951 I960 42,900
Chlttgong thermal power project 7.7 2.9 1953 1938 7,000
Coalpara diesel power project 7.8 2.31 1953 1957 10,000
Coalpara steam power project 14.0 1956 1959 16,000
Chittagong electric supply
extension & improvement of L.T.
distribution 2.0 0.2 1954 1959
Pool of small power plants with
total capacity of 1,300 KU 4.0 . . . . . . 1957 19b0 1,500
Dacca-Chlttagong lnter-connectlon 18.1 . . . . . . 1955 1960
High Voltage distribution and
sub~8 ta 11 on 12.9 1.3 . . . 1951 1960
Hardinge Bridge-Coalpara
inter-connection 12.2 a . . .  . . 1957 1 959 • . .
Transmission lines (Comllla
Choudpur and Ku11 gunJ-Nars1ngd1) 5.5 . . . . . . 1937 1960
Small power supply acquisitions 2.2 0.1 . . . 1955 1959 6 54
Small power supply undertakings 1.9 0.3 1950 1939 777
Total 111 + IV 610.8 51.7 . . . . . . ) b8,831
Coastal Tributaries and Desert Streams Region
POWER
V Cfui-tta thermal power project 8.0 . a . 3.0 1958 1961
Urjnd Total 2.817.1 17777 593,-61
Note: Only those multipurpose projects have been included i n this table which have the component of bydro~electr1c
genu ration.
Source: The First Five Year Plan, op.clt.. pp.343-383.
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additional installed capacity in the Indus Basin was planned
to come from the gas-based thermal power stations. In the 
Coastal Tributaries and Desert Streams Region, only one 
power project, namely, Coal Fired Steam Station (capacity 5 
MW) at Quetta, was planned to commence during the Plan
O  Operiod which was to be completed in 1961.
The policy of nationalization of electrical 
undertakings remained unchanged. Rural electrification was 
still in the future. Modest beginning, however, was made in 
NWFP where rural electrification was initiated in 1949 
(Table 2.2). To improve planning and execution of policies 
and programs relating to water and power, the Plan recom­
mended the establishment of autonomous agencies, each in
29both wings, at the earliest.
Atomic Energy. The atomic energy policy during
1955-60 period consisted of setting up atomic energy centres
for research purposes, training of scientists and
30exploration of radio-active minerals in the country.
The Fuels Sector. The policy of attracting private 
capital, including foreign companies, for the exploration
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and exploitation of oil, gas and coal continued. Most of
the investment was expected to come from the private sector. 
The Government envisaged no expansion in oil production and 
refinery capacity. It also had no firm investment plans in 
respect of oil and gas prospecting due to total dependence 
on the private sector. The Plan noted:
It is not possible to foretell exactly how much 
will be invested in oil and gas prospecting, but our 
estimate, for the plan period is Rs. 417.5 
million, of which Rs. 80.8 million might be public 
and Rs. 336.7 million private.51'
The Plan stressed the need for better coordination 
and improvement in laws and regulations for the development 
of fuel and mineral resources. In respect of administrative 
bottlenecks, the Plan noted:
To obtain good results from private enterprise in 
fuel and mining operations, the Government needs a 
clear policy, offering strong incentives for rapid 
and thorough prospecting, and providing for prompt 
exploitation of valuable deposits under appropriate 
safeguards so as to prevent waste or monopolistic 
practices. Current policy needs improvement. The 
Central Government regulates the granting, renewal 
and revocation of prospecting licenses and mining 
leases, operating and safety conditions, and other 
aspects of mining. Some of these regulations are 
out-of-date, and their administration has not always 
been prompt and effective.
Under present arrangements, information on possible 
deposits is often not published promptly and fully,
110
with the result that businessmen do not know what 
opportunities may exist. The system of "certificate 
of approval" and "prospecting leases" is cumbersome, 
and frequently results on the one hand in superficial 
and wasteful exploitation of known deposits, and on 
the other hand in leaving promising sites untouched. 
Private concerns are often faced with uncertainty and 
long delays in obtaining the necessary permits and 
licenses to start work. The standards necessary in 
the public interest should be clearly laid down. The 
administration of the mining laws is split among 
several separate departments and this hampers the 
development of uniform and consistent policies.... We 
believe that the establishment of a Bureau of Mines
T Ois urgently required and should not be delayed.
The Bureau of Mines was envisaged to be responsible:
...for issuing claims, licenses and leases; for 
collecting and publishing information on all phases 
of the mining industry; for economic and technical 
studies and advice; for stimulating and assisting the 
progress and efficiency of the mining industry; for 
encouraging the participation of foreign capital in 
fuel and mineral development; for expediting the 
import and production of necessary mechanical 
equipment and spare parts; and for other activities 
designed to make the best use of the country’s fuel 
and mineral resources for development.33
At the beginning of the Plan, the Sui gas was 
already being delivered, through a transmission line from 
Sui to Karachi, to a number of users and the average output 
of Sui gas field by 1956 had reached about 25 million 
cu . ft. (MCFT) per d a y / 4 The Government adopted the policy 
of encouraging the use of gas, particularly in power genera­
tion, and other industries. As a result, a number of new
1 1 1
industries were being planned which would use gas as fuel
and many old ones were being converted to gas burning. It 
seems that all of this was happening without a clear policy. 
The Plan, in this respect, noted:
The policies relating to the gas should be designed
to reap the maximum benefit for the country.
Hitherto, there has been no definite public policy on
the rate of exploiting the gas, its proposed uses and
~z cthe prices at which it should be made available.
For the purification, transmission and distribution 
of gas, the Government adopted the policy of private sector 
involvement through public limited companies controlled by 
it. The Sui Gas Transmission Company was the first to be 
established in February 1954. The Karachi Gas Company 
Limited and the Indus Gas Company Limited, were established 
in August 1 9 5 5 . The Plan allocated Rs. 214 million for the 
transmission of gas (Rs. 160 million for West Pakistan and 
Rs. 54 million for East Pakistan) and Rs. 54 million for gas 
distribution (all in West Pakistan). Out of the total 
investment of Rs. 214 million to be made on gas transmission 
and distribution in West Pakistan, Rs. 90 million (more than 
42 percent) were planned to come from the private sector.3'
The Plan paid particular attention for the
development of coal mining in the country which was in a bad
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shape at that time. The Plan stated that ’a combination of
- 7 0habit, prejudice, and lack of clear-cut national policy’
had contributed for the existing state of affairs. The Plan
pointed out that large imports of coal were being made, at
considerable costs in foreign exchange, to fulfill needs
which could have been fulfilled economically by indigenous 
39coal. The Plan allocated Rs. 29.3 million for the 
development of coal mining, of which Rs. 10 million were 
expected to come from the private sector. The bulk of the 
investment (Rs. 19.3 million) was planned to be made by the 
Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), a 
public sector corporation, which owned coal mines in the
A QPunjab and Baluchistan. For the development of indigenous 
coal, the Plan argued:
The most important consideration here is the very 
large savings in foreign exchange produced by 
investing in coal mining. Pakistan is at present 
importing over one million tons of coal each year- 
valued at over Rs. 75 million. Import prices per ton 
range from about Rs. 60 for Indian coal up to Rs. 110 
for coal shipped from China, (compared to local 
prices which vary from Rs. 35 to Rs. 70 per ton). We 
estimate that an investment of approximately 
50 rupees is required to produce each additional 
annual ton of coal (under average conditions). 
This Rs. 50 is well below the foreign exchange 
expended on importing one ton of coal, which means 
that each rupee invested in the coal mining industry 
will save more than one rupee of foreign exchange 
each year, or more than 100% of the original 
investment. This is much better saving than that ob­
tained from investing in most industries, and coal 
mining should be given high priority by all con-
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cerned. It is admitted that the quality of the coals 
found in the country is not good. The coals cannot be 
used for coking because they contain much sulphur and 
ash. The average heating value is about 10,000 8TU 
per pound, as compared with 12,000 BTU per pound of 
imported coal. However experience has shown that 
indigenous coal is satisfactory for use in boiler 
plants, if suitable firing arrangements are made. The 
soda-ash plant at Khewra, started in 1937, has always 
used it without difficulty. Beginning in late 1954, 
the North Western Railway too has been using it on 
the Quetta-Zahidan and Quetta-Chaman runs, and is 
ready to use much more of it.41
The Plan, therefore, recommended the adoption of a
coal policy that favored the use of indigenous coal,
wherever economical. It stressed the need for assisting the
coal mining industry to increase the output and improve the
quality of the indigenous coal. The import of coal was
recommended to be allowed only to meet solid fuel require-
42ments which could not be met from indigenous supplies.
New and Renewable Sources. The new and renewable 
sources of energy also got some attention. The plan provided 
Rs. 6 million (Rs. 2 million in the public and Rs.4 million 
in the private sector) for the production of power alcohol 
in the country. Each sugar plant was recommended to be given 
an opportunity to install its own power alcohol still, or 
convert the already existing still to the production of 
power alcohol. The Power Alcohol Ordinance had already been 
passed at the time of the launching of the First Five Year
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Plan, which, for general consumption, required the mixing of 
power alcohol, when available, with petrol up to 25 
pe rcent.4^
Firewood also received some consideration of the 
Plan. It suggested to grow plants by the Forest Department 
along canals, roadside, and railway tracks in West Pakistan. 
The possibility of raising trees, especially for firewood, 
in the upper regions of catchment areas having adequate 
rainfall was also pointed out. An afforestation program for 
Lahore Division spread over a period of 20 years to seed 
about 32,000 acres was approved. About 100,000 acres were 
planned to be stocked with firewood species in compact 
plantations and shelter belts along the canals in the Thai 
area (Punjab) and 300,000 acres in the Kotri, Guddu and 
Sukkur barrages areas (Sindh) were earmarked for irrigated 
plantations to be completed in 15 to 20 years. The plan also 
pointed out the prospects for the development of firewood 
crops on village waste lands. The plan provided an amount of 
Rs.29.8 million for ’afforestation and regeneration’ for the 
entire country without specifying the provisions for 
firewood plantation.44
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THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN (1960-65)
The Power Sector. The power development strategy of 
the Second Plan consisted of the installation of thermal 
capacity based on the use of indigenous fuel (gas), and the 
addition of hydel capacity due to the completion of schemes 
already in progress: 12 MW from Gujranwala Hydel Scheme 
(West Pakistan), and 120 MW from the Karnafuli hydroelectric 
station (East Pakistan). No new hydroelectric project was 
included in the plan as major investment in this regard was 
expected to be made under the Indus Waters Treaty (details 
in the following pages).
The Plan allocated Rs . 1,140.5 million (Rs. 950.5 
million in the public sector, and Rs. 190 million in the 
private sector), of which Rs. 320 million were to be spent 
on the schemes already in progress. This constituted about 
6 percent of the total estimated Second Plan development 
outlay of Rs. 19,000 million (Public Sector: Rs. 11,500 
million and private sector: Rs. 7,500 million) compared to 
8.7 percent allocation in the First Plan.4~*
The plan envisaged the retirement of 142 MW from the 
existing capacity during the plan period due to obsolescence
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and uneconomic operations, most of it in the industrial
establishments. The industrial captive capacity, which was 
mostly based on the imported diesel oil and coal, was 
expected to decrease by 28 percent (from 252 MW in 1960 to 
181.5 MW in 1965) during the plan period. The policy of 
nationalization of electric supply companies, wherever 
required, remained in force.46
The classification of the country into three
hydrologic regions for the purpose of developing water and
power resources continued. However, some boundary changes
were made in West Pakistan. The Karachi area was included in
the Coastal Tributaries and Desert Streams Region, although
it r emained under the ju risdiction of the Karachi Electric
Supply Corporation. The rest of the region continued to be
47served by the West Pakistan WAPDA.
The Second Plan accorded a higher priority to 
transmission and distribution of existing power than to the 
generation of additional power, and allocated about 61 
percent (Rs. 695.0 million) of the total power development 
allocation for the transmission and distribution against 
First Plan allocation of about 23 percent (Rs. 255 million). 
In West Pakistan, the transmission and distribution program
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consisted of the completion of five grids along with the
secondary transmission and distribution systems: the West
Pakistan high-tension grid by connecting Multan and Warsak
power stations with the existing grid linking the power
stations at Malakand, Dargai, Rasul, Daudkhel, Shahdara,
Chichokimallian, Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) and Montgomery
(now Sahiwal); separate grids for Hyderabad and Sukkur
thermal stations; a grid around Quetta; and the expansion
4Sand strengthening of the existing Karachi grid.
Rural Electrification. The electrification of about 
2,000 villages situated near the power lines was planned. 
The policy of providing electric power to the consumers at
the cheapest possible rates also continued during the Plan
• ^  49period.
Electrification of Railways. The idea of electrifica­
tion of railways in West Pakistan had been floating in the 
country since 1955. The Second Plan indicated an increased 
interest on the part of railway authorities who were consid­
ering the electrification of the lines where sufficient 
electric power was likely to be available and where traffic 
density justified. This was to be established by expert 
investigations likely to be undertaken during the Second
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Plan period.
Indus Basin Works. The Indus Waters Treaty was signed 
in September, 1960 through the mediating efforts of the 
World Bank which settled the dispute between India and 
Pakistan over the use of the Punjab rivers. According to the 
Treaty, India got exclusive rights over the use of three 
eastern rivers, namely, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej, 
after 31 March 1970. During the transitional period, 
Pakistan was required to construct and bring into operation 
replacement works which would replace the water supplies 
from the eastern rivers. India was required to pay a part of 
the costs, while the major portion of the expenditure would 
be met by some friendly countries through the World Bank. 
The Indus Basin Replacement Works comprised the construction 
of two dams, over the River Jhelum and River Indus; eight 
interlink canals; five barrages; one gated syphon; and 
remodeling of three existing link canals, two existing 
headworks and some existing irrigation canal systems 
affected by the new const ruetion. The West Pakistan WAPDA 
was' entrusted the responsibility to execute the work. The 
two dams, namely, Mangla Dam over the River Jhelum and 
Tarbela Dam over the River Indus were also expected to 
provide large quantities of hydroelectric power (Mangla:
50
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1,000 MW and Tarbela: 2,100 MW).51 Work on Mangla Dam was 
expected to start during the Second Plan period. Hopes were 
pinned on these two projects to alleviate the power 
shortages in West Pakistan.
Atomic Energy. The atomic energy program consisted of 
mainly training of scientists and engineers, exploration of 
radio-active minerals and the establishment of research 
institutions. The Plan allocated Rs. 45.5 million for the 
following specific purposes:
1. continuance of the program of training of nuclear 
scientists and engineers;
2. intensive training over extended periods of
selected scientists and engineers of outstanding 
ability and merit;
3. exploration for radio-active minerals in 
Pakistan;
4. establishment of an Institute of Nuclear Research
and Reactor Technology with a swimming pool
research reactor (1 MW-5 MW) at the headquarters 
of the Atomic Energy Commission;
5. establishment of a nuclear accelerator of
10-15 MW in East Pakistan; and
6. establishment of a suitable number of medical and
agricultural centres in the country using isotope 52techniques.
The Fuels Sector. The Second Plan allocated an amount 
of Rs. 974 million for the fuels sector including the
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Department of Geological Survey of Pakistan. This was about
5 percent of the total Second Plan development outlay, 
against 7 percent of the First Plan development outlay. The 
contribution of private sector was expected to be Rs.698 
million (about 72%).
The development of gas received higher priority. Wide 
spread distribution of natural gas in both the provinces was 
planned to substitute fuel oil, coal, kerosene and firewood. 
The Plan stressed the expansion of gas utilization in all 
sectors, including residential and commercial. Fertilizer 
plants were also planned to use natural gas both as a 
feed-stock and as a fuel. An amount of Rs. 351 million was 
allocated for the transmission and distribution of gas, most 
of which (Rs. 313 million) was to be contributed by the 
private sector. Oil and gas prospecting and development got 
an allocation of Rs. 320 million (Rs. 80 million in the 
public sector and Rs. 240 million in the private sector). 
Coal got an allocation of Rs. 100 million (Rs. 70 million in 
the semi-public sector and Rs. 30 million in the private 
sector). The policy to strengthen the Geological Survey of 
Pakistan continued, and Rs. 20 million (Rs. 7.6 million in
5 4the First Plan) were allocated for this purpose."
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The oil refining capacity was planned to be expanded
in the country and Rs. 155 million were allocated in the 
Second Plan to set up a new refinery at Karachi in the 
private sector. It was expected to come into operation by 
1963 with a capacity to refine approximately 1.5 million 
tons of imported crude oil per annum. For the modernization 
of the existing refinery at Morgah, an amount of Rs. 10 
million was also allocated. The establishment of two more 
refineries in the Private Sector, one at Karachi and the 
other at Chittongong, was sanctioned during the Plan period.
The policy of total dependence on the private sector 
for oil and gas exploration and exploitation underwent 
change during the Second Plan period. By 1961, the interest 
of the private companies for the oil and gas exploration in 
Pakistan waned as they did not succeed in making any signif­
icant oil and gas discovery. Consequently, they drastically 
reduced their exploratory efforts; some of then eventually 
closed down operations. It was at this juncture that the 
government decided to enter directly the field of explora­
tion and established the Oil and Gas Development Corporation 
(OGDC) in 1961 for this purpose with the assistance of 
Soviet Union^6
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Firewood. The need to put a certain proportion of the
newly irrigated areas in West Pakistan under forests, par­
ticularly for firewood production was stressed in the Plan. 
This program included the afforestation of 110,000 acres of 
irrigated land during the Plan period. The plantation of
trees along approximately 2,00 miles of roads and canals in
57West Pakistan was also planned.
THE THIRD FIVE YEAR PLAN (1965-70)
The Third Five Year Plan discontinued the classifica­
tion of the country into three hydrologic regions for the 
purposes of water and power development. Instead, it adopted 
a development strategy based on the provincial lines i.e. 
East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The Plan allocated Rs. 
3,449.80 million for power development: Rs.1,432 million for 
East Pakistan; Rs. 1687.80 million for West Pakistan; and 
Rs. 330 million for Central Government Program. This was 
about 6.6 percent of the total Third Plan development outlay
of Rs. 52,000 million (Rs. 30,000 million in the public
sector, and Rs,. 22,000 million in the private sector). In
addition, an amount of Rs. 280 million (Rs. 30 million in
East Pakistan and Rs. 250 million i n West Pakistan) was
expected to come from the private sector. Moreover, the
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installation of Mangla Hydro Station was outside the Plan
framework as it was being constructed under the aegis of 
Indus Basin Development Fund. A sum of Rs. 1,296 million 
(Rs.620 million in East Pakistan and Rs. 676 million in West 
Pakistan) was allocated for the fuels development program. 
The included Rs. 650 million in the private sector. An 
amount of Rs.276 million was allocated for strengthening the 
operations of the Oil and Gas Development Corporation 
(OGDC). Allocation for fuels sector amounted to about 2.5 
percent of the total Plan outlays.58
In September 1965, Pakistan was attacked by India and 
the resources had to be diverted to meet this national 
emergency. Moreover, Pakistan’s foreign assistance was 
suspended and the meeting of the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium 
was postponed. Consequently, the actual expenditure on 
development programs during 1965-66 was about 21 percent 
less than planned. Under the circumstances, Pakistan was 
forced to have a fresh look at the public sector development 
program. In December 1966, the Government approved the re­
vised sectoral allocations, priorities and phasing, al­
though the overall size of the Plan remained unaffected. As 
a result of this reallocation, the power sector allocation 
in the public sector was increased to Rs. 3,848.35 million
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(Rs. 1,550 million in East Pakistan, Rs. 1,925.75 in West
Pakistan and Rs. 373.60 for Central Government Program), but
59that of fuels sector was decreased to Rs. 532.62 million.
The Power Sector. The main objective of the Third 
Plan was the provision of sufficient supply of low-priced 
electric power to the consumer. The power generation 
strategy aimed at increasing the hydroelectric and steam 
(gas-based) capacity; and decreasing the diesel capacity. 
Hydroelectric and steam capacities were planned to increase 
by 127 percent and 134 percent respectively. The diesel 
capacity was planned to decrease by 35 percent. Nuclear- 
power capacity of 202 MW (132 MW in West Pakistan) was also 
planned to come on-stream by 1970. The industrial captive 
capacity was planned to decrease by 21 percent (from 290 MW 
in 1965 to 230 MW in 1970) during the Plan period. Overall, 
the installed capacity was planned to increase from 1,435 MW 
in 1965 to 2,888 MW in 1970. The Hydel and Steam capacities 
of the public utilities were planned to increase from 348 MW 
and 686 MW in 1965 to 788 MW and 1,597 MW in 1970 
respectively.^
In West Pakistan, the Plan emphasized the strengthen­
ing of the existing grid systems in the Northern and South-
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ern zones. The integration of Hyderabad and Sukkur networks
and their interconnection with Karachi and the Northern 
grids was planned. The rehabilitation and improvement of the 
distribution system was also planned.
Rural Electrification. The pace of rural electrifica­
tion was planned to be enhanced. The Plan provided for the 
electrification of additional 4.000 villaqes by 1970.61
Electrification of Railways. Based on the studies 
conducted durinq the Second Plan period, the Third Plan 
recommended the introduction of electric traction on the 
Khanewal-Lahore (178miles) and Lahore-Rawalpindi (179 miles) 
sections with the objective of handling the increased traf­
fic and reducing the foreign exchange component of the
railway's operating costs. The work on Khanewal-Lahore
62section was to be completed during the Third Plan period.
Atomic Energy. Two reactors (Karachi: 137 MW and
Rooppur: 70 MW) with the total capacity of 202 MW were
63planned to be established during the Plan period. The 
nuclear power reactor at Karachi was considered to be 'a
first step in meeting the growing power requirements of the
. 64country.
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The Fuels Sector. The Plan adopted the policy of
increased reliance on gas, both as a fuel and as a feed­
stock for petrochemical industries and nitrogenous fertiliz­
er. The need to encourage the use of indigenous coal was 
also stressed. The utilization of gas as fuel was not to be 
encouraged wherever coal could conveniently be provided.
Most of the capital for the oil and gas prospecting, 
gas transmission and distribution, and the development of 
coal and peat resources was planned to be provided by the 
private sector. Table 3.3 indicates the public sector 
revised allocation of Rs.532.62 million for the various 
activities in the fuels sector. As mentioned earlier, an 
additional amount of Rs.560 million was envisaged to come 
from the private sector.
The oil refining remained in the private sector and 
an expansion of 3.6 million tons (from 2.6 million tons in 
1964 to 6.2 million tons in 1970) was planned to be imple­
mented by establishing two new refineries, namely, National
66Refinery Ltd., Karachi and Eastern Refinery, Chittagong.
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TABLE 3.3
THIRD PLAN (1965-70)
PUBLIC SECTOR ALLOCATION FOR FUELS 
(Million Rupees)
Name of Sub-Sector PAKISTAN
1 . Geological Survey 70.50
2. Oil and Gas Development Corporation 250.00
3. Oil and Gas Prospecting 36.00
4 . Gas Transmission and Distribution 80.00
5. Coal and Peat 96.12
Total 532.62
Source: Revised Phasing , Sectoral Priorities and Allocation 
of the Thi rd Five Year Plan. (1965-70 ) . March 1967 ,p .21.
THE ANNUAL PLAN PERIOD (1970-78)
The Fourth Five Year Plan (1970-75) was sanctioned 
during the turbulent times in the history of Pakistan. The 
movement against President Muhammad Ayub Khan had forced him 
to resign and the country was experiencing another Martial 
Law under General M. Yahya Khan. Subsequent events resulted 
in the secession of East Pakistan in December 1971. The 
priorities, allocations, strategy, and objectives of the 
Fourth Plan, therefore, became irrelevant in the changed 
circumstances.
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No coordinated development programmes were issued
during the 1970-72 period. Work on the old schemes slowed 
down due to the paucity of funds. New schemes were being 
sanctioned on a piece-meal basis. The G.D.P. growth rate 
during 1970-71 and 1971-72 reduced to 1.6 percent and 1.7 
percent respectively against a sustained growth averaging 
6.3 percent per annum in West Pakistan during the sixties. 
The commodity component of G.D.P., in fact, registered a 
decline in the two-year period. Pubic sector development 
outlay during 1970-71 decreased to about Rs. 3,000 million 
against the original Fourth Plan allocation for West 
Pakistan of Rs. 3,240 million which was further reduced to 
Rs. 2,620 million during 1971-72. Private sector investment 
also declined from Rs. 3,100 million in 1969-70 to Rs. 2,200 
in 1971-72. The implementation of even the reduced develop­
ment programmes was not possible without a sizable recourse 
to deficit financing. Under the circumstances, the medium- 
term planning (Five Year Plan) was shelved. Instead, the PPP 
Government resorted to the process of Annual Development 
Plans which continued until 1978.
As such the policies and programmes in the energy 
sector could not remain unaffected. The progress on all 
major power sector programmes was behind schedule. No
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additions to the installed capacity were made during 1970-72
period. Power losses in the IaIAPDA system were on the
increase; the losses (excluding consumption in auxiliaries)
increased from 27.75 percent in 1969-70 to 29.34 percent in
1971-72. In January 1972, the government tried to increase
supply of electric power by restoring canal hydel stations
which were closed due to defence requirements and by taking
such emergency steps like activating all captive industrial
generation. Moreover, Electricity Control Order, 1972 was
promulgated banning the use of electricity for neon sign
advertisements, external lights of show rooms and outside
lights of cinemas and hotels, staggering of holidays by
6 8industrial consumers and regulation of tube-well loads.
Similar conditions prevailed in the fuels sector. The
production of crude oil decreased from about 3.5 million
barrels in 1969-70 to about 3.3 million barrels in 1971-72.
The production of gas continued to increase, but as a result
of damage to the purification plant at Sui gas fields, the
supplies of gas to the major thermal power stations were
made at reduced levels for quite some time. The production
of coal decreased from about 1.33 million metric tons in
69 ,1971 to 1.29 million metric tons in 1972. Government s 
direct activities in the oil and gas exploration remained at
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very low levels. Financial support to the fuels sector-
development programmes remained insignificant; public sector 
expenditure on fuels sector development programmes during
1971- 72 amounted to about Rs. 50 million (about 0.002
70percent of the overall development programme).
The Annual Plan, 1972-73 was issued in October 1972 
which was the first in the series. This system remained in 
force until 1978 when the Fifth Five Year Plan (1978-83) was 
launched. As these Plans were designed ’to provide a more 
flexible response to the urgent and more pressing problems 
of the nation’,71 the policies and priorities kept chang­
ing. Table 3.4 below depicts public sector ADP allocations 
during 1972-78 period.
The salient features of the energy policy during
1972- 76 were as follows:
1. Intensive exploration of indigenous resources of 
fuel.
2. Development of existing and new oil and gas 
fields.
3. Maximum use of hydro energy.
4. Increase of nuclear power generation to reduce 
imports of energy.
5. Maximum use of coal resources.
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6. Judicious use of gas, giving priority to 
fertilizer use.7'"'
TABLE 3.4
PUBLIC SECTOR ADP ALLOCATIONS DURING 1972-78
1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78
Powe r 753.2 1001.85 1302.37 2072.204 2520.830 3174.411
Fuels 77.5 155.30 382.79 824.127 789.000 492.5
Total
(Energy) 830.7 
(20.01)
1157.15 
(23.29)
1685.16
(19.17)
2896.34 
(21.67)
3309.830
(18.80)
3666.911 
(19.73)
Total 
G ross 4150.5 
( 100)
4967.13 
( 100)
8788.38 13365.466 17496.172 
( 100)
18584.5 
( 100)
Source: * Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, 
Annua1 Plan 1973-74.pp.10,111.113.
* _,Annual Plan 1974-75,p .16.
* ____ ,Annual Plan 1976-77. p.15.
* ____ .Working Papers for the Development Programme
1977-78. Islamabad, pp. 5&96
The Power Sector. From 1972-73 onwards, the power 
sector programmes, particularly the generation and transmis­
sion schemes, received priority attention. The policy to 
expand the hydroelectric capacity and gas-based thermal 
power capacity continued during 1970-78 period. Total in­
stalled capacity on 30 June 1978 was 3,510 MW including 230
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MW of captive capacity in the private sector. Out of this
capacity, 1,567 MW was hydroelectric compared to 667 MW in
1969-70. The use of coal for thermal power generation was
reduced to the minimal. In 1977-78, gas accounted for
7396.8 percent of the fuel consumed for power generation.
The power sector policies, during 1970-78 period, 
were conceived in the light of yearly assessment of problems 
and prospects and responded to the felt needs. For example, 
Annual Plan 1972-73, inter alia, suggested:
a. Removal of transmission/transformation bottlenecks 
for maximum utilization of existing generation;
b. installation of capacitors for improving power 
factor and reduction of losses; and
c. maximum utilization of existing equipment by 
preventive maintenance and keeping the equipment 
in top condition.74
Annual Plan 1974-75 adopted the following strategy 
and objectives:
a. Augmenting generating capacity from 2445 MW to 
2720 MW by completing Lyallpur Gas turbine station 
(200 MW), Quetta extension 25 MW, Kotri and 
Karachi gas turbines stations of 50 MW and 100 MW 
respectively.
b. Use of alternate fuels at the thermal power 
stations, besides natural gas.
c. Synchronizing completion of Lyallpur Gas turbine 
station with SNGPL Project (3-A) to augment gas 
supply by 26 MMCFT.
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d. Installation of diesel stations at Tehsil head- 
quarters in Azad Kashmir.
e. Augmenting grid station capacity by 1400 MVA.
f. Extension of high voltage transmission lines 66KV 
and above by 1200 miles.
g. Removal of transmission line bottlenecks for 
optimum utilization of hydel power from Mangla and 
absorption of full output from Guddu.
h. Accelerating the progress of 220 KV Tarbela-Wah 
Transmission lines to synchronize with Tarbela 
Development.
i. Procurement of distribution equipment from aboard 
has become necessary due to world wide shortage of 
raw materials, which places a constraint on 
domestic production.
j. Improvement in efficiency of transmission and 
distribution and reduction in losses.
k. Reorganization of WAPDA with decentralization and 
creation of Area Boards.
l. Providing 1.4 lakhs additional service connections 
(1.0 lakhs by WAPDA, 0.4 lakhs by KESC and REPC0).
m. Electrification of 1000 villages.
n. To meet the fuel shortage at Shahdara power 
station, it is planned to switch over two of its 
turbines on LPG, which are presently burning HSD, 
already a deficit product. LPG is much cheaper and 
cleaner fuel. The turbines could be easily 
transformed to burn this fuel with slight 
modifications. This will result in considerable 
savings in foreign exchange through lesser import 
of HSD.
o. The second 220 KV transmission line from Mangla to 
Kalashah Kaku for Mangla units 5 to 8 is scheduled 
for commissioning in January 1975, WAPDA has 
therefore, no alternative but to make use of the 
existing 220 KV lines from Mangla during the 
summer of 1974-75 with six units in operation at 
Mangla. Ways and means should be found to make
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optimum utilization of Mangla power without over 
loading the transformers on the 220 KV line.
p. According to the recent schedules of commission­
ing, the first double circuit of 220 KV Tarbela- 
Wah Transmission line is expected in December, 
1975, i.e. one month behind the scheduled commis­
sioning of Tarbela Units 1 and 2. The situation 
therefore demands serious efforts to accelerate 
progress of this project during 1974-75.
q. Constant watch is required on the progress of
SNGPL’s project 3-A and Lyallpur gas turbines
stations project. At present both are scheduled7 5for completion in January, 1975.
The power losses further increased and service 
deteriorated during 1974-75. Annual Plan 1975-76, therefore, 
stressed to take effective steps to control power losses.76
Special programmes were initiated during the 1970-78 
period to provide electric power to the underdeveloped 
areas. WAPDA initiated the Guddu-Sibbi-Quetta transmission 
project in order to link Quetta with the national grid and 
provide electricity to Baluchistan areas. To electrify the 
isolated towns of Baluchistan, the policy of installing 
small diesel stations was adopted. Besides, installation of 
small hydel stations in northern areas and Azad Kashmir 
along with extension of necessary distribution facilities 
was also undertaken. Village electrification continued at a 
slow pace.
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The policy of nationalization of electric supply
undertakings continued. Under the Economic Reforms order, 
1972, the government took over the management of all the 
private sector electric supply public utilities in January 
1974.77
Atomic Energy. Significant developments took place in
Pakistan’s nuclear energy policy during 1970-78 period.
The (aborted) Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75 provided for the
construction of the nuclear power station (200 MW capacity)
at Rooppur in East Pakistan besides making the Karachi
Nuclear Power Plant operational. In addition, it provided
for initiating work to establish a fuel reprocessing plant
and to determine the feasibility of a dual-purpose nuclear-
reactor, for desalination of sea-water and power generation,
7 Rin West Pakistan.
It was announced in May 1972 that Pakistan had drawn 
firm plans to set up second nuclear power plant in the north 
with a 500 MW capacity and that studies were also being 
carried out to set up a dual-purpose nuclear desalination 
plant for Karachi area with a capacity of 400 MW and the 
desalination of 100 million gallons of sea water per day. On 
11 May, 1972, Radio Pakistan also reported that ’Pakistan
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with its large deposits of uranium planned to set-up two
7 9atomic reactors'. Annual Plan 1972-73 allocated Rs. 48.70
million for the atomic energy development programme. The
Plan envisaged the completion of new laboratories at the
Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near
Islamabad.80 The Central research facility of PINSTECH,
namely, Pakistan Research Reactor (PAAR) had gone ’critical’
in December, 1965 and attained its full power of 5MW in
June, 1966.81 The 1972-73 Plan also provided for the import
of plant and machinery for Uranium exploration in D.G. Khan
district. In June 1973, a plan to set up a heavy water
production plant with an output capacity of 13 tonnes of
R ?heavy water per annum was announced. In July, 1973 the
Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission disclosed
more details regarding the planned setting up of the second
nuclear power plant with installed capacity of 900 MW
instead of 500 MW initially announced and stated that the
83plant would be completed within two-and-half years time.
On the basis of IAEA assessment, Pakistan made public 
its 25 year nuclear power generation programme on 27 
December, 1973. The Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy 
Commission announced on television that Pakistan would 
establish 15 new nuclear power stations in the next 25
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years. He stated that the first nuclear power station of 900 
MW capacity would be completed by 1975 near Kundian, in 
Chashma Baghage area of Punjab. He also disclosed that 
Pakistan had discovered an "abundant quantity" of Uranium 
which would not only be sufficient for Pakistan’s require-
p Aments but it could also be exported.”
India conducted its nuclear explosion on 18 May, 
1974. This caused a serious blow to the Pakistan’s efforts 
to overcome its energy shortages by developing nuclear 
power. The Indian explosion created suspiciicion and mistrust 
amongst the nuclear technology exporting countries who
announced severe restrictions for the transfer of nuclear 
technology. The nuclear power programme of Pakistan was, 
therefore, revised. This revision also considered the second 
assessment of the IAEA confirming Pakistan’s future nuclear
p Cpower needs. Under the revised schedule, the second 
nuclear power plant of 600 MW capacity at Chashma (original 
planned capacity of this reactor was 500 MW which was
changed to 900 MW in the first revision) was planned to be
completed by 1980. The third plant (dual-purpose plant to 
generate 400 MW electricity and 100 million gallons of fresh 
water by desalination of seawater) at Karachi was envisaged 
to be completed by early 1980s. After 1985, the programme
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envisaged the construction of a nuclear power plant almost
Revery year till the end of the century.
Pakistan’s nuclear program, detailed in the Annual 
Plan 1974-75 consisted of (a) nuclear power development, 
(b) research and application of nuclear technology in the 
field of medical, physical and biosciences, (c) exploration 
of radio active minerals, and (d) manpower training. Annual 
Plan 1974-75 provided for a separate scheme, namely, 
’Nuclear Power Generation Training Project’ in order to meet 
the future requirements to implement the nuclear Power 
generation program. Allocations were also made in the 1974-
o 775 Plan for setting up Chashma Nuclear Power Plant. The 
subsequent Annual Plans continued to provide for the imple­
mentation of the above mentioned schemes.
The Fuels Sector. The coal remained neglected during 
1970-78. Allocations for coal development during this period 
continued to be negligible. Coal got nothing in some of the 
Annual Development Plans. The production of coal declined 
from about 1.33 million metric tons in 1971 to 1.25 million 
metric tons in 1977-78, touching the 1.05 million metric 
tons mark in 1975-76. The share of coal in the total energy 
consumption declined from 8.3 percent in 1971-72 to 5.5
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percent in 1977-78. Coal continued to be replaced by gas and
petroleum products in the absence of any comprehensive coal 
development plan dealing with its production, transportation 
and utilization. The brick-kiln industry remained the only 
major consumer of coal; its share increased from 75 percent 
of total coal consumption in 1971 to about 94 percent in
1977-78 88
The policy of expansion of gas utilization continued. 
Gas prices were particularly kept low to encourage its 
consumption. The production of gas, including associated 
gas, increased from 124,786 MMCFT in 1971-72 to 199,067 
MMCFT in 1977-78. The share of gas, excluding feed-stock, in 
the energy supplies increased from 35.6 percent in 1971-72 
to 37.6 percent in 1977-78.89
Pakistan continued to import large quantities of 
crude oil and petroleum products during the 1970-78 period. 
Production of crude oil decreased from 3,007,815 US barrels 
in 1971-72 to 2,443,345 US barrels in 1974-75, increased to 
3,743,020 US barrels in 1976-77 and again decreased to 
3,539,370 US barrels in 1977-78. The increase in crude oil 
production in 1976-77 was mainly due to the doubling of 
production at Meyal Gil Field, which also declined in the
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following year. 90
In respect of oil and gas exploration, the policy to 
invest in the private oil companies’ efforts instead of 
making direct investment by the public sector continued 
during 1970-78 period. Government signed a number of joint 
venture agreements with private as well as foreign 
countries’ public sector companies. The OGDC was also 
allowed to enter into joint venture agreements and make use 
of the contract drilling.
After the oil price hike in 1973, the government 
announced to step up its efforts in the exploration and 
development of oil and gas. The Minister for Petroleum and 
Natural Resources announced at the beginning of 1974 that 
the government was ’making all out effort’ to accelerate oil 
exploration by stepping up the activities of the Oil and Gas 
Corporation and by promoting foreign participation in this 
field. He also disclosed that a seven year "Master Plan" 
involving investments of about $250 million in oil develop­
ment was approved by the government and would be put into 
movement in 1974. He further mentioned that "liberal terms" 
were being offered to the foreign exploration companies and 
the negotiations with foreign countries for joint ventures
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were also underway. In 1975, the government allowed the 
well-head price of oil in all new concession agreements to 
rise to world levels. To attract foreign investment and 
accelerate exploration and development, the following addi­
tional incentives were announced in 1976:
a. Companies were permitted to remit annual net 
profits after providing for deductions allowed 
under the Income Tax Act.
b. Initial participation by Government in exploration 
was restricted to payment in rupees. The extent of 
participation was made subject to arrangement 
between GOP (Government of Pakistan) and the 
concessionaire.
c. Mining lease for a proven field was to be granted 
for an initial term of twenty years with provision 
for four renewals of four years each.
d. Facility was extended for export of foreign 
company’s crude oil share after meeting internal 
requirements based on prorated figures of produc­
tion as compared to other producing companies.
e. Rate of royalty fixed at 12-1/2% of well-head 
value throughout the term of the agreement without 
any allowance for the revision with increase in 
production. Royalty was to form part of the sum of 
payments to the Government and taxes on income 
with the provision that it would not be more than 
50% nor less than 50%.
f. Oil Companies were given the facility to inspect 
all data in respect of relinquished areas in the 
Ministry of Petroleum, free of cost.
g. Import of material and equipment required for ex­
ploration and drilling prior to commercial discov­
ery was allowed to be imported free of customs 
duty and sales tax. After commercial discovery, 
the rate of custom duty and sales tax was fixed at 
5-1/4% adalorem for a negotiated period.
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h. Foreign nationals employed by oil companies or
its contractors were not to be charged income
tax for a period of 3 years from the date of92their arrival in Pakistan.
The above mentioned incentives were provided legal 
cover through Regulation of Nines and Oil-field and Mineral 
Development (Government Control) Amendment Act, 1976.
Subsequently, it was also decided to freeze the provisions 
of the Income Tax Act at the time of the agreements. The 
government also tried to strengthen the state-owned OGDC. 
The financial allocations for the OGDC significantly 
increased towards the end of 1970-78 period; allocations 
increased from Rs. 58.3 million in 1972-73 to Rs. 450 
million in 1977-78. The support to the Geological Survey 
of Pakistan continued at a low level.
In March 1977, the Ministry of Fuel, Power and
Natural Resources was bifurcated into the Ministry of Water
and Power, and the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural
Resources. The Government also established the Petroleum
Commission of Pakistan ’with the objectives of integrated
energy policy formulation, project implementation and the
9 5regulation of the petroleum industry’. The charter of the 
Petroleum Commission was to: supervise exploration
activities of the state-owned Oil and Gas Development
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Corporation and foreign companies; and oversee the domestic
Qmarketing of oil products.
Prior to the Economic Reforms Order 1972, oil 
refining was in the private sector. On January 16, 1972, the 
government took over the management of the only refinery, 
(National Refinery Limited at Karachi) owned by Pakistani 
private sector. It was reported in January, 1974 that 
Pakistan signed a protocol with Abu Dhabi to build a 
refinery at Multan with a capacity of 40,000 barrels per day 
and a pipeline from Karachi to Multan (800 kilometers). In 
July 1974, after acquiring the majority shares in the capi­
tal of National Refinery Limited (NRL), the government
transferred its management to a newly established State
98Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation Limited. 
Subsequently, the capacity of the National Refinery at 
Karachi was also decided to be raised from 531,000 tons per 
year to 2.1 million tons per year by May 1976. By 1977-78, 
the refining capacity of all three refineries was raised to 
5.13 million tons per annum.100 The output of these refiner­
ies, however, did not match with the consumption pattern in 
the country. The deficit products which had to be imported 
increased from 418,655 metric tons in 1971-72 to 1,098,978 
metric tons in 1977-78 showing an increase of 262 percent
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during this period. On the other hand, surplus production of
furnace oil and naphtha had to be exported ’at a real low 
price’.10'1 The policies to remove this imbalance in the 
refinery production and consumption pattern remained non­
existent.
Energy Tariff. The policy of keeping the gas prices 
at low levels continued. The gas price for industrial users 
was kept very low, whereas domestic and commercial users 
were charged at higher levels. The gas price for general in­
dustrial users was increased five times during 1970-78 and 
was brought closer to the price paid by the domestic users, 
although the industrial users were charged at reduced rates 
after a certain consumption level. On the other hand, the 
domestic consumers were charged at higher rates after a 
certain consumption level. The commercial users were charged 
at higher rates. Table 3.5 below shows the changes in gas 
price for various consumers made on different occasions 
during 1970-78. Gas price for power, cement and fertilizer 
industries varied from plant to plant (therefore, not 
possible to give average price) and was based on two part 
tariff; a fixed charge and commodity charge per NCFT. They 
were charged at rates even lower than the general industrial 
use rs.
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TABLE 3.5
GAS PRICES. 1969-76 
(Rs. Per MCFT)
Gene ral 
Indust ries
Commercial Domestic
28-6-1969 3.25/3.05 6.04 6.40
11-8-1973 3.73/3.53 6.88 6.40
08-6-1974 5.60/5.30 10.00 6.40
01-7-1974 5.60/5.30 10.32 6.40
01-2-1975 7.46/7.06 13.76 9.60
29-3-1976 9.32/8.82 17.20 9.60 (. Fo r first MCFT 
12.00(A11 over one 
MCFT)
Source: Energy Data Book, op.cit.. p . 136.
After the oil price increases in the international 
market, the government adopted the policy of gradually 
increasing the prices of petroleum products to bring them at 
the international level. The price of Kerosene oil and High 
Speed Diesel (HSD) were kept low. The price of kerosene was 
increased thrice during 1970-78 from Rs. 2.00 per gallon to 
Rs. 4.00 per gallon. The price of HSD was increased on six 
occasions from Rs. 3.00 per gallon to Rs. 6.35 per gallon. 
The price of MS was increased on nine occasions from 
Rs. 4.81 per gallon to Rs. 12.70 per gallon. The price of 
H0BC was enhanced also on nine occasions from Rs. 5.45 per
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gallon to 15.40 per gallon. The price of Furnace Oil
increased in different stages from Rs. 240 per ton to
1 02Rs. 600 per ton.
The coal price for brick kilns fluctuated between 
Rs. 60 per ton and Rs. 150 per ton during 1970-74. The
prices almost doubled during 1974-75 ranging between
Rs. 210 per ton and Rs. 376 per ton and continued to 
fluctuate in this range until 1977-78.10^
The policy in respect of electricity tariffs also 
underwent substantial change during 1970-78. Until March 
1976, tariffs used to be lower on increased consumption in 
the domestic sector. This was revised on March 24, 1976, 
when higher tariffs were fixed for the electricity to be 
consumed beyond a certain level. The tariffs for domestic 
users were kept low. The tube-well tariffs were kept at the 
lowest level. The tariffs for industrial users, which were 
lower than that of the domestic (household) users until 
February 1975, were gradually increased to higher levels. 
Office and Commercial users continued to be charged at 
higher rates. While the tariffs applied to the domestic and 
general users remained relatively stable, other tariffs were 
enhanced more frequently.104
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THE FIFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (1978-83)
The Fifth Five Year Plan adopted an integrated energy 
development strategy. The salient features of the Fifth Plan 
strategy were as follows:
a. Maximum priority to hydel generation and commis­
sioning of on-going hydroelectric projects;
b. to economize fuel consumption by transmitting bulk 
power from Tarbela to the southern part of the 
country over extra high voltage transmission 
1ines;
c. intensive exploration for indigenous resources of 
fossi1 fuel;
d. quick development of discovered and proven oil and 
gas fields;
e. expansion of gas consumption for industrial use; 
and
f. maximum use of coal resources.^05
The public sector energy development program was 
allocated Rs. 33,522 million (23 percent of the public 
sector development outlay); Rs. 27,932 million for the power 
sector programs and Rs. 5,590 million for the fuel sector 
programs.^ 06 Table 3.6 indicates the physical targets envis­
aged to be achieved by the end of the Fifth Plan.
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The Power Sector. The power sector strategy of the
Plan was to:
a. Increase per capita generation of electricity by 
42%, from 167 KWH in 1977-78 to 237 KWH in 
1982-83;
b. increase total installed capacity from 3,510 MW 
to 5,765 MW by 1982-83;
c. give maximum priority to the hydel generation and 
commissioning of on-going hydroelectric projects;
d . economize fuel consumption by transmitting bulk 
power from Tarbela to the southern part of the 
country over extra high voltage transmission 
1ines;
e. improve the secondary transmission and 
distribution facilities to reduce system losses 
and extend power facilities to the maximum number 
of consumers;
f. accelerate village electrification; and
g. place the power corporations on a sound 
financial footing so that at least 30 percent of 
the expansion program is financed through self- 
generation of resources.107
The policy of nationalization of electric supply 
undertakings continued. On the directive of the Government, 
WAPDA took over various private electric supply companies 
operating in the country along with their physical assets 
and employees in May 1981. Subsequently, the Government paid 
compensation to these companies. WAPDA also gained increased 
control over the affairs of the KESC during the Fifth Plan
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period. The Chairman of WAPDA was made ex-officio Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the KESC.
TABLE 3.6
FIFTH PLAN ENERGY SECTOR PHYSICAL TARGETS
A . POWER
1 .
2 .
3 .
Total Installed capacity 
(addition)
Public utilities
Hydel
Thermal
Nuclear
Private Captive Capacity 
No. of consumers (addition)
2255 M.W.
2090 M.W.
1330 M.W.
760 M.W.
165 M.W.
165,000 per annum
Villages electrified (addition) 5,000
B. FUELS
1. Crude oil production
2. Drilling of wells 
0GDC
Private companies
3. Gas production
4. No. of gas consumers
(addition)
5. Coal production
36.8 thousand barrels 
per day 
70 
50 
20
Average gas supply to 
increase from 496 MMCFT 
in 1977-78 to 856 MMCFT 
in 1982-83
0.5 million 
1.7 million tons
Source: The Fifth Five Year Plan , pp.98-99, 112.
Rural Electrification. The strategy in respect of 
rural electrification consisted of increasing the number of
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rural electrical consumers, which was only about 10 to 15
percent of the electrified villages, instead of increasing 
only the number of electrified villages. The target for 
electrification of an additional number of 5,000 villages 
was also fixed.108
Atomic Energy. The Fifth Plan continued the Atomic 
Energy Policy evolved during the past twenty years. The Plan 
provided for the completion of reprocessing plant and the 
continuation of work on the Chashma Nuclear Power Project, 
besides a number of research and training programs.
The Fuels Sector. The fuels policy envisaged to achieve 
the following five objectives:
a. Large resources would be allocated to exploration 
and development of new oil and gas fields with the 
emphasis in the public sector on quick development 
of discovered or proven fields.
b. In view of recent gas discoveries, freer expansion 
of gas consumption in modification of earlier 
policy of conserving gas for industrial use. The 
use of gas for power generation would be limited 
due to large availability of hydroelec trie power'. 
Expansion of LPG would also be encouraged.
c. To accommodate the anticipated larger availability 
of indigenous crude oil, the plans for refining of 
crude oil would be reviewed.
d. Strengthening of arrangements for transport and 
sto rage of oil.
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e. Continuation of limited efforts for development of
coal uses and for research and demonstration of1 0 * 9unconventional sources of energy.
In respect of oil, the Plan adopted the following 
objectives:
a. Accelerate development of known oil fields, i.e. 
Toot, Meyal and Dhodak, with a view to reducing 
the oil import bill.
b. Continue to explore the additional oil fields 
through OGDC and also international oil companies 
by providing incentives.
c. Encourage reduction in consumption of middle 
distillates, i.e. kerosene and HSD.
d. Operate the refineries based on imported crude oil 
at optimum capacity consistent with foreign 
exchange economies.
e. Provide additional refining capacity to process 
the indigenous crude oil production.
f. Provide adequate transportation capacities for 
POL movement to and from south.
g. Develop adequate storages up country to meet the 
requirements.110
The policies and regulations for foreign companies 
regarding oil and gas exploration and development, however, 
remained unaltered. The Plan envisaged oil and gas explora­
tion activities at a low level; with only 3-4 exploratory
wells per annum by the private companies, and only 4 explor-
111atory wells per annum by the OGDC.
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The National Energy Policy Committee (NEPC) was set
up in 1980 for keeping the energy policy under constant 
review which held its first meeting on 27 November, 1980. 
The NEPC issued policy directives from time to time during 
the Fifth Plan period. The policy of ’freer expansion of gas 
consumption’ adopted by the Fifth Plan was changed by the 
NEPC as the impact of the 1iberalization of gas consumption 
was soon realized. The NEPC, in its first meeting, decided 
that the Sugar and other industries having furnaces with 
dual firing system should consider to ’switch over to fuel 
oil instead of gas, particularly during winter months’. It 
was also decided that the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural 
Resources should consider ’not to give natural gas to brick 
kiln industry. Similar directives were repeatedly issued 
by the NEPC in its subsequent meetings for the substitution 
of gas by other fuels due to continued increase in demand 
which outpaced the supply.
Energy Tariff. The Fifth Plan pointed out the 
existing distortions in the pricing of energy and envisaged 
to remedy the same. Gas prices were increased during the 
Fifth Plan period on two occasions for domestic sector and 
on three occasions for commercial and industrial sectors. 
The price structure also underwent a structural change from
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that of encouraging the gas consumption to that of economiz­
ing it. Table 3.7 indicates the gas price movements for 
various sectors during the period.
TABLE 3.7
GAS PRICES. 1978-83
Rs. Per MCFT
Indust ry Commercial Domestic
23-6-1978 9.32/ 8.82 17.2 12.00/ 9.60
26-6-1979 10.96/10.48 18.85 12.00/ 9.63
11-1-1982 ooK) ’—{ 22.00 14.00/21.00
9-1-1983 16.34 25.34 No change
Source: Energy Year Book,. 1983. op.cit. , p.53.
The price of petroleum products was increased on 
various occasions. The price of kerosene was decreased once, 
but again increased to the previous level in three months 
time. The price of kerosene increased from Rs. 1 per litre 
on 1 January, 1979 to Rs. 2.75 per litre on 9 January, 1983. 
The price of HSD was gradually increased on five occasions 
from Rs. 1.56 per litre to Rs. 4.00 per litre. The price of 
HOBC was also increased on five occasions from Rs. 3.60 per 
litre on 29 June 1978 to Rs. 7.30 per litre. The price of 
Gasoline (regular) was increased on six occasions from Rs. 3
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per litre to Rs. 6 per litre. The price of furnace oil was
increased on five occasions from Rs. 590 per ton to Rs. 
1,720 per ton. The price of coal varied between Rs. 375 per 
ton and Rs. 678 per ton.
The policy in respect of electricity tariff also 
changed. WAPDA introduced the system of adding fuel sur­
charge in tariff since July 1978 whenever price of fuels was 
increased. The domestic consumers, however, were exempted. 
This system was already being followed by the KESC.
THE SIXTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (1983-88)
The Sixth Five Year Plan assigned highest priority to 
the energy sector. The Plan allocated Rs. 116.5 billion for 
the energy sector development programs; Rs. 87.4 billion for 
power sector including Rs. 9 billion for the PAEC programs; 
Rs. 27.5 billion for fuels; and Rs. 1.6 billion for energy 
planning, research, conservation and renewables. The energy 
sector allocation amounted to 38.2 percent of Sixth Plan 
public sector development outlays against the 25.3 percent 
of the Fifth Plan revised allocations. As a percentage of 
overall development outlay, the energy sector allocation 
increased from 17.2 percent in the Fifth Plan to 23.1 per-
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cent in the Sixth Plan.114 Table 3.8 gives details of the 
physical targets of the Sixth Plan for the energy sector.
The Sixth Plan set the following ’basic objectives’ 
of the national energy policy:
a. To ensure adjustments for realizing growth targets 
of the Sixth Plan in an energy efficient manner;
b. to arrange inter-fuel adjustments with the 
objective of minimizing import-dependence within 
the Plan period;
c. to prepare the ground for growing self-reliance in 
energy during the Seventh Plan and beyond;
d. to develop indigenous resources of energy,
intensify the search for yet undiscovered re­
sources, develop nuclear and renewable energy 
resources and to acquire full command on
technology relating to energy substitutes;
e. to ensure coverage of the entire rural population 
residing in compact villages by rural 
electrification;
f. to develop mechanisms for greater participation of
the private sector in meeting the energy
requirements of the nation;
g. to ensure proper institutionalization of long term 
energy planning, monitoring and evaluation;
h. to rationalize energy prices.115
The Plan provided for greater participation of the
private sector in the ene rgy sector and envisaged an
investment of Rs. 15.7 billion to come f rom the private
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TABLE 3.8
SIXTH PLAN ENERGY SECTOR PHYSICAL TARGETS
A ■ POWER.
1. Energy generation 31,723 Million Kwh
a) WAPDA 26,323 Million Kwh
b) KESC 5,400 Million Kwh
2. Installed capacity addition 3,795 M.W.
a) WAPDA
b) KESC
3. No. of consumers (addition)
a) WAPDA
b) KESC
2,895 M.W. 
900 M.W. 
3,152,550 
2,900,000 
252,550
4. Villages electrified 
(including others) 20,000
B. FUELS
1. Crude oil production 
(yearly averageO
2. Gas consumption
3. Coal production
4. Drilling of wells
a) OGDC
b) Joint Ventures
c) Private
5. LPG Production
6. Refining capacity
7. Gas consumers 
(new addition)
21.00 thousand barrels 
per day
439,460 MMCFT 
5.4 million tons/annum 
250 
96 
25 
129
200,970 tons 
8 million tons/annum
110.000 per annum
Source: The Sixth Five Year Plan, pp.223-258.
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sector- Besides, it was decided to encourage the private
sector to participate in power generation, particularly coal
based, with guaranteed purchases by the KESC or WAPDA
1 1 &allowing a reasonable rate of return.
The Plan placed special emphasis on the conservation 
of energy- It suggested to take steps like setting up a 
National Energy Conservation Unit, institutionalizing a 
system of energy surveys and audits, training of experts, 
arranging institutionalized financing for the conservation 
of energy, demonstration and dissemination of information, 
and setting up of efficiency standards- It also recommended 
the following measures:
a. Closure of shops earlier in the evening and 
consideration of adopting day-light saving time;
b. introduction of a system of 5 day week with longer 
working hours as well as staggered holidays and 
shifting times in industrial estates and 
industrial areas;
c. encouraging industries to close for plant mainte­
nance during the critical energy supply period 
of December to May;
d. investigating more energy efficient means of bulk 
transportation such as the use of pipe lines and 
the inland waterways;
e. carrying out energy audits which will be made 
mandatory for major sectors of energy consumption
in due course;
f. availability of funds at relatively easier terms
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for energy conservation and efficiency improvement 
p rog rams;
g. preventing wasteful or ostentatious energy use 
through the price mechanism, particularly for 
decorative purposes or for advertisements;
h. introduction of an energy management legislation 
after ensuring that the people have been made 
adequately aware of the necessity of energy 
conservation and improvement in efficiency and 
have access to adequate service and appropriate 
energy information for this purpose.1“17
The Power Sector. Within the energy sector, the Sixth
Plan assigned highest priority to the power sector which got
more than 75 percent of the total energy sector allocation.
Out of the total of Rs. 87.4 billion power sector
allocation, power generation, including nuclear power, was
provided more than 60 percent (Rs. 52.6 billion). The power
sector allocation increased to about 28.7 percent of total
public sector development outlay compared to the 18.4
percent during the Fifth Plan and 14.4 percent during the
118Annual Plan period.
For power generation, the Sixth Plan placed more 
emphasis on (oil-based) thermal power additions. It 
envisaged to increase the installed capacity of the public 
utilities (i.e., WAPDA and KESC) from 4,809 MW in 1982-83 to 
8,604 MW in 1987-88. The additional capacity of 3,795 MW 
would comprise 630 MW hydel, 2,440 MW steam and 725 MW gas
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turbines. Chashma Nuclear Power with the installed capacity
of 900 MW was envisaged to come on-stream after the Sixth 
Plan period in February 1991. Table 3.9 compares the 
installed capacity at the beginning and at the end of the 
Sixth Plan period.
TABLE 3.9
INSTALLED CAPACITY SIXTH PLAN TARGET 
(Public Utilities Only)
1982-83 1987- 88
M . W . % MW %
Hydel 2,547 53.0 3,177 36.9
Steam 1,436 30.0 3,876 45.1
Gas Turbine 689 14.2 1,414 16.4
Nuclear 137 2.8 137 1.6
Total 4,809 100.0 8,604 100.0
Source: The Sixth Five Year Plan, p .238.
Ru ral Electrification. The Sixth Plan envisaged to
accele rate the pace of rural electrification, Rural
electrification strategy mainly consisted of expanding the 
national grid to the rural areas, although solar energy and 
small hydel plants were also decided to be established in 
remote areas. As regards distribution of power, the Sixth
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Plan placed greater emphasis on the agricultural and 
industrial consumers. It envisaged not only to clear the 
backlog of the industrial and agricultural connections but 
also meet all future requirements.
The Fuels Sector. The fuels sector got much better 
allocation compared to the previous years. It improved to 
about 9 percent of the public sector development outlay 
compared to 6.9 percent during the Fifth Plan and 3.9 
percent during the Annual-Plan period. The renewables also 
got better attention which got 0.5 percent of the public 
sector development outlay compared to 0.1 percent during the 
Fifth Plan. For the first time, energy plantation was given 
some attention and Rs. 600 million were provided for this 
pu rpose,
In respect of oil and gas exploration, the Sixth Plan 
continued the policy of attracting private investment. 
Besides, it also envisaged the public sector to gear up its 
efforts. The financial allocations (Rs. 19 billion) for the 
OGDC were increased considerably. The Sixth Plan fixed a 
target of 250 wells; 96 by OGDC, 25 by joint ventures, and 
129 by the private companies. This amounted to an average of 
50 wells per annum against the Fifth Plan average of 16.4
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wells per annum.
In order to accelerate the oil and gas exploration,
the concession rules were amended in 1985. Under the new
rules, the terms of the new concessions were reduced to
three years from the previous 8-12 years and the drilling
was required to start within 18-24 months. New formula
for gas producer price for linking the price of all
non-associated gas to the international price of fuel oil
was also announced. The new price to be paid to the producer
for the pipeline quality gas would equal 66% of the
international price of the fuel oil at the main consumption
centres, adjusted for the transmission cost from the gas
field and subtracting a negotiated percentage discount. The
new formula would be applied to concessions signed on or
1 20after 30 September, 1985.
The Sixth Plan placed greater emphasis on the devel­
opment and utilization of coal, although it continued to be 
treated as a mineral. The Plan discussed the policies and 
programs in respect of coal in the chapter on Minerals. To 
streamline the policies relating to coal, the Plan recom­
mended to setup a National Coal Authority (NCA) with the 
following principal functions:
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Assessment of the quantity and quality of coal 
reserves and formulation of National Exploration 
P rog ram;
Investigation and assessment of economic potential 
of coal and formulation of projects of coal based 
industry preferably close to the coal mine heads;
Coordination and supervision of coal utilization 
feasibility studies e.g. manufacturing and market­
ing of smokeless coal briquettes and fuel 
substitutions;
To act as clearing house of ideas and provide 
advisory and consultative services for the proc­
essing of leases and concessions, in consultation 
with provincial governments for the public and 
private domestic/foreign joint ventures;
NCA assistance to the Government in establishing 
the appropriate structure and mechanism for 
mining finance especially the financing of the 
private sector.1^1
The Plan envisaged to take the following measures for 
the exploration, development, production and utilization of 
coal :
Upgrading reserves from inferred/indicated to 
proven status through appropriate investigation;
development of coal infrastructure, marketing and 
utilization;
encouraging mining ventures on cooperative base; 
introducing fiscal incentives;
applying dual firing systems In heat processing 
units;
establishing small thermal energy plants near coal 
mines (with participation of IaJAPDA and KESC, as 
well as provincial Governments), on joint venture
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or equity basis;
carrying out feasibility studies of gasification 
of Lakhra coal for medium/low Btu gas;
introducing the unit-train concept at railways for 
moving coal from the mines to the centralized 
delivery points;
investigating the feasibility of water transporta­
tion on the Indus river especially between Kala- 
bagh and Sukkur;
adopting pricing policies in relation to competing 
fuels on a more rational basis to encourage in­
creased coal development and use; and
setting up smokeless briquette plants of economic 
sizes based on major coal fields as a substitute 
for kerosene oil.
Renewable Energy Sources. The Plan allocated Rs.1.6 
billion for research, energy planning and development of the 
renewable energy sources. Energy plantation received spe­
cial attention and this project received an allocation of 
Rs.612 million. Bio-gas development project envisaged the 
establishment of 3,000 family size bio-gas units per year 
during the six plan period. It was also planned to harness 
solar energy and a program of Research and Development and 
Demonstration of solar energy was included in the plan. The 
plan also allocated funds for the development of other
renewable sources of energy such as wind energy, garbage
12 3power, ethanol production for sugarcane and small hydels.
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Energy Tariff. The price distortions in the energy
sector had continued during the Fifth Plan. Natural gas 
remained the cheapest fuel in the country. Table 3.10 gives 
the comparison between the prices of various fuels for 
1982-83. The Sixth Plan undertook to rationalize the energy 
prices in the country.
TABLE 3.10
RELATIVE ENERGY PRICES. 1982-83
(Rs./Million BTU)
Ene rgy Agricul- 
tu ral
Indust rial Transport Residen­
tial
Comme rcial 
&
Indust rial
Natu ral 
Gas
- 16.67 - 14.29 25.86
Coal - 33.69 33.69 30.73 -
Ke rosene - - - 80.43 -
LPG - - - 63.34 -
HSD 116.69 116.69 116.69 - -
L.D0 79.35 79.35 79.35 - -
MS - - 188.15 - -
FQ
Electri-
41.50 41.50
'
city 67.39 184.59* 99.62 108.41 292.99
J P - 1 - - 146.09 - -
HOBC - - 230.04 - -
Fuel Wood - - - 48.0 -
* Exclusive of the fuel surcharge.
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Report 
of the Working Group on Development and 
Conservation of Energy Resources, March 1983,
p.116.
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CONCLUSION
The energy sector has received high priority 
attention from successive Governments in Pakistan since 1947 
when the country came into being. The areas which 
constituted Pakistan at the time of independence we re 
industrially underdeveloped. The country also inherited an 
antiquated agricultural sector. The energy requirements of 
the country were not much. In spite of this, about 90 per 
cent of the requirements were met by the imported fuels. 
Some of the areas were dependent on electric supplies from 
India. The institutional framework for planning and execut­
ing energy policy had also to be reorganized. The policy 
planners, therefore, assigned high priority to the energy 
sector as they considered the provision of energy at low 
rates a p re requisite for industrial development and moderni­
zation of agriculture.
From the very outset, the cherished goal of the 
energy policy has been to reduce dependence on imports. The 
initial response of the government was to increase the 
production of oil and coal from the existing fields and to 
gear up the exploration efforts to discover new fields. The 
Pakistan Petroleum Production Rules were framed in 1949 to
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regulate and facilitate the exploration and exploitation of
oil and gas in the country. The natural gas was discovered 
in 1952 at Sui, Baluchistan, but it took some time to 
formulate gas utilization policy. In the power sector, the 
initial response was to construct small thermal plants and 
small canal fall hydel stations to achieve quick results. 
The industrial establishments were encouraged to install 
generating units to meet their individual electric power 
needs. For the purpose of planning and regulating the devel­
opment of electricity, Central Engineering Authority was 
created in 1948 under the Federal Ministry of Industries and 
Natural Resources. The policy for nationalization of elec­
tric undertakings was adopted from the very beginning.
Pakistan embarked upon planned economic development 
in a coordinated way with the launching of the First Five 
Year Plan (1955-60). However, the Fifth Five Year Plan 
(1978-83) is the first official document of the Government 
of Pakistan which treated energy a separate sector of the 
economy. Prior to this, energy related policies and programs 
were ou 11ined separately without establishing int ra-sectoral 
1inkages.
In the fuels sector, the policy to reduce dependence
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on the imported fuel by gearing up exploration and 
exploitation efforts in the country has been adopted by 
successive regimes. It gained real impetus, however, after 
the onset of oil price like in 1973. Initially, the 
Government pursued the policy of total dependence on the 
private companies in the field of oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation. By 1961, as a result of diminishing 
interest of the private companies in the exploratory work, 
the Government of Pakistan established the Oil and Gas 
Development Corporation (OGDC) in the public sector to 
directly undertake exploration and exploitation of oil and 
gas in the country. The Government also adopted the policy 
of entering into joint ventures with other companies. The 
oil crisis of 1973, forced the Government to review the 
priorities in the energy sector and it was at this stage 
that conee rted efforts were made to reorganize and 
strengthen the OGDC. Since mid 1970s, the OGDC has received 
high priority attention of the Government. The efforts are 
afoot as of June, 1988 to achieve financial self-sufficiency 
for the corporation and run it on commercial lines. The 
private sector companies have also shown increased interest 
in the exploration work as a result of revision of rules and 
regulations in 1976 and 1985 providing for attractive 
incentives.
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The policy in respect of gas utilization has provided
for encouraging the consumption of gas in all the sectors. 
This policy led to indiscriminate use of gas and created 
problems forcing the Government to resort to gas load­
shedding during 1980s. The purification, transmission and 
distribution of gas has remained in the public sector, but 
handled by public limited companies under the control of the 
Government. The production and utilization of coal has suf­
fered as a result of gas utilization policy. Although, 
successive plans have emphasized the development and utili­
zation of coal resources.
Until 1974, all three oil refineries were in the 
private sector, when one of them, namely, National Refinery 
Limited located at Karachi, was nationalized. The Government 
also enhanced its participation in marketing, storage and 
distribution of petroleum by nationalizing the Pakistani oil 
marketing companies under the Marketing of Petroleum 
Products Federal Control Act, 1974. The Pakistan State Oil 
Company Limited (PSO) was established in 1976 by integrating 
the' nationalized companies to carry out these functions. 
The foreign-owned oil marketing companies, however, were 
allowed to continue their operations.
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The new and renewable sources of energy, such as
small hydels, bio-gas, solar energy, wind energy, firewood 
and power alcohol, have received belated attention of the 
Government. The first Plan mentioned the production of power- 
alcohol and rules were also framed for its utilization.
Firewood/energy plantation has received some attention in 
energy plans, but without separate allocation of funds 
except the Sixth Plan. Bio-gas and solar energy received 
attention in the Fifth and Sixth Plans. Prior to this, no 
financial allocations were made for their development.
In the power sector, the policy relating to generat­
ing capacity mix has varied. In the initial few years, 
small thermal plants and small hydel stations were planned. 
Development of hydel potential was taken up in the Second 
and the Third Plans. A great headway was made after the 
signing of the Indus Basin Treaty which provided for the 
construction of Mangla and Tarbela Hydel Stations. After the 
discovery of natural gas In 1952, the policy to increase gas 
based ed thermal power capacity has also been pursued. As a 
result of shortage of gas during 19S0s, this policy was 
changed and the use of gas for power generation was discour­
aged. The Sixth Plan placed more emphasis on oil based 
thermal additions. The reliance on the private captive
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capacity decreased after the Second Plan period.
The policy of nationalization of electrical undertak­
ings, has been pursued since independence with the result 
that as of June 1988 no private company is involved in power 
generation and distribution. The Seventh Five Year Plan 
(1988-93), however, has provided for private sector partici­
pation in coal-based thermal power generation. The rural 
electrification has been pursued vigorously since mid 1970s.
The Government has followed its policy of peaceful 
use of atomic energy since 1954. Various atomic energy 
centres are operating in the country. The first nuclear 
power plant with installed capacity of 137 MW started its 
operations at Karachi in 1972. The Government announced its 
nuclear power generation program in 1973 which provided for 
the establishment of 15 nuclear power stations in 25 years. 
Under this program, the first nuclear power station of 
900 MW capacity was planned to be completed by 1975 at 
Chashma in the Punjab. Nuclear power generation policy of 
the Government has not undergone any change.
In respect of energy tariff, the policy has been to 
provide gas and electricity at low rates. Lately, some
171
adjustments have been affected in the tariff structure so as
to discourage wasteful consumption. Until March 1976, the 
electricity tariffs for domestic consumers decreased with 
the increase in consumption. Similarly, the gas tariffs 
also encouraged consumption until 1982 when changes were 
made which provided for higher rates beyond a certain level 
of consumption. The Government has adopted the policy of 
charging the economic price in recent years causing upward 
movements in energy prices. Since the advent of the Fifth 
Five Year Plan, the Government has pursued the policy to 
place the public sector corporations, namely, WAPDA, KESC 
and OGDC, on a sound financial footing so that at least 30 
per cent of the expansion program is financed through self- 
generation of resources. The conservation of energy has 
received some attention from 1978 onwards and the Fifth and 
Sixth Fi ve Year Plans suggested some policy measu res in this 
rega rd.
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CHAPTER IV
IMPLEMENTATION OF ENERGY POLICY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the implementation of energy 
policy in Pakistan. It analyses the achievement of policy 
objectives and the factors which have influenced the 
implementation process. Multifarious variables have been 
identified. The chapter includes case studies on "growth of 
installed capacity and power generation", "transmission 
system", "thermal power", "hydroelectric power", "nuclear 
power", "rural electrification", "railway electrification", 
"power system losses", "power commission", "oil and gas 
exploration and exploitation", "coal policy" and "National 
Energy Policy Committee" which highlight the multiplicity 
and complexity of these variables. In view of the enormity 
of the problem, the analysis has been restricted to major 
policy initiatives pursued during the 1947-88 period. The 
chapter discusses the implementation issues relating to two 
sectors, namely, the power sector and the fuels sector. The 
case studies are devoted to special policy initiatives 
undertaken during the 1947-88 period.
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THE POWER SECTOR
The implementation of energy policy relating to the 
power sector during the 1947-88 period was mainly the re­
sponsibility of the public sector. The Ministry of Water and 
Power of the Federal Government implements the energy 
policy relating to hydroelectricity and thermal power 
through two field organizations under its control, namely, 
the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and the 
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC). The nuclear 
power policy is the responsibility of the Atomic Energy 
Commission of Pakistan which is under the direct control of 
the Chief Executive of the country.
WAPDA has developed to be the most powerful organiza­
tion in the power sector. It was established in 1958 as a 
result of the recommendation by the First Five Year Plan. In 
pursuance of Government policy of nationalization of elec­
trical undertakings, WAPDA had assumed the monopolistic 
control of the power sector by 1985 when it took over the 
management of the KESC (Ch. II). The Chairman of WAPDA is 
usually the confidant of the Chief Executive of the country 
and wields tremendous powers.
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The growth of installed capacity and power generation
At the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan’s total 
installed capacity (excluding former East Pakistan), includ­
ing industrial captive capacity, was a meager 88,4 MW, As of 
30 June 1988, the installed capacity of the public utilities 
alone was 6,820,7 MW, Table 4.1 indicates the progress of 
installed capacity by source during various Plan periods. 
Sizable increases had also been made in power generation 
during the 1947-88 period. The generation by the public 
utilities increased from 117.90 GWH in 1948 to 33,091 GWH in 
1988, Per capita generation by the public utilities in­
creased from less than 4 KWH in 1948 to 318.7 KWH in 1988. 
Table 4.2 indicates the progress of power generation in the 
country since independence. Table 4,3 compares the expansion 
in generating capacity with that of the power generated by 
source at the beginning and the end of each Plan period.
It is evident from Table 4.3 that additions made in 
the thermal capacity during the First and Second Plan peri­
ods were more than double the additions made in the hydel 
capacity; thermal capacity expanded by 535.2 MW against the 
expansion of 207 MW of hydel capacity. At the end of the 
Second Plan (1960-65), the hydel capacity accounted for 29.6
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TABUE 4.1
l’HOCRISS OF IHSTAI.I-I:n CAI'ACITY DY SOURCE OK CKHEKATION
(M.W.)
Year Hyde 1
I’ubl 1c 
The m u  1
Utilities
Nuclear Total
Copt 1ve 
Industrial 
(Thcrmn1)
Total
1947 10.7
(15.6)
58.1
(84.4)
- 68.8
(100.0)
19.6 88.4
1955 62.7
(37.3)
105.5
(62.7)
168.2
(100.0)
100.0 268.2
1960 250.7
(45.6)
299.6
(54.4)
— 550.3
(100.0)
180.0 738.3
1965 269.7
(29.6)
640.7
(70.4)
910.4
(100.0)
185.0 1,095.4
1970 667.8
(38.3)
1,075.6
(61.7)
— 1,743.4
(100.0)
180.0 1,923.4
1978 1,567.2
(46.7)
1,648.8
(49.2)
137.0
(4.1)
2,253.0
(100.0)
230.0 3,583.0
1983 2,547.2
(52.7)
2,153.3
(44.5)
137.0
(2.8)
4,837.5
(100.0)
298.7* 5,136.2
1988 2 , 8 9 8 .2
( 4 2 . 5 )
3 , 7 8 5 .5
( 5 5 . 5 )
1 3 7 .0
( 2 . 6 )
6 8 2 0 .7
( 1 0 0 . 0 )
N. A. N. A.
Cpptlve Industrial capacity seams to be under-reported by 
the Energy Year Book. 1983. According to the Ministry of 
Water and Dover, the captive capacity at the end of 1982-83 
waa about A30 MU.
Notest (a) Flgurea In parentheaia Indicate percentage ahare.
(b) Figures for the former East Pakistan sre excluded. 
Total Installed capacity of public utilities In East 
Pakistan progressed as under!
1947
1955
1960
1965
1970
7.6 MW 
32.2 MW
108.7 MW
205.7 MW 
550.0 MW
Source: (a) 
<b)
Twenty Years of Pakistan, op.clt., p.240. 
The Fourth Five Tear Plan, op.clt., p.429.
(c) The 1947 figures Indicate the capacity existing at the 
time of Independence. The others are the end of 
flnanclul year figures l.e. 30 June from 1960 onwards 
and 30 Harch for 1955.
(d) To present data as accurately aa possible Strenuous 
efforts have gone Into the construction of Table* 4.1 
The data reported In a host of documents Issued by 
different agencies of Government of Pakistan vary due 
to various reasons Including variation In the 
reporting time, difference In the clasalflcatIon or 
coverage, or mlsreportlng or careleasneaa. Variation 
In flgurea for a particular year In the same document 
on different pogea la not an uncommon occurrence. For 
example, WATDA Annuiil Report 1983-64, on pagea 13 and 
91 gives the Installed Generation Capacity of the 
WAPUA System for 1982-83 to be 3,954 MW. But on page 
89 In the same report, the Installed Generating 
Capacity for the same year (l.e. 1982-83) la 3,988.53 
MW. The figures given In the above table have, 
therefore, been cross-checked before Including them In 
the table. Figures In Table 9 are slightly different 
from this table due to variation In reporting time.
Sources: (1) For 1947 figures:
(a) Twenty Tears of Pakistan, op.clt., pp.232 
and 2a0.
(b) The First Five Year Plan, op.clt., p.346.
(II) For 1955 and 1960 figures:
(a) The Second Five Year Plan, op.clt., 
pp.196-194 and 2l2-Jl4.
(III) For 1965 and 1970 flgurea:
(n) Twenty Years of Pakistan, op.clt., pp.240.
(b) The Fourth Five Yeor flan, op.clt ■, p.424.
(lv) For 1978 figures:
(a) Energy Year Book 1979, op.clt., p.57.
(b) The Fifth Five Year Plan, op.clt., p.183.
(v) For 1983 figures:
(a) Energy Year Book 1983, op.clt., pp.56-58.
(b) Energy Year Book 1$87, op.clt•, pp.65-66.
(c) WAPUA Annual Deport, 1984j pj>.6 l 89.
(d) KESC 7ind Annual Report, December 1984,
P*M*
(vi) For 1988 figures:
(a) Energy Year Book 1989, pp. 52-53
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in sIuNIt:/M. i:miturn or Hii'.'iAI.1.1:1» Aim i:i:m:n/.il"H o f M .iiC ik ic m f
IH I.-KI3IAU (IHüLIC in 11.11 ILÜ)
H e a r
1 « )
1(11*1 88 I  I  U«l 
Cg | | t. lC I  1 y  
( M . W . )
( 2 )
A n n u a l  K i m r f y
l n r r « a i e  C m c r n i c ü
I n  C j p a c l t y  (L ’U l i )  
( H . W . )
C M  C M
A i i n u . i  I 
1 !•«! I  u a t f C  I I I  
I n n
( C U ! , )
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F o |»o  1 t i l  I o n  
( » 1 11 I o n s )
CM
8 U l i
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( > )
A n n u a  1 
I n e r t e n » «  i n  
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CU|» I l  a
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1 9 4 7 6 b . 8 _ _ _
i  v ; h 6 8 . n l < - > 0 . 1 9 1 1 7 . 9 0 - 3 1 . 6 3 . 7 -
1 9 4 9 7 ) . 6 5 5 . 0 4
( 7 . ) )
1 5 0 . 8 5 3 2 . 9 5
( 2 7 . 9 )
) 2 . 4 4 . 7 i
( 2 7 . 0 )
1 9  5 0 8 6 . 4 5 1 2 . 8
( 1 7 . 4 )
1 5 6 . 1 0 5 . 2 5
( 3 . 4 8 )
3 3 . 4 4 . 7
1 9 5 1 1 0 5 . 6 6 1 9 . 2 1  
(  27  2 )
2 0 6 . 1 ) 5 0 . 0 )
( 3 2 . 0 )
3 4 . 4 6 . 0 1 . )
( 2 7 . 6 )
1 9 5 2 1 ) 0 . 0 4 2 4 .  ) S  
( 2 2 . 1 )
2 8 1 . 9 0 7 5 . 7 7
( 1 6 . 8 )
3 5 . 5 7 . 9 1 . 9
( 3 1 . 6 )
1 9 5 ) 1 4 ) . 6 8 1 3 . 6 4
( 1 0 . 5 )
) 6 4 . 8 0 1 0 2 . 9
( 1 6 . 5 )
3 6 . 6 1 0 . 5 2 . 6
( 3 2 . 9 )
1 9 5 4 1 6 ) . 6 0 1 9 . 9 2
( 1 3 9 )
4 6 8 . 9 6 8 4 . 1 6
( 2 1 . 9 )
3 7 . 7 1 2 . 4 1 . 9
( 1 8 . 1 )
1 9 5 5 1 6 8 . 1 2 4 . 5 2
( 2 . 8 )
5 9 ) . 5 9 1 2 4 . 6 )
( 2 6 . 6 )
3 8 . 6 1 5 . ) 2 . 9
( 2 3 . 4 )
1 9 5 6 2 0 6 . 7 0 ) 8 . 58  
( 2 2 . 9 )
7 2 5 . 5 9 1 3 2 . 6 0
( 2 2 . 2 )
4 0 . 0 1 8 . 1 2 . 8
( 1 8 . 3 )
1 9 5 7 2 1 6 . 0 6 9 . 3 8  
( 9 . 5 )
8 ) 0 . 1 9 1 0 4 . 6
( 1 4 . 4 )
4 1 . ) 2 0 . 1 2 . 0
( 1 1 . 0 )
I 9 5 ß 2 2 8 . 4 0 1 2 . 1 2
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1 , 0 6 6 . 0 0 2 ) 5 . 8 1
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4 2 . 5 2 5 . 1 5 . 0
( 2 4 . 8 )
1 9 5 9 2 4 1 . 1 0 1 2 . 7
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1 , 0 4 7 . 0 0 < - > 7 9 . 0  
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4 5 . 2 2 ) . 2 ( ”  ) 2 . *  
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1 9 6 1 5 2 1 . 8 8 2 8 . 5 6
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i , 2 y a . o o 2 5 1 . 0
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( 1 9 . 4 )
1 9 6 2 5 8 4 . 6 8 6 3 . 0
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1 , 6 9 2 . 0 0 ) 9 4 . 0  
( 3 0 . ) )
4 8 . ) 1 5 . 0 7 . )
( 2 6 . 3 )
1 9 o ) 7 2 5 . 8 8 141  . 0  
( 2 4 . 1 )
2 , 1 1 7 . 0 0 4 2 5 . 0
( 2 5 . 1 )
4 9 . 7 4 2 . 6 7 . 6
( 2 1 . 7 )
I 9 i > 4 7 4 2 . 5 0 1 6 . 6 2
( 2 . ) )
2 , 7 1 2 . 0 0 5 9 5 . 0
( 2 8 . 1 )
5 1 . 1 5 3 . 1 1 0 . 5
( 2 4 . 6 )
1 9 6 5 8 9 8 . 7 5 1 5 6 . 2 5
( 2 1 . 0 )
3 , 1 7 6 . 0 0 4 6 4 . 0
( 1 7 . 1 )
5 2 . 6 6 0 . 4 7 . )
( 1 3 . 7 )
1 9 6 6 9 4 7 . 9 5 4 9 . 2
( 5 . 5 )
3 , 6 9 8 . 0 0 5 2 2 . 0
( 1 6 . 4 )
5 4 . 0 6 8 . 5 8 . 1
( 1 3 . 4 )
1 9 6 7 1 , ) 1 0 . 9 5 ) 6 3 . 0
( 1 8 3 )
3 , 9 2 5 . 0 0 2 2 7 . 0
( 6 . 1 )
5 5 . 7 7 0 . 5 2 . 0
( 2 . 9 )
1 9 6 6 1 . 4 1 0 . 9 5 1 0 0 . 0
( 7 . 6 )
4 , 6 7 2 . 0 0 7 5 2 . 0
( 1 9 . 2 )
5 7 . 3 8 1 . 6 1 1 . 1
( 1 5 . 7 )
1 9 6 9 1 , 4 6 9 . 9 5 5 9 . 0
( 9 . 2 )
5 , 5 1 8 . 0 0 6 4 1 . 0  
( 1 8 . 0 )
5 8 . 9 9 1 . 2 1 1 . 1
( 1 4 . 8 )
1 9 7 0 1 , 7 2 4 . 9 5 2 5 5 . 0
( 1 7 . 3 )
6 , 3 8 0 . 0 0 8 6 2 . 0
( 1 5 . 6 )
6 0 . 6 1 0 5 . ) 1 1 . 6
( 1 2 . 3 )
1 9 7 1 1 , 7 1 9 . 5 5 ( -  ) 5  • 4 
( - H 0 . 3 )
7 , 2 0 2 . 0 0 8 2 2 . 0
( 1 2 . 9 )
6 2 . 4 1 1 5 . 4 1 0 . 1
( 9 . 6 )
1 9 7 2 1 , 8 6 2 . 2 5 1 4 2 . 7
( 8 . 1 )
7 , 5 7 2 . 0 0 3 7 0 . 0
< 5 - 1 )
6 4 . 9 1 1 6 . 7 1 . 3
( 1 . 1 )
1 9 7 ) * 1 , 8 7 1 . 7 5 9 . 5
( 0 . 5 )
8 , 3 7 7 . 0 0 8 0 5 . 0
( 1 0 . 6 )
6 6 . 8 1 2 5 . 4 8 . 7
( 7 . 4 )
1 9 7 4 2 , 0 7 1 . 7 5 2 0 0 . 0
( 1 6 . 7 )
9 , 0 6 4 . 0 0 6 8 7  . 0  
( 8 . 2 )
6 8 . 8 1 ) 1 . 7 6 . )
( 5 0 )
1 9 7 5 2 , 4 ) 0 . 4 0 3 5 8 . 6 5
( 1 7 . ) )
9 , 9 4 1 . 0 0 8 7 7 . 0
( 9 . 7 )
7 0 . 9 1 4 0 . 2 8 . 5
( 6 . 4 )
1 9 7 6 2 , 5 2 7 . 7 ) 9 7 . 3 )
( 4 . 0 )
1 0 , ) 1 9 . 0 0 3 7 8 . 0
( 1 8 )
7 ) . 0 1 4 1 . 4 1 . 2
( 0 . 8 )
1 9 7 7 ) , ) ) ) . 4 8 8 0 5 . 7 5
( 3 1 . 9 )
1 0 , 8 7 7 . 0 0 5 5 8 . 0
( 5 . 4 )
7 5 . 2 1 4 4 . 6 3 . 2
( 2 . 2 )
1 9 7 « ) , ) ) ) . 0 ) 1 9 . 5 5
( 0 . 6 )
1 2 , 3 7 5 . 0 0 1 , 4 9 8 . 0
( 1 1 8 )
7 7 . 4 1 5 9 . 9 1 5 . )
( 1 0 . 6 )
1 9 7 9 ) , ) ) ) . 0 ) 1 4 , 1 7 4 . 0 0 1 , 7 9 9 . 0
( 1 4 . 5 )
7 9 . 6 1 7 7 . 6 1 7 . 7
( 1 1 . 0 )
1 9 8 0 ) 5 1 8 . 0 ) 1 6 5 . 0
( 4 . 9 )
1 4 , 9 7 4 . 0 0 8 0 0 . 0
( 5 . 6 )
8 2 . 1 1 8 2 . 4 4 . 8
( 2 . 7 )
i v m 4 , 1 0 5 . 0 ) 5 8 7 . 0
( 1 6 . 7 )
1 6 , 0 6 2 . 0 0 1 , 0 8 8 . 0
( 7 . 1 )
8 4 . 6 1 8 9 . 9 7 . 5
( 4 . 1 )
1 9 8 2 4 , 2 0 5 . 0 ) 1 0 0 . 0
( 2 . 4 )
1 7 , 6 8 8 . 0 0 1 , 6 2 6 . 0  
( 1 0 . 1 )
8 7 . 1 2 0 ) . 1 1 3 . 7
( 4 . 9 )
1 9 8 ) 4 , 7 9 8 . 5 5 5 9 3 . 5 2
( 1 4 . 1 )
1 9 , 6 9 7 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 9 . 0
( 1 1 . 4 )
8 9 . 7 2 1 9 . 6 1 6 . 5
( 8 . 1 )
1 9 8 4 5 , 0 1 0 . 1 ) 2 1 1 . 5 8
( 4 . 4 )
2 1 , 8 7 3 . 0 0 2 , 1 7 6 . 0  
I I 1 . 0 )
9 1 . 9 2 ) 8 . 0 1 8 . 4
1 8 . ) )
1988 (S,820.65 — 33,091.00 —  ■ 103.8 318.7 —
* I n t t . l l i ' J  C a p a c i t y  f i g u r e *  l o r  1 9 7 ]  c o r r e c t e d  by a u b t i i i c t l n g  100 HU and by d e l
c a p a c i t y  I r o a  D i a l  waa r e p o r t e d  by t l i o  E ne rg y  Yenr  l o o k ,  1979 a l t a r  c o o p e r i n g  
w i t h  MAFOA Enu iT  S y e t ei* S t i l t  l e t  l e a . 0| i . t l l  .  p . t .  aa i l i a  l i y d a l  c a p a c i t y  d i d  
n o t  l i i c t e a e e  d ur 1 ug 1 9 7 7 - 7 ) .
S o u rc e  I f o r  I n a t a l l c d  c a p a c i t y  and e n e rg y  gen e r a t i o n  l l g u r e a t 
( I )  E ne tpy  Uata  l o o k , o p . t I t . .  p p . M  l  lot.
I l l )  Ene rg y  f e a t  Book 197 9 , o p . c I t . .  p y . ) 7  1 62 .
( I l l )  Ene rgy t e a r  l o o k  1 9 6 8 , p p . 74 -75  6 « 0 .
F o r  p o p u l a t i o n  l l g u r e a l
( l v )  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A t o a l c  Ene rg y  A ge n cy ,  N u c le a r  Power F l a n n in g  S tu d y  l o r  
f a b  I a t u n . V i e n n a ,  1 9 7 ] ,  p .2 8 .
( v )  U u r l d  Bank, f a k l a t a n l  Bec e i i t  E c o n o a lc  De va lo p a u n t  a , R e p o r t  | l o .
4 9 0 6 - f a k ,  F e b r u a r y  7 l , l9 i<T] p , S t .
( * l )  C i u n o a l c  Sur v e y  199 7 - 9 0 ,  o p . c I f * .  S l a t l a t l c a l  A nn e eu re ,  p. j t
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percent of the total capacity against the thermal capacity
share of 70.4 percent. During the next 18 years (1965-83), 
the hydel capacity expanded at a much faster rate due to the 
completion of Mangla and Tarbela dams. Between 1965 and 
1983, hydel capacity increased by 2,277.5 MW against an 
expansion of 1,512.6 MW of thermal capacity, increasing the 
share of the former to 46.7 percent in 1978 and to 52.7 
percent in 1983. During the Sixth Plan (1983-88), thermal 
capacity expanded by 1,632 MW against an expansion of 351 MW 
of hydel capacity, thereby decreasing the share of hydel 
capacity in the country. Pakistan has only one nuclear 
power plant with installed capacity of 137 MW which became 
operational in 1972. As no additions could be made in the 
nuclear capacity afterwards, its share has decreased from 
7.4 percent in 1972 to 2.0 percent in 1988. The industrial 
captive capacity expanded at a much slower rate compared to 
that of the public utilities during the 1947-88 period. In 
1947, the captive capacity amounted to 22.1 percent of the 
total capacity. Its share decreased to 5.8 percent in 1983.
Pakistan has developed its hydroelectric capacity in 
integration with the development of water resources. The 
policy to conceive, develop and implement multi-purpose 
projects, which would provide irrigation water as well as
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hydroelectricity, was pursued during the study period. As a
result three dams, namely, Warsak, Mangla and Tarbela, were 
constructed which developed huge storages of water for 
irrigation purposes. Hydroelectricity generation facilities 
were integrated into the projects in such a way that the 
water released for the irrigation purposes would be proc­
essed to generate electricity. The policy gave priority to 
the irrigation requirements in the use of water.
The percentage of the energy produced by different 
sources (thermal, hydel, nuclear) has varied in Pakistan 
without any regard to the percentage share of the respective 
installed capacity which is evident from Table 4.3.1 The 
generation of hydroelectricity is dependent on the seasonal 
flow of rivers (which varies in response to weather condi­
tions; rainfall, snowfall, snow-melt, etc. in the catchment 
areas) and irrigation requirements (which vary considerably 
during a year depending upon rainfall and cropping pattern). 
Thermal generation has suffered due to almost complete 
dependence on gas and the neglect of coal and furnace oil 
for power generation. The burning of garbage and other 
wastes in big cities to generate electricity still remains 
to be tried in Pakistan, although such plants have been 
operating in Europe for many years. Due to manifold increase
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in demand, load-shedding of gas has been increasingly re­
sorted to, particularly in winter months, since early 1970s 
and power sector has mostly been amongst the first to bear 
the pinch. Nuclear generation has suffered due to the denial 
of nuclear technology to Pakistan by those having monopolis­
tic control over it.
The performance of the government in implementing the 
planned additions in installed capacity deteriorated during 
the 1965-88 period. It failed to achieve the Plan targets 
since the advent of the Third Five Year Plan (1965-70). The 
expansion in the installed capacity during a particular Plan 
has remained substantially lower than the targets. Table 4.4 
indicates the performance during various Plan periods. 
Table 4.5 indicates delays in the Commissioning of some 
important projects.
The Third Five Year Plan envisaged to augment the 
existing capacity by 1,197.7 MW, but only 833 MW were added 
during the Plan period, representing a shortfall of 30.5 
percent (364.7 MW). The shortfall was on account of delay in 
the commissioning of the 137 MW KANUPP and the failure to 
bring on line a further addition of 237.8 MW of thermal 
capacity. The target for the hydel capacity was, however,
188
TABLE 4 4
lMfLEHLKIATiOK OF THE PLAS'NCI’ ADDITIONS IK THE INSTALLED GENERATING CAPACITY Of M'bLIC LIILMILS
(Mbj)
Period _______________ Targets_____________  _____________ Achievements___________________________Slmr 11 al 1 /Exc1 1s *
Hyde) Thera«! Nuclear Total Hyde) Thermal Nuclear Total Hvdc 1 1 he r m«i 1 Nuc lea r Total
1947-55 52.0 47.4 99.4
1st Plan 
(1955-60)
176.0 203.2 379.2 188.0 194.1 382.1 412.0 
(46. P.)
-9.1
(-4.5)
42.9 
(40. f)
2nd Plan 
(1960-65)
12.0 312.0 324.0 19.0 341 .0 360.1 47.0
(458.3)
429.1
(49.3)
*3(.l 
(411.1 )
3rd Plan 
(1965-70)
400.0 672.7 125.0 1.197.7 398.1 434.9 833.0 -1.9
(-0.5)
-237.8
(-35.4)
-125.0 -3t4.7
(-100.0) (-3C.5)
^th Plan (Abortive) 
(1970-75)
750.0 382.1 125.0 1,257.1
Annuol Plan Period 
(1970-78)
899.4 573.2 137.0** 1,609.6
5th Plan 1
(1978-83)
,330.0 760.0 2,090.0 980.0 535.0 1,515.0 -350.0
(-26.3)
-225.0
(-29.6)
-575.0
(-77.5)
6th Flan 
(1983-88)
630.0 3,165.0 3,795.0 2,018 _ 1,777 
(-47)
Figures In the paranthaaac lndlcaca percentage ahortfa 1)/excess. 
The capacity o( KANUPP was ralaed to 137 MU lnctead of 125 MV.
Note»: (a) Figures lor the former East Pakistan are excluded, which are as under:
1947-55 - 24.6 
1955-60 - 76.5 
1960-65 - 97.0 
1965-70 - 344.3
Source: See, Table 7, Note (b).
(b) Targets for additions In the installed capacity are derived frosi the Plans. The targets and achievements set for the 
first Four Plans take Into account the likely retirements of the installed capacity during respective Plan periods, 
vhlle the 5th and the 6th Plan targets and achievements do not take Into account likely retirements. The achievements In 
Table 14 are calculated from the data presented In Table 7 and take into account the relirment of generating capacity 
during the respective Plan periods except for the 5th and 6th Flans. Table 7 figures lndicsie actual Installed capacity 
at the end of each Plan period. These figures differ from those given In The Sixth Five Year Plan (p.529). The figures 
Indicating additions In the generating capacity during various Plan periods given In the Sixth Five Year Plan also 
differ from those given In the Second Five Year Plan and the Fourth Five Year Plan for the respective Plan periods. The 
authors of the Sixth Five Year Plan have not given any reasons or explanations for the discrepancies.
(c) During the 1970-76 period, the targets were revised on an annual basis which cannot be compared on an overall basis. 
Delays In the Implementation of projects, however, did occur which are discussed In the text.
Source: (1) The Sixth Five Year Plan, op.clt., p.238.
(II) Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Adviser's wing. Economic Survey 1965-86, May 1986, Islamabad, p.64.
(III) All the Sources for Table 7.
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TABLE 4 . 5
cow iis r.io ta hc delays for some important fhojects
DUR1NO 1 9 00- 85
N . i i i h- o  1 1’ i o j c c t O r i g i n a l  P I  t i n n e d D a t e  o f De  1 n y
C o m m i s s i o n i n g  D a t e C o m m  1 s s 1 o n l n g ( M m  .. )
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 4
V-'.ir-. il (Hydi-IJ
Ul» l t K 1 ” 4 ( I b O  MU' ) 1 9 0 0 I 9 6 0 -
U i»i 1 r> 5 - b ( 8 0  M U ) J u n e  I 9 7 y H a  r c l i  1 9 8 1 2 7
M i i n f  I n  ( H y d e  1 )
Ui t  11  s  1 -  4 ( 4  0 0  MU’ ) 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 7 0 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 6 9
D u  1 t 5 ( 1 0 0  MU’ ) M a r c h  1 9 7 1 D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 3 3 3
U m 1 I 0 ( 1 0 0  MU' ) J u n e  1 9 7 1 M a r c h  1 9 7 4 3 3
D u l l  7 ( 1 0 0  MU’ ) J u n e  1 9 7 3 J u n e  1 9 8 1 9 6
D u l l  8 ( 1 0 0  MU’ ) J u n e  1 9 7 4 J u n e  1 9 8 1 8 4
i i i . i i  9 ( 1 OU MU' ) D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 6 • S e p t e m b e r  1 9 8 9 -
U n i t  1 0 ( 1 0 0  MU' ) D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 6 • S e p t e m b e r  1 9 8 9 “
T a  r  !*«• l a  ( H y d e  1 )
U n i t s  1 -  2 ( 3 5 0  MW) J u n e  1 9 7 6 M a y  1 9 7 7 2 3
i i n i i  3 ( 1 7 5  MU’ ) Ma  r  c  1» 1 9  7 7 J u n e  1 9 7 7 3
U n i t  4 ( 1 7 5  H W ) M a y  1 9 7 7 J u l y  1 9 7 7 2
U n i t  5 ( 1 7 5  M W) J u n e  1 9 7  9 A u g u s t  1 9 8 2 3 8
U n i t  6 ( 1 7 5  MW) J u n e  1 9 7 9 O c t o b e r  1 9 8 2 2 8
D u  1 i 7 ( 1 7 5  MW) J a n u a r y  1 9 8 0 O c t o b e r  1 9 8 2 3 3
U n i t  8 ( 1 7  5 MU ) J a n u a r y  1 9 8 0 D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 2 3 5
U n i t  y ( 1 7 5  MW) F e b r u a r y  1 9 8 3 A * 3 6
U n i t  1 0 ( 1 7  5 MW) H a y  1 9 8 3 A A 3 0
C o t l d i i  ( T h e  r  ma 1 )
U n i t  1 ( 1 1 0  MW) S e p t e m b e r  1 9 7 2 M a r c h  1 9 7 4 1 8
U n i t  2 ( 1 1 0  MW) N o v e m b e r  1 9 7 2 O c t o b e r  1 9 7 4 2 3
U n i t  3 ( 2 1 0  M U ) D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 3 D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 0 8 4
f a l s a  l a h a d  (Cos  T u r h i n r )  ( 2 0 0  MW) S e p t e m b e r  1 9 7 4 November 1975 14
l . a k h r a  ( T h e m a  1 - C o a  1 b a a e d  )  1 1 9 7 9 - 8 0 * * * D e r e m b c r  1 9 9 2 1 5 0
K A N U P P  ( N u c l e a r ) ( 1 3 7  MW) J u n e  1 9 7 0 N o v e m b e r  1 9 7 2 2 9
T l i c r » » l ( 1 2 5  M U  ) S e p t e m b e r  197*» S e p t e m b e r  1 9 7 2 3 6
C a s  T u r b i n e ,  K o r a n g i  
T h e r m a l  P o w c f  S t a t i o n
( 1 0 0  M U )  
, P I  p  r  1
D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 5 A p r i l  1 9 7 9 5 2
U n i t  1 ( 2 1 0  MW) D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 1 N o v e m b e r  1 9 8 3 2 3
U n i t  2 ( 2 1 0  MW) D o c e m h e  r  1 9 8 3 S e p t e m b e r  1 9 8 4 9
C a s  T u r b i n e ,  S I T E ( 1 2 5  MW) J u n e  1 9 7 8 D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 9 1 8
* E s t i m a t e d  Dal e  S o u r c e  ( l x )  b e l o w.
** Not c o m m i s s i o n e d  u n t i l  June 1985 .  Ex p e c t e d  t o  be c o m m i s s i o n e d  d u r i n g
1985- Bb.
*** R e v i s e d  s c h e d u l e ,  s o u r c e  ( l x )  b e l o w.
S o u r c e : ( 1 )  The F i r s t  F i v e  Year 1'lan ( 1 9 5 5 - 6 0 ) , o p . c 1 1 . , p . 3 6 8 .
( 1 1 ) The Th i r d  F i v e  Year Pl an  ( 1 9 6 5 - 7 0 ) ,  o p . c l t . , p . 3 5 7
( 1 1 1 ) The Fo u r t h  F i v e  Year P l a n  ( 1 9 7 0 - 7 5 ) ,  o p . c l t . , p . 4 2 4
(1 v ) Annual  Pl an 1 9 7 2 - 7 3 , o p . c l t . ,  p p . 8 8 - 9 2 .
(V) Annual  P l on  1 9 7 5 - 7 6 , , o p . c l t - ,  p p . 2 2 4 - 2 2 8 .
( v l ) The F i f t h  F i v e  Year Pl an  ( 1 9 7 8 - 8 3 ) ,  o p . c l t . , p p . 1 8 5
( v l  1 ) P a k i s t a n  Economic  S u r v e y ,  1 9 7 5 - 7 6 ,  o p . c l t . . P - 7 4 .
( M i l )  The P a k i s t a n  T i m e s , R a w a l p i n d i ,  J a n u a r y ,  1 9 8 1 .
( l x )  I n f o r m a t i o n  p r o v i d e d  by t h e  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  C h i e f  E n g i n e e r i n g
A d v i s e r ,  M i n i s t r y  o f  Water and Power ,  I s l a m a b a d ,  16 J u l y ,  1 9 85 .
( * )  WAfUA Power S y s t e m  S t a t i s t i c s  ( N i n t h  I s s u e ) , o p . d t . , p p . 1 - 2 .
( x l )  ICESC, Annual  Repor t  1 9 7 3 , p p . ( l l l )  & 14 .
( x i l ) KESC, Annual Report 1976 , p p . 8 - 9 .
( K i l l ) KXSC, Annual Report 1 977 , p . 6 .
( x l  v ) ICESC, Annua 1 Repor t 1978 , p p . 5 - 6 .
( * v ) KXSC, Annual Report 1 9 80 , p . 5 .
( x v l )  ICESC, Annuo 1 Report  1 9 8 4 , p . 6 .
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achieved. The target for the Third Five Year Plan was met in
1974, i.e., after four years. Similarly, the target of the 
(abortive) Fourth Five Year Plan was met in 1977 i.e. two 
years behind schedule.
The Third Five Year Plan had just been launched (July 
1965) when India attacked (September 1965) the country. All 
the resources, therefore, had to be diverted to meet this 
national emergency. Moreover, the United States of America 
suspended its aid to Pakistan as a consequence of the war. 
The paucity of resources, therefore, thwarted the achieve­
ment of the Third Plan targets.
During the 1970-73 period, the mid-term planning was 
replaced by short-term annual planning, and the targets were 
revised on an annual basis. Due to delays and slippages in 
the implementation of various projects, the Plans were 
altered and the commissioning dates of the delayed projects 
were adjusted forward. During the 1970-72 period, no 
additions in the installed capacity were made, except trial 
operation of the 137 MW KANUPP. The shortfall, therefore, 
was 100 percent. The KANUPP was commissioned in November 
1972. During 1972-73, the installed capacity increased only 
by 9.5 MW against the target of 220 MW, excluding 137 MW of
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KANUPP. The shortfall during the 1973-74 was of the order of
110 MW or 20.6 percent. Mangla units 5 & 6 (100 MW each) 
which were originally scheduled to be commissioned in March 
and June 1971 were commissioned in December 1973 and March 
1974 respectively. Guddu unit 1 (110 MW thermal) which was 
originally scheduled to be commissioned in September 1972 
was commissioned in March 1974. Guddu unit 2 (110 MW
thermal) which was originally scheduled to be commissioned 
in November 1972, was commissioned in October 1974. Annual 
Plan 1974-75 envisaged to augment the installed capacity by 
375 MW, without taking into account 110 MW of Guddu unit 2 
which was expected to be commissioned during the 1973-74 
Plan period, but only 125 MW were added during this year 
representing a shortfall of 250 MW or 66.6 percent. During 
1975-76, only 100 MW of new capacity were added by complet­
ing a delayed project, carried over from the previous year. 
No other capacity additions were planned during 1975-76. 
Annual Plan 1976-77 envisaged to add 700 MW of hydel capaci­
ty during the Plan period by commissioning the Tarbela units 
1&2 and 3&4 in December, 1976 and May, 1977 respectively. 
Originally, Tarbela units 1&2 were scheduled to be commis­
sioned in June 1975. During the 1976-77 period, Tarbela 
units 1-3 were commissioned, representing a shortfall of 175 
MW or 25 percent of the target. During 1977-78, Tarbela
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unit 4 (175 MW hydel) and 125 MW extension in Korangi Ther­
mal Power Station were commissioned. No other additions were 
scheduled to be made during 1977-78. In all, the installed 
capacity increased by 1,610 MW during the 1970-78 period.
The events, including a war with India, which led to 
the secession of the erstwhile East Pakistan in 1971 had a 
major effect on the development efforts of Pakistan during 
the early 1970s. Each sector of the economy felt the pinch 
of resource constraints. The organizational degeneration of 
WAPDA also contributed to the implementation failures which 
is evident from various stories carried by the national 
press. N AW A-I- W A Q A T , for example, published a report on 
Tarbela Darn on 10 October 1985. The following extract from 
the report is illuminating:
Many calamities struck the Dam during its construc­
tion. Due to the dishonesty of high-level Pakistani 
officers, important structures of the Dam, namely, 
intake tunnels were seriously damaged. The present 
writer remembers quite well the words of the then 
Prime Minister uttered by him at the lawn of Tarbela 
Guest. House No. 1, while it was drizzling, when he 
was requested by the high-level, officers of WAPDA to 
visit the site for inspection. He said in rage, "Have 
you people left anything behind which I should 
inspect!" ... Although, the then Prime Minister 
[Bhutto] declared at Tarbela that defective material 
had been used for the construction of the tunnels and 
that severe action would be taken against the 
officers who had betrayed the nation to become rich 
overnight ... yet those who earned crores of rupees 
through unfair means during the construction of
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Tarbela Dam are living with the same pump and show. 
They still own the big houses in big cities of the 
country which were built not only by using the 
material meant for Tarbela Dam but also employing
Othe people being paid from Tarbela Fund.^
The Fifth Five Year Plan envisaged to augment the 
installed capacity by 2,090 MW (1,330 MW hydel and 760 MWH 
thermal), but only 1,515 MW were brought on stream (980 MW 
hydel and 535 MW thermal). The shortfall, therefore, amount­
ed to 575 MW or 27.5 percent of the Plan target. An in­
stalled capacity of 2,018 MW was commissioned during the 
Sixth Plan period against the Plan target of 3,795 MW. This 
represents a shortfall of 1,777 MW or 47 percent.
The Transmission System
At the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan 
inherited isolated systems existing in larger municipalities 
where a number of public and private companies and corpora­
tions were licensed to generate and supply electricity 
mainly to domestic and commercial consumers. Most of the 
industries had their own captive capacity to meet their 
requirements. It was recognized that the supply of cheaper 
and dependable electric power was essential for increasing 
the pace of industrial and agricultural development. 
Pakistan’s substantial hydroelectric potential offered the
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possibility of generating hydroelectricity at low costs. The
exploitation of hydroelectric potential, therefore, received 
a high priority from the very beginning. The discovery of 
natural gas in large quantities at Sui in 1952, followed by 
more gas discoveries in the 1950s opened up the possibility 
for the country to generate thermal power at low costs by 
utilizing indigenous gas. Consequently, a number of gas 
based thermal power stations were commissioned in central 
and southern areas, where most of the load centres were 
situated. As the entire hydroelectric potential, except a 
few canal falls, was situated in the north and all the gas 
discoveries were situated in the southern areas, the optimum 
utilization of the indigenous power resources could not be 
possible without developing an integrated national grid 
system that would allow maximum utilization of hydroelectric 
capabi1ity.
Hydroelectric capability in Pakistan fluctuates with 
wide variations in the maximum and the minimum capability 
not only in different years but also in a year. Because the 
hydroelectric development in this country has taken place 
mainly as a part of multipurpose development, the use of 
water for irrigation has been given absolute priority over 
the use for power generation. The irrigation requirements
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vary in a year in accordance with the cropping seasons as
well as rainfall at proper times during a year. Besides, 
hydroelectric generation is affected by the seasonal
variation of flows in the rivers and the levels of hydro 
storages which are dependent upon the vagaries of weather- 
such as rainfall, snowfall and snow-melt in the catchment 
areas. The development of an integrated national grid 
was,the refore, considered essential by the experts to syn­
chronize the operation of the thermal power stations with 
the capability of the hydel power stations. The development 
of the transmission system was also needed to be synchro­
nized with the expansion in the installed capacity and the 
power requirements of the load centres.
The power system in Pakistan has progressed to an 
integrated national grid from the following isolated 5 
regional grids:
a. The Northern Grid System - covering the provinces 
of Punjab and NWFP and containing all the hydro 
electric capacity of the country in addition to 
thermal power stations;
b. The Upper Sindh Grid System (Sukkur) - covering 
Sukkur and the surrounding region;
c. The Lower Sindh Grid System (Hyderabad) - covering 
Hyderabad and surrounding areas;
d. Quetta Grid System - covering Quetta and the 
surrounding areas in the province of Baluchistan;
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e. KESC System - encompassing the city of Karachi and 
parts of Thatta District in the province of Sindh, 
and District Lasbela of the Baluchistan province.
The first 4 systems are controlled by the WAPDA, 
while the last system is under the jurisdiction of the 
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC). The WAPDA System 
has been operating as an integrated system since 1975-76. 
The KESC System was linked to the Lower Sindh Grid during 
the Third Plan period (1965-70). At 30 June 1984, out of 
111,901 kilometers of transmission network, only 2,589 
kilometers of these lines could carry power at 220 KV or 
above and about 82 percent of them (91,258 KM) were ener-
3gized at 11 KV only.
The power system in Pakistan has suffered due to 
delays in the completion of transmission facilities. The 
length of transmission lines and load carried at relatively 
low voltage levels have contributed, to a considerable 
extent, to the high system losses in this country. 
Overloading of the system has also contributed to frequent 
power breakdowns. The implementation of transmission schemes
has suffered f rom the very beginning . During the 1947-55
period, the implementation was only 35 percent. In this
rega rd, the First Five Year Plan noted: ’Very little
progress was made on schemes for the transmission and
197
distribution of supplies. These were estimated to cost
Rs. 60 million, of which only Rs. 21 million were spent by 
March 19551.4 The progress of the transmission system during 
the First (1955-60) and the Second (1960-65) plan periods 
remained satisfactory in as much as the transmission facili­
ties more or less matched with the expansion in the 
installed capacity. The total length of transmission and 
distribution lines (11 KV and above) increased from 
1,395 miles [2,245 KM] in 1955 to 4,400 miles [7,080 KM] in 
1960 and to 13,500 miles [21,722 KM] in 1965.^ Almost all 
the transmission schemes were implemented without signifi­
cant delays. The Third Five Year Plan described the situa­
tion regarding the transmission facilities as under:
At the present time, the 132 KV grid generally has 
sufficient capacity to supply existing loads. At 
several primary and secondary grid load centres, 
however, demand will soon reach the capacity of both 
lines and substations and in particular, substation 
transformers.6
The situation started to deteriorate from the Third 
Plan. During the Third Plan period, delays in the implemen­
tation of the transmission program deprived the country of 
the benefits which could be obtained from the expansion in 
the installed capacity. For example, the transmission lines 
associated with Mangla Dam units 1-4 comprising 220 KV
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double circuit line from Mangla to Kala Shah Kaku (166 KM),
single circuit 220 KV line on double circuit towers from 
Kala Shah Kaku to Kot Lakhpat (42 KM) and 220 KV double 
circuit line from Kala Shah Kaku to Faisalabad (144 KM) were 
scheduled to be completed in November 1968,7 but due to 
delays these lines could only be completed in March 1970,
OMarch 1971 and June 1971 respectively. The energizing of 
the 220 KV Mangla-Kala Shah Kaku second circuit and the 220 
KV double circuit between Kala Shah Kaku and Faisalabad, 
however, was not possible before 1972-73 due to the delayed 
installation of protection gear required for the purpose.9 
The power system also suffered during the Third Plan due to 
the shortage in number of grid stations and under capacity 
of transformers.^
The Third Five Year Plan envisaged ’the integration
of the Hyderabad and Sukkur networks and connection to the
new plant [at Guddu] and possibly interconnection of this
network with Karachi to the south and through Rahim Yar Khan
to the north’.11 However, different zonal systems in
Pakistan were interconnected not before 1975-76 i.e. six
12years after the Third Plan target.
The failure to synchronize the extension in the
199
transmission facilities with the expansion in the installed
capacity continued to plague the power system in the country 
during the Annual-Plan period. The second 220 KV Mangla-Kala 
Shah Kaku double circuit transmission line, which was asso­
ciated with the Mangla units 5 and 6 was completed in Sep­
tember 1975, whereas Mangla units 5 and 6 were commissioned 
in December 1973 and March 1974 respectively. The task of 
optimum utilization of Mangla power without over-loading the 
transformers on the existing 220 KV line, therefore, kept 
the WAPDA authorities quite busy until the new 220 KV line 
was completed in September, 1975. Another 220 KV line 
associated with the expansion in the installed capacity at 
Mangla (namely, Mangla-Wah transmission line) was further 
delayed and was completed in September 1976. Second circuit 
of Kala Shah Kaku--Kot Lakhpat, which was also associated 
with the Mangla project, was completed and energized in 
January 1979. Another 220 KV Tarbela-Mardan (68 KM) line was 
delayed for about two years and was commissioned in January 
1983 instead of 1981.
The completion of two important transmission lines, 
namely, 220 KV Tarbela-Wah (67 KM) and 500 KV Tarbela- 
Paisalabad (331 KM) was to be synchronized with the commis­
sioning of Tarbela units 1-2 and 3-4 respectively. Tarbela
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units 1-2 were commissioned in May 1977, whereas 220 KV
Tarbela-Wah transmission line was completed in October, 
1976. Tarbela units 3-4 were commissioned in June and July 
1977 respectively whereas 500 KV Tarbela-Faisalabad line was 
completed in September 1979.14
The Fifth Five Year Plan gave the following schedule 
for the completion of 500 KV transmission line between 
Faisalabad and Karachi via Multan, Guddu and Jamshoro
Phase I
a. 500 KV Multan-Guddu 1979-80
(to be operated on 220 KV)
b. 500 KV Mu 1 tan-Faisalabad 1980-81
(to be operated on 220 KV)
Phase II
c. 500 KV Guddu-Hyderabad (Jamshoro) 1981-82 
(to be operated on 220 KV)
Phase III
d. Completion of line to Karachi 1982-83
and conversion to 500 KV
The first phase of the above project comprising the 
519' kilometers of 500 KV Faisalabad-Guddu transmission line 
was completed on schedule and commissioned on 220 KV with a 
220 KV substation at Multan in March 1981. The completion of 
the remaining phases was, however, delayed. Phase II
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comprising the 438 kilometers 500 KV Guddu--Jamshoro
transmission line along with 220 KV sub-stations at Dadu and 
Jamshoro was completed in February 1984; Guddu-Dadu section 
along with 220 KV sub-station at Dadu was commissioned in 
August, 1983 and Dadu-Jamshoro section along with 220 KV 
sub-station at Jamshoro was commissioned in February, 1984. 
The 220 KV Jamshoro-Karachi double circuit transmission line 
was completed by December 1984. The upgrading of 220 KV sub­
stations at Multan, Guddu, Dadu, Jamshoro to 500 KV and 
extension of existing 500 KV Gatti (Faisalabad) sub-station 
required for energizing at 500 KV was delayed and the 
project was completed in July 1987.
The work on almost all the primary 220 KV and 500 KV
transmission lines scheduled to be commissioned during the
Sixth Plan period (1983-88) was delayed. For example, second
500 KV Tarbela-Faisalabad transmission line, originally
scheduled to be completed in 1983, was completed in 1985.
Similarly, 220 KV double circuit Faisalabad-Sahiwal (94 KM)
line was scheduled to be commissioned in 1983, but was
completed in July 1987. Another 220 KV double circuit
Mardan-Peshawer (56 KM) transmission line was scheduled to
be commissioned in 1984-85, but in 1988 WAPDA expected to
17complete it by January 1991.
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A study indicated that ’lack of coordination and
cooperation’ between various Government agencies (both
Federal and Provincial) was prominently observed in the case
of "500 KV Faisalabad--Mu1 t.an--Guddu--Karachi Transmission
Line, which caused delays in the completion of work. The
work on this project also suffered as a result of "delay in
signing foreign credits, and availability of technical
1 Rdocuments and equipments".
Various portions of the transmission system suffered
from low voltage and high losses. The installation of static
capacitors could substantially mitigate these problems.
Interviews with the officials in the Ministry of Water and
Power during April-May 1985 revealed that the installation
of the capacitors was being delayed since 1976. The WAPDA
officials disclosed that the line staff was highly allergic
to the capacitors who had a mistaken notion that frequent
breakdowns on the lines were caused by capacitors. They had
therefore disconnected the capacitors and subsequently the
capacitors had disappeared. WAPDA Annual Report, 1983-84
envisaged to complete this project by December .1984 which
19was further delayed and was completed in 1985.
For the augmentation of its secondary transmission
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system, WAPDA initiated the implementation of Third WAPDA
Power Project in 1980-81. The project envisaged the 
construction of 219 grid stations (including new ones, 
augmentation and extension of existing sub-stations) adding 
a transformation capacity of 4,800 MVA and 4,598 Kilometers 
of 220/132/66 KV double and single circuit transmission 
lines by 1983. The project was completed in December 1987, 
after a delay of four years.20
Interviews with the officials of WAPDA revealed that
the internal priorities of WAPDA were not adjusted on
rational grounds. The rapport of the persons in charge of
various projects with the higher authorities of WAPDA
considerably influenced the provision of resources. There
was also a general lack of coordination between various
departments. WAPDA organization had outgrown its system of 
21coordination. The Fourth Plan stressed the need to effect 
organizational improvements to overcome the coordination 
and priority setting problems. The Plan stated:
Serious doubts have been expressed on the ability of 
WAPDA to shoulder the responsibility of retail dis­
tribution of power along with the construction of 
major power and irrigation facilities. Consideration, 
therefore, should be given to the bifurcation of the 
power wing from WAPDA or at least the separation of 
retail distribution and its handing over to an auton-
90omous power corporation.""
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Howeve r the WAPDA authorities did not respond to
such moves positively as it would have caused a contraction 
in their domain. Rather they acted very swiftly to take over 
the management of all private elect rical u nde rtakings and by 
1985 they had brought the only other public sector organiza­
tion, the KESC, under WAPDA’s effective control. It was 
confided by informed sources that WAPDA was agreeable to the 
development of generating facilities by other organizations,
but was not prepared to hand over the distribution of elec-
23tricity. WAPDA staff would strongly oppose any such move.
THERMAL POWER
The thermal power generation system was supposed to 
fill-in a gap in the power system of Pakistan, but the fuel 
mix policy for thermal generation pursued by various govern­
ments in Pakistan during the 1970s denied the country of 
this option. Most of the thermal additions in the installed 
capacity made in Pakistan since late 1950s had been gas- 
based. As a result, the consumption of gas by the power 
sector increased from 2,922 MMCFT in 1956-57 to 42,344 MMCFT 
in 1969-70 to 60,328 MMCFT in 1977-78 and 84,743 MMCFT in 
1980-81. The consumption of gas had to be decreased, mainly 
due to non-availability, to 74,294 MMCFT in 1982-83 which
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again increased to 88,906 MMCFT in 1984-85. In 1978-79, gas
(in terms of heat units.) accounted for 98 percent of the 
total fuel consumed for thermal power generation. The 
percentage share of gas had fluctuated, depending upon its 
availability, mostly between 80 percent and 98 percent 
during the 1964-82 period, after which it had been decreas­
ing; gas accounting for 69.4 percent in 1982-83 and 65.4
24percent m  1987-88.
The demand for gas had been increasing in the country 
at a tremendous rate. Its demand for more productive uses 
multiplied over the years resulting in the reduction of gas 
supplies to some users, like cement, sugar and power. Load­
shedding of gas had increasingly been resorted to in the 
country with varying intensity since early 1970s. Conse­
quently, the alternative use of oil in the gas-based thermal 
power stations, due to non-availability of gas, had been 
affecting their capabi1ity adversely. In crisis situations,
due to bad planning, instances of power stations running
25short of oil supply were also a common occurrence.
Table 4.6 indicates the fuel consumption mix for 
thermal power generation in Pakistan. It is evident from 
Table 4.6 that the utilization of coal for power generation
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TABLE 4 .6
FÜHL CONSUMPTION MIX FOR THERMAL POWER GENERATION
(PERCENTAGE SHARE)
Y e a r  E n d i n g  Fuel Oil 
30 Ju n e
D i e s e l  O i l Coa 1 Ga s Total
1965 1.8 2.3 10.3 85.6 100
1966 7. 1 1.6 7.8 83.5 100
1967 7.5 2.0 8.0 82.5 100
1968 0.6 0.3 8.9 90.2 100
1969 0.2 0.2 7.5 92.1 100
1970 4.4 1.2 5.6 88 . 8 100
1971 5.4 0.2 5.3 89.1 100
1972 7.5 1.4 3.9 87.2 100
1973 5.4 1.3 2.3 90.9 100
1974 10.7 4. 1 1.8 83.4 100
1975 14.4 5.5 1.3 78.8 100
1976 7.5 4.2 1.5 8 7 . 0 100
1977 7.0 3.1 1.4 88 . 5 100
1978 1.4 1.0 0 . 8 96.8 100
1979 0.2 0.9 0.9 9 8 . 0 100
1980 1.7 0.9 0.4 97 . 0 100
1981 6.9 1.5 0 . 6 91 .0 100
1982 11.36 8.02 0 . 0 3 8 0 . 5 9 100
1983 16.65 13.37 0 . 5 8 6 9 . 4 0 100
1984 20.6 8.6 0.4 70.4 100
1985 25.0 6.0 0.5 68 . 5 100
1988 2 2 .T - 11.7 0.2 65.4 100
S o u r c e : (i) E n e r g y D a t a  Book, op . c i t . , p.110.
(ii) E n e r g y Y e a r  Bo o k 1979, op •cit • , p .64.
(iii) E n e r g y Y e a r  B o o k 1985, op • c i t . , p .83.
( vi) Energy Year Book 1989, op. cit., p. 59
I
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remained completely ignored; its percentage share continued
to decrease reaching the lowest 0.03 percent in 1981-82.
Its share in 1988 was 0.2 per cent.
Another striking feature in respect of the fuel 
consumption mix during the study period was the neglect of 
domestically produced furnace oil. Although furnace oil was 
a surplus product until 1983-84, and was shipped out at a 
"real low’ prices, its utilization for power generation 
declined. The percentage share of furnace/fuel oil in the 
fuel consumption mix for power generation amounted to 0.2 
percent in 1968-69 as well as in 1978-79. During the 1964-81 
period its share at times increased not because of a policy 
shift, but because of the forced increase in its utilization 
due to load-shedding of gas. The share of furnace oil had 
been increasing toward the end of the study period. Inciden­
tally, the price of the furnace oil had also been picking up 
in the world market in these years.
The consumption of petroleum products by the power 
sector on an annual basis since 1964-65 is given in 
Table 4.7. For comparison purposes, the export and import of 
furnace oil is also indicated on an annual basis for the 
same period. It is obvious from Table 4.7 that the quantity
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TABLE 4-7
CONSUMPTION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS FOR
THERMAL POWER GENERATION
(Metric Tons)
Yea*** Ending 
at 3® June
Consumption of Pe t ro leum Products Export Import 
of F.O.Total H. S . D. L.D.O. F.O. of F.O.
1965 26,109 415,306 0
1966 74,438 325,718 0
1967 78,047 300,172 0
1968 6,238 431,875 6
1969 3,606 583,835 0
1970 63,351 429,786 0
1971 65,665 287,399 0
1972 99,597 13,637 1,657 84,303 456,416 0
1973 77,088 12,021 1,949 63,118 511,675 0
1974 202,974 52,659 994 149,197 455,450 0
1975 308,419 79,764 2,259 226,396 154,463 20,187
1976 156,851 52,997 1 , 742 102,112 207,621 0
1977 162,450 46,330 1 ,001 115,119 133,769 0
1978 34,936 13,693 501 20,742 570,829 0
1979 15,521 12,882 282 50,919 458,903 0
1980 50,490 15,999 219 34,272 788,626 0
1981 182,972 29,973 155 152,844 606,269 0
1982 442,063 176,729 364 264,970 756,161 0
1983 754,177 324,415 1,255 428,507 182,606 0
1984 766,274 214,980 1,906 549,388 74,062 227,530
1985 944 ,468 174,471 164 769,833 0 417,007
Notes:
Source:
Export figures up to and including 1976 includes bunkering 
and overseas sector consumption- Figures indicating total 
consumption for 1974 includes 24 tons of Motor Spirit and 
100 tons of Superior Kerosene-
(i) Energy Da ta Book, op-cit-, pp-116 & 121.
(ii) Energy Year Book 1979, op-cit-, pp- 30-41.
(iii) Ene rgy Year Book 1985, op-cit-, pp-29-35 &
39.
(iv) Energy Year Book 1985, op-cit-, pp.33-38, 44
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of furnace oil available for export had remained dependent
upon the quantity utilized for power generation. Greater use 
of furnace oil for power generation could have been possible 
during the last two decades of the study period. Table 4,7 
also shows erratic increases (as in the case of furnace oil) 
in the use of High Speed Diesel (HSD) for power generation. 
HSD had always remained on the import list of Pakistan, 
Valuable foreign exchange could be saved by implementing 
rational fuel mix policy for power generation.
The operational efficiency of the power system in 
Pakistan became a cause of concern by 1970. The Fourth Five 
Year Plan noted that complaints about the poor quality of 
service not only persisted but increased during the Third
O  X.Plan period* and considered it imperative to improve the 
efficiency of WAPDA by creating proper balance between gener­
ation and marketing facilities, reducing power losses and
27employing better operating and maintenance techniques. 
Annual Plan 1975-76 noted:
The operational efficiency of WAPDA continues to 
cause concern because of spiral increase in power 
losses, mounting arrears in consumer bills and poor 
quality of service with consequent deterioration in 
financial performance ... The financial performance 
of WAPDA has steadily deteriorated over the years in 
spite of the tariff increase allowed from time to 
time to compensate for the increase in fuel costs and 
general establishment expenses. The increase in
210
operating income through increased generation and 
tariff increases has been offset by increase in 
losses and larger increase in operating expenses. ... 
As a result, self-financing was nil and estimated 
return on net assets-in-operation which are valued at 
more than Rs. 6,000 million sagged to 1% in 1974-75 
from 4.2% in 1973-74.28
In spite of the alarms raised on various occasions, 
the operational efficiency remained poor. Thermal efficiency 
in electricity generation remained low, system losses (in­
cluding losses in transmission and distribution, and losses 
due to consumption in the power station auxiliaries) contin­
ued to be high and the financial performance remained poor.
The level of thermal efficiency in thermal power 
generation for the WAPDA system, had been stagnating at 
around 25.2 percent - 26.7 percent during 1973-83 period 
which was inefficient compared with the performance in some 
other countries where thermal efficiency levels greater than 
30 percent had been achieved. Thermal efficiency in Korea, 
for example, had been improved from 22.6 percent with 367 MW 
capacity and 1,773 GWH generation in 1961 to 36.8 percent 
with 13,115 MW capacity and 46,850 GWH generation in 1983. 
Japan achieved the thermal efficiency level of 36.50 percent 
in 1981 (Table 4.8).
The situation in respect of self-financing improved
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as a result of mainly tariff increases and some reduction in
the system losses during 1982-83, when it amounted to Rs.
2,100 million compared with Rs . 158 million during 1977-78.
The rate of return increased from 8.9 percent in 1977-78 to
17.7 percent in 1981-82 (Table 4.9). During 1983-84, WAPDA
was able to contribute about 68 percent of its three-year
average capital expenditure on power development from its
29internal sources.
TABLE 4.8
THERMAL EFFICIENCY IN THERMAL GENERATION 
(PAKISTAN, KOREA, JAPAN)
Percent
Period Country
*Pakistan Ko rea Japan
1969-71 - 30.70 -
1973-74 25.20 - -
1972-76 - 33.69 -
1978-79 25.20 - -
1977-81 - 35.05 -
1981 - 36.39 36.50
1982-83 26.67 - -
1983 36.80
^Includes the thermal efficiency of the WAPDA system only.
Source: (i) WARD A Power System Statistics, o p . c i. t..., 1985;
and Information supplied by WAPDA, July 1985.
C1i) Korea Electric Power Corporation, Statistics 
of Electricity, 1984.
The stimulus to improve the financial performance of 
the public utilities came mainly from outside. International
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lending agencies particularly the World Bank and Asian
Development Bank included financial covenants in loan docu­
ments requiring the executing agencies to maintain tariffs 
at levels sufficient to cover operating expenses, debt 
amortization and to finance an agreed upon percentage of 
capital expenditures. Asian Development Bank, for example, 
included a financial covenant in its loan documents in 1972 
requiring the KESC to finance 25 percent of capital expendi­
ture from its internal resources. The KESC was also required 
to implement tariff increases by 31 January 1973.30 Similar­
ly, the World Bank as a condition for its loan for Third 
WAPDA Project required WAPDA to finance 40 percent of its 
investment in a given year calculated as the average of two 
preceding years and the year under consideration. The World 
Bank, during the negotiations for a loan for Fourth WAPDA 
Project made the Government of Pakistan to agree to a new 
formula (to be introduced starting from 1987-88) for calcu­
lating the 40 percent internal cash generation, whereby the 
investment for a given year would be calculated by averaging 
the investment in the year under consideration, the preced­
ing year and the next year. In a communication, the World 
Bank required the Government of Pakistan to agree with it by 
November 30, 1984 on annual tariff increases needed to 
achieve the 40 percent cash generation by WAPDA according to
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TABLE 4.9
WAPDA’S FINANCIAL POSITION 
(1977-83)
Year Revenue Self-financing Return on
Realization (Million Rupees) Assets
(Million Rupees) (Pe rcentage)
1977-78 2,040 158 8.9
1978-79 2,709 647 11.8
1979-80 3,941 1,528 17.8
1980-81 4,641 1,759 16.1
1981-82 5,948 1,955 17.7
Source: WAPDA- in Brief, qp._ cit. . p. 10.
new formula. In the same communication, the Bank noted that 
due to the ’backward rather than forward looking formula’ 
for calculating internal cash generation, WAPDA had contrib­
uted only 50 percent of originally targeted investments from 
its internal resources/1
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that 
WAPDA procedures and practices did not force the authorities 
to pursue an optimum fuel mix policy. Uneconomic organiza­
tional practices, therefore, caused heavy losses to the 
national exchequer. It is also obvious that WAPDA authori­
ties did not have an effective coordination with the oil 
refineries in the country which would have enabled them to 
effectively utilize the surplus furnace oil. The operational 
efficiency also suffered due to inefficient practices and
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resistance to change. The WAPDA authorities even tried to
play with figures rather than effecting a real improvement.
HYDROELECTRIC POWER
Wide spread load-shedding of electricity over 
extended periods since the 1970s, bringing the electricity 
supply system to a crisis situation, demonstrated the 
short-comings of lopsided expansion of hydel capacity in 
Pakistan. The hydro storage on which the electricity supply 
system of Pakistan was based had a systematic built-in flaw. 
The system was entirely dependent upon the vagaries of 
weather. If there was a plenty of rain in the country and/or 
snow fall and snow-melting in the mountains, all at appro­
priate times, then the hydro storages would be full, making 
it possible to release sufficient amounts of water for irri­
gation and power generation. On the other hand, if rains 
failed and/or there were insufficient snow-fall or late snow 
melting, causing a drop in the hydro storage, then there 
would be a serious problem. There would not be enough water 
for irrigation and power generation. The demand for water 
would, however, be maximum due to the drought conditions. 
This would require the tube-wells to run on full capacity 
which in turn would require more electricity as most of the
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tubewells in agricultural sector were run on electricity. If
the water level in the reservoirs was low, even the rains in 
the countryside would cause reduction in hydro generation. 
In this case, less water would be required for irrigation 
purposes requiring less water to be released from the dams. 
In view of low levels in the reservoirs, water had to be 
saved to meet future needs. Without a sufficient thermal and 
Nuclear capacity to compensate for the temporary loss of 
hydel capacity in such circumstances, the supply system was 
bou nd to fail.
WAPDA had been increasingly blaming 'the shortages 
of water in hydro storages and drought conditions’ for power 
shortages since early 1970s. For example, Annual Plan for 
1972-73 states:
The unprecedented drought in the Winter of 1971-72 
directly affected the capability of the existing 
plants. Meager river flows as well as thin snow packs
in the mountains greatly reduced the capability of32the hydel power stations at Mangla and Warsak.
Annual Plan 1974-75, inter alia, blamed the reduction 
in water releases from Mangla from the end of December, 1973
up to January 1974 and shut down of small hydel stations due
33to canal closures for the shortfall in generation." The 
Plan further added:
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River flows in early summer have been abnormally low. 
It is expected that river flow will improve as snow 
melting increases. A continuance of abnormally low 
flow would have serious repercussions on power 
supply. ’
According to WAPDA, the ’abnormally low water flows’ 
and the ’persistence of drought conditions’ were again the 
culprits in 1974-75.
The situation continued to deteriorate during the 
past 1980s and the load-shedding routine remained uninter­
rupted. The reasons given by the WAPDA for an ever- 
increasing load-shedding also remained unchanged: canal 
closures and/or unfavorable weather conditions; drought, 
slow snow-melting, etc. causing drop in the reservoir levels 
in hydro storages. In March 1985, WAPDA announced that the 
generating capability of its system had been reduced to ’50 
percent’ leading to load-shedding for ’extended period in 
domestic, industrial and rural sectors’. It was stated that 
load-shedding was ’mainly due to the fall in the levels of 
Mangla and Tarbela Dams’ reducing the capability of Mangla 
to 60 MW against the installed capacity of 800 MW and that 
of Tarbela to 424 MW against the installed capacity of 
1,575 MW. The inflow in Kabul river had decreased to the 
l-evel that it was good only to produce 40 MW at Warsak 
against the installed capacity of 240 MW. The spokesman of
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WAPDA said that small hydel stations on canal falls were
also affected due to water shortages and were producing at 
less than 40 percent of their capacity. The hydel capacity 
was falling every day due to a drop in reservoir levels, it 
was further stated."56
In April 1985, The Pakistan Times, stated:
We all know that at present the National Grid carries 
only half the power needed by us. Unfortunately, even 
this half is curtailed to another half owing to the 
paucity of water in the hydel power reservoirs. 
WAPDA’s daily TV appeal addressed to the citizens 
says the crisis is brought about by factors outside 
the Authority’s control: the snow on high mountains 
is not melting fast enough and is not expected to 
melt at the required rate till June.j7
In January 1986, The Pakistan Times, reported that the 
worst load-shedding of the current winter (eight hours a day 
in urban and 10 hours a day in rural areas requiring the 
industry to close one shift daily and the tube-wells used 
for irrigation purposes to operate a maximum of 12 hours a 
day) was resorted to by the WAPDA ’ due to over 50 percent 
fall in power generation of its system following the closure 
of canals’.
It is evident from the preceding paragraphs that the 
WAPDA authorities pursued a hydroelectric policy during the
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study period which had serious implications on the power-
system of Pakistan, The WAPDA bureaucracy found it conven­
ient and far more prestigious to build huge dams enabling 
them to make substantial additions in the installed capacity 
rather than implementing thermal additions to achieve a 
balanced growth- The implementation of a defective policy, 
therefore, made it impossible for WAPDA to realize the 
cherished goal of providing sufficient and uninterrupted 
power supply to the people of Pakistan.
NUCLEAR POWER
Pakistan made a modest beginning in the field of 
nuclear power in 1953 by establishing an ’Atomic Energy 
Committee’ in the Ministry of Industries to make recommenda­
tions for the establishment of an atomic energy agency, 
exploration of radio-active minerals and possible use of 
atomic energy.In 1954, the American exhibit "Atom for Peace" 
toured Pakistan to explain the benefits which could be 
derived from the nuclear power in the fields of energy, food 
and medical treatment. Consequently, the Government of 
Pakistan started taking more interest and set up in 1955 a 
Council, which was upgraded into a Commission in 1956, to 
step up its activities in the field of nuclear power. Until
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1970, the country had trained a sufficient number of scien­
tists and engineers who set up a number of atomic energy 
centres and an Institute of Nuclear Research and Reactor- 
Technology with a swimming pool research reactor at 
Islamabad. Attention was also paid to the exploration and 
exploitation of radio-active minerals. A nuclear power plant 
with a capacity of 137 MW was also established in Karachi 
which started production in 1972.
Significant developments took place in Pakistan’s 
nuclear energy policy under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. He had a 
dream and passion to make Pakistan the Atomic Power. He took, 
keen and persistent interest in boosting Pakistan’s nuclear 
energy program in various capacities while he was Minister 
for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Minister in charge for Atomic Energy, Chief Martial 
Law Administrator and Prime Minister. He considered it to be 
’vital for Pakistan to give the greatest possible attention 
to nuclear technology’.39 He was particularly perturbed by 
the Indian plans in this regard and believed that India was 
’determined to proceed with her plans to detonate a nuclear 
bomb’40 and argued: ’If Pakistan restricts or suspends her 
nuclear program, it would not only enable India to blackmail 
Pakistan with her nuclear advantage, but would impose a
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crippling limitation on the development of Pakistan’s 
science and technology, Even as Minister, he tried to 
persuade President Muhammad Ayub Khan to build fuel rep roc- 
essing plant, but without success. Now that he got full 
power, he decided to translate his dreams into reality 
without any further delay.
On 20 January 1972, just one month after his coming 
into power, he called a meeting of Pakistan’s eminent 
scientists from all over the world and put before them his 
desire to make Pakistan an Atomic Power as soon as possible. 
It is said that in this meeting Dr. I. H. Usmani, Chairman, 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and some senior scientists 
like Dr. Abdul Salam, President’s Advisor for Science, not 
only opposed the idea of making Pakistan an atomic power but 
also considered it impossible. But he did not want to listen 
’no’. He announced the replacement of Dr. I. H. Usmani as 
Chairman of the PAEC by Munir Ahmed Khan.4° It is at this 
stage that Pakistan’s atomic energy program took a turn and 
expanded in scope to include defence uses.
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, however, 
already had expansion plans for power generation and other 
uses. The (aborted) Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75 provided
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for the construction of the nuclear power station (200 MW
capacity.) at Rooppur in East Pakistan besides making the 
Karachi Nuclear Power Plant operational. In addition, it 
provided for the initiation of work for establishing a fuel 
reprocessing plant and determining the feasibility of a 
dual - purpose nuclear reactor, for desalination of sea­
water and power generation, in West Pakistan.44
Under the new Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission, Pakistan’s nuclear program received greater
impetus. It was announced that Pakistan had drawn up firm
plans to set up second nuclear power plant in the north with
a 500 MW capacity and that studies were also being carried
out to set up a dual-purpose nuclear desalination plant for
Karachi area with a capacity of 400 MW and the desalination
of 100 million gallons of sea water per day. On 11 May,
1972, Radio Pakistan reported that ’Pakistan with its large
deposits of uranium planned to set-up two atomic
, 45reactors . .In June 1973, a plan to set up a heavy water 
production plant with an output capacity of 13 tonnes of
A <heavy water per annum was announced. L In July, 1973 the 
Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission disclosed 
more details regarding the planned setting up of the second 
nuclear power plant with installed capacity of 900 MW
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instead of 500 MW initially announced and stated that the 
plant would be completed within two-and-half years time.47
In November 1972, a team of experts from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) paid a visit to
Pakistan to assess Pakistan’s future electric power
requirements and the role of nuclear power in meeting
them. On the basis of IAEA assessment, Pakistan made
public its 25 year nuclear power generation program on 27
December , 1973. The Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission announced on television that Pakistan would
establish 15 new nuclear power stations in the next 25
years. He stated that the first nuclear power station of
900 MW capacity would be completed by 1975 near Kundian, in
Chashma Baghage area of Punjab. He also disclosed that
Pakistan had discovered an "abundant quantity" of Uranium
which would not only be sufficient for Pakistan’s
49requirements but it could also be exported.
India conducted its nuclear explosion on 18 May, 
1974. This caused a serious blow to the Pakistan's efforts 
to overcome its energy shortages by developing nuclear 
power. Indian explosion created suspicion and mistrust 
amongst the nuclear technology exporting countries who
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announced severe restrictions for the transfer of nuclear
technology. The nuclear power program of Pakistan was,
therefore, revised which also considered the second
assessment of the IAEA confirming Pakistan’s future nuclear 
*50power needs. Under the revised schedule, the second
nuclear power plant of 600 MW capacity at Chashma (original
planned capacity of this reactor was 500 MW which was
changed to 900 MW in the first revision) was planned to be
completed by 1980. The third plant (dual-purpose plant to
generate 400 MW electricity and 100 million gallons of fresh
water by desalination of seawater) at Karachi was envisaged
to be completed by early 1980s. After 1985, the program
envisaged the construction of a nuclear power plant almost
51every year till the end of the century.
The nuclear power generation and development in 
Pakistan suffered a set back as a result of international 
politics after India detonated her nuclear device in May 
1974. Maximum power generation in a year by the Karachi 
Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) with installed capacity of 137 
MW could not go beyond 610 GWH which was achieved during 
1975-76. As a result of Indian explosion, the Canadian 
Government unilaterally repudiated in December 1976 its 
contracts for the provision of technical assistance and the
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supply of materials (including fuel) and spare parts for the
KANUPP, This caused sharp decline in the KANUPP’s output 
leading to complete shut down in 1979. Energy produced by 
the KANUPP during 1979-80 amounted to 2 GWH only. The plant 
restarted its operations with indigenous efforts after 
remaining closed for more than one year and produced 150 GWH 
of energy during 1980-81. Its generation was 254 GWH in 
1987-88 which was still much below the performance level 
achieved during 1975-76. Since 1980-81, the KANUPP is being 
operated without any outside help in respect of maintenance, 
spares and supplies including nuclear fuel (which is pro­
duced locally from the natural uranium mined in the 
count ry) .
Pakistan’s Nuclear Power Development Program became a 
subject of intense international political activity since 
May 1974 when India joined the ’nuclear club’ by detonating 
a nuclear device. At that time, Pakistan was busy to line 
up finances and suppliers for the construction of 900 MW 
Nuclear Power Plant at Chashma. Pakistan had announced its 
Nuclear Power Development Program in 1973 which provided for 
the establishment of 15 nuclear power stations in 25 years. 
The plan was prepared in the wake of oil price hike which 
imposed a crushing burden on Pakistan’s economy. The objec-
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tive of the Plan was to decrease dependence upon the import­
ed fossil fuels to meet its rapidly rising energy needs. 
The Chashma Nuclear Power Plant Project also included a 
reprocessing plant to produce nuclear fuel for its require­
ments. At the time of Indian explosion, Pakistan was nego­
tiating with France for the supply of reprocessing plant. 
Pakistan argued that the reprocessing facility was essential 
because the success of its Plan was dependent upon the 
uninterrupted supply of enriched uranium which could not be
ensured by depending on one or two foreign powers whose
53reliability as suppliers was seriously in doubt.
Charles K. Ebinger has cited Zalmay Khalilzad to sup­
port their shared view that Pakistan’s Nuclear power program 
was an after effect of the May 1974 Indian nuclear detona­
tion. Obviously, this is not correct. Pakistan’s plan for 
setting up more nuclear reactors including reprocessing 
facility, had been made public before May 1974. Zalmay 
Khalilzad ignored the announcement by the Chairman of 
Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission made on 27 December, 
1973 disclosing Pakistan’s nuclear power generation program. 
He has gave July 1974, the time falling after the May 1974 
Indian explosion, as the time when Pakistan announced her 
program of nuclear power generation. For his purposes, it
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was necessary to ignore the date falling before the Indian
explosion as it would have made it difficult for him to 
imply that it was an after-effect of the Indian explosion. 
Charles K. Ebinger’s assertion that budgetary allocations 
for Chashma Nuclear Project ’were not made until after the 
Indian nuclear detonation’ is also untenable. Annual Devel­
opment Plan, 1974-75 was published in July 1974. The ap­
proval for the inclusion of development projects and finan­
cial allocations were obviously made much before its publi­
cation. The Indian explosion took place on 18 May, 1974. By 
that time, the Annual Plan had already been sent to the 
press for printing. The decision to make financial alloca­
tions for the Chashma project was not therefore an after 
effect of Indian explosion.^4
The United States of America and other members of the 
'nuclear club’ became suspicious about Pakistan’s intentions 
against the backdrop of Indian explosion and the traditional 
animosity between India and Pakistan. Their doubts were 
reinforced by the disclosures of the authors of The Islamic 
Bomb and other writers as well as the announcements by 
Pakistan that it had acquired the capability to enrich 
uranium. The Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, 
for example, announced in September 1980 that Pakistan had
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acquired the capability of producing nuclear fuel. Also, Dr.
Khan who supervised the project announced in February 1984 
that "Pakistan had broken the western monopoly in the tech­
nique of enriching uranium"56.
Successive regimes in Pakistan since 1973, had the 
full support of the people of Pakistan to implement the 
nuclear power development program. A perceptive analyst 
wrote in 1987 as follows:
An outstanding feature of the recent three-day debate
on foreign policy was the endorsement by the joint
session of the National Assembly and the Senate of
Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear program. The nation thus
stands united behind the program for peaceful uses of
nuclear energy to augment its energy supply which is
5 7falling short of the galloping demand.
However, an intense political activity at the inter­
national level kept Pakistan down in this regard. The 
intensity of the efforts in this regard can be adjudged from
the chronology of 58events given in Chart 4.1 ., leading to
the cancellation of the agreement between Pakistan and
France for the provision of reprocessing plant.
CHART 4.1
NUCLEAR PLANT DEAL: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
March 1973:
Negotiations begin between Pakistan and France for the sale 
of a nuclear power plant for Pakistan.
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October 18, 1974:
An agreement is signed between the French firm Saint-Gobain 
Techniques Nouvelles (SGN) and Pakistan Atomic Energy 
Commission for the design and construction of a $60 million 
reprocessing plant at Chashma.
Autumn 1974:
The US convenes a secret meeting of the nuclear suppliers 
group (set up by the Nixon Administration after the Indian 
nuclear explosion) to decide on a uniform set of nuclear 
export standards.
February 1976:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), France and 
Pakistan sign a tripartite agreement embodying approved 
international safeguards for the sale of the nuclear power 
plant, Pakistan consented to submit the Chashma plant to 
international controls, including regular inspection by IAEA 
officials.
February 1976:
The US delegate at the IAEA Board of Governors voted In 
favor of the tripartite agreement when it came before the 
IAEA Board.
February 23, 1976:
Fred Ikle, Director of US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, tells a Senate Sub-committee that there is no 
economic justification for Pakistan’s desire to acquire a 
reprocessing plant and that the US is discouraging Islamabad 
from proceeding further.
February 26, 1976:
While visiting Ottawa, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
rebutted lkle’s view and declared that it was for Pakistan 
alone to determine its economic justification.
March 18, 1976:
Agreement signed between Pakistan and France for 
construction of a nuclear power plant at Chashma.Soon after, 
Canada which had supplied the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant 
(KANUPP) terminates all shipment of fuel supplies for this
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reactor. The U.S. applauds the action.
June 1976:
While Washington exerts pressure on Paris and Islamabad to 
cancel the nuclear deal, the U.S. Congress adopts an 
amendment to the Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill. Called the 
Symington Amendment, named after its author, Democrat 
Senator, Stuart Symington, this prohibits all economic and 
military assistance to any country acquiring enrichment or 
reprocessing technology.
August 9, 1976:
President Gerald Ford dispatches Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger to Pakistan to persuade Islamabad to drop the 
project. Here Dr. Kissinger is reported to have offered to 
Nr. Bhutto’s government .110 Corsair A-7 jet fighters as a 
quid pro quo if it gave up the French nuclear plant.
Dr. Kissinger is also reported to have warned Bhutto that
the American Administration "would make a horrible example 
of you" if he went ahead with the nuclear program.
August 1976:
From Pakistan, Kissinger goes to France, where he urges 
Prime Minister Jacques Chirac to unilaterally cancel the 
deal with Pakistan. But Chirac refuses to submit to US 
pressure saying France will honor its commitments and con­
tracts. Chirac says the deal is "an agreement between
Pakistan and France and not subject to third party
interference".
August 1976:
Chirac resigns after disagreements with President Giscard d’ 
Estaing.
September 1976:
Dr. Kissinger meets President Giscard d’ Estaing who in the 
same month imposes direct control over nuclear exports 
through the establishment of the Council of Foreign Nuclear 
Policy,
October 1976:
President Giscard visits the US and on his return announces 
a new nuclear export procedure.
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December 1976:
The French Council for Nuclear Foreign Policy issues a 
statement announcing that it is discontinuing fu rthe r 
exports of reprocessing technology abroad. But the 
statement makes clear that contracts already signed would go 
ahead, including the one with Pakistan.
January 1977:
Jimmy Carter becomes US President and expresses his 
commitment to stop nuclear proliferation.
February 1977:
The Carter Administration begins talks on the nuclear plant 
issue with French officials. The new French Prime Minister 
Raymond Barre says France would continue the agreement with 
Pakistan, "unless Pakistan does not wish to continue with 
it". But France also begins to offer alternate technology
("coprocessing") and announces delay in shipment of key
components for the plant.
March 1977:
Bhutto holds general elections which are followed by an
opposition campaign of mass agitation to protest ballot 
rigging.
April 28, 1977:
Bhutto tells the National Assembly that a "foreign hand" is 
out to destabilize his government. He alleges a massive 
international conspiracy against Pakistan. "The blood 
hounds are after my blood", he charges, because of his
determination to press ahead with the nuclear reprocessing 
deal with France.
April 29, 1977:
A State Department spokesman expresses "disquiet" over 
Bhutto’s allegations.
June 1977:
France begins to delay performance of the contract, while 
adding fresh conditions in order to provoke Pakistan into 
revoking the agreement.
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June 3, 1977:
U.S. withdraws offer of A7s to Pakistan,
June 10, 1977:
Prime Minister Bhutto reaffirms Pakistan's decision to go 
ahead with the French deal.
June 25, 1977:
A Foreign Office spokesman in Islamabad criticizes US and 
Indian attempts to pressurize France over the sale of the 
nuclear power plant to Pakistan.
June 28, 1977:
Indian Prime Minister denies reports of pressurizing France 
over Chashma deal.
July 5, 1977:
Military coup d ’etat brings General Zia ul-Haq to power.
July 14, 1977:
General Zia tells a press conference that he will go ahead 
with French deal.
July 26, 1977:
President Carter reiterates the hope that France will stop 
the sale of the plant to Pakistan.
July 29, 1977:
Joseph Nye, US anti-proliferation official visits Pakistan. 
Says the position of the two countries on the French plant 
remains "as divergent as before."
August 1977:
France suspends deliveries for the plant reportedly after 
the US provided the French with intelligence information 
alleged to reveal Pakistan’s "intentions".
September 1, 1977:
At a press conference, General Zia reiterates he will not
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abandon the nuclear plant deal.
September 1977:
Pakistan’s new foreign minister, Agha Shahi visits France, 
to urge the French to stop delaying, and is reported to have 
been assured that France would honor the deal.
September 1977:
The US cuts off military and economic assistance to Pakistan 
because of its insistence on the nuclear deal with France.
November 1977:
The French government assumes control of SGN by becoming the 
majority share holder.
January 1978:
President Carter visits France. Agha Shahi says the French 
are dragging their feet over the Chashma project.
June 1978:
President Giscard d’Estaing tells a press conference that 
his government would go ahead with the contract. But a day 
later, the Council on Foreign Nuclear Policy decides to 
revoke the contract.
July 1978:
President Giscard sends Andre Jacomet (Secretary of the 
Council on Nuclear Policy) to Islamabad with a letter to 
tell General Zia of France’s decision to suspend the 
contract. But, by way of a face saver, France offers to 
renegotiate the deal with the proposal of an alternate 
nonproliferating but as yet undeveloped technology. General 
Zia is reported to have told Jacomet: "You are breaking a
contract".
August 24, 1978:
Islamabad announces French cancellation of the agreement 
with Pakistan.
October 1978:
US restores military and economic aid to Pakistan.
The nuclear supplier’s club, led by the United
States, therefore, successfully dissuaded all suppliers (as
of June 1990) from bidding for the tenders for the Chashma
Nuclear Power Plant, in spite of Pakistan Government’s
repeated invitation for bids, Pakistan admitted her failure
to enlist support of foreign countries for the construction
of Chashma Nuclear Power Plant in April 1985 when Minister
for Finance announced : "There has been no success so far in
enlisting support of foreign countries for Chashma
..59Nuclear Power Project , although the Fifth Plan had pro­
vided for the completion of reprocessing plant and the 
continuation of work on the Chashma Nuclear Power Project, 
envisaged to come on-stream in February 1991.
The nuclear power development policy could not be 
implemented due to non-availability of technology. The 
access to the technology was blocked by those who controlled 
it. Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear power development program 
suffered due to international suspicion that Pakistan was 
pursuing a uranium enrichment program which would enable it 
to develop nuclear weapons. Although Pakistan repeatedly 
denied the reports that it possessed nuclear devices, but it 
refused to open up all of its nuclear facilities for inter­
national inspection due mainly to security considerations.
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Moreover, Pakistan announced its successes in the field of
uranium enrichment which not only strengthened the suspi­
cions but also indicated a diversion of substantial re­
sources for this purpose. All these developments affected 
the implementation of nuclear power policy adversely.
THE POWER SYSTEM LOSSES
Excessive energy losses plagued the power system in 
Pakistan since 1960s. The situation in the WAPDA System 
became particularly distressing. During 1976-77, the losses 
in the WAPDA system touched an all-time high peak, of 37.58 
percent of the energy generated. At 30 June 1988, the losses 
amounted to 24.59 percent. Table 4.10 indicates the nature 
and extent of system losses in the WAPDA system on an annual 
basis from 1960 onwards. It is evident from Table 4.10 that 
although the percentage share of the system losses to the 
gross generation decreased from 1976-77 onwards, the losses 
in terms of GWH significantly increased.
Power system losses can be classified into: technical 
losses; and non-technical losses. Non-technical losses con­
sist of pilferage of electricity, administrative errors in 
metering and billing, "fudging" of various statistical
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returns and defective meters. Non-technical losses, in a
healthy system, should be reduced to zero. Technical losses, 
however, can never be reduced to zero, because when elec­
tricity flows it always generates some heat and thereby 
losses occur. In a power system, technical losses are caused 
whenever power is transmitted between two points due to the 
resistance of the lines, transformation of voltage in trans­
formers, isolators, connectors and other electrical equip­
ment. Since these losses cannot be eliminated, the sound 
engineering practice is to keep these losses at an economi­
cally acceptable level. According to World Bank estimates, 
economic loss level for transmission can be as low as 3 
percent and that for distribution it can be as low as 5 
percent. Technical losses in a healthy distribution system 
should never exceed 10 percent of gross generation.00 In 
\Pakistan, both the technical as well as non-technical 
losses were far more than acceptable limits. Non-technical 
losses, particularly in the WAPDA system, were exorbitant 
and were estimated to be at least one-third of total distri­
bution losses. Table 4.11 indicates the percentage share of 
various categories of losses in the WAPDA system on an 
yearly basis from 1976-77 to 1987-88.
WAPDA’s estimates for pilferage for the years between
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1979-80 and 1983-84 ranged between 5 to 6 percent of the
gross generation, and for previous years an increase of 1/2 
percent per annum was to be added. The Federal Inspection 
Team, however, estimated that during 1978-79 the pilferage 
amounted to an average of 8.55 percent of gross generation 
with the financial loss of Rs. 240 million in that year. The 
possibility of theft of energy with the connivance of WAPDA 
staff could not be ruled out. The failure of WAPDA to imple­
ment measures suggested by various agencies from time to 
time including Federal Inspection team in 1980 to segregate 
theft from transmission and distribution losses and fix 
responsibility indicates the possible involvement of WAPDA 
officialdom. The installation of meters on the distribution 
transformers and interconnected feeders to measure energy 
input to consumers so as to segregate distribution line loss 
from the theft of electricity suggested by the Federal 
Inspection Team was agreed to by WAPDA only in April 1983, 
and by July 1985, the progress in this regard was nil. 
Although, the expenses for the installation of energy meters 
on distribution transformers would have been Rs. 150 million 
according to WAPDA’s own calculations against Rs. 240 mil­
lion of WAPDA’s accepted figure of loss of revenue due to 
theft during 1978-79.61
239
Social, political and economic factors contributed to
the increase in the incidence of theft with or without the 
connivance of WAPDA staff. It was well-known where the theft 
took place and who were the culprits. For example, according 
to a report:
... the theft is wide spread either in Katchi Abad.is, 
slums and the congested streets and high-income 
districts like Gulberg and Garden Town. The consumers 
in tribal areas, Afghan refugee camps and Baluchistan 
simply do not believe in paying any dues to the 
Government. In Khyber Agency, losses are 55.8 
percent ... In Bannu and North Wazirstan, the figures 
are 37.7 percent and 52.68 percent respectively ... 
The highest feeder losses are in Gulberg and Garden 
Town in Lahore ... there is considerable temptation 
to steal, particularly by the prestigious private 
hospitals and clinics, and restaurants who are reluc­
tant to pay the proper dues which might cause inci­
dence of high income-tax also ... Maximum tempering 
is done with MDI meters and highly ingenious methods 
are used in order to circumvent time mechanism of 
recording ...62
Measures to segregate non-technical losses and theft 
from the technical losses were also suggested on various 
occasions in the past, even prior to the recommendations of 
the Federal Inspection Team referred to above. Annual Plan 
1975-76, for example, suggested:
a. All 11 KV feeders should be metered accurately to 
register the units sent out. The meters should be 
properly protected from tempering by WAPDA staff.
b. Sub-divisions should be demarcated on feeder-wise 
basis and SDO’s and Executive Engineers should be
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given full authority for detection of stealing.
c. Every SDO in charge of a feeder should maintain a 
rise and fall register of energy bills to deter­
mine the extent of stealing by calculating the 
technical losses of the average load the feeder 
carried monthly.
d. The SDO should submit every month his report on 
the rise and fall of revenue as against the energy 
sent out to Divisional Engineer and the Divisional 
Engineers every quarter to Superintending 
Engineers who should be made responsible for 
rooting out this malpractice in their circles.6'3
In spite of all the remedies and measures suggested 
to WAPDA from time to time to root out theft of energy, 
improvements of any significance could not take place. The 
reluctance of WAPDA authorities to fix responsibi1ity 
was indicative of the possible involvement of its official­
dom and widespread corruption in the organization. However, 
they were also afraid of taking action against the powerful 
sections of the society.
The measures taken by WAPDA, as of June 1985, to 
check pilferage mainly included the installation of anti­
theft boxes (ATBs) and checking by special surveillance 
teams. Feeder-wise checking had been introduced from 
1984-85. As of 30 June 1984, a total number of 4,277 ATBs 
had been installed on industrial connections receiving power 
above 70 KW representing a coverage of 88 percent in this
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category of consumers. About 4 percent of commercia1
consumers had ATB’s. Besides, a total number of 178,847 ATBs 
had been installed on small industrial, tube-well and gener­
al connections by 30 June 1984 representing about 4 percent 
coverage.6 The reliability of the above figures was ques­
tioned by certain quarters. It was reported that many ATBs 
had not been sealed properly. A large number of them were 
reported to have no lids or not latched properly or the 
prize bonds had not been pasted. Such ATBs, therefore, 
served no purpose.65
Inadequate and defective distribution system in the 
country caused excessive technical losses. More than admis­
sible length of 11 KV feeders, inadequate conductor sizes 
and voltage levels and in many cases improper conductors 
(for example, if proper conductor is not available in the 
stores, the linemen would often strung G.I. wire which is 
technically criminal), undersized distribution transformers, 
low power factor and poor workmanship and sub-standard 
electrical equipment, were the main causes for excessive 
technical losses. In suburban areas and "Katchi-abadis", 
unauthorized long distribution lines had been strung on 
spliced wood and branches. Physical replacement of these 
lines was not difficult, but administrative procedures were
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tedious and the field staff were reluctant to report such
cases for fear of action against them. They would rather 
approach the unauthorized users for whatever gains they 
could squeeze from them. Strenuous efforts were required to 
solve these problems. The Distribution Wing of WAPDA had 
been suffering due to long neglect, although it employed 
more than 50 percent of the WAPDA employees. The distribu­
tion system, therefore, needed greater attention and re-
66sources than what it got for many years.
The number of consumers in the WAPDA system increased 
from 59,000 in 1947 to 311,596 at 30 June 1960 and to 
5,779,623 at 30 June, 1988. In the KESC system, the number 
of consumers increased from 98,056 at 31 December 1960 to 
879,287 at 30 June 1988. Table 4.12 shows the number of 
consumers in both the systems at the end of various Plan 
periods from 1960 onwards. Consumption of electricity per 
capita (excluding captive capacity generation of the indus­
try) in the country increased from 3.6 KWH in 1948 to 318.7 
KWH in 1988. Table 4.13 indicates the consumption of 
electricity per capita (public utilities only) during the 
terminal years of various Plan periods.
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TABLE 4.12
NUMBER OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS IN PAKISTAN
Yea r WAPDA KESC PAKISTAN
194 7 59,000 *
1960 311,596 98,056 *
1965 687,866 162,747 *
1970 1,174,625 225,486 *
1978 2,280,441 415,936 *
1983 3,901,436 635,000 4,536,436
1988 5,779,623 879,287 6,658,910
* Figures for WAPDA indicate the number of consumers at 
30 June, whereas the figures for KESC indicate the number of 
consumers at 31 December. The total for Pakistan is, 
therefore, not given. The figures for the years 1983 and 
1988 indicate the number of consumers at 30 June for both
the systems. 
Source: (i)
(ii)
(iii)
(. iv )
WAPDA Power System Statistics, October 1990 
pp.38 ~ 87.
KESC Power. System Statistics (1983), p . 26 . 
KESC 71st Annual Report (1983), op.cit., p .5. 
KESC 72 Annual Report (1983 ) , op.cit. , p .5.
In spite of the manifold growth in the distribution 
system, an ever increasing demand for more power and new 
connections always kept the system under pressure. Besides, 
being at the tail end of the power system, the distribution 
system Invariably suffered due to drastic ADP (Annual Devel­
opment Plan,) cuts. As a result of inadequate finances as 
well as attention, the distribution system deteriorated over 
the years. The system had been developed haphazardly without 
proper planning and ignoring the design requirements of a 
technically sound system. In many parts of the system, the
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TABLE 4.13
CONSUMPTION OF ELECTRICITY PER CAPITA 
(PUBLIC UTILITIES)
Yea r Total Consumption
Consumption per Capita
(GWh) C KWh)
1948 112.7 3.6
1955 475.6 12.2
1960 875.4 \Tcr *—(
1965 2,437.8 46.3
1970 4,622.7 76.3
1978 8,372.0 108.2
1983 14,150.0 157.7
1988 25,075.0 241.5
Sou rce: For consumption figures:
CD Energy Data Book, op.cit., pp.126-127.
(ii) Energy Year Book 1983, op.cit., p .64.
( i i i ) Energy Year Book 1989, op.cit., p.64.
lines had been extended without any design criteria and some 
of the 11 KV feeders were more than 150 KM long. Moreover, 
the conductors were too small for the load carried and the 
transformers were overloaded in many areas. In many portions 
of the system, the equipment was as much as 50 years old. 
Renovation was highly neglected. Firstly, meager funds were 
allocated for this purpose. Secondly, even those funds were 
not fully utilized for lack of incentives. Consequently, the 
system suffered from high power losses and low voltage. The 
rehabilitation program, including the installation of static 
capacitors where needed, suffered in the WAPDA system due
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to the neglect of the distribution sector over a long time
also because, according to a highly placed WAPDA official,
, 67it had no glamour' attached to it.
The First Five Year Plan pointed out that the
implementation of the transmission and distribution schemes
54during the 1947-55 period was about 30 percent. The Second
Plan accorded a higher priority to transmission and
distribution and provided for the construction of 9,100
miles (14,642 KM) of transmission and distribution lines of
11 KV and above compared to 3,050 miles (4,907 KM) during
55the First Plan period. Although, these targets were 
achieved during the Second Plan period, the distribution 
system continued to deteriorate. The Third Plan stated that 
the ’distribution system in many areas is old and inadequate 
for present load’, and described the situation to be ’not 
satisfactory’. The need to continue the rehabilitation and 
extension program at an accelerated pace was stressed. A 
backlog of 80,000 pending applications for new connections 
only in the Northern Grid (Punjab and NWFP) of WAPDA was 
reported. The target for the construction of 11,000 miles 
(17,699 km) of 11 KV and above transmission and distribution 
lines was fixed.70 In spite of an increased stress of the 
Third Plan for the rehabilitation and improvement of the
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distribution system, the situation further deteriorated
during the Third Plan period. The Fourth Five Year Plan 
considered the 'inadequacy of the distribution system 
particularly the shortage of grid stations, longer than 
permissible lengths of feeder circuits and under capacity of 
distribution mains and transformers’ responsible to a large 
extent for ’poor quality of service and increase in system 
losses’. A large percentage of ’the abnormally high system 
losses’ was considered to occur in the distribution system. 
The incidence of ’widespread theft of energy by meter tam­
pering, wrong reading etc.’ was also highlighted by the
~7 1Fourth Plan. The Fourth Plan urged the WAPDA authorities 
to improve the distribution system and the operational effi­
ciency. The Plan underlined the strategy as follows:
Greater emphasis will be placed on ,improving the 
operating efficiency of the public utilities, 
particularly that of the Water and Power Development 
Authority. Efficiency can be introduced by creating 
proper balance between generation and marketing 
facilities, reducing power losses (recorded as high 
as 32% of total generation) and employing better 
operating and maintenance techniques (the failure at 
the Multan Power Station was due to inefficient 
operation and poor maintenance). The Plan attempts to 
achieve a balance between generation and marketing 
facilities through higher allocations to distribution 
than in the previous plans. WAPDA on the other hand 
will have to take concerted action to reduce the 
losses in the system and to evolve better operating 
and maintenance techniques and to improve its 
distribution system. Emphasis will be placed on 
creating more grid stations with shorter feeder- 
circuits, renovating existing distribution mains
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through replacement of transformers and installation
of shunt capacitors and feeder voltage regulators to
stabilize voltage to consumers. These works will have
to be undertaken simultaneously with extension works
to give new connections for spreading the social 72benefits.
However, the neglect of the distribution system 
continued and the system losses continued to increase una­
bated until 1976-77 when the system losses in the WAPDA 
system reached a peak of 37.58 percent of the energy gener­
ated. Although, WAPDA claimed that the ’process of reduction 
of power loss started in right earnest in 1977’,73 the 
distribution system could not be improved to a respectable 
level by 1988.
The problem of system losses also got attention of 
the international organizations. In 1980, a World Bank 
report stated that the length of the transmission and dis­
tribution lines and loads carried at relatively low voltage 
levels had contributed to the high system losses. The prob­
lem, according to this report, had been further aggravated 
by theft and bad metering.'4 In 1983, the IED Consultants' 
report described the situation as follows:
In many parts of the distribution system the conduc­
tors are too small for the load carried, transformers 
are overloaded, and the system suffers from high 
losses and low voltage. A modest program for rehabil­
itating the distribution system is underway. Appar-
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ently the above programme is not financed adequately
to allow the system to be greatly improved in the 7 5near future.
In 1985,the World Bank asked WAPDA to reduce its 
overall system losses which were 29.3 percent in 1983-84 to 
23 percent within the next three years as a precondition of 
a loan for the Fourth Power Project of WAPDA. It was report­
ed by a highly placed officer of WAPDA that the WAPDA au­
thorities had provided arguments attempting to prove that
”7three years was too short a period to achieve this target. 
Asian Development Bank expected the transmission and distri­
bution losses stabilizing below 11.0 percent in the KESC 
system as a result of the implementation of a Power Project 
financed by it. Project Performance Audit Report of the Bank 
was very critical of the KESC’s performance in this regard 
as the losses had increased to 23 percent instead of
stabilizing below 11.0 percent after the completion of the 
7-7project. '
The pattern of electricity consumption also underwent 
substantial changes over the years which added to the enor­
mity of the problem. The share of the industrial sector 
consistently declined, whereas the percentage share of the 
agricultural sector in the total consumption of electricity 
continued to increase during the Second, Third and the
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Annual-Plan periods and decreased during the Fifth and Sixth
Plan periods. The consumption by the domestic sector began 
to increase considerably during the Annual-Plan period 
(1970-78). This trend continued during the Fifth and the 
Sixth Plan periods. Table 4.14 indicates the consumption by 
different categories of consumers, from 1960 onwards, during 
the terminal years of various plan periods. During the Fifth 
Plan period, the number of domestic consumers increased by 
about 1.50 million against the target of 0.7 million. But 
the number of industrial and agricultural consumers in­
creased by about 27,000 and 24,000 against the Plan target
70of 55,000 and 70,000 respectively.
Shifts in the consumption pattern of electricity are 
indicative of the socioeconomic and political developments 
which took place in the country during the study period. 
People’s revolt against Ayub regime was mainly the result of 
the failure of the government to spread the benefits of 
economic development to the disadvantaged sections of the 
society. Under the Bhutto Government, efforts were made to 
extend the facilities to as many people as possible. With 
the increase of home remittances from abroad by Pakistani 
workers who mostly belonged to the poorer sections of the 
society (45 percent of them were unskilled and another 41
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TABLE 4 -14
PATTERN OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION IN PAKISTAN
(GWH)
Y e a r ____________________ Category of Consumers__________________  Total
Doric stlc Comme rcla 1 Industrial Agricultural Others*
* *
1959-60 195.212
(23.3)
- 518.818
(59.3)
67.180
(7.7)
94. 193 
(10.7)
875.403
(100)
1964-65 331.178
(13.6)
128.924
(5.3)
1,276.368
(52.3)
424.210
(17.4)
277.174
(11.4)
2,437.854
(100)
1969-70 568.825
(12.3)
301.682
(6.5)
2,304.984
(49.9)
956. 140 
(20.7)
491.058
(10.6)
4,622.689
(100)
1977-78 1,705.780
(20.4)
733.290
(8.8)
3,402.580
(40.6)
1,760.500
(21.0)
769.930
(9.2)
8,372.080
(100)
1982- 83
1983- 88
,752
(26.5)
7,900
(31.53
1,049
(7.4)
1,868
(7.4)
5,572
M9.4)
8,973
(35.8)
2,559
(18.1)
4,415
(17.6)
1,218
(8.6)
1,919
(7.7)
14,150
(100)
25,075
(100)*
* *
Includes,
Includes
puollc lighting, bulk supply, traction 
consumption by the commercial sector.
etc*
Note: Figures on parentheses Indicate percentage.
Source: (1) Energy Data Book, op.clt., p. 127.
(11) Energy Year Book 1983, op. c 11 . , p.64.
(111) Energy Year Book 1989 op. c1t•, p-62
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percent were semi-skilled labor) raised the standard of
living of their dependents in Pakistan. This was followed by 
an unprecedented increase in the housing construction. The 
number of household electric appliances and other gadgets 
also multiplied over the years (no one would return from 
overseas without a number of these items). The pace of rural 
electrification also increased during the later part of the 
Annual Plan period. All these factors caused the consumption 
in the domestic sector to increase at a faster rate as 
compared to the industrial sector. Commercial activities 
also picked up during the 1970s and the consumption in this 
sector also increased at a faster rate. These developments 
put the distribution system under tremendous pressure. 
However, matching resources were not provided to upgrade the 
distribution system. The WAPDA bureaucracy did not adopt oa 
rational system of deciding internal priorities.
The Sixth Five Year Plan envisaged the system losses 
to go down by 2 percent each year during the Plan period to 
bring the losses down to 19 percent of the total 
generation.79 However, the losses at the end of the Sixth 
Plan period amounted to 24.6 percent. Had the losses been 
reduced to the 19 percent level envisaged by the Sixth Plan, 
which was still higher than the optimum economic level,
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enormous gains would have accrued to the nation. The country
could have financed at least one big project every year from 
1960 onwards out of the additional income earned by the sale 
of energy which had been going down the drain. Immeasurable 
additional benefit as a result of adequate and dependable 
electric supplies would have been a bonus for a better house 
keeping. During 1983-84, 19 percent losses in the WAPDA
system compared to actual losses of 29.30 percent would have 
enabled WAPDA to sell additional units amounting to 1,860 
GWH and increase its income by approximately Rs. 989 million 
which was (at 1983-84 price) equivalent to the Rupee 
component of the total estimated capital cost of Tarbela
gounits 9 & 10 with an installed capacity of 350 NW.
RAILWAY ELECTRIFICATION
In order to modernize the railway system and to save 
valuable foreign exchange on account of imported fuel oil, 
electrification of Pakistan Railway was considered in early 
1960s. The Khanewal-Lahore section, a distance of 290 KM, 
mostly single track and heavily overloaded was first select­
ed for 25 KW,AC, single phase electrification. It was also 
considered that if electrification of this section proved 
successful, it could be extended to Lahore-Rawalpindi (293
O C T4n -vU O
KM) section as well. The electrification work on Khanewal-
Lahore section was completed in December 1970 at a cost of
O  1Rs. 142 million. The Third Plan also recommended the 
electrification of Lahore-Rawalpindi section after the Plan 
period. The Fourth Five Year Plan recommended to conduct 
studies for the electrification of other important sections
O 7such as Karachi-Kotri and Lahore-Rawalpindi. A comprehen­
sive study on the energy use in the transport system 
sponsored by the National Transport Research Centre recom­
mended the electrification of the main track between Karachi 
and Rawalpindi. The study, on the basis of field data, 
concluded that the specific energy consumption in the case 
of electric traction was 5considerably lower than that under 
the best petroleum fuel, HSD’.°4 The Fifth Five Year Plan 
envisaged the extension of electric traction from Khanewal 
to Samasatta. The Plan stated:
A provision of Rs. 160.00 million has been made in 
the Fifth Plan for extension of electric traction 
from Khanewal to Samasatta. This would ensure better 
utilization of the existing 29 Electric Locomotives 
in use on Lahore-Khanewal section.85
The Working Group report on the development and 
conservation of energy resources for the Sixth Five Year 
Plan also recommended for the acceleration of electrifica­
tion of the railways.86 The Sixth Five Year Plan is silent
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about the fate of the above project. Instead, the Plan 
envisaged" the introduction of electric traction on a small 
section between Sukkur and Quetta (Abegum--Kolpur). The 
under-utilization of the existing Electric Locomotives, 
therefore, continues unabated. As of 30 June 1988, no exten­
sions had been made in the electric traction.
Since the electrification of Khanewal-Lahore section 
in 1970, no electrification project was implemented. Not­
withstanding the fact that the system was working satisfac­
torily and the targets set forth had long since been 
achieved. Besides affecting savings in running time, the 
project had since paid its capital cost. The railway staff 
had also gained technical knowledge and experience and was
O  Ofully capable to undertake similar projects. '
Numerous causes account for ’no progress' in the 
railway electrification. The financial constraints, paucity 
of foreign exchange and the rising costs of equipment 
contributed to readjust priorities in the Railways Ministry. 
The funds earmarked for the electrification projects were 
utilized elsewhere. The priorities were not set in the 
ministry on rational grounds. The inter-departmental rival­
ries In the Railways Ministry had a major effect on the
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implementation of this project. The mechanical engineers
felt an imminent threat to their supremacy in the ministry
who feared that the implementation of these projects would
give material advantage to the electrical engineers. The
purchase and supply staff who were making millions from the
purchase of oil took it a challenge to their survival. The
bureaucratic interest groups, therefore, made all out ef~
89forts to shelf the railway electrification scheme.
The reluctance of WAPDA in giving clearance for new 
electrification projects was another factor. This was gener­
ally attributed to the prevalent shortage of power in the 
country. However, the situation was not as bad at the pri­
mary source because the railway required power at 132 KV. 
The demand of electric power for electrification projects 
was very small as compared to that of local industry. Rail­
way’s working was round the clock but mostly the freight 
trains run during the night hours. The Railway’s peak demand 
was, therefore, during the off-peak hours of WAPDA which 
would rather improve the overall load factor of WAPDA gener­
ation. Coordination with WAPDA at appropriate level could
have solved this problem, but the basic stimulus which would
90have come from the railway bureaucracy remained absent.
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RURAL ELECTRIFICATION
Until 1970, rural electrification in Pakistan was 
considered a ’social service’ to be provided to some lucky 
vi1lages. The Fourth (abortive) Five Year Plan (1970-75) 
stated:
The rural electrification programme has been adopted
in conjunction with Tube-we11 electrification largely
as a social service. Since it cannot be regarded as a
paying commercial proposition, care has been taken to
see that this programme does not impose excessive
financial handicaps on the power industry. According
only 1,000 villages are planned to be electrified91during the Fourth Plan period.
More than half a century was required to electrify 
45,122 villages and an equal number of small settlements in 
Pakistan at the rate adopted in the Fourth Plan. The 
downfall of Ayub regime and the subsequent developments 
caused a change in government’s policy. Consequently, a 
higher priority was started to be given for the uplift of 
rural areas where about 72 percent of the population lived. 
The rural electrification programme gained momentum from 
1972-73 onwards and the number of villages electrified in 
the WAPDA system (WAPDA is the main agency responsible for 
rural electrification) increased from 2,553 at 30 June 1972 
to 7,609 at 30 June 1978. In the KESC system, 199 villages
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and goths (small settlements) were electrified during
1972-78 period against a total of only 125 during the 
previous 25 years. As of 30 June 1988, according to the 
figures given by WAPDA 27,691 villages had been electrified 
in the country. Table 4.15 indicates the progress of village 
electrification in the WAPDA System at the end of various 
plan periods in each province. It is evident from Table 4.15 
that only about 61 percent of the total villages were elec­
trified at the end of June 1988. The position of the NWFP
TABLE 4.15
PROVINCE WISE VILLAGE ELECTRIFICATION
Province Total No. Number of
of villages
Villages Electrified at 
30 June
1960 1965 1970 1978 1983 1988
Punjab* 25,489 277 879 1 , 136 3,552 7,735 13,373
NWFP** 7,717 625 919 1,043 2,294 4,018 6,963
Sindh 5,847 2 55 200 1,607 3,065 5,756
Baluchistan 6,069 - 5 10 156 421 1,599
TOTAL 45,122 904 1858 2,389 7,609 15,239 27,691
* Includes Islamabad.
** Includes Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
Source:(i) WAPDA Power System Statistics, October, 1990 
p. 57.
(ii) Energy Year Book, 1989, p .65.
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and Sindh in respect of village electrification was better
where the percentage of electrified villages was 90 and 98 
respectively. In the Punjab and Baluchistan the percentage 
of such villages was 52 and 26 respectively.
The Planning Commission of Pakistan, however, did not
accept WAPDA figures. According to 7th Five Year Plan only
16,525 villages or 33.7 percent were electrified by 30 June, 
921988. The Planning Commission used the definition of the 
village as adopted by Population Census 1981, whereas WAPDA 
authorities changed the definition to exaggerate the figures 
to show impressive progress in respect of rural electrifica­
tion project. It had also been reported that WAPDA figures
included 25 per cent of "paper connection , and were inflat-
93ed by resorting to double counting.
The numbers of beneficiaries in the electrified 
villages were even more depressing. On an overall basis, 
only about 25 percent of the population in the electrified 
villages had electricity connections. According to WAPDA’s 
own criteria in respect of rural consumers, a village was 
considered electrified if 15 percent of the population 
were provided electricity connections. In some cases, even 
this requirement was not fulfilled. Majority of the rural
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people even in the electrified villages, therefore, had no
access to electricity, Even if 25 percent of the population 
in the electrified villages were considered to have access 
to electricity, for a country as a whole it would translate 
to be less than 11 percent of the rural population.
The tube-we11 electrification program in the rural 
areas had always received high priority. The number of 
electrified tube-wells increased to 136,860 in the WAPDA 
System at the end of June 1988. About 600 agricultural tube- 
wells were also electrified in the KESC system. The back­
log of tube-well connections, however, had increased over 
the years. At 30 June 1984, the number of pending applica­
tions for tube-well connections in the WAPDA system was
3,642. Besides, it was estimated that approximately 100,000
96tube-wells operate on diesel engines. Had these tube-wells
been electrified, valuable foreign exchange could have been
saved. The tube-well electrification programme of the Sixth
Five Year Plan envisaged to provide 40,000 new tube-well
97connections in the WAPDA system during the Plan period. 
WAPDA could, however, electrify only 22,470 tube-wells 
during the plan period. The Sixth Plan target in respect of 
village electrification was to electrify 20,000 villages93 
As only 10,127 villages were electrified during the plan
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period, the shortfall was, therefore, about 50 percent.
The rural electrification policy pursued in Pakistan 
during the study period did not address the question of 
poor coverage of the population in the electrified villages. 
The targets were set in terms of number of villages to be 
electrified and the progress of the agencies concerned was 
measured primarily in terms of meeting those targets. This 
approach not only caused under-utilization of the capital 
for rural electrification, but also deprived the majority of 
the population of its benefits. Also, low sales and high 
transmission and distribution losses were the inevitable 
consequences which the public utilities had to live with as 
a result of pursuing this policy. Besides, it had not been 
possible to decrease the consumption of kerosene oil in the 
rural areas. A full 75 percent of the rural population 
suffered due to this lopsided policy. Appropriate credit 
arrangements for the less affluent sections of the rural 
population were necessary to achieve better results. Even 
the possibilities of providing grants to the poorest of 
the rural population to meet internal electrification 
charges would have been considered. One possible source for 
this purpose could be the Zakat Fund. Without appropriate 
credit facilities and grant mechanism, it is unlikely that
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the rural poor will have access to electricity.
The implementation of rural electrification suffered 
due to the wrong assumptions on which the policy was based. 
It was assumed that once a village was connected to the 
national grid, its entire population would be benefited. The 
implementing agency was interested only in numbers. In their 
enthusiasm to show results, the officials resorted to such 
practices as "paper connections" and modification of crite­
ria by changing definition of the village. This also indi­
cates the prevalence of defective management and control 
procedures and practices to monitor the performance of the 
Implementing agency. Misreporting could not be pointed out 
for several years.
THE POWER COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN
The Government of Pakistan established a Commission, 
namely, Power Commission of Pakistan, In May 1961 with the 
objective to make wide range recommendations for the devel­
opment and utilization of electric power in the country. 
The Commission was headed by a very senior official of the 
Government of Pakistan with a membership consisting of
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equally senior officials including specialists. The
secretariat of the commission was located in the Atomic 
Energy Commission of Pakistan (PAEC). The Power Commission 
submitted its report to the Government in August, 1963. 
Subsequently, the Government appointed an officials’ commit­
tee again headed by a very senior officer and drawing its 
membership from the relevant organizations with the objec­
tive to submit a report to the Government on the recommenda­
tions of the Commission. This committee submitted its 
report to the Government in March 1964, recommending inter 
alia to get comments on the Report from the relevant agen­
cies. At this juncture, Government also decided to shift 
the Secretariat of the Power Commission from the PAEC to the 
Ministry of Water and Power
The Ministry of Water and Power got agency comments 
from relevant organizations of Provincial and Federal 
Governments in due course. In the meantime, the Government 
decided to restore original provinces of the country by the 
breakup of one unit in western Pakistan. Fresh reports 
were, therefore, called from all the Provincial Governments 
which were received in the Ministry in due course.
Nothing happened until 1973 when someone in the
Ministry of Water and Power thought of generating some work
out of this otherwise dust clad reports. By that time, the 
country had lost one of its wings and the former East 
Pakistan had become Bangladesh , an independent country. It 
was argued that after the secession of the erstwhile East 
Pakistan, new reports/comments from the provincial govern­
ments and other relevant agencies were necessary as the 
entire scenario had changed. The Office of the Chief 
Engineering Advisor in the Ministry of Water and Power was 
entrusted the responsibi1ity to coordinate. Fresh comments 
were received from all the relevant quarters by August 1973 
which were placed in the relevant files and the officials 
concerned were advised to wait for further instructions.101
In 1982, President of Pakistan issued a directive to 
the Federal Inspection Commission (FIC) to form a Cell for 
the study of Reports of Commissions/Committees appointed by 
the Government from time to time.  ^ The FIC, therefore, 
asked the Ministry of Water and Power about the fate of the 
Power Commission’s Report. The Ministry passed on this 
responsibility to the Chief Engineering Advisor’s Office. 
Strenuous efforts were made to dig out the Report and the 
comments of various agencies on the implementabi11ty of 
the conclusions and recommendations of the Report. After
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lengthy deliberations and discussions by experts in the 
Ministry of Water and Power spread over three years, it was 
finally advised by the Chief Engineering Advisor in April 
1985 that the recommendations of the Commission had become 
irrelevant and it would not be desirable to pursue them fur­
ther. The desirability of appointing a new Commission for 
the purpose was, however, recommended to be studied. °
The case of Power Commission demonstrates the capa­
bility of the bureaucracy to resist change or reform efforts 
likely to affect their preeminence. In the absence of a 
system to fix responsibility, such delays and inactions 
rampant in the implementation of energy policy are unlikely 
to be curbed.
THE FUELS SECTOR
The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources is 
responsible for the implementation of energy policy relating 
to the fuels sector. Major investments in this sector were 
envisaged to come from the private sector. The bureaucracy 
of the Ministry was required to regulate the activities of 
the private companies. In the absence of effective political 
leadership, the bureaucracy1s main concern remained to
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effectively control the operations of the private sector.
There was no incentive for the bureaucrats to liberalize the 
p rocedu res.
The oil and gas exploration and exploitation
The oil and gas exploration and exploitation policy 
of the Government suffered as a result of bureaucratic 
apathy and red-tapism. Until 1973, there was no u rgency to 
accelerate the oil and gas exploration and exploitation 
efforts. Natural gas was discovered in 1952, but the gas 
utilization policy remained the victim of adhocism. The 
trend had been to expand its consumption in all the sectors. 
The oil production deteriorated or remained static till the 
beginning of the Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-88). The policy 
had been to depend on the private sector investment in this 
field. The public sector investment remained low. The pri­
vate sector performance was dependent among other things on 
the incentives and facilities made available by the Govern­
ment. The Government response in this field remained poor. 
The Pakistan Petroleum (Production) Rules, 1949 remained 
unaltered until 1976. Second revision in the rules was 
affected in 1986 providing for attractive incentives to the 
private investors. The bureaucracy has been very slow to
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respond positively and most of its policies had been re­
strictive. It was during the Bhutto regime (1970-77) that 
the powers of the bureaucracy which discouraged investment 
were curtailed. Inaction and delay, however, continued to 
infest the bureaucracy, Pakistan Oilfields Limited com­
plained that its case for rationalization of crude price 
remained pending with the Government for years and it was 
not until 1986 that the price for this oldest indigenous 
oil/gas producer was rationalized.
The B hu t to Government brought in Shehzad Sadiq, a
technical expert, to appoint him as Secretary of the
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Under the
Junejo Government, another expert of international standing, 
Dr. Asad, was appointed Minister of State. These two 
appointments account for bringing about major changes in the 
system. It was only possible when the politicians were 
effectively controlling the national affairs.
The Petroleum Sector suffered due to the lack of 
technical competence at the top management level. According 
to a report of the World 8ank, "institutional inadequacies 
in the energy sector (Insufficient managerial and technical 
skills) and poor policies (especially In the area of pric-
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ing) have posed a serious obstacle to efficient energy 
sector development". Pakistan even needed to hire inter­
national qualified and experienced advisors to assist the 
Directorate General (Petroleum Concessions) of the Ministry
of Petroleum and Natural Resources with concession 
1negotiations. Bhutto and Junejo, both tried to utilize 
the services of Pakistani nationals with such an expertise 
in the persons of Shehzad Sadiq and Dr. Asad, but the bu­
reaucracy got rid of them in a short time.
The general criticism of OGDC’s top management had 
been that the directors as per practice were deputed from 
the Government services who neither had any interest or 
stake in the affairs of the Corporation nor possessed rele­
vant. qualifications or experience. Moreover, they were 
transferred out of OGDC after completion of their tenure 
ranging up to a maximum of three years. As long as civil 
servants continue to be deputed as directors, this pattern 
will continue because of the peculiar nature of career 
planning of the civil servants. Hence, there is a need to 
have directors nominated from industry or corporate sector 
having a broader base and experience of business environment 
in general and of oil industry in particular. They can even 
be drawn from the ranks of professionals working in OGDC.10'
268
The Coal Policy
The development of indigenous coal industry also suf­
fered during the 1947-88 period. In the initial years, the 
coal production suffered due to the conversion of railway 
locomotives from coal to oil burning and the switch over to 
oil in a number of industries by 1953 in an effort to re­
place the imported coal without a clear-cut national coal
policy and without making appreciable investments for the
1 OSdevelopment of indigenous coal industry. During the 
1947-55 period, the coal industry also suffered due to 
procedural delays and in some cases as a result of the ’non 
issue of licenses for import of equipment’. The First 
Five Year Plan observed in this connection that the import 
licenses for the mining equipment were ’granted only for 
small amounts and after much delay, making it extremely dif­
ficult for mining companies to obtain essential equipment, 
supplies, spare parts, and replacements’. This happened due 
to defective laws and regulations and the exercise of con­
trols over mining by several departments.110 The First Five 
Year Plan outlined impressive policy objectives in respect 
of coal, but nothing happened. The coal remained ignored 
till Sixth Five Year Plan which emphasized the development 
and utilization of coal resources. The targets of the Sixth
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Plan could not be met due to non-enforcement of measures
enunciated in the Sixth Plan. National Coal Authority was 
planned to be established during the Sixth Plan period. No 
progress was achieved in this regard due to non-settlement 
of inter-provincial problems.
The Secretary, Mineral Coordination Board, Ministry 
of Petroleum and Natural Resources was of the view that the 
domestic coal had a very strong case to get maximum possible 
share in energy supplies on the ground of lower investment/ 
growth rate coefficient and of much larger employment poten­
tial it provided in comparison with oil and gas. The utili­
zation of coal in power generation, cement manufacturing and 
process heat was justified on economic grounds. But, coal 
mining industry in Pakistan required extensive restrueturing 
before any reliance could be placed on it for sustained 
large supplies at competitive prices. Federal Government in 
view of national importance of coal in the future energy 
supplies needed to play a leading role in this matter. 
However, in bureaucratic terms, the Secretary of the Mineral 
Coordination Board did not have a status high enough in the 
Ministry for its views to receive priority attention from 
the Government.  ^ Reforms in the coal industry required 
maximum encouragement to the private sector which implied
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curtailment of bureaucratic controls- However, bu reauc racy
in Pakistan was not appreciative of these ideas during the 
study period- Therefore, nothing happened to break the 
i ner t ia .
THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY COMMITTEE (NEPC)
In multi-actor policy implementation situations, the 
importance of coordination for an effective and timely 
accomplishment of intended objectives cannot be over­
emphasized, The technical departments involved in the 
implementation of energy projects were often in conflict, 
and the decisions were constantly postponed or selectively 
implemented during the study period. The underlying causes 
of lack of progress in formulating and implementing a devel­
opment strategy for energy sector included ecological, so­
cial, political, economic as well as organizational and 
managerial. Furthermore a well-defined operational strategy 
for energy development and utilization was missing. While 
targets were set in different plans for different activi­
ties, projects were not planned in a way that would ensure 
achievement of national objectives. The absence of a well 
thought-out mechanism for coordination between various 
energy producing agencies and energy consuming agencies
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hindered the implementation of energy policies in a system­
atic way. The creation of NEPC at the national level was 
envisaged to surmount the coordination problems. The present 
case throws light on the bureaucratic politicking to protect 
agency domains.
The National Energy Policy Commit tee (NEPC) is the 
highest national body, co-chaired by the Minister for 
Finance and the Minister for Petroleum and Natural 
Resources, to formulate and review the implementation of 
energy policies of the Government. The NEPC was established 
on 25 May 1980 as a result of President Zia ul-Haq’s 
interest (incidentally raised by reading an article written 
by Brian Locke of the Financial Times on India's energy 
plans regarding coal and cow-dung utilization).
The President sent a directive in 1979 to the then 
Finance Minister GhuLam Ishaq Khan, who happened to be a 
confidant of the President, to set up ’a committee to under­
take a detailed review of the energy situation In 
Pakistan’.113 On the submission by the Finance Minister, the 
President approved the composition and terms of reference of 
NEPC on 25 May 1980. The Committee was to be headed by the 
Minister for Finance or in his absence by the Minister for
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Petroleum and Natural Resources. The Secretaries of the
ministries of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Water and
Power, Planning and Development, Agriculture, Industries,
and Production and the Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission were appointed as members. The Secretariat of the
Committee was to be the Directorate General of Energy
Resources in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources
with the Director General Energy Resources as Secretary of
the Committee. [Director General (Energy Resources) was
later on renamed as Director General (New and Renewable
Energy Resources)]. The terms of reference of the Committee
were: (a) to review the progress of implementation of the
current energy policies of the Government; and (b) to formu-
1 1 4late short term and long term energy policies.
A technical committee, namely, Technical Advisory 
Committee was also established to assist the NEPC at the 
working level. This committee was to be headed by the 
Director General, Energy Resources. The other members were; 
Chief, Energy Section, Planning and Development Division; 
Chief Engineer, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission; 
Secretary, Oil Companies Advisory Committee; Director Plan­
ning, WAPDA; a senior representative from Gas Production 
Companies. The Director (Energy Planning) in DGER was ap-
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pointed as Secretary of the technical committee. 1 15
The terms of reference of the Technical Advisory
i i fCommittee were as follows:
a. To assess the energy requirements (present and 
future) of the national economy;
b. to assess the energy resources of the country;
c. to establish the supply and demand balance of 
energy for the national economy;
d. to make recommendations for a national energy 
policy;
e. conservation of energy resources in the national 
interest;
f. to prepare short and long term plans to meet the 
energy requ i rernen ts of the country; and
g. to recommend a pricing and taxation pattern which 
would best serve the interest of the national 
energy policy.
The idea of establishing an energy committee at the 
national level was familiar to the Pakistani bureaucracy at 
least since 1963 when the Government of Pakistan constituted 
a National Energy Policy Advisory Committee (NEPAC) with 
Secretary of the Ministry of Industries and Natural 
Resources as its Chairman and the Secretaries of some other 
ministries as its members. The NEPAC in its first meeting 
decided to conduct a comprehensive energy survey in the
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country. As the things used to be moving at a slow pace
during those days, it was only in 1974 when a firm of con-
sultants (Acres International) was contracted for this work.
The cost of this survey was financed by the UNDP. As a
result of this survey, a new organization, namely, the
Directorate of Energy Resources (now Directorate General,
New and Renewable Energy Resources), which was initially set
up in 1974 as Energy Resources Cell, also came into being.
This new organization acted as the counterpart agency to the
above mentioned survey project sponsored by the UNDP. The
National Energy Policy Advisory Committee held its second
meeting in June 1978 after a recess of 10 years, although it
was reconstitu ted in 1975 after upgrading and expanding its
membership, with the Minister for Petroleum and Natural
Resources as its chairman, and Secretaries of the various
Divisions concerned including the Secretary of Planning
Division at the Federal level and Chiefs of the Provincial
Development Boards as its members. The Technical Advisory
Committee also existed prior to the establishment of NEPC in
1980 which was assisting the then Energy Resources
Directorate to assess the long term energy forecast being
developed by a Pakistani consultant organization in
117collaboration with the Energy Resources Directorate.
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The national energy policy body after a name change
from NEPAC to NEPC, which gave it a more prestigious look, 
held its first meeting on 27 November 1980 (i.e. six months 
after its face-lifting). In all, it has held seven meetings; 
the latest was held on 29 February 1984. Table 4.16 below 
exhibits the calendar of meetings. All these meetings were 
effectively chaired by the then Finance Minister, Ghulam 
Ishaq Khan.
TABLE 4.16
CALENDER OF NEPC MEETINGS
No . Date
First Meeting 27 Novembe r 1980
Second Meeting 22 April 1981
Third Meeting 22 Octobe r 1981
Fourth Meeting 11 Ma rch 1982
Fifth Meeting 17 January 1983
Sixth Meeting Not, Available
Seventh Meeting 29 Feb rua ry 1984
Source: Information supplied by the Ministry for Petroleum
and Natural Resources, June 1985.
After the departure of Ghulam Ishaq Khan as Finance 
Minister, no meeting of the NEPC was held (as of June 1988) 
due to bureaucratic in-fighting. The Committee, even during 
its four years of active life, frequently debated three
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basic issues: the location and role of its Secretariat; the
membership; and the periodicity of meetings.
The location and the role of the NEPC Secretariat was 
the thorniest of the issues. The control of the Secretariat 
with effective role to play had a strategic importance in 
the bureaucratic power game of inter-departmental commit­
tees, as the controlling organization could effectively 
increase its power vis-a-vis other competitors by virtue of 
having access to more information and by controlling the 
agenda. At least, four of the member organizations would 
consider themselves to be eligible to be vested with the 
responsibility of housing the Secretariat with effective 
powers: Planning and Development Division by virtue of its 
having access to the information and also being a national 
body for formulating the development plans, including the 
energy sector; Ministry of Water and Power being controller 
of power sector claiming the largest share of investment in 
the energy sector; Ministry of Petroleum and Natural 
Resources, being the controlling Ministry of Directorate 
General of Energy Resources and traditionally involved in 
the coordination of energy policy matters; and the 
Directorate General of Energy Resources being the present 
Secretariat approved by the President as a result of which
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its position and prestige vis-a-vis its controlling ministry
(Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources) and other
Directorates-General of Ministry of Petroleum and Natural
Resources was greatly enhanced. Under the circumstances, it
did not have to wait too long for a challenger. In the
second meeting, it was suggested that in future the working
paper for NEPC Committee might be prepared by the Planning
Division, to which the ’Chairman disagreed’ and ’directed’
that the Ministries/Directors concerned ’should prepare
position papers relating to their field of activities and
submit them to the NEPC Secretariat for further necessary
action’.118 The Planning Division, however, scored on
another point in the same meeting. In view of the inability
of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources to
achieve a ’20% cut in imports of deficit products’ in spite
of an Executive Committee of the National Economic Council
(ECNEC) directive, the Planning Division was empowered to
act as Convener for the meeting of a sub-committee decided
to be constituted with representatives from Ministry of
Production, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, and
1 1 9Planning Division to look into this problem. In response 
to the observation made by the Chairman in the third meeting 
that ’the NEPC working paper was deficient in terms of 
making policy recommendations and full progress made on
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implementation of the decisions taken in the last
meeting1, the Secretary of the NEPC stated that the
deficiency was ’mainly due to the non-availability of
information requested from ministries concerned on
implementation of the decisions of the NEPC, which was not
1 7 1provided to the Secretariat in spite of reminders’. " On 
this, the ’Chairman gave a clear ruling that NEPC was the 
highest powered Committee on the subject of Energy in the 
Government of Pakistan and that it had been established 
under the directive of the President of Pakistan thus no 
information was to be withheld from this Committee or shadow
1 o oreported to the Secretariat of the Committee’. The facts 
pointed out by the Chairman in this ruling were, however, 
not new to the participants of the Committee, although not 
liked by many. The issue regarding the location of the NEPC 
Secretariat took a new turn when the NEPC Chairman, in its 
fifth meeting, ’remarked that under the proposed revision of 
the rules of business, the coordination of energy policy 
vested in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources 
and as such it was considered appropriate that the 
Secretariat of NEPC might also be formally placed under the 
Ministry.’123
It was also decided that the ’agenda, working papers
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and the minutes would in future be routed from the NEPC
Secretariat to the Chairman through the Secretary, Petroleum 
and Natural Resources,'1'""4 Prior to this, the Secretary NEPC 
was not required to rout papers through the Secretary, 
Petroleum and Natural Resources, although as Director 
General Energy Resources, he was subordinate to the 
Secretary, The location of the NEPC Secretariat was again 
challenged in the seventh meeting held on 29 February 1984. 
The following extract from the minutes of this meeting is 
illuminating:
.... On the question of location of the Secretariat, 
different views were expressed, It was pointed out 
that at the time of bifurcation of the Ministry of 
Fuel, Power and Natural Resources (NR), most of the 
staff was allotted to the Ministry of Water and Power 
and only nucleus staff was given to the Ministry of 
Petroleum and NR. A suggestion was, therefore, made 
that the Ministry of Water and Power which was 
equally concerned with the energy problems but was 
better staffed to handle the work, could be entrusted 
with the Secretariat functions of the Committee. The 
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, it was 
pointed out, was so thinly staffed that it could not 
spare any officer from the Ministry to handle the 
job. Under the existing arrangement, the Secretariat 
of the NEPC was located in a Directorate of the 
Technical Wing of the Ministry. The DG (ER) is the 
Sec retary of NEPC and is expected to work directly 
under the Chairman. [In spite of the Chairman's 
directive to the Secretary in the Fifth Meeting to 
route all papers through the Secretary of the Minis­
try of Petroleum and Natural Resources!] This was not 
a proper and satisfactory arrangement as a ministeri­
al body was being serviced by an attached department 
which under the rules was meant for the execution of 
the policy and not for its formulation.
The consensus, however, was that the Secretariat 
duties were rightly entrusted by the President to the
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Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and these
should remain with that Ministry. The work should,
however, be handled in the main Ministry and proper
staff assistance should be provided to them if their
existing staff was inadequate to handle this work
properly. Secretary Finance agreed to allow a post of
Deputy Secretary and two Section Officers with1 'P scomplimentary staff to handle this work.
In the seventh meeting, the Directorate General
(New and Renewable Energy Resources) was at last effectively
relieved of the Secretariat responsibi1ities. Subsequently,
a Deputy Secretary was recruited to ’handle1 the ’work’, but
who, being a lower level officer compared to the Director
General, was not sure (as of May 1985) regarding his
position as the Secretary of the NEPC. The situation was
further confused by an Office Order signed by the Secretary
regarding the distribution of work amongst the Directorates
General of the Technical Wing of the Ministry of Petroleum
and Natural Resources. This Office 0rder assigned the NEPC
work to the Director General (New and Renewable Energy
Resources), but mentioned the Deputy Secretary as Deputy
Secretary (NEPC). The Director General, however, still
1 Pconsidered himself the Secretary of the NEPC.
If the energy bureaucracy in Pakistan had to accept 
the supremacy of the NEPC in matters of energy policy 
formulation and implementation, then the membership of such
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a prestigious committee was very important. The Minutes of
the first meeting indicate that '"Secretary Cabinet could not 
attend the meeting . This is a surprise, because the 
Secretary of Cabinet Division, according to the original 
composition of the NEPC was not the member of the Committee. 
Perhaps, the then Secretary Cabinet was a latter addition to 
the list. However, his attendance has not been reported in 
any of the subsequent meetings, nor his absence is 
mentioned. The then Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission started attending the NEPC meetings from the 
fourth meeting onwards. The Minutes are silent about his 
membership status, although he effectively participated in 
the discussions as well as in decision-making. At this 
stage, three organizations, namely, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, and the 
Planning and Development Division (of course assisted by 
their respective Secretaries and senior staff) were 
represented at the Ministerial level, and, therefore, better- 
placed to put forward their points of view. The representa­
tion of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was also at 
the highest level, i.e. by its Chairman who was directly 
responsible to the President. Under the circumstances, the 
Secretaries/Officials of remaining Ministries on the NEPC, 
particularly those with some stake in the energy matters and
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more importantly with some power, could not be expected to
allow the continuation of this state of affairs, and the 
inclusion of more ministers in the Committee was inevitable« 
The announcement to this effect was made one day before the 
seventh meeting of the NEPC, and the membership of the NEPC 
was increased to include the Minister for Water and Power, 
the Minister for Food and Agriculture, the Minister for 
Planning and Development, and the Minister of State for
1 O OPetroleum and Natural Resources« This decision effective­
ly transformed an Official’s Committee to a Ministerial 
Committee, relieving the high powered officials of the 
energy bureaucracy to concentrate undisturbed on their 
respective departments in their own way.
In respect of the periodicity of meetings, the NEPC
, , 129decided in its first meeting to meet every quarter , but 
its Chairman was still telling the members in its seventh 
meeting that ’the committee had not been meeting regularly 
for one reason or the other’,150 and was trying to convince 
them of the necessity to ’meet more regularly, at least once 
a quarter’.1^1 Table 4.16 indicates the dates of various 
meetings. It had been meeting between 1980 and 1984 
generally after a gap of six months, except the fifth 
meeting which was held after a gap of 10 months. The date of
283
sixth meeting is not available. It remains to be seen when
the advice of the Chairman rendered in the seventh and which 
became the decision of the NEPC would stimulate a positive 
response. No one knew as of July 1985 when the eighth meet­
ing of the NEPC would be held.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has analyzed the implementation of 
energy policy in relation to the achievement of major policy 
objectives pursued by successive governments in Pakistan 
during 1947-88 period. The factors which influenced the 
implementation process have been identified. The obstacles 
have been particularly high-1ighted. The implementation 
problems range from lack of resources and objective adminis­
trative practices and procedures to negative bureaucratic 
behavior like bureaucratic apathy and resistance to change, 
inter- and intra-organizational coordination, political 
interference, to the absence of established and accepted 
procedures for articulation of public interest, bureaucratic 
in-fighting and to the international pressures.
Formal Policy. The formal policy is the starting
130point for the implementation. Browne and Wildavsky *“ con-
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sider the ’validity of theory of causality’ and ’clarity of
objectives and priorities’ crucial for effective implernenta- 
tion. Goodwin and Moen hold that ’sound technical theory’ 
is essential for implementation success. Alexander^4 , 
Berman1-"'’5 , Baum1"56, and Ingram and Mann^ 7 also highlight
the importance of these variables. In the context of
Pakistan’s energy policy, these variables influenced the 
implementation process substantially. The hydroelectric 
power projects were developed in conjunction with the devel­
opment of hydel storages giving priority to the irrigation 
needs in the use of water over power generation. This 
required the development of an optimum mix for capacity 
increases in the hydroelect ric, thermal and nuclear power- 
generation on the basis of objective realities such as 
weather conditions, access to technology, geopolitical 
environment and future requirements. An imbalance in capaci­
ty increases in the thermal, hydroelect ric and nuclear power- 
generation put the power system of Pakistan under tremendous 
pressure and affected the implementation of all projects due 
to frequent priority changes in response to crises. The fuel 
use' policy for thermal power generation created implementa­
tion problems in the face of erratic gas-use policy. The 
nuclear power policy implernentation suffered due to wrong 
assumptions about technology transfer and development,
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geopolitical environment and the technical competency of the
implement©rs. A policy shift in the use of nuclear power for 
defence purposes had severe implications for the implementa­
tion of nuclear power generation projects. The impact of 
this link was not fully appreciated by the policy planners. 
Similarly, defective policies relating to oil and gas explo­
ration and exploitation, rural electrification and the 
development of coal resources hindered the realization of 
objectives and targets in these areas.
Institutional Structure and Procedures. The foregoing
pages have demonstrated that the structure and procedures of 
the implementing agencies considerably affected the achieve­
ment of energy policy goals in Pakistan. The implementation 
of distribution and transmission schemes was affected as a 
result of low internal priority, lack of internal coordina­
tion, Lack of effective supervision, inefficient procedures 
and practices and lack of incentives for the implementing 
officials. Many of the power system breakdowns were caused 
by poor maintenance practices. Misreporting in the case of 
rural electrification and power losses could not be checked 
due to an ineffective supervision. In Pakistan, the low 
level of thermal efficiency in thermal generation and poor 
quality of service were mainly caused by an ineffective
786
supervision and inefficient oneratinq techniques and proce­
dures, The fuels sector oroqress was dependent upon the 
modification of regulating procedures and the provision of 
appropriate incentives. Institutional inadequacies in the 
energy sector had been a serious obstacle to efficient 
energy sector development. This was particularly observed in 
the fuels sector where the top management generally lacked 
the technical competence. The practice of appointing gener­
alist administrators on the managing bodies proved detrimen­
tal to the development of energy resources in Pakistan.
The implementation analysts have underscored the
importance of the structure and procedures of the implement-
138ing organizations. Nakamura and Smallwood hold that
’organizational structures’ and ’bureaucratic norms’ have 
considerable effect on the implementation. Ross’s "per­
sonal and institutional dispositions of actors’, 
Scheirer’s140 ’decision and control processes, routines, 
work group norms and incentives’ Weimer'si4i ’civil service 
system’ and Edwards’s142 ’bureaucratic structure’ all influ­
ence the implementation of public policies. In the developed 
countries, the existence of relatively better organizational 
structures and systems preclude the preeminence of these 
variables. In the case of Pakistan’s energy sector, these
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variables had a dominant role to play and affected the
implementation process considerably.
The energy sector organizations were also found 
lacking in evolving an intraorganizational coordination and 
rational internal priority setting system. This was particu­
larly noticed in WAPDA where the power system suffered due 
to neglect of distribution and transmission schemes as well 
as their non-synchronization with the power generation 
schemes. Railway electrification also suffered due to wrong 
internal priority setting. The progress on the railway 
electrification was halted due to wrong departmental priori­
ties manipulated by the powerful bureaucratic groups.
1 / 7hontjoy and O ’Toole ° argue that the dominant coalition in 
an organization exhibits a consistent set of preferences and 
beliefs which determines the goals and the world view of the 
organization. To limit their discretion, the sovereigns must 
specify the policy directives and provide resou rces specifi- 
cally for those directives.
Interorganizational Coordination. O ’Toole and
Mont joy 44 outline the coordination problems which may arise
in interorganizational implementation situations. Other
145writers such as Ackermann and Steinmann ~ , Pressman and
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14 ö 14Wildavsky °, and Baum1 ' also underline the importance of
effective coordination for implementation success. In the
case of Pakistan’s energy policy, coordination was found
terribly lacking. Attempts to affect coordination amongst
the energy sector organizations met with scant success. The
case of NEPC exhibited a typical example of domain extension
and bureaucratic infighting with which the Pakistani
1 4 Rbureaucracy was infested. Sapolsky holds that ’skill at 
bureaucratic politics’ pays in such situations. In
Pakistan’s case , it degenerated into personal empire build­
ing at the cost of negating national policy objectives. 
Other examples of implementation failures due to lack of 
coordination were the ’railway electrification’, the trans­
mission schemes, the fuel mix policy for thermal power 
generation, and the coal policy.
Technology. The availability of requisite technology 
played a crucial role in the implementation of energy policy 
in Pakistan. Lack of progress in the implementation of the 
nuclear power policy was mainly due to the non-availability 
of technology. The transfer of sensitive technology at the 
international level is generally conditional. The refusal of 
Pakistan to accept certain conditions considered by her to 
be detrimental to national interests proved fatal for the
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implementation of nuclear power policy. Some of the projects 
of WAPDA such as Mangla and Tarbela dams and 500-KV trans­
mission lines also suffered delays due to delayed availabil­
ity of technical documents and equipments. Slow progress in 
the oil and gas exploration and exploitation efforts was 
also attributed to the restricted availability of the latest 
technology.
The case studies relating to the developed countries 
do not particularly highlihgt the availability of technology 
as posing constraints in the implementation of policies. 
However, some researchers have discussed related problems 
such as ’technical requirements of the task’^44, ’technical
1 ( ~ f \  1 C  1limitations’ ' , and ’task technology’ . In the case of 
Pakistan’s energy policy implementation, this was found to 
be a formidable one.
Bureaucratic Apathy and Resistance to Change. The
rationalization of rules and regulations in the fuels sector 
could not take place due to bureaucratic apathy. The changes 
in ' rules could be affected only in 1976 and 1985 when the 
sovereigns took keen interest and the generalist administra­
tors were placed under an effective control of specialist 
departmental heads. The case of ’Power Commission of
290
Pakistan’ exhibits the capacity and tactics of the 
bureaucracy to resist change. Other cases include the 
opposition of WAPDA officials to install capacitors and 
segregate the technical losses from non-technical losses, 
and resorting to misreporting and resisting to provide 
certain information to the higher authorities. WAPDA also 
resisted to entertain suggestions to limit its role in the 
distribution of electricity.
International Agencies. The international aid agen­
cies were found to influence the implementation of energy 
policy in Pakistan considerably. Almost all the big projects 
were financed by foreign aid. The progress of these 
projects was dependent upon the timely releases of foreign 
exchange by these agencies. In Pakistan, the stimulus for 
reforms and improvements in the energy sector largely came 
from these agencies. In this context, their role was found 
to be positive. These agencies also monitored the progress 
of the projects for which they had provided finances, which 
this kept the implementing organizations a bit more vigilant 
about the project implementation.
International Politics/Events. International politics 
influenced the implementation of energy policy in Pakistan
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significantly. Pakistan’s failure to implement its nuclear-
power policy was due to the impact of international politics 
which determined its position in the world. It demonstrated 
that even with the total commitment by the Government in a 
developing country, the national ambitions were hard to 
achieve. The Indian nuclear explosion had a devastating 
effect on the implementation of Pakistan’s nuclear program. 
The political consequences of two wars with India brought 
for Pakistan the stoppage of aid by the US which affected 
the implementation of energy policy in a big way. The tar­
gets of the Third and Fourth five year plans had to be 
curtailed substantially. Pakistan’s refusal to abandon its 
nuclear program also resulted into stoppage of foreign aid 
by the US for many years which had its adverse effects on 
the implementation of energy projects.
Political Influence/Support. The powerful sections of 
the society exerted political pressure on the WAPDA offi­
cials for the provision of electric connections. In many 
cases, the distribution lines had to be extended beyond 
design capacity. This subjected the system to excessive 
overloading resulting in frequent breakdowns and excessive 
power losses. Political influence was also used to get 
illegal connections and unauthorized power lines. The offi-
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cials were afraid of taking any action against them.
ISO 1S~s 1S<d ISS I Q4Smith , Grindle , Scott , Weiner , and Riggs have 
pointed out this phenomenon in the context of Third World 
countries. The Pakistani case provided further evidence to 
support their contentions.
The electrification of rural areas had an extensive 
political commitment and support since the early 1970s. 
However, the program was poorly defined by the sovereigns. 
The WAPDA authorities designed the program in such a way 
that would highlight their performance without taking into 
account the program benefits in real terms. They even re­
sorted to false reporting in an attempt to prove that action 
was being taken and results were being achieved to satisfy 
the political or martial law leadership. In this case, 
political support without clear objectives proved detrimen­
tal to the achievement of policy objectives.
Bureaucratic Corruption. The energy bureaucracy was 
found to be infested with corruption. This was even recog­
nized in the official documents of the Government of 
Pakistan. The nation suffered on two counts: it was deprived 
of revenues; and it was defrauded by the embezzlement of 
development funds. The implementation of energy policy in
293
Pakistan was very adversely affected due to corruption in
the rank and file of the implementing organizations.
To sum up, Chapter IV has highlighted a number of 
factors which influenced the implementation of energy policy 
in Pakistan. The factors include: formal policy; 
institutional structure and procedures; interorganizational 
coordination; technology; bureaucratic apathy and resistance 
to change; international agencies; international politics 
and events; political influence; and bureaucratic corrup­
tion. The chapter has also demonstrated that the policy 
implementation is a very dynamic process. The original 
policy intents underwent continuous transformation through 
interaction between the relevant parties and affected 
interests. The policy in fact evolved in the course of 
implementation implying an ongoing dynamic of policy devel­
opment, modification, and execution. The chapter therefore 
also demonstrates the approprlateness of the holistic ap­
proach to study the implementation of Pakistan’s energy 
policy.
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CHAPTER V
IMPLEMENTATION OF KALABAGH DAM PROJECT
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the implementation of an 
important national hydroelectric project. Its implementation 
has been focus of attention of the people of Pakistan since 
1985. The fate of the project is still undecided, although 
lot of investment has already been made.
PROJECT FEATURES
Kalabagh Dam is a multi-purpose project considered by 
WAPDA the linchpin of future power system of Pakistan. It is 
planned to be located 120 miles dawnstream of Tarbela and 12 
miles upstream of Kalabagh town on the river Indus. Total 
cost of the Project (June 1987 price) is estimated to be 
Rs.90.20 billion. Annual benefits are estimated at Rs.17.40 
billion with an internal economic rate of return (IER) of 
16.8 per cent. Annual energy generated at Kalabagh is esti­
mated to be equivalent to 20 million barrels of oil. Expend­
iture incurred up to June 1989 is Rs. 1,023.177 million. The
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dam will have significant impact on the environment due to
the submergence of 134,500 acres of land along with built up 
property affecting 83,000 persons. Out of the affected area, 
99500 acres (74%) is uncultivable land while 35,000 acres is 
cultivable and 3,500 acres is irrigated land.1 Table 5.1 
describes the salient features of the project.
The main objectives of the project are: 2
a. Generation of large amounts of hydroelectric power 
near major load centres;
b. Provision of additional storage and regulation on 
the Indus;
c. Increase the energy output of the existing Tarbela 
scheme by conjunctive operation of Tarbela and 
Kalabagh reservoirs;
d. Compensation for the storage lost due to the 
silting up of existing reservoirs in the system; 
and
e. Regulation and control of the flood peaks of the 
Indus.
The project feasibility and viability have been 
confirmed on the basis of numerous investigations, surveys 
and technical studies by national and international agencies 
spreading over a period of more than three decades. The 
consulting firms include Tipton and Hill, Chas T. Main, 
World Bank, Harza (USA), Associated Consulting Engineers
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TABLE 5.1
KALABAGH DAM FEATURES
Indus river at sit.e 
Catchment area 
Maximum recorded flood 
Average flow
110,500 sq . rnl . 
1,200,000 cfs 
123,000 cfs
Reseryoix.
Total storage 
Usable storage 
Maximum retention level 
Minimum retention level
7.9 MAF 
6.1 MAF 
915 ft SPD 
825 ft SPD
Dam
Crest elevation 
Maximum height (above river) 
Total length 
Total fill volume
940 ft SPD 
260 ft 
11,000 ft
60 m cu yds
Spillways.
Overflow spillway capacity 1,070,000 cfs
Orifice spillway capacity 980,000 cfs
Power facilities.
Pens tocks 
Power house 
Installed capacity
Tu rbines
Turbine design head
12 No. x 36 ft 
Indoor type 
2,400 MW initial 
3,600 MW final 
Francis type 
170 ft.
Source: WAPDA Annual Report 1988-89 p . 37.
(ACE), Binnie & Partners (UK), Preece Cardew & Rider (UK) 
and National Engineering Services of Pakistan (NESPAK) and 
various other study groups. Table 5.2 below indicates the
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main studies/reports. On the basis of various feasibility
and viability studies, the financing of the project was 
agreed to by the World Bank and other international agencies 
including foreign governments.
TABLE 5.2
KALABAGH DAM PROJECT STUDIES/REPORTS
S tudy/Report Agency Year
Preliminary Feasibility Report Tipton & Hill 1953
Preliminary Feasibility Repo rt Chas T. Main 1966
Study of Water and Power 
Resources of West Pakistan
World Bank 
Study Group
1967
Feasibility Report Wapda/'Harza 1972
Feasibility Report ACE 1975
Review of Feasibility Report Board of 
Consu1 tan ts
1975
Appraisal Report World Bank 1980
Detailed Designs *Kalabagh 
Consu1 tan ts
1986
Design Refinements and 
Documents
Tende r Kalabagh 
Consu1 tants
1987
* M/s Kalabagh Consultants is a consortium of consulting 
firms comprising Binnie & Partners (.UK), Preece Cardew and 
Rider (.UK), Harza (USA), Associated Consulting Engineers 
(ACE) and NESPAK (Pakistan).
Source: WAPDA Annual Report 1988-89, p .34
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The decision to construct Kalabagh Dam was taken in
1953 and it figured first on priority after the completion 
of Mangla Dam. The priority was, however, changed in favor 
of Tarbela Dam in 1959. The initial Cabinet approval to the 
project was given in 1975. A sub-committee consisting of the 
Minister for Finance, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Minister for 
Planning, Dr. Mahboobul Haq and the Secretary, Ministry of 
Water and Power reviewed the project in detail and recom­
mended for the approval of the Cabinet in December, 1983.° 
The project was included in the Sixth Five Year Plan and the 
power station Kalabagh-1 with generating capacity of 880 MW 
was planned to be completed in September, 1993.4
PRIORITY CHANGE
The project ran into trouble at the preparatory stage 
in 1959 and could not come out unscarred. Its priority was 
changed in favor of Tarbela Dam which was initially planned 
to be constructed after the completion of Kalabagh Dam. The 
chain of events started as a result of an agitation caused 
by a small dam, Namal, in District Mianwali, the district 
where Kalabagh Dam had to be constructed. Due to Namal Dam, 
the surrounding villages were affected with water-logging 
and salinity. The people raised hue and cry and approached
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the higher authorities to rid them of this menace. The
matter had yet to be resolved to their satisfaction when 
they came to know about the siting of a huge dam nearby to 
which they reacted bitterly. They approached Nawab of 
Kalabagh, Malik Amir Muhammad Khan, the then Governor of 
West Pakistan, who hailed from the same area, for help. They 
pleaded that siting of Kalabagh Dam in the area would aggra­
vate the water-logging and salinity problem and requested to 
shift the dam site. Malik Amir Muhammad Khan pressurized the 
WAPDA authorities to shift the site of the Dam about 12 
miles upstream from the original place. This necessitated 
further studies and investigations before the project could
C.be launched . 'J
Besides, it has been reported that President 
Muhammad Ayub Khan desired to build Tarbela Dam before 
Kalabagh Dam to muster political support in his home 
province, the NWFP. The Chairman of WAPDA who incidentally 
belonged to the same province readily obliged the President 
by submitting a report recommending change of priority in 
favor of Tarbela Dam contrary to the expert advice. The 
shifting of the site provided hirn the pretext for the 
recommendation. According to the original plan, work on 
Tarbela Dam Project was to be initiated in 1975 after the
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completion of Kalabagh Dam. The new decision was a bolt from
the blue for the operational level technocrats of WAPDA.
The site for Tarbela Dam was selected in a hurry without
detailed feasibility studies and technical reports. The
decision to advance the construction of Tarbela Dam delayed
6the Kalabagh Dam project for several years.
Initial funding for Tarbela Dam was also arranged 
deceptively. In 1959, the Mangla Dam was in the take-off 
stage. The World Bank had approved an aid of 500 million 
dollars for this project. To begin with, 150 million dollars 
were granted. However, President Muhammad Ayub Khan asked 
the World Bank to increase the initial grant to 250 million 
dollars. It is believed that the request for increase was 
made with a motive. The President wanted to start, work, on 
Tarbela Dam but the World Bank was not agreeing to Finance 
this Project. He intended to utilize the additional grant 
to start work on Tarbela Dam. To satisfy an inquisitive 
technocrat who advocated the construction of Kalabagh Dam 
before Tarbela Dam, the President argued that the construc­
tion of Kalabagh Dam was assured as the World Bank had 
already committed to finance it. He thought that if the 
work on Tarbela Dam were started, the World Bank would have 
no option but to help finish the project.'
oil
POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation of the project sailed smoothly
until its impact was known to the people. The residents of
Nowshera area in the NWFP were terrified when in July 1985
they came to know that their homes and hearths were going to
be submerged. The news was broke to them by the WAPDA
employees who were marking various places in the area which
would be submerged in the Dam, This invoked a strong
reaction in the affected people. They launched strong
protests in July 1985 against their displacement as a result
Rof the siting of the Dam . Incidentally, the political 
activity was also picking up in the country at that time as 
a result of the decision of the Martial Law regime of 
General Ziaul Haq to allow limited political freedom. 
General elections on non-party basis had just been concluded 
in February 1985. The Kalabagh Project, thus, became focus 
of attention of all politicians as a live issue to gain 
political preeminence. Some technocrats also joined who 
pointed out design defects due to which the town of Nowshera 
faced the flood danger. The protest against the construction 
of Kalabagh Dam launched by the affected people in the 
NWFP,therefore, triggered nation-wide controversy.
The politicians of Sindh joined the protest with
their own ends in view. They alleged that the construction 
of the Dam would affect the water supply in the river Indus 
adversely. It was also apprehended that it would further 
enhance the role of the Punjab to regulate water supply in 
the river Indus, The opportunity was,therefore, seized by 
the advocates of greater provincial autonomy to exploit the 
sentiments of the Sindhis against "Punjab domination". The 
politicians of Baluchistan also showed their apprehensions 
against "Punjab domination" and accompanied difficulties in 
protecting the rights of smaller provinces. This invoked a 
strong reaction in the Punjab and the Punjabis, irrespective 
of their political affiliations, pressed for expeditious 
implementation of the project. All the four provinces of 
Pakistan, therefore, put forward quite divergent positions 
on the issue. The political parties, thus, became actively 
involved in the whole affair and many allied issues like 
division of Indus water amongst the provinces, role of the 
Punjab Governrnent in the regulation and control of the Indus 
water, distribution of income from the proceeds of 
hydroelectricity generated at Kalabagh, etc. were raised and 
became the centre of public debate. The members of the 
Parliament also took the matter to their respective Houses.
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To pacify the opposition to the Dam, the Government
issued the details of the project highlighting the benefits 
which would accrue to the nation by its completion. The 
Federal Minister for Water and Power, Mir Zafarullah Khan 
Jamali, in response to questions raised in the Senate, 
stated that the apprehensions of some of the Honorable 
Members against the Dam were unfounded. The project was 
declared viable and feasible by experts of international 
repute on the basis of numerous studies. He further stated 
that Nowshera town would be shielded against flood danger by 
protective works around it. In order to allay the misgivings 
that the dam had adverse effects only on the NWFP, the 
Minister gave province-wise break up of the land to be 
inundated. He pointed out that 37 per cent of the land to 
be inundated belonged to the NWFP and the remaining 63 per 
cent to the Punjab. He expected the project to be completed 
by 1994.9
The Government also appointed Foreig n Experts to
study the technical details of the p roject After an
in-depth study and analysis for ten days, the Experts
declared the project to be feasible The WAPDA au tho rities
declared in a press release that the work on the project
could be started as soon as they would yet go- ahead signal
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from the Government and would invite international firms for
registration. It was further stated that issuance of 
tenders, their acceptance and the grant of permission to the 
construction companies could be finalized by 1987, if the 
Government resisted public pressure to delay the project.10
The Federal Minister for Planning and Finance,
Dr. Mahboobul Haq, at a luncheon hosted by Lahore Chamber of
Commerce and Industry on 27 July 1985, accused the opponents
of the Dam guilty of exaggerating its adverse impact. He
reiterated Government’s commitment to complete it on time.11
However,the Government could not withstand the public
pressure. It was reported in August 1985 that work on the
site had to be stopped, although, huge amounts had already
been spent on the development of infrastructure and other
facilities like residential colonies, laboratories, airport
and roads. It was stated that the work, had already been
delayed by two years. Further delay was expected if the
12Federal Government did not act promptly.
The opposition to the Dam was spearheaded by the Red- 
Shirt Leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the National 
Democratic Party headed by his son Khan Abdul Wall Khan. 
In spite of his old age, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan toured the
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entire Peshawer District and addressed at seven public
meetings organized for registering protest against Kalabagh 
Dam Project. In addition, design defects were also pointed 
out due to which the town of Nowshera faced the flood dan­
ger. Lt. General Fazle Haq, the then Governor of the NWFP, 
followed suit. He wanted to demonstrate to President Gener­
al Zia ul-Haq that he could not be dispensed with easily. 
He was feeling insecure as a result of general elections. 
During the elections, he won the confidence of the former 
Chairman WAPDA, Engr. Shah Nawaz Khan and appointed him as 
his advisor. Engr, Shah Nawaz Khan issued a statement to 
the press endorsing the apprehensions of the people about 
the Dam. The Federal Government tried to convince the 
Governor and provided all technical details but without 
success. On the behest of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan 
Junejo, the Minister for Planning and Finance, Dr. Mahboobul 
Haq, even offered to sanction industries for the NWFP. The 
Governor dubbed it to be a ’lollipop’, Subsequently, he was 
relieved from the post of Governor, but the Government of 
the NWFP continued to follow the line as a matter of politi­
cal expediency. General Zia ul-Haq, who was very upset with 
the Kalabagh affair, complained bitterly that the whole 
fiasco was created by "my former colleague, Fazle Haq".'0
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The NWFP Chief Minister, Arbab Muhammad Jahangir
Khan, addressing a public meeting on 30 September, 1985 said 
that the construction of Kalabagh Dam was likely to affect a 
great chunk of fertile land of Peshawer valley besides 
rendering 2 lakh (200,000) people homeless. He said that 
instead of the Kalabagh Dam project, there were many other 
projects, for example, Basha Dam, which unequivocally quali­
fied for consideration. A similar statement on the Kalabagh 
Dam was released to the press on 30 September, 1985 by 
Senator Shirin Dil Khan from the NWFP. He stressed that 
Provincial Government's observations must be given serious 
consideration and an alternative site for Kalabagh Dam was 
the only solution. He said that the area was already water­
logged and the dam would aggravate the problem. He regret­
ted that Kalabagh Dam was under consideration for the past 
10 years, while 30 years had passed in the process of its 
investigation but nothing was made public about the project. 
He not only expressed apprehensions about the flood danger
as a result of the dam but also worried about settlement of
14the would-be-displaced people.
On 2 October 1985, five adjournment motions were 
sought to be moved in the National Assembly to discuss the 
Kalabagh Dam issue. In response, the Federal Minister for
317
Water and Power (Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali) made a long
Statement in the National Assembly giving details about the 
project. He assured the House that the construction of 
the project would start in 1986-87 after obtaining final 
approval of the Federal Cabinet which would consider the 
view point of the provincial governments as well as 
the implications of the project. He informed that he had 
asked Chairman WAPDA to arrange a comprehensive briefing 
within two - three weeks for the members (concerned) of the 
Federal Cabinet and Chief Ministers of Punjab and NWFP. 
The Federal Minister for Interior, Muhammad Aslam Khattak, 
who belonged to NWFP, also participated in the discussion. 
He emphasized that the site should be chosen and decided 
after consultation with provincial governments concerned. 
He said that alternative sites should also he considered and 
a committee be set up to examine all aspects of the 
project.15
The daily Nawa-i-Waqat rendered a long editorial on 7 
October 1985 censuring the opponents of the Dam. It was 
regretted that not only Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his 
followers were against it, but also the members of the NWFP 
Provincial Assembly belonging to Jamaat-i-Islami termed the 
project as a conspiracy against the province which aimed at
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destroying the NWFP. The editorial emphasized the need for
the imp lernen tat ion of such a vital project without further 
16delay. By that time, the people of the NWFP, irrespective
of their political affiliations, had rallied behind their
leaders in their opposition to the Dam. The Provincial
Assembly unanimously passed a resolution saying ’no’ to the
1 ~7Kalabagh Dam Project.
The NWFP Gove rnor, Lt. General Fazle Haq, while
talking to the newsmen on 8 October 1985, expressed the hope
that the issue would be settled amicably. He said that the
final decision of the construction of Kalabagh Dam at
the proposed site would be made by the Federal Cabinet, He
disclosed that the issue was discussed in the Federal
Cabinet meeting held in September 1984 and a sub-committee
was formed to look into its positive and negative aspects.
But the meetings of the sub-committee could not be held due
1 Rto the referendum and the general elections,
On 11 October 1985, the Federal Minister for Water 
and Power , Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, announced that all 
the doubts about the construction of the Dam at the proposed 
site would be removed in the Cabinet meeting which would be 
attended by the Chief Ministers of all four provinces. He
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emphasized that the project was of national importance which
would benefit the entire country. Me assured that the
displaced persons would be rehabilitated and compensation
1 Qwould be given to them, besides cultivable land.
The controversy set in commotion in the World Bank 
also. A high level delegation led by Wolfgang Sieback, 
Co-Financing Coordinator, South Asia Program Department, 
paid a visit to Pakistan and held talks on 22 October 1985 
with the Federal Minister for Finance and Planning, 
Dr. Mahboobul Haq, about the technical and economic aspects 
of the Kalabagh Dam Project. In this connection, the latest 
analysis of the World Bank about the preparatory work, 
financing program, etc. came under detailed review. Stress­
ing the importance of the project in the economy of the 
country, the Federal Minister expressed his conviction that 
the question of would-be-affectees would be resolved amica­
bly to the entire satisfaction of the provinces concerned
20before the launching of the project.
The Federal Government, in the face of mounting 
opposition, announced on 27 October 1985, that some design 
changes would be affected to satisfy the objections raised 
by the NWFP so as to safeguard the interests of the
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p rovinee. Dr. Mahboobul Haq informed that he had a
meeting with the Chief Minister of the NWFP, Arbab Jahangir 
Khan and would meet him again to discuss the matter. He 
further informed that the Chairman of WAPDA, Lt. General 
G.S. Butt would go to Peshawer the following day to have 
discussions with the Government of NWFP and its experts.21
The Minister for Water and Power had to reassure the 
nation on 12 November 1985, that any decision regarding 
the Kalabagh Dam Project would be taken by the Government 
with only national interests in view. This assurance was 
given in response to five adjournment motions sought to be 
moved in the National Assembly to discuss the Kalabagh Dam 
Project. He informed the House that the importance of the 
project to the national economy, the rehabilitation of 
the affected people and the distress it might cause 
to population in various areas were some of the aspects 
which were being discussed at appropriate level. The movers 
had divergent views on the issue. For example, Malik Abdu r 
Rauf from NWFP said that the project was causing a lot of 
concern in the NWFP because of its effects on the people 
of three districts who would be displaced. Sher Afgan from 
Punjab highlighted the benefits of the project and pointed 
out that statements issued recently on the project by
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various responsible persons in the provincial governments
had created misunderstanding and apprehensions among people 
of different provinces. He was of the view that the 
confusion being created in this regard would jeopardize 
the project as it might encourage reluctance on the part of 
the World Bank to provide funds.^
Qn 13 November 1985, a high level meeting was held in 
Peshawer under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister,
Muhammad Khan Junejo to solve the tangle. The meeting was 
attended by the Governor and Chief Minister of the NWFP and 
the Federal Ministers for Water and Power, Finance 
and Planning, and Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Deputy 
Chairman of Planning Commission and high ranking officers of 
the Federal and Provincial Governments. WAPDA and the 
Government of NWFP presented their view points in 
the meeting. The Government of NWFP, however, was not 
satisfied with the assurances of WAPDA and threatened to 
resign if the implementation of the project took place 
without their approval. It was, therefore, decided that the 
project would be furthei reviewed. The Prime Minister 
announced that a sub-committee of the Federal Cabinet would 
review the project in the light of the submissions made by 
the Government of NWFP and WAPDA. The Federal Cabinet would
TOOW  Z—
make the final decision after considering the report of the
sub-committee, He declared that the Government would not
2 3take any step which would go against any province.
To pressurize the Government, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan
reite rated his opposition to the dam and declared, in a
public meeting held i n Charsada one day prior to the
high-level meeting, that Kalabagh Dam could only be
const rue ted on the dead bodies of Pakhtoons. He urged the
24Government to review the project,
On 14 November 1985, two adjournment motions on 
Kalabagh Dam were sought to be moved in the Senate, The 
movers underlined the concern being expressed in NWFP over 
the site and designed height of the dam. They said that 
large population of Nowshera and Mardan would be affected by 
the project and the cultivated area likely to be submerged 
exceeded that of being irrigated in the province through the 
project. The Federal Minister for Water and Power responded 
that the question of Kalabagh Dam Project was being 
deliberated at the highest level and all its aspects were 
being reviewed. The Cabinet would take a decision only 
after taking into account various factors connected with the 
issue. He referred to the meeting held in Peshawer on
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3 November 1985 to solve the problem. He also informed that
he himself had a meeting with the Governor of NWFP on
28 October 1985. He disclosed that there was an agreement
on a number of things while some had yet to be thrashed out.
He pointed out that the issue had been discussed in the
National Assembly as also the Senate on at least six
occasions during last six months. He assured the House that
Government would not take any decision that might undermine
25interests of any province.
The opposition to the dam continued in spite of these 
assurances. A former President of Pakistan Muslim League 
and sitting Senator, Mohsin Siddiqui also joined the chorus. 
He said that the construction of Kalabagh Dam at the 
proposed site would cause incalculable losses to the NWFP. 
He supported the construction of Basha Dam instead of 
Kalabagh Dam and advised the Government not to trample the 
rights of the smaller provinces.26
In a public meeting on 19 November 1985, Khan Abdul 
Wall Khan (President, National Democratic Party), threatened 
to bomb the Dam in case it was constructed against the
0 7wishes of the people of the NWFP.*“
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The mounting opposition in the NWFP to the 
construction of Kalabagh Dam at the proposed site also 
created commotion in the Punjab. The people of Punjab 
irrespective of their political affiliations supported the 
construction of Kalabagh Dam at the proposed site without 
further delay. Three adjournment motions were sought to be 
moved in the Punjab Provincial Assembly to discuss 
the implications of the controversy on Kalabagh Dam. 
All the members emphasized the need to complete the project 
at the proposed site on time. It was pointed out that 
the dam was crucial for the economy of the Punjab and the 
country. Rana Phool Muhammad proposed that the Punjab 
Assembly should pass a resolution to impress upon the 
Federal Government not to delay the construction of the Dam, 
All the members of the Assembly who spoke on the motion 
endorsed his proposal."-8
A number of articles also appeared in the National 
Press analyzing the positive and negative impact of the Dam, 
The experts analyzed the design and technical details of the 
project. Dr. Mubashir Hasan, an engineer of established 
repute and an expert on Dams, who was Federal Minister for 
Finance in the Bhutto Cabinet and Secretary General of 
Pakistan Peoples Party, discussed at length the design
T O C^
of the Dam in a press conference. He pointed out some basic
design defects and argued that those should be removed to
save valuable land and property of the people and also
to economize on the cost of the project. He said that
Nowshera town and the surrounding area was amenable to flood
danger only if the water level of the Dam rose to
995 ft. above the sea level or 928 ft. retention level of
the dam and this could happen only once in a hundred years.
As the entire river Indus flowed in Pakistan, the flood
danger could be averted by an effective warning system and
releasing appropriate amount of water from the Darn to keep
0 9water level within safe limits, he argued.
The Federal Minister for Production, Khaqan Abbasi, 
also joined the debate and assured the people that Kalabagh 
Dam would definitely be constructed.^
As a result of elections, changes were affected in 
the Federal Cabinet and the Water and Power portfolio was 
entrusted to Kazi Abdul Majid Abid from Sindh replacing Mir 
Zafarullah Khan Jamali from Baluchistan. In a policy 
statement regarding Kalabagh Dam, Kazi Abdul Majid Abid 
announced that the Government was considering different 
proposals being presented from different schools of thought
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and the final decision would be made on the basis of
consensus.31
In view of the gravity of situation, the Government 
constituted a Cabinet Committee on Dams, under the 
chairmanship of Dr. Mahboobul Haq, Federal Minister for 
Finance, Planning and Economic Affairs. The Chairman 
announced that the committee was likely to meet during 
January 1986, to deliberate on the issue. He said that the 
Government wanted to take into confidence the public 
representatives of the four provinces and planned to issue a 
white paper containing all facts and figures about the Dam. 
He described Kalabagh Dam project as a matter of national 
survival and said that the decision on it would be made in 
the supreme national interest. He dispelled the impression 
that the Pakistan Government was going to accept any 
condition of World Bank in this respect. Talking about the 
controversy on the issue of Kalabagh Dam, the Minister said, 
"we should not worry about it". Such a controversy even 
took place earlier on the construction of Mangla and Tarbela 
dams, he added. In a follow-up statement, the Minister 
refuted the allegation that Government was responsible for 
delay in starting construction of the darn because of 
shortage of funds. He stated that Cabinet meeting would
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be held in the beginning of February 1986 which would
consider the objections raised by the NWFP and Sindh to
~7 ~Zaffect design changes if required.00
In a bid to satisfy the people of Punjab, statements 
by the federal ministers reiterating Government’s commitment 
to construct Kalabagh Dam continued to appear in the press. 
In a public meeting organized by Awami Mohaz at Mianwali on 
27 January 1986, the Federal Minister of State, Maqbool 
Ahmed Khan, declared that Kalabagh Dam would be constructed 
at ail cost. He said that the Dam would also supply 
irrigation water to 14 to 15 lakh acres of land in Bannu and 
Dera Ismail Khan districts of the NWFP and to lakhs of acres
r r  aof land in Mianwali and Khushab districts of Punjab.' The 
NWFP Chief Minister, Arbab Muhammad Jahangir Khan, however, 
wasted no time to rebut. On 2 March 1986, he stated that the 
dam would have adverse effects on the socioeconomic life of 
the province.'5^
The Federal Minister for Finance, therefore, had to 
issue a conciliatory statement on 26 April 1986. In a press 
briefing, the Minister said that efforts were being made to 
patch up the differences between the provincial governments 
and the work on the project would be started only after
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achieving consensus." ' The explanation was not considered 
satisfactory by the Vice President of National Democratic 
Party, Ghulam Ahmed Ba'lur, who issued a very strong 
statement in a press conference on 5 June 1986. He said 
that the construction of Kalabagh Dam would be considered ’a 
declaration of war against Pakhtoons, and they would put up 
vigorous resistance to stop it„^7
The work on the project, however, continued. The 
Federal Minister for Planning informed the press that IaIAPDA 
had prepared seven design plans of the project. He gave the 
details of one of them which recommended to decrease the 
maximum retention level of the dam from 925 ft. to 915 ft.
-- this retention level was eventually approved by the
competent authority. He said that the new design would 
eliminate the possibility of flood danger to Nowshera. Also,
TOno dykes would be required to protect Nowshera town.'JO In a 
subsequent briefing, the Standing Committee on Planning and 
Development of the National Assembly was apprised by the 
Minister for Planning and Development about Kalabagh Dam 
project. He emphasized the need for its completion on 
priority basis to prevent impending power crisis. He said 
that the power shortage in 1996 could be of the order of 
4,000 MW if the project was delayed. He also informed the
36
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committee that the alternatives to Kalabagh Dam we r a
too expensive and would place a very heavy burden on the 
39people. In response to a question in the National
Assembly on 21 June 1986, the Minister informed the House 
that Kalabagh Dam was of immense national importance, that 
was why the Government was keen to create consensus among 
the provinces.40
The Punjab Government also stepped up its campaign 
for the support of the dam and lashed out severely on the 
opponents. Malik Salim Iqbal, the Punjab Minister for 
Cooperatives, stated on 23 June 1986 that the construction 
of Kalabagh Dam was absolutely essential for the 
socioeconomic progress of the country. Only those elements 
were opposing the dam who did not want Pakistan to be 
prosperous and strong, he added. He said that anti-Pakistan 
elements were fanning hatred and provincialism among the 
people of various provinces and inimical forces were 
harassing the public by bomb blasts to create a law and 
order crisis.41 The leader of the opposition in the Punjab
Provincial Assembly also supported the construction of
42Kalabagh Dam in a press conference.
The Province of Sindh entered the scuffle as a result
330
of differences developed with the Punjab on the question of
distribution and use of Indus water- Both of these prov­
inces had a long-standing dispute on the issue. Unfortunate­
ly, the weather conditions during 1984-85 were such that the 
water availability in the country deteriorated. The water 
storage in Tarbela Dam also depleted- The situation had 
turned very bad during the summer of 1985. Not enough snow 
was melting on the mountains due to unusually low tempera­
ture in the region. Besides, mismanagement of water re­
sources contributed to worsen the situation. The President, 
General Ziaul Haq, ordered IaIAPDA not to resort to load­
shedding during 1985. He was very happy to win vote of 
confidence in the national referendum held on 18 December 
1984, and desired to reward the people for their prudence. 
General elections on non-party basis were also scheduled in 
February 1985, and the President did not want the opposition 
to use ’load-shedding’ against the establishment. Lot of 
water was, therefore, released to generate hydroelectricity 
during the period when it was not required for irrigation 
pu rposes. Its impact was experienced in May 1985, when water 
was needed the most for irrigation purposes but was not 
available. The provinces of Sindh and Punjab both felt the 
pinch.43
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The relations between the two provinces strained
badly on the question of closure of Chashrna--Jhelum Link 
Canal which supplied water to vast areas in the Punjab. 
This canal originates from River Indus at Chashma and is 
14 ft. deep, 380 ft. wide and 67 miles long. The canal 
supplies 21,700 cusec of Indus water to River Jhelum which 
is used for irrigating vast areas in the Punjab. In 
May 1985, the Government of Sindh pressed hard to close the 
canal as not sufficient water was available in Tarbela Dam. 
Consequently, the Federal Government, informed the Government 
of the Punjab about the closure of Chashma--Jhelum Link 
Canal, The decision was likely to decrease the sowing of 
crops by 300,000 acres in the punjab. The situation in the 
Punjab, therefore, became very volatile. To solve this 
problem, a meeting was held under the Chairmanship of the 
Federal Minister for Water and Power and attended by
the Ministers for Irrigation, Governments of the Punjab and 
Sindh, Secretaries Irrigation of the NWFP and Baluchistan,
Federal Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power, Chairman,
WAPDA and other high-level officers. The issue remained 
unresolved even after eight hours of negotiations and
discussion and the meeting ended without any decision. The 
Chief Minister of the Punjab disapproved the outcome and
indicated his intentions to meet the Prime Minister to press
for his demand not to the close the canal.44
On 11 May 1985, a high-level meeting was held to
reconsider the demand of the Punjab. The meeting was
chaired by Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo and attended
by Chief Ministers of all four provinces of Pakistan and
high-level officers. The decision to close the canal was
not reverted in the meeting. The Punjab, however, recorded
4 5the note of dissent. '
The water situation further deteriorated and the 
political activity gained momentum. The need to solve 
the long-standing water distribution problem amongst the 
four provinces of Pakistan was stressed by all and sundry. 
All the provinces, however, advanced conflicting claims as 
to the entitlement and modality.
The Members of the Punjab Provincial Assembly 
displayed their strong displeasure against the Federal 
Government decision to close Chashma--Jhelum Link Canal. 
The Speaker appointed a seven-member committee under the 
chairmanship of Minister for Irrigation, Sardar Arif 
Rasheed, to draft a resolution in the light of the views 
expressed by the Members on the floor of the Mouse. The
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Punjab Assembly passed a unanimous resolution drafted by the
committee demanding immediate opening of the canal. Some of 
the Members, however, were not satisfied with the wording of 
the resolution. They threatened to resign from the Member­
ship and go on hunger strike in front of the House if the
A  Akcanal was not opened within 24 hours.
The Chief Minister of Sindh, in his rebuttal, pledged
in the Sindh Provincial Assembly to protect the rights of
the Province. He declared that no one would be allowed to
use a drop of Indus water until the requirements of Sindh
were met. The Members of the Punjab Provincial Assembly
were free to resign, but Chashma-Jhelum Link Canal would get
water only after meeting the requirements of Sindh, he
added. Some of the Members threatened of dire consequences
if the canal was opened.47 The Sindh Minister for
Irrigation and Power also assured the Sindh Provincial
Assembly that Chashma--Jhelum Link Canal could only be
opened with the permission of the Chief Minister of Sindh,
and the permission would be granted when the requirements of
48Sindh had been met.
The Chief Minister of the Punjab Mian Nawaz Sharif, 
in a rejoinder, declared in the Punjab Assembly that he
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would prefer to resign along with his colleagues instead of
compromising on this issue. He criticized the Federal
Government for not taking the Punjab Government into
confidence at the time of closure of the canal. He declared
that the Punjab could control all the canals whose headworks
49were located in the Punjab.
The canal was opened on 9 June 1985 after a closure 
of one month. The WAPDA intimated the Punjab Government 
that the Punjab would get 15,000 cusec of water during the 
current cropping season.5^
The Federal Minister for Water and Power threw light 
on the background of the water dispute in his statement in 
the National Assembly. He hoped that the water distribution
dispute amongst the provinces would be solved during the
. 51cu r rent year.
The opening of Chashma--Jhelum Link Canal annoyed 
Sindhi leaders. Some of them moved privilege motions in the 
Sindh Provincial Assembly seeking explanation about the 
statement of the Punjab Chief Minister and the opening of 
the canal without consulting the Sindh Chief Minister. The 
Chief Minister of Sindh, Ghous Ali Shah, made a lengthy
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Statement in the House explaining the whole affair and
advising the members to control their emotions. He, however, 
criticized the Punjab Government for its aggressive beha­
viour and the Federal Government for not consulting the 
Sindh Government before opening the Canal.
The Government of the NWFP did not sit idle during
the scuffle between the Punjab and Sindh. The Chief
Minister told the NWFP Provincial Assembly in its Budget
Session that they were watching their interests and would
get their due share in the Indus Water. ° Similar
statements were issued by the Baluchistan Chief Minister,
Mir Ghulam Quadir, who assured the people to get their due
54share in the Indus Water.
The Prime Minister called a meeting to discuss the
water dispute. The meeting was attended by Chief Ministers
of the Punjab and Sindh, and elected Members of the
National Assembly from the Punjab and Sindh. The Prime
Minister assured that the water dispute would be discussed
in a meeting attended by the Chief Ministers of all four
provinces as soon as the report of the Justice Halim
Committee was received by him. He disclosed that the report
55was under consideration with the President.
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With the above background in mind, the Sindhi leaders
became apprehensive of Kalabagh Dam Project when they came 
to know that the Dam would also provide irrigation water to 
the Punjab and the NWFP,. They suspected that the Dam would 
be controlled by the Punjab and without arriving at final 
decision regarding water distribution, Sindh would be left 
at the mercy of the Punjab. So the NWFP and Sindh put up 
strong resistance to stop the construction of Kalabagh Dam.
The Federal Minister for Water and Power assured the
Senate on 2 October 1985 that the construction of the Dam
would be started after receiving approval of the new design
by the high-level committee comprising the representatives
of the four provinces. The final decision would be made
56keeping in view the interests of all the provinces.
The controversy somehow lingered on. The Sindh 
Provincial Assembly raised hue and cry when the Federal 
Minister for Water and Power, Kazi Abdul Majid Abid issued a 
statement that the construction of Kalabagh Darn was 
indispensable to meet the power and water needs of the 
country. He said that Es as ha Dam was important, but could not 
replace Kalabagh Dam. Hussain Haroon, a member of the Pro­
vincial Assembly, sought to discuss the matter in the House.
T  7  ~7 
v J  O  t
It was demanded that the Government of Sindh should adopt a
clear policy to oppose the construction of Kalabagh Dam.
The Chief Minister of Sindh assured the House that he had
appointed a committee under the Chairmanship of Provincial
Minister for Irrigation to look into the matter. He declared
that any decrease in the share of Sindh in the Indus Water
57would not be tolerated.
The Chief Minister of the Punjab reiterated in his 
rebuttal that no compromise would be made on the question of 
Kalabagh Dam. He said that the Punjab was magnanimous with 
the smaller provinces, but could not sacrifice its genuine 
rights. The members of the Punjab Provincial Assembly 
strongly criticized the Federal Government in the .Budget- 
Session for an inordinate delay in the implementation of
cpKalabagh Dam Project. 'J
The controversy also had its impact on the financiers 
of the project. The Punjab Minister for Irrigation and 
fourism, Sardar Arif Rasheed, disclosed on 31 October 1987 
that the World Bank might withdraw its financial assistance 
for the construction of Kalabagh Dam, if differences among 
the provinces were not sorted out and settled before the 
current financial year was out. The Minister stated that
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the Punjab Government had submitted its proposal for conven­
ing an inter-provincial meeting of Irrigation Ministers with
a Federal Minister in the chair to resolve the differences 
5 9immediately.'
On 3 November 1987, the Federal Minister of State for 
Water and Power, Malik Said Khan Mahsud, refuted the reports 
that Kalabagh Dam project was being dropped by the Govern­
ment in favour of thermal power stations. He informed that 
the Cabinet Sub-committee would soon meet to review the rec­
ommendations of the Provincial Governments. The Government, 
he said, was trying to finalize the project as soon as 
possible.^
On 24 January 1988, the Provincial Minister for Law
and Par1iamentary Affairs, Akhtar Ali G. Kazi, assured the
Sindh Provincial Assembly that the rights of the Province
would be safeguarded on the question of the construction of
Kalabagh Darn. The members of the House were pressing for
passing a resolution against its construction. The matter
was raised in the House in view of the forthcoming
high-level meeting on the issue to be attended by all four
61Chief Ministers.
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To settle the Kalabagh Dam issue, Prime Minister
Muhammad Khan Junejo presided over a high-level meeting nn
26 January 1988. The meeting was attended by Chief
Ministers of all four provinces. Federal Minister for
Finance and Economic Affairs, Federal Minister for Water and
Power, Federal Minister for Planning and Commerce, Federal
Secretaries for Pinance, Water and Power, and Planning,
Chairman of WAPDA, Secretary, Prime Minister's Secretariat
and other relevant high-level officers. The meeting
continued for five hours and discussed the submissions of
all concerned. It was decided that the Prime Minister would
appoint a Committee consisting of members of the Parliament
belonging to all four provinces which would deliberate on
the issue and submit a comprehensive report to the Prime 
6 °Minister .
The report of the committee on Kalabagh Dam Project
appointed by the Sindh Chief Minister was published by The
Nawa~i~Waqat on 24 February 1988. The committee unanimously
recommended that the Government of Sindh should not approve
the" construction of Kalabagh Dam without ensuring geographi-
6 3cal guarantee against the diversion of the Indus Water.
In March 1988, the Sindh National Alliance held a
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province-wide convention to oppose Kalabagh Dam Project.
The convention was addressed by a number of politicians as
O 4well as technical experts from Sindh.
The dai1y Jang invited experts f rom the NWFP at 
Peshawer Jang Forum in February 1988- These experts had 
worked on the Kalabagh Dam Project at various stages Those 
who participated in the Forum included former Chairman 
WAPDA, Shah Nawaz Khan, former Vice Chancellor of Peshawer 
University and Geologist of international fame, 
Dr. Rasheed Ahmed Khan, former General Manager of Mangla and 
Tarbela Dams, Engr. Mehtab Khan, Social Geographer,
Prof. Israruddin and Engr. Mumtaz Zafar. These experts 
pointed out technical defects in the Kalabagh Dam Project, 
although they considered the project technically feasible. 
They were of the opinion that if the retention height of the 
Dam was decreased to an appropriate level (more than 10 ft.) 
so as to reduce the losses of the NWFP to the minimum and 
the water distribution dispute was settled, then the NWFP 
would have no objection against the construction of the
Kalabagh Dam. They, however, favoured the construction of 
65Basha Dam.
The daily Jang organized a symposium on Kalabagh Dam
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in March 1988. Prominent onliticians and experts from all
four provinces participated in the deliberations, The
proceedings were published in Friday Magazine of The Jang..
A perusal of the proceedings indicate that no one budged 
from the popular stand of the home province. The
participants from the NIaIFP and Sindh opposed the project, 
whereas those from the punjab supported it unequivocally.
The Awami National Party also organized an
anti-Kalabagh Dam convention in Peshawer under the
chairmanship of Khan Abdul Wali Khan. About 24 speakers
from different walks of life of the NIaIFP addressed the
convention and all of them opposed the construction of
the Dam. The formation of Anti-Kalabagh Front comprising
of all political parties was also recommended by the
convention. The Front was subsequently formed under the
chairmanship of Mian Muzaffar Shah, the Secretary
6 7General of Pakistan Peoples Party, NWFP. '
The matter was still under consideration when the 
Junejo Government was dismissed by President General Zia 
ul-Haq on 29 May 1988, Fresh elections on party basis were 
announced. As a result of these elections Benazir Bhutto 
took over as Prime Minister of Pakistan on 2 December 1988.
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Her Government’s relations with the Governments of the
Punjab and Baluchistan remained strained throughout her 
tenure as Prime Minister. The Kalabagh Dam issue remained 
alive in the press. The NWFP and Sindh persistently opposed 
the project, while the Punjab kept pressing for an 
expeditious implementation of the project. The Provincial 
Assembly of the NWFP again passed a unanimous resolution in 
1989 opposing the construction of Kalabagh Dam. The Prime 
Minister, being Sindhi, was even blamed by the Punjab lobby 
in the opposition for her inaction in respect of Kalabagh 
Dam Project. The Water Dispute, which was a major hindrance 
for the Dam, also remained unresolved. The Council of 
Common Interests (CCI) which has the power to settle such 
issues, was constituted very late. The Government of 
Benazir Bhutto was dismissed on 6 August, 1990 before the 
CCI was called into session.
THE WATER APPORTIONMENT ACCORD
Mian Nawaz Sharif took over as Prime Minister of 
Pakistan on 6 November 1990 as a result of general elections 
held on 24 October 1990. Islam! Jamhoori Itahad (IJI) under 
the leadership of Mian Nawaz Sharif got landslide victory in 
the general elections, enabling IJI to form governments
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in all the provinces. Kalabagh Dam was one of the 
issues with Mian Nawaz Sharif. He wasted no 
constitute the Council of Common Interests and the 
Finance Commission.
priority 
time to 
National
The resolution of the dispute on distribution of 
Indus Water was considered the first step to solve the 
Kalabagh Dam issue. The first meeting of the CCI was held 
on 1.2 January 1991, just three months after taking over the 
Government by Mian Nawaz Sharif, at the Prime Minister’s 
Secretariat to decide water apportionment of Indus Water 
amongst the four provinces.
The Water Apportionment Accord was signed on 
21 March 1991 and the seventy year old dispute over 
apportionment of water was solved according to the 
Constitution with complete consensus among the Chief 
Ministers of the four provinces. The Prime Minister 
announced the accord in a press conference. Replying to a 
question about the construction of Kalabagh Dam, he said 
that distribution of river water was the basic issue that 
defied solution. Once this issue was overcome, the 
Government would assess the possibility and location of 
building storage facilities in the country. Clause 6 of the
344
accord says: "The need for storages wherever feasible, on
Indus and other rivers was admitted and recognized by the
participants for planned future agricultural development".
Responding to another related question, the Prime Minister
said that the issues of royalty on natural gas and
electricity would be resolved in due course by the National
69Finance Commission. The National Finance Commission
announced its decision on 9 April 1991, and among other 
things, it decided that the profits on the hydel power 
generation would be paid to the provinces.
It was expected that the water accord would put at 
rest the controversy on Kalabagh Dam issue. Fiowever, in a 
short time since the signing of the accord, divergent views 
were expressed about the project. The scenario appeared to 
be more or less similar to that before the accord - the 
Punjab persisting in Its demand for implementation of 
the project and the NWFP and Sindh vehemently opposing the 
same.
Ihe Sindh Chief Minister, Jam Sadiq Ali, responding 
to a question in his post-accord news conference said that 
Kalabagh Dam project was not being considered and if the 
Federal Finance Minister, Sartaj Aziz, had said that the
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Government might consider the project, it was also agreed
that any irrigation project of such magnitude would be taken
up amicably. He said that Sindh had never supported Kalabagh
7 1Dam and also water was not available for the purpose.
Federal Finance Minister, Sartaj Aziz, in a press conference
on 24 March 1991 had hoped that the dispute over Kalabagh
Dam Project would be resolved in a matter of two to three 
72months
The interpretation of the Punjab was quite different
to that of Sindh. Finance Minister of the Punjab, Shah
Mahrnood Qureshi, who represented his province in the water
distribution negotiations and was a signatory to the accord,
stated that the accord had set the stage for building
Kalabagh Dam and any other feasible projects of the same 
7kind. " He argued:
Para 6 of the Agreement recognizes "the need for 
storages, wherever feasible, on the Indus and other 
rivers". Para 8 specifically states that "there 
would be no restriction on the Provinces to undertake 
new projects within their agreed shares". Finally 
para 14(e) says "all efforts will be made to avoid 
was tage."
I think that if you read these terms carefully you 
will find that we have, in fact, opened the doors to 
the building of new storages, as long as we remain 
within our share of the allocation. As I have stated 
earlier, the quantity of surplus water is much 
greater than what we envisage for- storage in future 
dams. '^
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Engr. Mehtab Khan Yusafzai from the NWFP, a staunch
opponent of Kalabagh Dam Project, agreed with the above 
interpretation of the accord, although did not like the 
accoi d, He s ta ted;
It seems that the whole exercise of resolving the 
70 years old issue of the so-called equitable 
distribution of water's of the river Indus, among the 
provinces through which the river Indus passes, has 
been done in an irrational manner, m  order to pave 
the way for undertaking the i11-conceived Kalabagh 
Dam Project, on the same river Indus, near
Kalabagh.
But here the main and pertinent question - which
would obviously arise, when the Apportionment Accord
was finally agreed to, by all the provinces and
adopted - would be, as to whether the Punjab would
like to have a Dam, with a height lower than
925 ft.- as proposed, just to divert its own share
of water to its side; or stick, to the original
proposal of putting a Dam of the same height
and specifications, as was suggested and insisted
upon before the Water Apportionment Accord was. 75concluded.
Another analyst offers the following comments:
...it appears that the matter of Kalabagh Dam has not 
been sorted out in full, There are reports that the 
Federal Government has started dusting its Kalabagh 
Dam files but whether the NWFP and Sindh will allow 
its construction still remains to be seen. There is 
no doubt that water' storage has been allowed by the 
Water Accord but it does not mean it will allow 
storage of water at Kalabagh. In any case, a dam at 
Kalabagh has to be constructed by the Federal 
Government since the Punjab Government cannot handle 
or finance such a huge project and Kalabagh thus 
falls outside the ambit of the Water Accord.
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There is talk that the NWFP Government has agreed to 
allow Kalabagh Dam to go up provided its height is 
brought down, which is acceptable to the Punjab but 
Mir Afzal Khan [Chief Minister of NWFP] does not 
appear to have taken his ANP allies into confidence 
while signing the accord and whereas the Punjab 
politicians have been cheering about Kalabagh ever 
since the accord was signed, ANP leaders have 
consistently warned they will never allow it to go
On 31 May 1991, the NWFP Assembly for the third time
passed a resolution unanimously saying ’no’ to Kalabagh Dam
Project, The first resolution against Kalabagh Dam was
unanimously adopted by the NWFP Assembly when Arbab Muhammad
Jahangir Khan was Chief Minister and the second was passed
when Pakistan People’s Party leader Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao 
7 7was in powe r * *  f
The WAPDA, however, was still busy in conducting 
various studies in the light of objections raised by the 
opponents of this project. A working paper prepared by 
WAPDA for the Technical Committee on Kalabagh Dam stated 
that the World Bank had suggested to carry out an in-depth 
environmental study before it could be presented for financ­
ing, The Technical Committee treaded by the Chairman of WAPDA 
included 10 more members - two senior officials of the 
WAPDA, two representatives each from the Punjab and Sindh, 
three from the NWFP and one from Baluchistan. It had been
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given an eight point terms of reference to study different
aspects of the Kalabagh Dam project including the environ- 
78mental impact.'
On 6 May 1991, Minister in charge for Water and 
Power, Sartaj Aziz, told the National Assembly that nothing 
could be stated categorically at the moment whether a stor­
age dam would be constructed at Kalabagh or Basha as the 
matter would be decided by the Planning Commission and
related agencies. He was responding to a question from a 
7 9member. Thus the fate of Kalabagh Dam Project, as of May 
1991, remained unsettled.
CONCLUSION
The Kalabagh Dam Project was conceived in the early 
1950s in line with the Government policy of developing 
country's hydroelectric potential as an integral part of 
developing water storages for irrigation purposes. It was 
approved by the Government in 1953 and was planned to be 
constructed after the completion of Mangla Dam. The World 
Bank also agreed to provide finances for the project. The 
implementation of this project, however, did not sail 
smoothly. An expenditure of Rs. 1,023.177 had been incurred
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as of June 1989, but its fate was still in the balance. A
number of factors contributed to bring about this state of 
affairs.
The Affected Interests. To begin with, the project 
was formulated by the energy bureaucracy without involving 
the people. No public debate was allowed to discuss its 
implications and benefits. Its design and other project 
features were the guarded secrets buried in the files of the 
Government. This approach was not different to what was 
followed in other similar projects such as Mangla and Tarbe- 
la. But it was to be implemented at a time when the politi­
cal scenario in the country had undergone material changes 
which rendered the old approach unsuitable. Had the affected 
public been involved in the project formulation, they would 
have not reacted so violently which might result in the 
demise of the project.
Theodore Lowi holds that the kind of policy being 
made determines the kind of political activity to be stirnu-
Q  Qlated by the policymaking process. This observation can be 
applied with equal validity to the implementation process of 
the Kalabagh Dam Project. The Kalabagh Dam Project intended 
to introduce significant changes in social, political, and
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economic relationships of the people. It was therefore
natural for it to stimulate considerable opposition from 
those whose interests were threatened by the changes. As the 
Project offered divisible benefits, it was likely to exacer­
bate conflict and competition among those seeking to benefit 
from it. The exclusion of the affected interests at the 
project formulation stage made its implementation uncertain. 
The cabinet approved the project initially in 1975 when 
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had full control on 
national affairs. If the people had been involved in the 
project formulation at that time, the achievement of consen­
sus on the project would not have been too difficult. The 
experience of the energy bureaucracy in respect of Mangla 
and Tarbela dams, however, had made it complacent and did 
not care to take the people into confidence.
The Kalabagh Dam Project was envisaged to affect a 
wide range of interests throughout the nation. On the one 
hand, a vast land was to be submerged in water displacing 
thousands of people. On the hand, it was to provide 3600 MW 
of electricity and more than 6 million acre feet of water 
for irrigation purposes to the people of all the provinces. 
Those who were to be adversely affected needed to be compen­
sated to their satisfaction. It was therefore necessary that
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the Government had formulated an agreed upon compensation
plan for those who were going to be adversely affected 
before the launching of the project. Throughout the contro­
versy, one cannot find any concrete plans addressed to 
satisfy the adversely affected interests. The people were 
confused with generalities.
The importance of the interest group influences in 
policy implementation cannot be overemphasized in any set­
ting. In the case of Third World countries, the interest
groups are particularly active due to their exclusion at the
ft 1policy making stage. ' The energy bureaucracy in Pakistan, 
however, ignored them in the context of implementation of
Q2Kalabagh Dam project. Effective ’compliance mechanisms’ 
were not developed in response to the affected interests.
Personality Interplay. The initial setback to the 
project was caused in 1959 by the personal interference of a 
powerful dictator General Ayub Khan. In a bid to muster- 
popular support in his home province, he manipulated to 
change the project priority in favour of Tarbela Dam which 
envisaged to bring more benefits to the NWFP. He even decep­
tively locked in the World Bank to finance Tarbela Dam. He 
got enthusiastic cooperation from the then Chairman of WAPDA
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who happened to hail from the same province, although it was
contrary to the expert advice. Prior to this, another strong 
personality, very powerful Governor of the then West 
Pakistan, Malik Amir Muhammad Khan had also pressurized 
WAPDA to shift the site of the dam which necessitated fur­
ther studies and investigations before the project could be 
lau nched.
In 1985, the project suffered another serious blow as 
a result of personal vendetta between President General Zia 
ul-Haq and the then Governor of the NWFP Lt. General Fazale 
Haq. At the time when the project had created distress among 
the affected people, Lt. General Fazale Haq was also dis­
tressed due to rumours of his replacement. Fazale Haq, in an 
endeavour to refurbish his position, extended his full 
support to the opponents of the dam. This paved the way for 
forging complete unity in the politicians of the NWFP 
against the dam.
The opposition to the project was spearheaded by 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan who had opposed the creation of Pakistan 
and had harboured life time vendetta against Punjabi who had 
humbled him. He saw an opportunity to settle the scores with 
them arid Pakistan, and in spite of his very old age he
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toured extensively to arouse emotions against the project
and the Punjab domination.
The Timing. The project was launched at the most 
inopportune time. The Martial Law regime of General Zia 
ul-Haq had recently decided to allow limited political 
freedom to the people, He had conducted referendum in 
December 1984 on the basis of which he had declared himself 
to be elected President for a five years term. General 
elections had also been held in February 1985 on non-party 
basis and Muhammad Khan Junejo had been installed as Prime 
Minister. The political activity was therefore picking up in 
the country. In July 1985, the WAPDA staff broke the news to 
the residents of Nowshera area in the NWFP while marking the 
places to be submerged in the dam. The politicians thus 
found a live issue to fetch them place in the news papers. 
The print media had also been freed from restrictions. 
General Zia restrained to take strong action personally, and 
left the matter to his weak prime minister. The issue was 
blown out of proportions resulting in sharp divisions on 
provincial lines with divergent positions.
In addition, the relations between the Punjab and 
Sindh were at the lowest ebb in July 1985 due to a dispute
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on the issue of sharing of Indus water. These provinces of 
Pakistan had a long-standing dispute on the sharing of 
water. Due to bad weather conditions, the water availability 
in the Indus river during 1984-85 had deteriorated. More­
over, lot of water was released from Tarbela Dam only to 
produce electricity to avoid load-shedding on the orders of 
the President. Due to the depletion of water storage, supply 
of water to the Punjab had to be stopped which incited 
furious reaction from the Punjab because of its severe 
damage to the crops. Sindh was pressing for the stoppage to 
ensure the availability of water for its crops. The tension 
between these provinces was at the highest level when the 
issue of Kalabagh Dam was brought to the lime light due the 
folly of the WAPDA employees which caused to further sharpen 
the differences.
The importance of appropriate timing for the imple­
mentation of public policies has been highlighted by a 
number of case studies . However, the WAPDA authorities 
acted even contrary to the common sense and caused irrepara­
ble damage.
Faulty Project Design. The project was also chal­
lenged on technical grounds and defects were pointed out in
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the project design. The WAPDA authorities initially defended
the project design, but subsequently agreed to review it in 
the light of objections raised by its critics. Consequently, 
changes were affected in the design which seriously under­
mined the credibility of the WAPDA authorities. Careful for­
mulation of the project would have saved it from criticism 
on technical grounds.
Implementation Strategy. The project suffered due to 
faulty implementation strategy. Grindle holds that while 
planning the implementation of a project, it is necessary to 
consider the context or environment in which the administra­
tive action will be pursued. In the process of administering 
a program, many actors are involved and would include 
national level planners; national, regional, and local 
politicians; economic elite groups, especially at the local 
level; recipient groups; and bureaucratic implementors at 
middle and lower levels. These actors may be intensely oi 
marginally involved in implementation, depending upon the 
content of tire program and the form in which it Is adminis­
tered. Each may have a particular interest in the program, 
and the goals of the actors may be in direct conflict with 
each other. In the case of Kalabagh Dam, the actors were 
Intensely involved. The implementation strategy therefore
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should have been based on an assessment of the power
capabilities and political leverages of the actors, their 
interests and the strategies for achieving them within the 
context of Martial Law regime’s willingness to put up with 
greater political freedom. This would have enabled the 
implementers to assess the potential for achieving the 
policy and program goals. The Government should have ad­
dressed the problem of how to achieve compliance with the 
ends enunciated in the policy, Eliciting this kind of com­
pliance required much bargaining, much accommodation, and 
again, considerable conflict. But, if overall policy goals 
were to be realized, a systematic approach was essential to 
be followed. However, this did not occur. Instead, the 
implementing officials scared the people and generated 
tension in the country,
Moreover, the implementers would fail if they ’have 
little control over the rewards or the penalties necessary 
to elicit compliance with program goals’. At the time of 
launching of the Kalabagh Dam project, the real authority 
rested with the President/Chief Martial Law Administrator 
General Zia ui-Haq. It was therefore imperative that imple­
mentation negotiations were handled at the level of 
President. Decentralization of implementation authority and
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responsibility to the Prime Minister would have been a
viable strategy if he had the capacity to ensure that imple­
menting activities would remain within the boundaries of 
program objectives and structures. He did not have those 
powers and therefore the project suffered.
The Related Issues. The implementation of the project 
raised some related issues which had fundamental importance 
not only for this project but also for national integration. 
The issued raised were: the distribution of Indus water 
amongst the provinces; the regulation and control of Indus 
water; and the distribution of income from the hydroelec­
tricity to be generated at Kalabagh. The underlying theme 
behind all the issues was the question of provincial 
autonomy and the fear of the smaller provinces of the 
"Punjab domination". The solution to these issues needed 
concerted efforts at the highest level with full devotion 
and confidence. This required a stable democratic government 
with overwhelming support of the people in all the prov­
inces. Since 1985, Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif was in a 
position to address such issues with confidence until seri­
ous differences developed between him and President Ghularn 
Ishaq Khan. He was able to solve the seventy year old water 
apportionment problem within four months after he took over
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government in November 1990. The ground had been prepared
for the solution of Kalabagh tangle, but the strained rela­
tions with the President incapacitated him to address this 
problem with confidence. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto did 
not attempt to solve the Kalabagh Dam issue as she did not 
enjoy the requisite political support. The opposition even 
dubbed her to be prejudicial against the Punjab for her 
inaction.
To sum up, the implementation of Kalabagh Dam Project 
witnessed intensive clash between the affected interests 
involving the entire nation. As the project offered divisi­
ble benefits to a large portion of the population having 
long range consequences, it invoked violent reaction from 
the opponents as well as supporters of the project. As a 
result, a process of tough bargaining, which is usually 
witnessed in the developed countries in such cases at the 
policy formulation stage, was set in requiring fundamental 
changes in the project. This again lends support to the 
premise held by the proponents of the holistic approach to 
the study of policy implementation. The implementation of 
the project faltered due to a number of factors. The most 
critical being the failure of the energy bureaucracy to 
involve the affected interests at the project formulation
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stage and subsequently the adoption of a wrong implementa­
tion strategy at a highly inopportune time. Many related 
issues were raised by the opponents which had no immediate 
solution. Faulty design of the project of the project added 
to the problems of the implementers. An interesting finding 
of the study is that the intervention of strong persons due 
to their personal reasons damaged the project implementation 
conside rably.
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CHAPTER VI
IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW AND RENEWABLE SOURCES OF ENERGY
PROJECTS
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-88) placed special 
emphasis on the development of new and renewable sources of 
energy. The Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy 
Resources (DGNER) under the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Natural Resources was entrusted with the responsibility of 
preparing, implementing and operating solar energy, wind 
energy and biogas projects throughout the country. As 
mentioned in the preceding pages, the DGNER was also the 
Secretariat of the powerful National Energy Policy Committee 
(NEPC). It implemented a number of projects in all the prov­
inces of Pakistan.
The present Chapter discusses the implementation of 
these projects. In the absence of published material, the 
analysis in this Chapter is based on the information 
obtained from the DGNER and the Projects Wing of the 
Planning and Development Division, Government of Pakistan.L 
The analysis, perforce, includes only those projects about 
which sufficient information could be gathered. The Chapter,
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therefore, discusses the implementation of such solar energy
and biogas projects.
ADMINISTRATIVE SET-UP OF THE DGNER
The DGNER functions through its headquarters in 
Islamabad. Three regional offices, one each at Lahore, 
Karachi and Rawalpindi, existed once, but without any finan­
cial and administrative powers. These offices were closed 
in the incipient stage without assigning any reasons. In 
fact, these were allowed to dissipate by the withholding of 
resources by the centre. All administrative and financial 
powers are centralized at the headquarters in Islamabad. The 
Director General of the DGNER, however, Is appointed by the 
Federal Government on an ad hoc basis. Other employees of 
the DGNER are also ad hoc appointees, who have no career and 
promotion prospects in the department. After getting train­
ing in the Implementation and operation of the PV solar- 
systems, biogas and wind energy technology, they are always 
looking for better opportunities elsewhere. They leave the 
department as soon as they get regular jobs. As of June 
1988, most of the trained staff had left the department, 
resulting in an acute shortage of trained manpower both at 
the headquarters in Islamabad and at the field unit levels.
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Some of the completed units had not even been started due to
non-availability of staff. Mechanisms for coordination with 
the provincial governments were also nonexistent."
IMPLEMENTATION OF SOLAR ENERGY PROJECTS
The DGNER prepared the following five projects to be 
implemented during the 1977-88 period for development and 
demonstration of Solar and Wind systems:0
A. Rural Energy Project.
8. Development of Solar Energy.
C. Renewable Energy for Village Electrification.
D. Solar Energy for Remote and Under-Developed Areas.
E. Japanese Aided Solar Systems.
The objectives of these projects were as follows:4
a. Domestic Sub-system for household electricity 
supply;
b. Community Sub-systems for street lights, mosques, 
community T.V., schools etc.; and
c. Water Sub-system for drinking and small irrigation 
depending upon water availability.
These projects envisaged the establishment of 
photovoltaic solar systems, wind generating systems, water 
pumping systems and domestic distribution sub-systems for 
household electricity, originally at an estimated capital
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cost of Rs.89.30 million having a Foreign Exchange Component
(FEC) of Rs.66.150 million. The implementing agency, DGNER, 
revised the projects during implernentation which resulted in 
downward revision of project scope and upward revision of 
cost. After the revision, it was planned to establish 25 PV 
solar units at different places with a proposed capacity of 
503.5KW and other systems as mentioned above at an 
estimated total cost of Rs.197.42 million having FEC of
5Rs. 1.14.95 million. The implementation of these projects is 
discussed below.
i. Rural Energy Project
The original Project was approved by the Central
Development Working Party (CDWP) in 1977 for an estimated
cost of Rs. 4.96 million including FEC of Rs. 1.302 million.
The main objective of the project was to establish Rural
Energy Centres in the country to demonstrate Biogas, Solar
and Wind technologies. The Rural Energy Project envisaged
6the installation of following systems:
(i.) Solar Cookers .. .. 1320)
(ii) Solar Water Heaters ., (320)
(iii) Solar PV System .. .. (6)
(iv) Solar Pumps .. .. (2)
(v) Wind Mills for Water Pumping tlOO)
(vi) Biogas Plants .. .. (320)
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The scope of the approved project was subsequently
changed by the DGNER. The activities completed under the 
7project were:
(i) Solar Cookers .. (100)
(ii) Solar Water Heaters .. (68)
(iii) Isolated Solar Systems „. (2)
(iv) Solar Pumps . . (2 )
(v) Wind Mills for Water Pumping .. (3)
(vi) Biogas Plants .. (320)
(vii) Solar PV Systems . . (6)
The DGNER proposed to establish Solar PV Systems one 
each at: (a) Mumniala (Punjab) 8.0 KW^; (b) Miro Padiar
(Punjab) 18.5 KW ; (c) Dittal Khan Laghari (Sindh) 20.0 KW ■
(d) Baiker (Baluchistan) 5.0 KW ;(e) Sundus (Northern Areas)
r
10.0 KWp; and (f) Nasirabad (Northern Areas) 10.0 KW .
The project was completed on 30 June, 1938, at a cost
of R s . 37.823 million with FEC of R s . 16.80 million. The
increase in cost works out as 662 % of the original cost
(4.96 million) with significantly reduced scope of the
project. The work on the project commenced during 1977-78
and the original completion date was June 1.979. The project,
9therefore, suffered a delay of 108 months,.
Information obtained from the Projects Wing of the 
P1 annI ng and Developmen t Erl visi on i ndI ca tes that, as of Ju ne
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1988, two out of the si> PV Solar Systems at Dittal Khan
Laghari and Nasirabad were out of order, while the remaining 
four were facing various problems for a variety of 
reasons. ' ' The observations of a monitoring team of the 
Projects Wing after a site visit to the Solar Power Station 
at Mumniala commissioned in 1981 are summarized below. The 
report highlighted a number of problems. It was stated that 
the other projects were facing similar problems.
Observations for Mumniala Solar Power Station."^
__ The supply is discontinued daily for maintenance 
from 4.00 to 6.00 P.M.
__ During Winter season, supply is stopped frequently 
and is most unreliable.
___ No record in any form is maintained. A register 
showing some reading up to 1983 was maintained but 
this practice had been discontinued since then.
__ There is no concept of maintaining log-book, 
log-sheets for power station to note the
maximum/minimum demand, voltage observation etc. 
Voltmeter and Am-meter are provided but no
readings are taken.
_ One T.V. has been provided for the community which
is out of order for the last six months.
Panels of the Station are not cleaned regularly.
No charges/revenues are being collected from 
consume rs.
Nearby village at 2 KM has been provided 
electricity from the National Grid.
Villagers are of the view that A.C. supply instead 
of D.C. supply be provided. They are willing to
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pay some reasonable cost if the supply is made 
reliable and continuous. At present, they can use 
only one tube light and one fan. The villagers 
are well-off and want to use electricity 
appliances like T.V. , Refrigerators, Pedestal 
fans, Irons etc. They are very angry at the 
present state of affairs as the nearby villages 
are enjoying the facility of electricity supply 
from the National Grid.
One water pump of 1.5 horse-power which can pump 
1000 Gallons of water in 3 days has been provided 
for the public. This facility is being used to 
provide water to animals only whereas the 
villagers are using hand pumps/wells for drinking 
water purposes.
As stated by DGNER representative, the maximum 
consumption comes out to be only 1.44 KW whereas 
the station’s rated capacity is 8 KW.
The existing information is not sufficient to 
comment on the maximum generation of the Solar 
Power Station. The efficiency of Solar Cells and 
the distribution losses can not be calculated.
No new connections/appliances are being provided 
although system can take the load. This has added 
to the annoyance of the people.
ii. Japanese Aided Solar System Project
The Project was developed to install two PV power- 
systems at Dhok Mian Jewan (District Jhelum) and Bhakkar 
(District Attock) in Punjab at an estimated cost of Rs. 
25.499 million including FEC of Rs. 18.95 million. The work 
on the project commenced on the basis of anticipatory ap­
proval. The installation of PV Solar Units were completed by 
30 June, 1988 at a cost of Rs. 21.922 million. Originally,
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the project was planned to be completed by June 1987 at an
estimated cost of Rs. 22.99 million. The project, thus,
suffered a delay of 12 months but was completed well within
1 ’7'the estimated cost. ^
The Gakhar Solar Power Station with a capacity of 
57.2 KW was commissioned in October, 1986, whereas Dhok Mian 
Jewan Solar Power Station with a capacity of 39 KW was 
commissioned in September, 1937. According to information 
provided by the Projects Wing of the Planning and 
Development Division, Dhok Mian Jewan Station had been 
functioning since its installation, but the beneficiaries 
had refused to pay the electricity bills, while the unit at 
Gakhar had not been working as beneficiaries had refused to 
use the D.C. current.1 A report of the Projects Wing which 
was compiled on the basis of site visits carries revealing 
observations;14
Observations for Gakhar Solar Power Station.
__  Villagers have refused to take power from the;
station and are demanding A.C. power and the 
Station is,therefore, closed and not providing 
power to any house in the village since 1986. The 
station is manned by one chowkidar only.
___ Shahpur, which is 3 KM from the Gakhar village,has
electricity from the National Grid. Another 
village which is one and half KM from Gakhar also 
has electricity from the National Grid.
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Street lights are not properly designed as no 
water-shields are provided with them. DGNER has 
not visited the plant for ten months.
Observations for Dhok Mian Jewan Solar Power Station.
__ The Power station is manned by only one Chowkidar 
who is also responsible for the operation and 
maintenance of the station and the distribution 
system.
_ The plant operates only between 7 P.M. to 6 A.M.
_ Rs.,10 per tube-light are being charged from
consumers, but they have stopped paying revenues 
from February, 1988.
_ Energy meters are not installed at the Power 
Station.
___ Three feeders emanate from the station. Maximum 
drop, as informed by the person in charge of the 
station, has been observed as 15 volts. However, 
villagers complained of low voltage.
_ Village Agara Moro which is 2 KM from Dhok Mian
Jewan has electricity from the National Grid. In 
fact, all the villages within 2 KM radius of Dhok 
Mian Jewan are being electrified from the 
National Grid. The villagers are demanding for the 
provision of A.C. power. They have also demanded 
for the provision of fans at reduced rates.
_ Voltage and current readings are not regularly
taken and proper record of maximum/'minimum load, 
voltages, current, etc. Is also not maintained.
iii. Development of Solar Energy Project
The project was approved by CDWP in May, 
period of 30 months at an estimated cost of 
million including FEC of Rs.14.90 million. It was
1980 for a 
Rs.19.933 
developed
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to demonstrate solar technology under the following
systems: ^  5
C i ) 05 KWp photovoltaic non--1racking system;
(ii) 20 KIa) photovoltaic tracking system; and 
(lii) 35 KW Solar Thermal generation system.
The scope of the project was reportedly revised later
16on to cover the following activities:
(a) Kankoi Solar Station (NWFP):
* Installation of 60.0 KW^ power station and diesel 
generator to utilize power for domestic use and 
water pumping.
* Installation of performance monitoring and 
communication equipment to carry out technical 
and economic analysis of the system to determine 
the unit cost.
* Installation of the invertors to convert D.C. 
system into A.C. system.
(b) Maskipur Solar Station (NWFP):
* Installation of 10 KW solar system to supply 
electricity for domestic requirements.
* Installation of performance monitoring equipment 
to carry out the technical and economic analysis 
of the system to determine the unit cost.
(c) Installation of two Solar Stations of 50 KW^ in 
Baluchistan.
Under the project, as of 30 June 1988, two PV solar 
systems one each at Kankoi and Maskipur, with capacity of
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36.8 and 10 KW respectively and an Isolated Solar System
(144 W ) at Dagger were installed. The Solar' Power Station
at Kankoi was originally commissioned in 1983 with capacity
of 5 KW which was increased to 36.8 KW... in 1985 as ar p
1 w7result of project revision by the DGNER. As of 30 June
1988, the work on the following planned items had not yet 
18s tar ted:
(a) Installation of two solar systems each of 20 KW^ 
in Baluchistan.
(b) Installation of two invertors each of 20 KW_ to 
convert D.C. system into A.C. system.
(c) Installation of two water pumping systems.
(d) Installation of 60 KW_ units in NWFP.P
It is obvious from above that only 46.80 KW systems 
had been installed, while 80 KW PV solar units were yet to 
be installed along with two water pumping systems for which 
even sites had not been identified. This means that only 37 
per cent of PV solar system work had been completed in 78 
months. The DGNER proposed to complete the remaining 63 %
work by June, 1989.
The information provided by the Projects Wing of the 
Planning and Development Division contains the following 
observations about the Solar Power Stations at Kankoi and
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Muskipur commissioned in 1985 and 1937 respectively: 19
Observations for Kankoi Solar Power Station.
__ NO record is maintained at the Station. Control 
room of the Station is equipped with computerized 
data logger to collect complete information of the 
Power automatically, which is not operating for 
the last two years due to non-availability of 
computer diskettes.
__ The Station has been provided with batteries so 
that power can be supplied during night and cloudy 
days. Terminals of the batteries were not clear 
and needed proper maintenance. Water level in 
some batteries was very low.
_ The Station has been provided with a diesel
generator of 40 KVA rating operated at 440 Volts 
A.C. to charge the batteries. However, the diesel 
generator has not been in operation since 1986 due 
to non-provision of diesel oil. Diesel engine 
being non-operative is becoming rusty and needs 
maintenance before it is put into operation.
_ One solar radiation recording system to record
solar intensity with the change in the direction 
of Solar Panels had been provided which was not 
operating for over a year due to non-provision of 
graph paper.
_ The Solar Panels have a provision for changing
their direction so that maximum sunlight falls on 
the panels. However, the direction of the Panels 
was not being changed at the Power Station.
_ Solar Panels are dirty and the cleaning is not
being carried out regularly.
_ Monitoring of current from panels Is also not
being done.
_ The tube well at the station is operated daily for
8-9 hours to supply water for irrigation purposes 
for which no revenues are collected.
_ One 1/2 h.p. A.C. motor with invertor is also in
> / 7
Operation with Solar Power Station to supply 
potable water for power station.
The maximum load of the Power Station is 80 Amp. 
indicating that it is supplying maximum power of 
9.6 KW. However, the Station is designed to 
provide 36.8 KW of load.
The feeder to village is 300 meter long. At 
9.00 AM when load was maximum (80 amp.) and 
voltage at Station was 120 volts d.c., the voltage 
actually measured at the remote point of the 
village was 75 volts indicating the drop of 
45 volts. Such a large voltage drop indicated 
that the distribution system was not designed 
properly. The consumers are connected to the 
Solar Power Station with a cable of 6 mm due to 
which voltage drop is large. Villagers complained 
of voltage drop.
The record of max./min. load, shut downs, mainte­
nance schedule, and break down, is not maintained 
properly and there is no record to assess its 
performance since operation.
The Station is manned by one Sub-Engineer and one 
Chowkidar only which is not sufficient.
It was observed that smoke from the village 
encircled the Solar Station in the evening thereby 
polluting solar panels. This indicated that the 
site for the station was not selected properly.
The villagers are not satisfied with the 
performance of the Solar Power Station. They are 
concerned that power is not supplied regularly 
especially during winter months. Sometime they are 
without power for 3 to 4 days. Fans are not being 
provided to them although they have deposited the 
requisite amount. Further-more,they are greatly 
annoyed that with the electricity supp1ied by the 
Power' Station they can not use mixer's, blenders, 
irons and refrigerators. They are even willing 
to pay some fixed amount if power is supplied 
regularly and reliably.
National Grid 11 KV line is passing at 2 KM from 
the village Kankoi and nearby village named Koga 
was electrified from it in 1986. The residents of
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Kankoi are demanding for the provision of similar 
facility. Faced with this situation, DGNER have 
proposed to shift Kankoi Solar Power Station to 
some yet unidentified place in the N.W.F.P.
Observations for Muskipur Solar Power Station.
__ Different types of Solar Cells are being used at 
the Station.
__ Solar Panels are not being cleaned regularly.
_  There is a provision to change angles of PV panels 
for optimum utilization, but these are being 
changed only twice in a year for win ter/summer 
seasons.
_ No record of any type is being maintained.
The distance of 11 KV National Grid supply from 
the village is only 1 KM.
No revenues are being collected from the villagers 
although A.C. Is being supplied.
Villagers complained that only a few fans were 
being issued.
iv. Renewable Energy for Village Electrification Project
This project was developed to demonstrate Biogas, 
Solar and Wind technologies in the country. The objectives 
of the project were:40
a. Generation of 500 cu. ft. of gas per day at Rakh 
Taragarh from agriculture waste; and Installation 
of Solar Photovoltaic system of 15 KW capacity 
for (i) pumping watet for drinking and irrigation 
purposes and (ii) for electrification purposes for 
5 hou rs du ring the night.
7 *7 Q  
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b. Production of electricity by using biogas along 
with setting up of a 15 KW photovoltaic generation 
system for general energy supply purposes at 
Angara in Sindh.
c. Installation of 15 KW photovoltaic generation 
system at project site in Baluchistan for pumping 
and storage of water for drinking and irrigation; 
and Installation of a Wind Mill for generating 
3200 KWH per year.
d. Support to the 15 KW photovoltaic production at 
the 4th energy center in Bonair Valley with wind 
mill producing 64,000 KWh per year.
O  1The project"" was approved by CDWP on 15th September, 
1980 for a period of 24 months at an estimated cost of 
Rs.19.933 million including foreign exchange component of 
Rs.16.60 million. The scope of the project was revised in 
1988 after a delay of 6 years in completion. The project 
was revised as follows:
a. Mera Rehmat Khan Solar Station (NWFP)
Installation of 18 KW PV power station to 
supply power for domestic requ i rernen ts .
Installation of performance monitoring equipment 
to carry out the technical and economic analysis 
of the system.
b. Qila Mojgarh Solar Station (Punjab)
Installation of 43.8 KW solar system to supply 
electricity for domestic requirements.
Installation of water pumping system for drinking 
wate r.
Installation of performance monitoring equipment, 
for the techno-economic analysis of the system.
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c. Khurkera Hybrid System (Baluchistan)
Installation of hybrid system comprising 8.8 KW
Solar PV station and 2 KW aerogeneration systemPat Khurkera to supply electricity and water for 
domes t ic r equ i r ernen ts ,
Installation of performance monitoring equipment 
to carry out the technical and economic analysis 
of the system.
d. Malmari Hybrid System (Sindh)
Installation of hybrid system comprising 10 KW 
solar PV station and 16 KW^ wind system to supply 
electricity and water for domestic needs.
Installation of performance monitoring equipment 
to carry out the economic and technical analysis 
of the system.
e. Installation of two mechanical wind pumpers, one 
each at Dahri and Khurkera villages.
Under the project, the DGNER had established by 30 
June 1988 four PV solar units of 75.90 KW capacity and two
r*'
wind generating systems, one of 2 KWn and the other of 16
KW . The work was in progress on other items. The DGNER had P
proposed further revision of the project for the upgrading 
of Kkurkera PV solar system by 5 KW^.4"^  The Projects Wing of 
the Planning and Development Division also compiled a report 
on the Solar Power Stations at Khurkera and Malmari after 
visiting the sites in June 1988. The main observations
2 5contained in the report are summarized below:
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Observations for Khurkera Solar Power Station
The station is manned by one Sub-Engineer and one 
Chowkidar who also carry out minor repairs of the 
distribution system.
The supply of the village is discontinued since 
April, 1988 due to the breakage of carrier wire. 
Villagers were very angry as they were without 
electricity since then.
Villagers are charged Rs. 10 for each connection.
There is one Primary School in the village. It has 
not been provided electricity. There is no Commu­
nity TV Center in the village.
Wind Mill was in operation. It operates 1.5 h.p. 
pumps to provide water to animals and villagers.
At the station compilator is Installed but is 
not fully operative. Sub-Engineer is not trained 
properly to operate the compilator.
Energy meters have been installed at the station.
The wind mill operates about 22 hours daily 
through-out the year except in April when the wind 
speed is slow. Wind generation is located on the 
tower of 85 feet height.
Feeders emanate from the station in three
directions; the longest feeder is 3.5 KM. Maximum 
voltage drop on the feeder is 10 volts. The maxi­
mum load of the station is 25 Amp. between 6 P.M.
to 8 P.M.
Bela which is about 3 KM away from Khurkera has 
electricity from the National Grid. Villagers 
feel deprived of a better and more reliable 
facility because of this solar station.
The distribution poles are of steel which are not 
galvanized or painted due to which there is
extensive corrosion of poles.
The distribution system consists of overhead 
cables with carrier wire which is extensively 
cor roded.
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Observations for Malmari Solar Power Station.
The station is manned by one Sub-Engineer and one 
Chowkidar who also attend minor faults in the 
distribution system.
No proper record is maintained at the station. 
There is no concept of maintaining log sheet for 
Power Station to note maximum/minimum demand, 
voltage and current. Voltmeters and Am-meters are 
provided but no readings are being taken. Energy 
meters are installed, but the readings are not 
taken regularly.
A wind mill of 10 KW planned to be installed 
at Malmari for providing drinking water to the 
villagers was damaged during testing and 
commissioning in March 1988. The equipment of the 
wind mill was found rusting in open space waiting 
for repairs. Water supply arrangements were, 
therefore, not yet completed.
The villagers are charged at the rate of Rs.10 per 
house.
Each of the two mosques in the village has been 
provided two tube-lights and one fan, but no 
street lights have been provided.
Four feeders emanate from Solar Power Station. The 
maximum length of feeder is 500 meter and maximum 
drop on feeder is 10 volts. The maximum load of 
station is 35 amp. between 7 to 8.00 P.M.
Villagers are not demanding fans, however, they 
require more tube-lights.
Automatic universal charge controller for measur­
ing discharging current of the battery has been 
installed at the station but is not in operation.
National Grid 11 KV feeder was passing at a dis­
tance of 22 KM from the Malmari village. The 
availability of power to this area was not antici­
pated from the National Grid in near future. It 
was also reported that plant had not been closed 
due to non-availability of sun light. The location 
of the Solar Power Station was, therefore, good.
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The distribution poles are of steel which are not 
galvanized or painted due to which there is 
extensive corrosion. The distribution system 
consists of overhead cables with carrier wire 
which is also extensively corroded.
The station is closed on alternate days for about 
2 hours for general maintenance and cleaning. 
However, the angles of modules are not changed 
regularly, and batteries are not maintained 
p roperly.
The villagers are not generally satisfied as due 
to D.C. power they cannot use T.V., refrigerators, 
washing machines, irons and other electronic 
appliances. They are demanding that the station 
should be converted into A.C. immediately. They 
are even willing to pay charges for A.C. power.
v. Solar Energy for Remote and Under-Developed Areas Project
The project was developed to set up 100 KWn solar 
system at Kharan town (Baluchistan), at an estimated cost of 
Rs. 21.5 million including foreign exchange component of 
Rs. 14.4 million. The project was originally planned to be 
completed by 30 June 1987. However, the DGNER revised the 
scope of the project, and instead of setting up 100 KW 
solar system at one site, decided to set up solar stations 
at four places. As of June 1988, two solar stations, 
namely, 8KW solar PV station at Sherozai, District Kharan 
and 15 KW solar PV station at Lehtar, District Kharan had
r
O  Abeen completed.^ The electrical distribution, civil works
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and installation of equipment were in progress at the fol­
lowing solar systems:'1'5
a. 20 KW solar PV station at Nawtani, District
r'Kharan: and
b. 20 KW solar PV station at 8ughat, District
Loralai.
In addition to the above four solar stations, the 
DGNER intended to establish two more PV solar systems of 
17- 20 KW capacity each in Baluchistan for which sites had 
not been identified by June 1988, Under the project, only 23 
KW had been installed by June 1988.fj
Physical Progress of the Projects
As discussed in the preceding pages, the DGNER 
planned to establish 25 PV solar units at different loca­
tions in the country with a proposed capacity of 503.5 KW . 
The other components of these projects were wind generating 
systems, and isolated sub-systems for house-hold electrici­
ty. As of June 1988, 15 units with capacity of 301.5 KW had
been completed, 3 units with capacity of 80 KW were at 
different stages of implementation and locations for 7 
remaining units had not been identified. This means that
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physical progress up to June 1988 was 60 per cent of the
■p r.planned capacity.“"
Financial Utilization
The financial utilization of all the five projects, 
as of June 30 1988, was Rs. 134.783 million against the 
total allocation of Rs. 197.443 million. The utilization of 
foreign exchange was Rs. 77.654 million against a provision 
of Rs, 114.974. The implementing agency had utilized about 
two-third of the funds in a period of ten years (.from 1977-
O  ~778 to 1987-88) /~
Delay in Implementation
All the five projects witnessed delays in implementa­
tion, ranging from 12 months to 108 months. The longest 
delay was observed in "Rural Energy for Village Electrifi­
cation Project" and the shortest in the Japanese Aided Solar 
Project, Project-wise details of original date of completion 
and actual/estimated date of completion along with period of 
delay in implementation are given in fable 6.1 below.
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TABLE 6.1
ORIGINAL AND EXPECTED DATE OF COMPLETION
S . No . Name of Date of
Project Commencement
Original 
Date of 
Completion
Ac tual/ 
Expected 
Date of 
Completion
Delay 
(months)
A. Rural Energy 
for Village 
Electrification.
B. Development of 
Solar Energy.
C. Renewable 
Energy for 
Village
Electrification.
D. Solar Energy 
for Remote and 
Under-Developed 
A r e a s .
E. Japanese Aided 
Solar System.
June 1977 June 1979
June 1980 June 1983
June 1980 June 1983
June 1984 June 1987
June 1985 June 1987
June 1988 108
June 1989 78
June 1989 84
June 1989 24
June 1988 12
Source: Information provided by the Directorate General of
New and Renewable Resources.
Cost Over-run
The original capital cost of the five p rojec ts was
estimated at Rs. 89.30 million having a total foreign
exchange component of R s . 66.15 million. The cost of these
projects increased to Rs. 197.42 million with foreign ex-
change cost also going up to Rs. 114.95 million. The
project-wise details of original and revised costs a re
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given in Table 6.2 below.
TABLE 6.2
ORIGINAL AND REVISED CAPITAL COST
(Million Rupees)
5.NO* Name of 
Project
Original Revised cost
approved cost
Pe rcentage 
change
A. Rural Energy 
for Village 
Electrification. 4.97
B . Development of
Solar Energy. 19,93
C. Renewable Energy 
for Village
Electrification. 19.91
D. Solar Energy 
for Remote and 
Under-Developed
A reas. 21.50
37.82
57.02
39.94
37.14
661
186
101
73
E. Japanese Aided
Solar System. 22.99 25.50 11
Total. 89.30 197.42 121
Source: Information provided by the Directorate General of
New and Renewable Resources.
Table 6.2 indicates that the increase in capital cost 
was 121 per cent of the original cost. The highest cost over­
run was observed in the Rural Energy for Village Electrifi­
cation Project, which was 662 % of the approved cost, while 
t'he lowest cost over run (73%) was in Solar Energy for 
Remote and Under-Developed Areas Project. These two projects
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also experienced the maximum and minimum delay in implemen­
tation. This indicates that cost over run was positively 
correlated to delay in .implementation.
Change in Scope and Location of Projects
The scope of four of the five projects was changed 
during the implementation, the only exception being the 
Japanese Aided Project. As is apparent from the foregoing 
discussion, the change in scope generally resulted in down­
ward revision of project scope and upward revision of cost.
The solar system is ideal for remote areas, where 
supply of energy from usual sources is expensive due to long 
distances involving huge capital investment and distribution 
losses. A cost effective solar system should be located 
some 30-35 KM away from the national grid. The DGNER changed 
the approved sites of units during the implementation 
without regard to the above principle and without approval 
of the competent authority. The rationale for such changes 
had not been given by the sponsoring agency. Most of the 
new locations were not ideal for solar units as these were 
n e a r t h e Nat i o n a 1 G r i d .
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The sponsoring agency did not furnish data regarding
distance of each unit from the National Grid network. 
However, an internal evaluation report by the Projects Wing 
of the Planning Division indicates that its evaluation team 
during the field visit noted distance of 7 units from the 
National Grid.. Except Malmari, which was about 25 KM from 
it, all other units were located within a range of 0-2 KM 
from the National Grid. This placed the beneficiaries of 
solar electricity in a difficult situation, unhappy with the 
restricted supply of DC solar electricity in lieu of the 
nearby National Grid system.
The implementing agency not only changed the 
locations but also changed the concept of these projects. 
For example, in the case of Solar Energy for Remote and 
Under-Developed Areas, the concept was to establish a 100 
KW PV solar unit at Kharan town to supplement the existing 
source of electricity. But during the implementation 
process, the project was shifted from Kharan town to four 
places in the districts of Kharan and Loralai without the 
approval of the competent authority. Like-wise, the scope 
of the Rural Energy Project was changed from domestic sub­
system to community subsystem resulting in higher cost and
?cdelay in implementation."
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Performance of Installed Units
The major components of the five projects were PV 
Solar system, diesel generating system, wind generating 
system and water pumping system, but the single main major 
component of these projects was PV solar system. By June 
1988, out of the total planned capacity of 503.5 KW , only 
301.5 KW had been installed at 15 different locations. In
r
addition to PV solar units, following items had also been 
completed under these projects to the extent indicated
IQagai nst each : *" '
I. Domestic sub-system for household:
(a) Solar Cooker .. .. .. 100
(b) Solar Water Heater .. .. 68
(c) Isolated Solar unit .. .. 2
ii. Diesel generating set .. .. 1
iii. Wind generating system .. .. 3
iv. Water pumping system .. 6
According to information provided by the DGNER, as of 
June 1988, out of the 15 completed PV solar units, 8 units 
were operational, 3 units had never worked since installa­
tion and 4 units had been out of order for 6 to 12 months. 
In other words, about 50% units had been out of operation 
for different reasons3  ^  The position of the operating units 
was also depressing. Most of them were operating much below 
their rated capacity. The suppIy of electricity was unr e 1 i -
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able, irregular and for fewer hours than should have been
the case. The demand was much higher than supply. There was 
also problem of non-availability of D.C. appliances. The 
operating units were suffering due to the centralization of 
financial and administrative powers in the DGNER headquar­
ters at Islamabad, resulting in inordinate delays in repair
7 1work and poor mai ntenance ,
The list of beneficiaries of the isolated solar 
system and the beneficiaries to whom solar cookers and 
heaters were supplied could not be obtained from the DGNER. 
The Projects Wing of the Planning and Development Division 
reported that even they failed to obtain the list from the 
DGNER. Therefore, it is not possible to comment on the per­
formance of the household items. The possibility that those 
might had not even been purchased, however, cannot be ruled 
out. According to a report of the Projects Wing of the Plan­
ning and Development Division, Isolated Solar Systems at
Dhok Mian Jewan and Dagger were working fault-free and the
3 °beneficiaries were satisfied with the performance.
Project Revenues
Information supplied by the DGNER on revenue
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collection indicates that there were two rates for billing.
The metered consumers were charged at the rate of P.s.0.50 
per KWH, and the rest at the rate of Rs.10.0 each per fan 
and tube-light per month. Further, in some areas like 
Mumniala, Baikar, Kankoi, Muskipur, electricity was being 
supplied free of cost, while the beneficiaries of Dhok Mian 
Jewan had refused to Day the duesh^
The Projects Winq of the Planning and Development 
Division believed that the revenue figures furnished by the 
DGNER were on the higher side. However, if the figures 
supplied are taken to be correct, then the total annual 
revenue worked out to be Rs.67,138, whereas the total 
recurring expenditure of these projects was Rs.3.125 mil­
lion. This meant that none of the projects was in a position 
to meet even its recurring cost or operational expenditure.
Subsidies
The data provided by the DGNER indicate that the 
annual subsidy for these projects amounted to Rs. 31.582 
million at 12 % opportunity cost of the capital. Annual 
recurring expenditure for all the five projects worked out 
to be Rs.3.125 million, whereas the annual revenue had been
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estimated at Rs. 0.067 million, which left a gap of Rs.3.058 
million to be filled by the Government.'54 The Government 
was therefore suffering from sustained financial loss for 
erroneously planned and poorly implemented so-called demon­
stration projects’.
IMPLEMENTATION OF 8I0GAS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
The DGNER prepared the "Biogas Development Project" 
for the establishment of biogas units which would produce 
renewable energy at a cost cheaper than commercial sources 
of energy by utilizing animal waste and provide to the 
selected villages their total energy requirements at the 
cheapest rate. Phase-I and Phase-II of the Project envisaged 
to achieve the following objectives:0'
a. Generation of Electricity (AC) 220 Volts having 
capacity of 5 KW to 10 KW at each site, which 
would be sufficient for lighting and for pumping 
water for the existing water wells and/or newly 
acquired sources of water.
b. Provision of fuel for cooking and heating in 
winter to replace the growing consumption of 
petroleum products and kerosene.
c. Conversion of animal waste into enriched manure.
To achieve the above objectives, the following 
physical targets were planned with art estimated capital cost
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of Rs.33.537 million having foreign exchange component of
Rs .5.048 million in three years of implementation period: 3o
i. Family biogas units (FBU) .. .. 1140
ii. Community Plants (CP) .. . . 45
iii. Biogenerators (BG) .. .. 200
iv. Compressors/Biofans .. .. 160
v . Wo rkshop . . . .  1
vi. Testing Laboratory . . . . .1
Change in Scope
The project envisaged the establishment of 1140 
biogas units at various places throughout Pakistan on a 
cost free basis for familiarization of biogas technology. 
During the process of implementation, however, the imple­
menting agency made major changes in the project without the 
approval of the competent authority. As a result, the cost 
of the project rose to Rs. 41 million. The Family Biogas 
Units (FBU) were installed on cost sharing basis instead of 
cost free basis. The following changes were made in the 
project:^ '
a. Family Biogas Units installed were four times 
bigger than the approved size.
b. The proposed facilities of Workshop and Testing 
Laboratory were dropped from the project.
c. The number of Family Biogas Units was increased 
from 1140 to 4137.
d. The implementation period was increased from 
3 years to 6 years.
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Financial Utilization
The data provided by the DGNER indicate that the 
actual expenditure on the project proved to be Rs. 32.643 
million against an estimated cost of Rs. 41 million. 
Table 6.3 below gives the year-wise allocations, releases 
and actual utilization during the 1981-87 (six years) imple­
mentation period.
TABLE 6.3
ADP Allocation, Funds Released and Actual Utilization
(1981-87)
(Million Rs.)
Yea r Allocation Releases Utilization Un-utilized 
amou n t
1981-82 10.100 10.100 5.101 4.999
1982-83 10.000 10.000 8.229 1.771
1983-84 8.600 8.600 8.406 0.194
1984-85 1.500 1.500 0.237 0.263
1985-86 8.090 8.090 7.700 0.390
1986-87 2.710 2.710 1.970 0.740
Total: 41.000 41.000 32.643 3.357
Source: The Directorate General of New and Renewable
Energy Resources, Ministry of Petroleum and
Natural Resources, Government of Pakistan.
Physical Progress
According to the original schedule, the implementa­
tion of the project was to commence in the year 1981-82 and
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was to be completed by June, 1984. The work on the project
did start according to the schedule but as a result of 
various changes affected in the project during its implemen­
tation by the implementing agency, the progress remained 
slow during the first two years of the project and could not 
be improved in the subsequent years, resulting in a three- 
year delay in the completion of the project.
During the implementation, the installation of family 
biogas units and purchase of compressors/biofans received 
more attention of the implementing agency, whereas the 
targets in respect of other activities as compared to origi­
nal planning, remained unachieved. The Workshop and the 
Testing Lab. were dropped altogether. The implementing 
agency (DGNER) had no reasons to assign for not establishing 
the wot'kshop and testing lab. Furthermore, as of 30 June 
1988, only 49 biogenerators and 59 biofans were distribut­
ed although 110 biogas generators and 300 compressors/ 
biofans had been purchased which were lying in the DGMER 
stores for the past four years. Only 3 Community Units were 
installed against 45 planned. It was disclosed by the offi­
cials in the Planning and Development Division that the 
Implementing agency offered no explanation for change in 
scope of the project to the Evaluation Team of the Projects
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7 pWing of the Planning and Development Division.01-
Implementation of ”8 iogas Development Project1' in the 
Provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan.
The Projects Wing of the Planning and Development 
Division carried out an evaluation of the implementation of 
the Biogas Development Project in the NWFP and Baluchistan 
provinces on the directive of the Central Development Work­
ing Party (CDWP). The DGNER was directed to furnish neces­
sary information and data regarding implementation and 
operation of the project.
The Evaluation Team selected a minimum sample of 20% 
of FBUs on random basis for each district in the provinces 
of NWFP and Baluchistan, out of the 611 units installed in 
these provinces which were mentioned in the list provided to 
the Evaluation Team. The list of the sample units was 
prepared before the start of field work. During the field 
visit, the units installed in the vicinity of sample units, 
were also visited/reviewed, resulting in an 8% increase in 
the sample. In a few cases, the sample units were not 
accessible/traceable, which necessitated substitution. In 
all, 133 units were visited. The information supplied by 
the Projects Wing Team is quite revealing. The salient
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features of its findings are discussed below.
Physical Progress
In the Provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan, a total of 
1,178 family biogas units (FBU) were installed out of 4,137 
installed in the whole of Pakistan. The DGNER, however, 
provided a list of only 611 Family Biogas Units (FBUs) . No 
reasons for not providing the complete list of the FBUs were 
given by the DGNEPs. It was suspected that the remaining FBUs 
existed on paper only. Not a single community biogas unit 
was installed in these provinces. Also, no Compressor/'Biofan 
was supplied. Only one generator had been given in the 
province of NWFP. The review team visited the site of the 
generator and found the house locked and biogas unit out of 
order. It was reported to the Team that the generator had
never worked since its installation due to low pressure of 
40gas.
In NWFP, out of 10 districts where FBUs were 
installed, 6 districts were covered by the study. In these 
districts, 92 units were visited out of 390 units. Table 6.4 
below depicts district-wise operational status of these 
units. The table indicates that out of 92 units only I9
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units were working which constituted 23 % of units visited.
The highest number of working units were observed in
Abbotabad district whereas in Peshawer, Bannu and Swat all
units were out of order. In the district of Mansehra, only 5
out of 29 units were operational with low pressure. It was
also observed by the Evaluation Team that during the visit
none of the working units was in such a condition that
could replace the use of other sources of energy for
cooking. The gas pressure of the working units was usually
too low and could only be used for preparing tea or heating
water. For the purpose of other cooking, the beneficiaries
needed alternative sources of energy. Of the 92 units, 41
units reportedly "never worked" and 32 units worked only for 
* 41a short tune.
TABLE 6.4
District-wise operational status of units in NWFP
Districts Uni ts 
Visited
Units Remarks
Operating
Mardan . . 14 3
Peshawar .. 11
Bannu . . 6 --
Swat . . 8 1 Low pressure.
Mansehra . . 29 5
Abbotabad .. 24 10
Total.. 92 19
Source: The Projects Wing, Planning and Development
Division, Government of Pakistan.
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In Baluchistan, out of 79 units installed in the 3
sample districts, 41 units were visited by the Evaluation 
Team. The district-wise performance of these units is de­
picted in Table 6.5 below. The table indicates that only 5 
units in Zhob district were working, which was 12 % of the 
total units visited, while in the other two districts, all 
the units were out of order. The Evaluation Team further 
observed that out of 41 units, 31 units had never become 
operative and 5 were out of order. In Kharan district, the 
beneficiaries informed the Team that all the 43 units 
installed never became operative due to non-supply of 
fittings by the contractor. They reported that the Office
of the DGNER was very much in the picture, but no corrective
4?measures were taken.
TABLE 6.5
District-wise operational status of units in Baluchistan
District Visited Operating Remarks
Pishin 9
Kha ran 17 -
Z hob 15 5 (3 with low pressure)
Total. 41 5
Source: The Projects Wing, Planning and Development
Division, Government of Pakistan.
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Financial Status of Owners
The report of the Projects Wing pointed out that the 
biogas units were installed in semi-urban areas and the 
owners of these units were Local Councillors, Khans, 
Sardars, members of provincial and national assemblies, 
businessmen and retired government servants. Their position 
in respect of the size of their land holding is exhibited in 
Table 6.6 below. The report also pointed out that they were 
financially well off and were using LPG, electricity and 
firewood for cooking, lighting and heating purposes. 
Socioeconomic conditions of beneficiaries were not assessed 
and considered by the DGNER to determine their suitability.
TABLE 6.6
Size of Land Holding of the Owners of Biogas Units
Land Holding (In Acres) NWFP Baluchistan T o tal
Without land 1 - I
Less than 5 Acres 17 - 17
5 Acres and above 74 41 115
Total: 92 41 13o
Source: The Projects Wing, Planning and Development
Division, Government of Pakistan.
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Availability of Cattle waste
For the successful operation of family biogas units, 
4-5 animals1 dung is required to produce 80-100 eft. gas for 
family of 6-8 persons. During the survey, the information 
about the availability of cattle waste/dung with owners of 
these units was also collected by the Projects Wing Team. 
The position of the owners of the family biogas units 
regarding their cattle numbers is summarized in Table 6.7 
below. The table indicates that out of 133 owners of FBUs, 
24 or 18 % are without cattle and 41% have 4 and more 
cattle.
TABLE 6.7
Cattle Ownership of the Owners of the Biogas Units
No. of Cattle NWFP Baluchistan Total
Without Cattle 11 13 24
Less than 4 48 6 54
4 and above 33 22 55
Total 92 41 133
Source: The Projects Wing, Planning and Development
Division, Government of Pakistan.
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Alternate Fuels
The main objective of the project was to replace the 
use of Kerosene Oil, firewood and electricity for cooking 
and lighting. The Projects Team, however, found during the 
visit that 80-90 % owners of the units had electricity and 
were meeting their lighting requirements from that source. 
For the purposes of cooking in semi-urban arid rural areas, 
the use of LPG was growing rapidly. However, the main source 
of energy for cooking was still the firewood which was 
readily available in the NWFP, Moreover, due to low pressure 
in the NWFP and Baluchistan, biogas was not regarded as a 
reliable source of energy during the winter season.
Supervision
Biogas being a new technology, the beneficiaries do 
occasionally need guidance and supervision to ensure 
successful operation of the units. The supervision aspect 
of the project was found to be very weak. The project 
authority placed more emphasis on installation of units 
rather than on their operation. During the field visits, it 
was observed by the Projects Wing Team that: out of 133 
units, 72 units never operated and 37 units became out of
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order due to lack of interest and maintenance (Table 6.4 &
Table 6.5),
The installation of the units was carried out on a 
contract basis. According to the contract agreement, thee 
responsibility of the contractor was limited to installa­
tion/construction of the units and getting these approved 
from the representative of the DGNER before start-up. The 
initial start-up of the units was the responsibility of the 
owner, which was reportedly the main reason for non-opera­
tion of "never operative units". The contractor and project 
officer visited the project sites after the completion of 
physical works, but they did not help the owners in the 
initial start. The owners of the units being ignorant, did 
not start the units. No representative from the DGNER’s 
Office ever visited the units for the purpose of rendering 
guidance and supervision. The existing administrative set-up
as well as the spread of the units hindered effective 
4 4supervision.
Selection of Locations
The locations of units under the project were
selected on pick and choose basis and no proper survey was
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carried out for the purpose. AS a result of this lapse, the
biogas units suffered due to 4 cthe following factors:
i . Weather: In districts of Abbotabad, Mansehra,
Swat, Pishin and Zhob, due to weather conditions 
the units could not work in winter, while during 
the remaining period of the year the pressure of 
gas remained so low that it failed to substitute 
the other sources of energy.
ii. Availability of firewood and LPG: In the
districts of Abbotabad, Mansehra, Swat, Mardan and 
PIshin, the firewood and L.PG were readily avail­
able. Therefore, people preferred to use firewood 
and LPG.
Technology
Although the technology used in these plants was very 
simple, its users still needed some training and guidance 
which were not provided by the Implementing organization 
(DGNEPO . Moreover, plants installed under the project were 
open wells which were socially not acceptable. Further, the 
gas pipes used were blocked with water which caused the 
stoppage of gas. It was further observed by the Projects 
Wing report that if once a plant stopped the supply of gas, 
it never became operational again. The Project did not have 
a provision for the training of beneficiaries, and it had no 
In-built system of supervision and guidance.40
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Achievement of Pro.iect Objective
The project was planned to meet the total energy 
requirements of selected villages by installation of biogas 
units. It Is evident from the preceding pages that this 
remained to be realized. The F8Us installed in Baluchistan 
and the NWFP could not become fully operational . As of 
June 1988, only 18 per cent of the installed units visited 
by the Evaluation Team were found working and those too with 
low pressure. The working units, therefore, were not able to
meet the energy requirements of the owners who we re com-
pelled to shif t to other sources of ene rgy. The mos t
alarming fea tu re of the program was that ou t of the to tal
installed units, about 55 per cent never became operative.
Coordination
The Project was spread over the entire country which 
made It impossible for the DGNER to coordinate effectively 
due to shortage of trained staff and enormous traveling 
involved. Enough interest on the part of the beneficiaries 
could not be generated to make them committed to the concept 
due to coordination difficulties. In fact, the DGNER lacked 
the capacity and capability for the implementation and
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operation of the project. Defective procedures and practices
further added to the problems. To achieve better results, 
the implementation of the project could be handed over to 
the provincial governments and the DGNER could act as 
"coordinator" with a minimum of staff.
CONCLUSION
The implementation of the projects relating to new 
and renewable sources of energy has been examined in this 
chapter. The implementation of a number of projects pertain­
ing to the solar energy, wind energy, and biogas were 
analyzed. All the five projects for solar and wind energy 
suffered a delay ranging from 12 months to 108 months (Table 
6.1) and an average cost over-run of 121 percent. The scope 
of four of the projects also underwent a downward revision. 
The performance of the installed solar and wind systems was 
unsatisfactory; 7 out of 15 were not operational and the 
remaining were operating at much below their rated capacity. 
Similarly, the "Biogas Development Project" with a signifi­
cantly reduced scope suffered a delay of 3 years. The per­
formance of the installed biogas units was depressing; 
majority of them were non-operational, The beneficiaries of 
both of these projects were highly dissatisfied and the
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projects failed to achieve their objectives. In the case of
solar and wind energy systems, the projects were not even 
able to meet their operational cost and the Government was 
incurring a loss of more than three million rupees per 
annum. A number of factors influenced the implementation of 
these projects as discussed below.
Organizational Capacity. The foregoing discussion has 
demonstrated that the implementing organization (DGNER) did 
not possess the capacity and capabilities to execute the 
projects. It suffered due to lack of trained staff. More- 
over, the projects were spread over the entire country. It 
was therefore not possible for the DGNER to effectively 
supervise their implementation. The DGNER was not even able 
to spend the budgetary allocations released to it on yearly 
basis. It could utilize only about two-third of the funds in 
a period of ten years. The project formulation was faulty 
and particularly the sites selected for the projects were 
not suitable. The locations for seven solar energy projects 
could not be identified by the DGNER in ten years. The 
projects suffered inordinate delays in their completion and 
the implementing organization could not complete the 
projects even within the revised completion schedule, AT the 
end of the project period, the physical progress in the case
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of solar energy projects was only 60 percent. The delays in
the completion of the projects were accompanied with cost 
increases. The inability of the DGNER to complete the 
projects on time resulted in cost increases and wastage of 
national resources.
Kelman4' holds that ’organizational capabilities’ are 
crucial for the implementation of public policies. One 
cannot expect good results if a task is entrusted to an 
organization which does not possess the requisite competency 
and the capacity to handle it. Durant’s perspective has 
wider implications and considers both ’adequacy and credi­
bility of enforcement resources’ necessary for implementa­
tion success. In other studies, it is contended that lack of 
’needed skills and knowledge’ and ’weakness of provider 
institutions’50 render even the best policies useless. The 
DGNER did not possess the requisite capabilities and capaci­
ty and therefore could not do better. Ironically, no atten­
tion was paid to improve the state of affairs.
Organizational Structure and Procedures, An inappro­
priate organizational structure and faulty procedures and 
practices affected the implementation of the projects ad­
versely. The DGNER centralized all the powers at its
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headquarters at Islamabad. Instead of decentralization which
was necessary for efficient implementation of the projects 
spread over the entire country, the DGNER chose to wind up 
the regional offices in the incipient stage. Lack of proper 
personnel policies and incenfives for the staff resulted in 
high turn over of the trained manpower. The installed solar, 
wind and biogas units equally suffered due to poor mainte­
nance, lack of technical advice and proper supervision. 
There was no check on the field staff. The operations of 
these units were stalled due to difficulties in carrying out 
repairs and non-provision of supplies such as diesel, com­
puter diskettes, log/graph paper for which approvals had to 
be obtained from the Head Office at Islamabad. Due to lack 
of proper supervision, the contractors also resorted to mal­
practice such as use of substandard material and equipment. 
They did not even supply certain components.
The importance of an effective and appropriate organ­
izational structure and efficient procedures cannot be 
overemphasized. A number of case studies, as mentioned in 
the preceding chapters, have highlighted their importance 
for an effective implementation of public policies. Adminis­
trative weaknesses and defective personnel policies contrib­
uted significantly to reduce the capacity of the DGNER to
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implement the projects effectively.
Bureaucratic Politics. Sapolsky considers the 
’skill at bureaucratic politics’ an asset for the implement- 
ers in multi-actor implementation situations. The DGNER 
exhibited high proficiency in it. In spite of the faulty 
implementation of the projects, the DGNER was able to re­
ceive huge sums of money for ten years to spend the way it 
liked. This demonstrates that the top management of the 
DGNER was highly skilled in bureaucratic politics. The 
approval of defective projects by the competent authority, 
subsequent revisions without the knowledge of the competent 
authority, and withholding of information by disregarding 
the orders of the higher authorities speak of the extraordi • 
nary skills and prowess of the implementsrs. The approval 
for the projects was obtained by exaggerating the benefits 
and underestimating the costs. No corrective action could be 
taken in spite of the disclosures of the Projects Wing Team 
of the Planning and Development Division. In the case of 
Pakistan’s energy policy implementation therefore the skill 
o f the D GNER at burea u c ra tic politics b ro u g h t a b out dir e 
consequences. The present study points towards the need to 
institute an effective system of accountability to guard 
against the undesirable consequences of the ’skill at
51
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bureaucratic politics'.
Faulty Project Formulation. The implementation suf- 
fered significantly due to the faulty project formulation by 
the DGNER. All the projects, except Japanese Aided Project, 
had to be revised by scaling down the scope and enhancing 
the cost. The selection of suitable locations for the 
projects was crucial for the achievement of project objec­
tives. This aspect was completely ignored by the DGNER. Even 
the Japanese Aided Project was no exception to this. It has 
been demonstrated in the preceding pages that all the 
projects, except one at Malmari, were located at wrong 
sites. The solar and wind energy projects were located near 
the national grid power lines, whereas the biogas projects 
were located at places where the weather conditions were not 
suitable for biogas generation. Moreover, the financial 
status of the beneficiaries and the availability of animal 
waste were completely ignored in the case of biogas 
projects. The power distribution system of the solar power- 
stations also suffered due design defects and substandard 
equipments. There was also no system for the guidance and 
training of the users of biogas technology. It has been 
pointed out by several studies, as discussed in the preced­
ing chapters, that defective project formulation adds to the
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imp lernentation problems and makes it difficult to realize
the policy goals. The present study provides further evi­
dence to support these findings.
Interorganizational Coordination. The project suf­
fered due to lack of interorganizatioal coordination. Proper 
coordination with the provincial governments could improve 
not only the field supervision of the projects but also 
would have helped in the selection of suitable locations for 
the projects. The DGNER could benefit from the work of the 
organizations engaged in research and development of solar, 
wind and biogas technologies. Coordination with WAPDA would 
have helped the DGNER to select sites for the solar energy 
projects away from the national grid. The knowledge about 
the weather conditions of an area was crucial to locate 
solar, wind and biogas projects. The DGNER located these 
projects with scant regard to the weather conditions. Coor­
dination with the Metreology Department would have helped in 
the selection of suitable sites for the projects. Lack of 
coordination with other organizations proved fatal for the 
realization of project objectives.
Organizational Control and Accountability. It appears 
that there was no effective control over the DGNER and its
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management was not accountable for anything to anybody. It
formulated defective projects, mismanaged their implementa­
tion and failed to achieve the project goals and caused 
considerable distress to the people, but there was no one to 
rectify the situation. The scope of the projects was also 
downgraded without any approval of the competent authority. 
There was no system to know what it was doing. There existed 
no system by which it could be found whether the DGNER had 
actually purchased and distributed the household appliances 
and whether it had established the FBUs. The DGNER refused 
to provide the list of the beneficiaries even to the offi­
cers of the Planning Division. It selected absolutely un­
suitable locations for its projects. The performance of the 
installed units was highly unsatisfactory. The people were 
dissatisfied and angry. Expensive machinery and equipment 
continued to be rusted (for example, wind mill at Malmari 
and other equipment in its stores at Islamabad), but no body 
pointed a finger. The solar station at Khurkera was located 
within 3 km from the national grid and the people were 
unhappy, but the DGNER was planning further expansion in it. 
The'DGNER was planning to shift the solar station at Kankoi 
to some unidentified place as the people were demanding 
electricity supply from the national grid which was only 2km 
from the village. This station was also first upgraded from
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5kWp to 36.8kw . In spite of this, the DGNER continued to 
spend national resources the way it liked and without any 
accountability and rectification of the state of affairs. 
Absence of effective control over the implementing agency as 
well as lack, of accountability caused the public money to go 
down the drain.
52MeLanahan " contends that 'public accountability’ is 
crucial for effective implementation of public policies.
C  ~7Thompson'0 adds that the ’capacity of oversight actors’ 
plays a central role to evolve an effective system of ac­
countability, The implementation of solar and wind energy 
and biogas projects demonstrated the importance of having an 
effective system of accountability and vigilant control by 
the sovereigns.
Participation of Target Groups/Beneficiaries. The
projects had been inflicted on the target groups who were 
dissatisfied and unhappy about the situation. In the case of 
the solar energy projects, the people were unhappy as the 
power supply was not regular especially in winter months, 
fans/tube-lights were not supplied to them according to 
their requirements, and they could not use household elec­
trical appliances. Moreover , they felt cheated as they were
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deprived of the facility of electricity from the national
grid due to the solar projects, whereas the nearby villagers 
were enjoying the facility of electricity supply from the 
national grid, In certain cases, the villagers had refused 
to take power, and in others refused to pay electricity 
charges. Even those who had been provided electricity free 
of charge were? not satisfied due to irregular and unreliable 
power supply and were demanding A.C, supply. Similarly, the 
performance of the biogas units was hopeless and the people 
were dissatisfied. Under the existing arrangements, these 
units were absolutely useless for them which were unneces­
sarily occupying space in their houses. The DGNEP. probably 
envisaged that no one would look the ’gift horse’ in the 
mouth. However-, the gift of the DGNER became a liability for 
the villagers and the projects failed to achieve the policy 
objectives, The case study demonstrates that the participa­
tion of the target groups/beneficiaries in the project 
formulation is essential where their interests are signifi­
cantly affected. The importance of interest group participa­
tion in such situations has also been recognized by several 
implementation analysts as discussed earlier.
Bureaucratic Corruption. The implementation analysis 
in the preceding pages suggests a strong possibility of
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bureaucratic corruption. The whole affair appears to be
scandalous. The refusal of the DGNER to provide the lists of 
the beneficiaries of FBUs and household equipment, substand­
ard work of the contractors, use of substandard equipment 
and high cost escalation all point towards the possibility 
of embezzlement of public funds.
To sum up, the implementation of solar and wind 
energy and the biogas projects was affected by a number of 
factors. It was a case of total failure in the realization 
of project objectives as a result of faulty project formula­
tion and poor implementation by an inadequate but corrupt 
organization with high level skills at bureaucratic poli­
tics. It also proved that policy implementation was not a 
straight forward matter, and that the implementers exercised 
considerable discretion to affect changes in the original 
policy in intents. The factors which influenced the imple­
mentation of these projects were; organizational capacity, 
organizational structure and procedures; bureaucratic 
politics; faulty project formulation; interorganizational 
coor dination; target groups/beneficiaries ' participation; 
organizational control and accountability; and bureaucratic 
corruption. The implementation was affected adversely due to 
the negative implications in all the areas.
4 18
NOTES
1.  Due to  i t s  s e n s i t i v e  n a t u r e ,  t h e  o f f i c i a l s  w e r e  r e l u c ­
t a n t  t o  p r o v i d e  i n f o r m a t i o n .  They wer e  a f r a i d  o f  t h e  
r e p e r c u s s i o n s  and w e r e  t h e r e f o r e  a s s u r e d  o f  a n o n y m i t y .  
The s o u r c e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  have  r e m a i n e d  
a n o n y m o u s .
2 .  I n f o r m a t i o n  p r o v i d e d  by t he  DGNER, I s l a m a b a d ,  December  
1 9 8 8 .
3 .  I b i d .
4 .  I b i d . .
5 .  I b i d . .
6 » G o v e r n m e n t  o f  P a k i s t a n ,  P l a n n i n g  and D e v e l o p m e n t  D i v i ­
s i o n  ( P r o j e c t s  W i n g ) ,  Rep o r t  on P e r f o r ma nc e  E v a l u a t i o n 
o f  S o l a r  E n e r g y  P r o j e c t s ,  I s l a m a b a d ,  1 9 8 9 ,  p . 5 .
7 -  I b i d .
8 .  I b i d .
9... I b i d ..
1 0 .  I n f o r m a t i o n  p r o v i d e d  by t h e  P r o j e c t s  Wi ng ,  P l a n n i n g  and  
D e v e l o p m e n t  D i v i s i o n ,  I s l a m a b a d ,  December 1 9 8 8 .
11 .  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  P a k i s t a n ,  P l a n n i n g  and D e v e l o p m e n t  D i v i ­
s i o n  ( P r o j e c t s  W i n g ) ,  N o t e s  o f  t h e  E v a l u a t i on Team on  
the. F i e l d  V i s i t s  t o  t h e  S o l a r PQwer S t a t i o n s , 
I s l a m a b a d ,  December  1 9 8 8 .
12.  I n f o r m a t i o n  p r o v i d e d  by t h e  DGNER, I s l a m a b a d ,  December  
1 9 8 8 .
13.  I n f o r m a t i o n  p r o v i d e d  by t h e  P r o j e c t s  Wi ng ,  P l a n n i n g  and  
D e v e l o p m e n t  D i v i s i o n ,  I s l a m a b a d ,  December  1 9 8 8 .
1 4 .  N o t e s  o f  t h e  E v a l u a t i o n learn, on t h e  F i e l d V i s i t s  to  
So l a r  Power  S t a t i o n s . op ... c i t .
15 .  R e p o r t  on Per  f orrnance E v a l u a t i o n  o f  S o l a r  E n e r g y  
P r o j e c t s , op... c i t .  , p .  6,.
16 .  I b  i d , , p p , 6 - 7  .
4 1 9
17. Information provided by the Projects Wing, Planning and 
Development Division, Islamabad, December 1988.
18. Ibid.
19 . Notes of the Eva. 1 uajtion [earn, on the Field Visi ts of 
Solar- Energy Projects, op. cit.
20. Report on Performance Evaluation of Solar Energy 
.Projects, op. cit. , p . 8.
21. lb.id..., pp . 8 -9.
22. Information provided by the Projects Wing, Planning and 
Development Division, Islamabad, December 1988.
23. Notes of the Evaluation Team on the Field Visits to 
Solar Power. Stations, op. cit.
24. Report on Performance Evaluation of Solar Energy 
Projects , op. cit..., p . 10.
25. Ibid.
26. Information provided by the Projects Wing, Planning and 
Development Division, Islamabad, December 1988.
27. Ibid.
28. Information provided by the DGNER, Islamabad, December 
1988.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Information provided by the Projects Wing, Planning and 
Development Division, Islamabad, December 1988.
32. Ibid.
33. Information provided by the DGNER, Islamabad, December' 
1988.
34. Ibid.
35. Government of Pakistan, Planning and Development Divi­
sion (Projects Wing), Evaluation Report on Biogas 
Development Project, Islamabad, .1988, pp. 1-2.
420
36 . Ibid., p . 3.
37 . Information 
Development
provided 
D i v i. s i o n ,
by the Projects Win g , 
Is1a mabad. De c e m b e r
P1 a n n i n g 
1988 .
and
38 . Evalua tion Report on op .
c it . , pp. 6- ~7
39 Ibid ,
40 Ibid. , p , 8 ,
4 1 . I b I d . , P . 9
47. I b i d .
43 . I b 1 d ,
4 4 , Information 
1988 .
provided by the DGNER, Islamabad, December
45. 1 ku 1 Q -
46 . Evaluation 
cit ., p . 11
Report on Biogas Development Project, op .
4 7 . Kelmari, Steven, "Using Implementation Research to Solve
Implementation Problems: The Case of Energy Emergency 
Assistance", Journal, of Policy Analysis and Management, 
Vol. 4, No. 1, (Fall) 1984, pp.75-91.
48 Durant, Robert F „ , "EPA, TVA and Pollution Control: 
Implications for a Theory of Regulatory Policy Imple­
mentation", Public Administration Review, Vol. 44, No. 
4, July/August 1984, pp. 305-315.
49. Gross, Neal, et a1., Implementing Organizational 
Innovations, (New York: Basic Books, 1971).
50. Mead, Lawrence M., Institutional Analysis: An Approach
to Implementation Problems in Medicaid. (Washington, 
D.C.. Urban Institute, 1977).
51. Sapolsky, Harvey, The Polaris Missile System: Bureau­
cratic and Programmatic Success in Government, (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).
421
52. McLanahan, Sara, "Organizational Issues in U. S. Health 
Policy: Participation, Discretion, and Accountability", 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
July/August/September 1980, pp. 354-369.
53. Thompson, Frank J., "Bureaucratic Discretion and the 
National Health Service Corps", Political Science 
Quarterly., Vol. 97, No. 3, (Fall) 1982, pp. 427-445.
422
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined the implementation of energy 
policy in Pakistan. The particular focus has been on the 
identification and analysis of factors which have influenced 
the implementation of energy sector projects and programmes 
during the 1947-88 period. The study has analyzed major 
policy initiatives with a view to exploring the dynamics of 
the implementation process. The thrust of Pakistan’s energy 
policy during the study period, irrespective of regime 
changes, has remained to decrease dependence on imported 
energy by developing indigenous resources. The energy sector 
therefore has been receiving high priority and substantial 
financial allocations, on the basis of careful assessment of 
indigenous potential and energy requirements in the light of 
Pakistan's socioeconomic goals, throughout the study period, 
however, the implementation dynamics blocked the realization 
of policy objectives and targets, resulting in a widening 
gap between commercial energy requirements and domestic 
production. It rendered the achievement of energy policy 
objectives and targets, over time, increasingly unpredict 
ab1e and delayed.
A O  7
The study has identified a number of factors which
influenced the implementation of energy policy in Pakistan 
during the 1947-88 period. The cases clearly are illustra­
tive of the dominant paradigms of the policy implementation 
literature as discussed in Chapter I. The cases demonstrate 
that implementation is a bargaining process as the policy 
could not be dictated and was negotiated with participants 
striving to condition implementation in whatever forum and 
at whatever stage of the policy process seemed promising to 
them in the pursuit of self-interests (Kalubagh Dam 
Project). The implementing agencies also used their discre­
tion to change the policy contents during the implementation 
1 for example, WAPDA in cases of power' system losses and 
rural electrification), or while translating policy into 
programs (for example, DGNER in the case of solar energy and 
biog.is projects). This supports our viewing the ’holistic 
approach’ as more appropriate for studying the implementa­
tion of energy policy in Pakistan. Nevertheless, the cases 
also suggest refinements to the conventional wisdom associ­
ated with prominent concepts of the policy implementation 
literature; refinements inspired by the identification of 
implications in the context of Pakistan's energy policy as 
well as the identification of additional factors critical 
for implementation success in particular situations. The
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factors which influenced the implementation of energy policy
in Pakistan during the 1947-88 pciiod as highlighted by the 
present study are examined below.
Formal Policy. A number of implementation studies 
identify poorly framed policies as a source of a litany of 
implementation problems.^ fhe clarity, specificity and 
consistency of policy goals, problem tractability, and sound 
technical theory, according to these studies, facilitate 
implementation. The policy itself would be responsible for 
implementation difficulties if it contains erroneous assump­
tions about either the nature of the problems that were to 
be solved by the policy or how the agencies operate in 
pi actice. In addition, the policies would fail if their 
underlying aims were unclear or contained ambiguities that 
permitted multiple interpretations .
The present study generally lends support to the 
above findings. The implementation of power generation 
targets and programmes suffered as a result of erroneous 
assumptions and wrong assessment about weather conditions, 
access to nuclear technology, geopolitical environment, 
availability of gas for thermal generation, and future 
requirements. Lack of clear and specific policy directives
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posed constraints in respect of rural electrification, the
coal policy, and oil and gas exploration and exploitation. 
The policy variables were therefore critical for implementa­
tion success in these areas. However, in spite of clear and
specific policy goals i n respect of the Kalabagh Dam
P r oject, and the New and Renewable Sources of Energy
Project, the policy goals remained unachieved due to various 
other factors. The critical factors for implementation 
success in those cases were different: the affected inter­
ests in the case of Kalabagh Dam Project; and organizational 
accountability and control in the case of the New and Renew­
able Sources of Energy Project.
Project Formulation. The policies are translated into 
programmes and projects/schemes. Project formulation is a 
critical factor for successful implementation of any policy 
as it is in this phase that many decisions are made on which 
depends the implementation of a project. These decisions 
include not only the design and scheduling for implementa­
tion but also assumptions on matters such as technical 
methods, costs, availability of skilled manpower, location, 
pricing, and participation by the recipient population. 
These assumptions may be wrong or may not eventuate once the 
p ro j ect is being implernen ted if proper at tention is not paid
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to the project formulation. The project approval system must
provide for the formulation of projects which are viable and 
contribute to the policy objectives. Firstly, these pro­
grammes and projects should be so conceived that they would 
contribute to achieve the policy objectives. Moreover, all 
projects within a policy area should reinforce each other. 
Secondly, they should be technically sound. Thirdly, they 
must be acceptable to the target groups/affected interests. 
In cases where opposition and conflict is anticipated, the 
stakeholders must be associated at the project formulation 
stage.
Pakistan has an elaborate project approval system. 
However, the cases of the Kalabagh Dam Project, power system 
losses, rural electrification and the New and Renewable 
Sources of Energy Project demonstrate that scant attention 
was paid to the above mentioned aspects. The DGNER was able 
to manipulate the approval of projects which failed to 
achieve the policy goals, and the WAPDA became instrumental 
to start a national controversy on the Kalabagh Dam issue. 
The Kalabagh Dam Project was challenged even on technical 
grounds which lent support to the opponents of the project. 
Defective project formulation is rampant in developing 
countries. Rondinelli notes that the three most frequently
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observed causes for implementation failures in Third World
countries are: ineffective project planning and preparation;
faulty appraisal and selection processes; and defective 
project design.0 Pakistan is particularly infested with this 
problem. The findings of a study group (Chapter I) of Plan- 
ning and Development Division indicate that 10 out of the 20 
most frequently observed implementation difficulties during
Athe 1978-83 period related to project formulation.
Implementation Strategy. Implementation strategy can
5influence policy effectiveness considerably. The strategy 
has to be conceived in the context or environment of the 
administrative action.6 It should therefore be very careful­
ly planned, particularly in situations where the projects 
offer divisible benefits. However, our study demonstrates 
that the implementation of energy policy in Pakistan suf- 
fered due to the absence of an appropriate implementation 
strategy responsive to objective realities. It resembled the 
bureaucratic-authoritative archetype which expected prompt 
and complete compliance with policies formulated without 
regard lor the interests of lower levels of authority and 
• longovernmenta1 actors.' This approach created insurmount­
able difficulties for the energy bureaucracy of Pakistan. It 
had telling effects on the implementation of the Kalabagh
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Dam Project (Chapter V). Research recognizes the value of
using other methods of dispute resolution such as mediation, 
facilitation and arbitration in similai situations.J The 
possibility of using these techniques to resolve the Kala- 
bagh Dam dispute could be assessed. The strategy adopted 
for the implementation of nuclear energy policy also proved 
equally harmful (Chapter IV). A better strategy would have 
helped to realize policy goals in both of these cases. For 
both of these cases, appropriate implementing strategy was 
critical for implementation success.
Institutional Structure and Procedures. At the time 
of independence, the administrative arrangements for the 
formulation and implementation of energy policies were 
inadequate. Oil and coal production was handled by the 
private sector. In the power sector, there were a number of 
small electric undertakings which served urban areas, The 
strengthening of institutional arrangements, therefore, 
received attention immediately after independer.ee. The 
Government adopted policies which aimed at enhancing its 
control over the power development and distribution opera­
tions in the country. The policy of nationalization of 
electric companies was pursued with conviction, and the 
Cover rumen t nationalized the entire power sector in a short
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period. By 198b, WAPDA gained monopolistic control over the
power sector, under nominal supervision of the Ministry of 
Water and Power. The approach in respect of the fuels sectoi 
was different. The policy in respect of the fuels sector 
initially provided for complete dependence on private sector 
investment but with maximum control over the operations of 
the private sector operators by the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Natural Resources, The Government could not have direct 
involvement due to paucity of funds. Its role, however, 
expanded in 1961 when it established the Oil and Gas Devel­
opment Corporation (OGDC) to undertake oil and gas explora­
tion arid exploitation activities directly.
The present study demonstrates that the structure and 
procedures of the implementing agencies adversely affected 
the realization of energy policy goals in Pakistan. Qvercen- 
tralization, defective organizational structure, irrational 
personnel policies and practices, inefficient and archaic 
procedures, lack of internal coordination, ineffective 
supervision, inefficient operating techniques, poor m a i m s  - 
naiice pi ac tices , and .lack of ra tional in ter na 1 pr ior i ty 
setting systems were observed to infest the energy sectoi 
organizations, w 11ich imposed cons train Is upon effec11va 
implementation. Poor implementation of transmission and
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distribution projects, power system breakdowns, misreporting 
of rural electrification and power losses, poor thermal 
efficiency, defective project formulation, and lack of 
progress in railway elect! if.ication (Chapters IV & V) were 
the manifestations of poor structures and procedures. Simi­
larly, institutional inadequacies and poor management prac­
tices hampered the realization of policy goals in the fuels 
sector. Coal policy has particularly suffered due to struc­
tural and procedural flaws. In the bureaucratic hierarchy, 
the position of the officers dealing with coal policies has 
remained low. Their views, therefore, do not get proper 
attention of the higher-ups. Consequently, most of the 
policy measures suggested from time to time have remained 
u n imp lernen ted (Chapters IV & VI).
A number of implementation studies have underlined
the importance of efficient and appropriate organizational
ostructure and procedures for successful implementation.' The 
findings of the present study are in consonance with them. 
The authors of Pakistan’s First Five Year Plan (1955-60) 
a 1 s o i I a d a si rn Liar assessment; ’We are of the v lew that in 
the period Immediately ahead, the inadequacies of Pakistan’s 
üdminis11 a11ve machinery will operate as the most serious 
s i i "I g 1 e i rn pediment to t h e in a x i i n u r i eco n o rn i c a I use o f t h e
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country’s financial and material resources’.iG The present 
study demonstrates that the energy sector organizations 
continued to be infested with administrative inadequacies 
res u11in g in the was tag e of nation a1 res ou r ces.
Organizational Capacity. "Capacity" is defined as the
i lability of an organization to;.
~ anticipate and influence change;
~ make informed, intelligent decisions about policy;
- develop programs to implement policy;
- attract and absorb resources;
- manage resources; and
~ evaluate current activities to guide future action.
The importance of ’organizetional capacity5 has been 
recognized by several implementation studies ^. The imple­
mentation of a number- of energy policy initiatives and 
projects in Pakistan suffered due to lack of organizational 
capacity and capabilities. The fuels sector was particularly 
the victim of organizational inadequacies. This was even 
recognized by outside observers (Chapter IV). The oil and 
gas exploration and exploitation and the coal policy goals 
remained unachieved due to this weakness of Pakistan's 
energy bureaucracy. The implementation failure in the case 
of New and Renewable Sources of Energy Project (Chapter VI) 
was mainly the result of organizational inadequacies of the
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implementing agency (DGNER) which simply did not have the
capacity to formulate and implement the projects. Ironical­
ly, no efforts were made to affect improvements.
Interorganizational Coordination. In multi actor 
implementation situations, interorganizational coordination 
is critical for implementation success. A number of imple­
mentation studies have recognized the importance of coordi­
nation in situations where the agreement of a number of 
actors is crucial for successful implementation of a 
policy. vj In their study, Pressman and Wildavsky highlight 
the implementation difficulties arising out of the complex­
ity of joint action and demonstrate that these difficulties 
can stall the progress to achieve policy objectives. The 
number of actors, in addition to the lead agency whose 
agreement is crucial for the Implementation of a policy, is 
the key element for coordination. The lead agency can secure 
agreement by offering inducements which are considered 
important by them. The implementation of "new towns 
in-towns" program to build model new communities on surplus 
federally owned land in metropolitan areas started by John 
so n ad i n in i s t r a tio n in 196 7, h ow ev e r , d emonstrates t he f 1 u id
nature of these agreements. No construction could be initi
i 5a ted due to initial agreements changing to disagreements.
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The present study has demonstrated that coordination
is crucial for successful implementation, but difficult to 
achieve. Integration and coordination of various programmes 
and appropriate linkages for optimal utilisation of local 
resources consistent with the plan objectives, national 
needs and regional disparities (horizontal and vertical) are 
indispensable. In such situations of interaction and inter­
dependence as are observable in the energy sector, efficient 
action comes about through coordination only. However, coor­
dination has often not been considered to be a necessary 
precondition, or is lacking due to conflicts between various 
line agencies, resulting in the complete absence of well 
structured and workable systems or mechanisms of coordina­
tion,. The energy sector of Pakistan is fraught with inter- 
organizational implementation problems. Realizing its impor­
tance, the Government established a coordination committee 
(NEPC). Bureaucratic in-fighting, however, hampered its 
proper functioning (Chapter IV). The case of NEPC is a 
typical case of coordination difficulties caused by bureau- 
c r'atic i nf iyhting f o r dorna i n ex tens 1 ori. Even a powertu 1 
C h a I i rn a n w i t h full backin g f i o m the Head of the State fails d 
tt;• achixeve desi red i esu 1 1s . The organizations invoived in 
the i rnpIenier11ation of energy policy persistent!y i aissd 
issues w 1 1h a view to ge t pi'ominence. the basic issues
Tea
somehow remained unsolved and coordination of implementation
of energy policy suffered. With the depat cure of the Chair 
man, even the meeting of National Energy Policy Committee 
c o u 1 d I "i o t b e h eld..
Due to lack of coordination, the implementation of 
various projects was adversely affected. The implementation 
of transmission and distribution schemes of WAPDA, the 
electrification of railway, WAPDA’s fuel mix policy for 
thermal generation and coal policy suffered due to lack of 
mterorganizational coordination (Chapter IV). Lack of 
coordination was a major factor in the failure of the New 
and Renewable Sources of Energy Project (Chapter VI). The 
case of the Kalabagh Dam has highlighted the difficulties 
arising out of the complexities of joint action. There were 
several "veto points" which stalled the implementation of 
the project. Effective coordination with various actors in 
this situation to secure agreement was critical for the 
implementation of this project.
Organizational Control and Accountability. Prior 
research suggests that if policy-makers do not have the 
capacity to monitor the activities of the implementing 
a g a n c i e s, t r i e y will f i nd it difficul t t o exert, e f fee li v e
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control over them.xo Waterman and Woodx 1 stress the need to 
institute a reliable monitoring system to enhance the effec­
tiveness of the policy -makers in controlling the implernent- 
srs. They argue that without a monitoring system, the imple- 
rnen ting agencies tend to mislead thie policy-niaker s by virtue 
of having a greater knowledge about the implementation 
process and particularly about the relevant policy outputs.. 
They can, for example, convince the policy-makers that their 
policy goals are being achieved, when in fact they are not. 
Since the irnp 1 ernenters themselves are evaluated on the basis 
of this faulty but complementary information, they also have 
the incentive to provide misleading information to the 
policy-makers. An effective monitoring system can provide 
p o 1 icy-makers, in real-world situations, with direct, sys­
tematically derived, and unbiased information on the level 
and nature of a particular policy output on a continual 
basis. Hogwood arid Gunn ' consider the control over imp le­
rnen ters’ essential for implementation success.
The absence of an independent, reliable and effective 
monitor ing system prompted the energy bureaucracy in 
P a k 1 s t a n t o r e s o r t t o t! i e rn alpractices r e f erred t o i n the 
preceding paragraph. WAPDA misled the Government in respect 
o f 111e Ka1abagh Dam Pro ject (desigri and its imp1 1cations),
436
power distribution system, power lasse:: and rural electrifi­
cation. It withheld information in respect of thermal effi­
ciency, fuel mix for thermal generation and other ineffi- 
c I. e n !. p r o c e d u res and practices (C h a p t e r IV) . T hi e 1 rn p 1 e m enta ~ 
t.ion of the rural electrification programme presents an 
interesting situation. The political bosses desired to 
accelerate the process of rural electrification. The funds 
were also provided. It was only after a decade that they 
came to know that WAPDA was inflating the figures and its 
reports contained paper connections to such an extent that 
the entire scenario changed. Similarly, the DGNER continued 
t o e x pend re s o u r ces w i t h s cant r e g a r d to t h e a c h i eve rn a n t o f 
policy goals. In fact, they worked to cause an alienation 
a 111 o n g s t t he people ( C h a p ter VI), a n d r i o body c o u 1. d stop them 
from squandering the national resources. Lack of a reliable 
system of accountability and control in Pakistan left the 
energy bureaucracy on i ts own, to the detr imerit of r ea 1 i2 a~ 
tion of po1 icy goals
Technology. The implementation of nuclear energy 
p ol It: y i n P a k i s t a n s u f f e r e d d u e t o n o i  - a v ail a b i 1 i t y o f 
nut Lear technology. It was one of the critical factors which 
stalled the implementation of nuclear energy policy In 
o the I policy areas, though it affected trie implements 11. on
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adversely, it was not a c: ; tica.L factor . In the rase of New
a nd R e n e w a b 1 e S o u , e s o f Ena r <j y F r o j e c t, i n a p p r o p * i a t e 
t e < h n o 1 o g y (. n o t a b 1 y b i o g a s p 1 a n t s i i o t: .a c. c e p t a!; ■ 1 e i, o t i i e
i ■ c. i r p I e ) a i s o contr i b at a d t o i m p I e me n t a 1 1 o n f a i 1 u re. In the 
rase of WAPDA projects, delayed availability of technical 
• 1<>curneri ts a 11d supp1ies from abroad con tr1bu ted to implemen~ 
tat. ion delays. Similarly, restricted access to the latest 
technology hampered the o i l , gas and coal exploration and 
exploitation efforts of the Government.
ft ansfer of sensitive technology is an international 
problem The case of nuclear power policy has demonstrated 
(Chapter IV) that international relations influence such 
transfers. This is a factor which is critical only for 
developing countries. Nevertheless, organizational concerns 
such as 'technical requirements of the task’ or ’task tech- 
no logy’ are universally applicable and have been recognized 
in certain cases to pose constraints for successful imple- 
mentation.19
Bureaucratic Politics. Anthony Downs, in his classic 
work Inside Bureaucracy, argues that agency members will 
routinely strive to advance their agendas, whether from 
their desire to engage in personal aggrandizement or to
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promote their own policy goals, at the expense of functional
rivals. At the organizational level, this generates vigorous 
competition for turf, responsibility, personnel, and 
budgets."' Renate Mayntz perceives the public agencies as 
actors whose task is the basis of their existence, but whose 
actions are largely oriented towards the achievement of 
organizational goals such as domain extension, conflict 
avoidance, saving energy and obtaining resources’ ' In the 
developed world where the supremacy of the political sector 
over the bureaucratic is established, the functional rivalry 
between agencies facilitates the monitoring of administra­
tive behaviour by the politicians charged with oversight and 
spurs the adoption of efficient production techniques by the
9 9bureaucrats being scrutinized. In the absence of strong
political leadership in Pakistan, bureaucratic politics
generally followed the pattern described by Renate Mayntz
and the public sector turned Into a highly differentiated
2 T 9 4macro-system of organizations. Thompson,“ following Cyei t 
and March, argues that in all organizations, coalitions 
will form in order to control the organization.
ihe present study demonstrates that bureaucratic 
; > o ] i 11 c s s u b s 1 a n t i a 11 y c o r itribu ted to the imp lerne n t a t i o i > 
failure of energy policy in Pakistan, The case of NEPC
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demonstrates the degeneration of bureaucratic politics into
domain extension and ayg i and izernen t of personal interest at 
the cost of energy policy goals (Chapter IV). The DGNER was 
able to secure resources for extended per rods without any 
objection from any colleague (Chapter VI). The implementa­
tion of railway electrification programme is an example of 
bureaucratic infighting within an organization. The powerful 
group of the agency did not allow the policy to be imple­
mented as it affected its position in the organizational 
setup (Chapter IV). The agency response in respect of con­
trolling power losses was an example of determined effort to 
protect the interest of the employees. Power theft with and 
without the connivance of the staff of the implementing 
agency contributed significantly to the overall losses, but 
could not be controlled due to the vested interest. WAPDA 
reportedly resorted to false reporting and underestimation 
of the losses, but no action was taken against anybody 
(Chapter IV).
Bureaucratic Apathy and Resistance to Change. An
important finding of the present study is that bureaucratic 
ap ; t! Iy a nd res1 s ta nce to change af f ec ted 111e ac hievenient o f 
enargy po1icy goa1s adversely . York Willbern holds. 'Civil
servants car r y out the instructions of their political
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s u p e r i o r s  w i t h  v i g o r  and a l a c r i t y  i f  t h e y  a g r e e  w i t h  them,  
and w i t h  some f o o t  d r a g g i n g  and m o d i f i c a t i o n  i f  t h e y  d i s a -  
g r e e , . ‘~ L o t s  o f  ' f o o t  d r a g g i n g  and m o d i f i c a t i o n "  by the  
e n e r g y  b u r e a u c r a c y  o f  P a k i s t a n  i s  d e p i c t e d  by t h e  p r e s e n t  
s t u d y .  R e f o r m s  e f f o r t s  have  b e en  r e s i s t e d  by t h e  e n e r g y  
b u r e a u c r a c y  w i t h  t e n a c i t y .  The c a s e  o f  t h e  Power  Commi ss i on  
o f  P a k i s t a n  o f f e r s  a c l a s s i c  e x a m p l e  o f  d e t e r m i n e d  e f f o r t  
a g a i n s t  such m e a s u r e s  ( C h a p t e r  I V ) .
The r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  
f u e l s  s e c t o r  r e m a i n e d  u n c h a n g e d  u n t i l  1 97 6  and c o n s e q u e n t l y  
p r i v a t e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t h i s  s e c t o r ,  on w h i c h  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  
o f  t h i s  s e c t o r  d e p e n d e d ,  r e m a i n e d  m i n i m a l .  The c h an g e  l e -  
q u i r e d  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  p r o c e d u r a l  b o t t l e n e c k s  and e l i m i n a t i o n  
o f  undue  i n t e r f e r e n c e  by t h e  b u r e a u c r a c y ,  w h i c h  was r e s i s t e d  
by t h e  b u r e a u c r a t s .  The f i r s t  r e v i s i o n  o f  r u l e s  t o o k  p l a c e  
i n  1 976  when t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s  w e r e  i n  p o w e r .  The s e c on d  
c h a n g e  i n  r u l e s  was a f f e c t e d  i n  1 9 8 6 ,  and t h i s  a g a i n  h a p ­
pe ned  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  when t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s  w e r e  s t a g i n g  a 
c o m e b a c k » They p r o v i d e d  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  s t i m u l u s  t o  b r e a k  t h e  
b u r e a u c r a t i c  a p a t h y .  The l a c k  o f  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  o i l  
a 11 d g a s c o in p a r 1 1 e s i n t h e  ex  p l o r  a t  i  o n and e x p l o i  t a  t i o  n a c t  i  v 
i t i e s  c o u p l e d  w i t h  t h e  e n h a n c e d  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  USSR i n  
P a k i s t a n  m o t i v a t e d  t h e  b u r e a u c r a t s  i n  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  P e t r o -
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leurn and N a t u r a l  R e s o u r c e s  to  i n v o l v e  t h e m s e l v e s  d i r e c t l y  i n
o i l  and gas e x p l o r a t i o n  and e x p l o i t a t i o n  i n  19t>l .  The 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  t he  O i l  and a a s  D e v e l o p m e n t  u o r p o r a t i o n  
(OGDC) was t he  r e s u l t .  Soon,  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  f a d e d  away as  
i t  r e q u i r e d  d e l e g a t i o n  o f  power t o  t h e  t e c h n o c r a t s  w h i c h  was 
n o t  i n  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t .  T h e r e f o r e ,  OGDC c o u l d  n o t  expand  
i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  u n t i l  1 9 7 3 .  The 1 973  o i l  s ho c k  and t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  p o l i t i c i a n s  we r e  i n  p ower  d u r i n g  t h o s e  d a y s ,  made i t  
p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  OGDC t e c h n o c r a t s  t o  s e c u r e  e n h a n c e d  a l l o c a ­
t i o n s  and r e a s o n a b l e  f r e e d o m  o f  a c t i o n  to  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l e v e l  
o f  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  H o w e v e r ,  c o n t i n u e d  d o m i n a t i o n  by t h e  
g e n e r a l i s t  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  on t h e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  posed  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  c o n s t r a i n t s  f o .  t h e  h e a l t h y  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  f u e l s  
s e c  t o  I . S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  arid u t i l i s a t i o n  o f  c o a l  
r e m a i n e d  n e g l e c t e d ,  a l t h o u g h  a l m o s t  a l l  t h e  p l a n s  e m p h a s i z e d  
I t s  d e v e l o p m e n t  and u t i l i z a t i o n .  B u r e a u c r a t i c  a p a t h y  and  
i n e r t i a  a g a i n  p l a y e d  a m a j o r  r o l e .  ( C h a p t e r  I V ; .
The DGNER a f f e c t e d  m a j o r  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  p r o j e c t s  
w i t h o u t  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  c o m p e t e n t  a u t h o r  l t y .  I t  r e f u s e d  
t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  c o m p l e t e  l i s t s  o f  t h e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  e v e n  t o  
t  he m o n i t o r  i  ng tearn o f  t  he P l a n n  t ng and De ve 1 opmen t  D i v i  - 
s i o  11 11 u 1 Lin I a t e l y  f a i l e d  to a c h i e v e  t h e  po 1 i  c y g o a 1 s , bu t 
d i d  n o t  a f f e c t  any  s t r u c t u r a l  and p r o c e d u r a l  i m p r o v e m e n t s
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(Chapter VI). Similarly, WAPDA resisted the measures aimed
at procedural, technical and orgariizational improvements. 
Its officials even sabotaged the efforts of the Governments 
ro control power losses by resisting the installation of 
capacitors (Chapter IV).
Political Support/Influence. An interesting finding 
of the present study is that political support to some 
projects affected the implementation adversely. The support 
of the sovereigns is generally considered an asset for the 
successful implementation of a policy. However, in the 
context of Third World countries, political commitment and 
support is not a sufficient condition for successful imple-
, ~ gmentation and may even became a liability. Stephen Quick s^ 
analysis of the cooperative policy of Zambia demonstrates 
that the policies which are extensively supported but poorly 
def i. ned w ill fail to ach i.eve any useful deve 1 opinen La 1 ob jec 
Lives. In such situations, the implementing agencies contin­
ue to spend resources to prove that action is being taken 
and results are being achieved in order to satisfy the 
polltreal leader ship or the sovereigns. In the context of 
present study, the cases of the rural electrification 
(C! I a p te r 1V ) and t \ • e Ne w and Renewable Sources of E ne r gy 
Pr ojec L (Cf .apter VI ) suppo rt the findings of Stephen Quick.
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In both of these cases, the projects enjoyed extensive
support and comrn 1 tinsnt of the sovereigns but the pollcy 
goals lacked specificity. WAPDA and the DGNER therefore 
resorted to mis reporting the achievements to obtain re­
sources as well as satisfy the sovereigns.
The study also demonstrates that powerful sections of 
society exerted pressure on the energy bureaucracy to bend 
the programs to their advantage, which affected the realiza­
tion of policy goals adversely. Excessive power losses in 
the WAPDA power system were partly the result of these 
pressures. This is also a typical Third World phenomena
 ^gwhich has been highlighted by a number of studies.'1'
The Affected Interests. A number of studies have 
highlighted the importance of affected interests and target 
groups for the implementation of public policies.'"" The 
theme of the existing research is: if the policy offers 
divisible benefits or adversely affects certain interests, 
its implementation will be problematic. The severity of 
constraints will be dependent upon the quantum of positive 
or negative consequences of the policy and the size and 
power of the affected population. The involvement of the 
affected interests/ targe t gr• oups at the policy/projecL
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formulation stage can contribute to mitigating the implemen­
tation difficulties.
The present study provides further evidence to sup­
port the thrust of this existing research- The Kalabagh Dam 
sparked intense political activity as the project was envis­
aged to bring about significant changes m  the socio­
political and economic life of the nation. As the people 
were not involved at the formulation stage of policy cycle, 
the reaction was very violent. The Government had already- 
incurred an expenditure of about one billion rupees when the 
controversy began and consequently the whole nation stood 
divided on the issue. The implementation of the project was 
stalled (Chapter V). The case of the New and Renewable 
Sources of Energy Project demonstrates that the failure of 
the DGNER to involve the people at the project formulation 
as well as at the implementation stage proved fatal for the 
achievement of policy goals. Lots of public resources were 
expended only to make the people unhappy (Chaptei VI).
The Timing. Prior research suggests that more analyt­
ic attention should be given to the role of "time" m  the 
compliance decision c a l c u l i . T h e  running theme is that 
white the policy is the product of conditions and coalitions
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at a single point of time, implementation must occur over­
time. Consequently, it is vulnerable to shifting public 
concerns, policy attitudes, and political agendas that can 
render implementation both unpopular and problematic. Such 
shifts benefit recalcitrant targets who may mobilize those 
who share a stake (material or ideological) in frustrating 
implementation. The more inconsistent a policy becomes with 
the priorities of the current political agenda, the more en­
forcement zeal diminishes and the chances of its implementa­
tion are minimized. The case of the Kalabagh Dam Project 
adds further evidence to the findings of the existing re­
search. The project was launched at a time when political 
readjustments were taking place in the country. Provincial, 
linguistic and ethnic Issues had occupied a prominent place 
in the political agenda of the country. A weak political 
setup was struggling to get rid of martial law, and a bewil­
dered Chief Martial Law Administrator was endeavouring to 
carve out a place for himself in the emerging political 
setup of the country. Tire print media had just been freed 
from long captivity. In fact, it was the most inappropriate 
time foi launching a project which offered divisive benefits 
to a large segment of the population (Chapter V).
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The Related Issues. An interesting finding of the
study is that the implementation of a project offering 
divisive benefits with repercussions at the national level 
may lu re opponents to associate it with controversial and 
ticklish national issues. This was observed in the case of 
the Kalabagh Dam Project. A number of issues were raised by 
the opponents of the project which had no immediate soiu 
tiun. Such tactics caused long-term delay. This was a 
situation-specific factor which contributed significantly to 
the implementation difficulties (Chapter V).
Personality Interplay. Another interesting finding of 
the present study is that intervention of strong personali­
ties with political clout due to personal reasons can influ­
ence implementation considerably. This is also a situation 
specific factor rampant in the developing countries. The 
case of the Kalabagh Dam Project provides evidence to this 
effect (Chapter V).
International Agencies. The study demonstrates that 
international agencies such as the World Bank, IMP and Asian 
Development Bank influenced the implementation of energy 
policy in Pakistan. The pressure of loan-giving agencies to 
affect structural changes in the economy have forced the
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i m p l e m e n t i n g  a g e n c i e s  and t he  G o v e r n m e n t  t o  i n c i e a s e  e n e r g y
t a r i f f s .  Most  o f  t h e s e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  have  a i s o  a t t a c h e d  t h e  
c o v e n a n t  o f  s e l f - f i n a n c i n g  t o  t h e  l o a n  a g r e e m e n t s ,  t h e r e b y  
f o r c i n g  t he  i m p l e m e n t i n g  a g e n c i e s  t o  i m p r o v e  e f f i c i e n c y  and  
c o n t r o l  w a s t e f u l  use  o f  r e s o u r c e s .  T h e i r  i n f l u e n c e  has  
m a i n l y  been  p o s i t i v e .  T h i s  i s  a l s o  a s i t u a t i o n - s p e c i f i c  
phenomenon g e n e r a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P o l i t i c s / E v e n t s .  An i m p o r t a n t  f i n d i n g  
o f  t h e  s t u d y  i s  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  and e v e n t s  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  e n e r g y  i n  
P a k i s t a n .  T h e i r  i m p a c t  was m a i n l y  n e g a t i v e .  The i m p l e m e n t a ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  n u c l e a r  p ower  d e v e l o p m e n t  programme o f  P a k i s t a n  
p r e s e n t s  a c l a s s i c  c a s e  o f  a s u p e r  power  i n v o l v e m e n t  t o  s t o p  
a c o u n t r y  f r o m  i m p l e m e n t i n g  a n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  w h i c h  has t h e  
f u l l  b a c k i n g  o f  t h e  p e o p l e .  P a k i s t a n  has n o t  been  a b l e  t o  
i m p l e m e n t  i t s  n u c l e a r  e n e r g y  d e v e l o p m e n t  p r o g r amme,  a l t h o u g h  
e f f o r t s  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  have  b e en  p e r s i s t e n t l y  made for  t h e  
l a s t  two d e c a d e s .  The G o v e r n m e n t  o f  P a k i s t a n  has a d m i t t e d  on 
v a r i o u s  o c c a s i o n s  i t s  f a i l u r e  t o  e n l i s t  s u p p o r t  o f  f o r e i g n  
g o v e r n m e n t s  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d .  The I n d i a n  n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i o n  
c r e a t e d  a commo t i on  I n  t h e  w o r l d  and t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t a s  o f  
A m e r i  u a w e n t  a 11 o u t  t  o s t op 1 i u c 1 ear t e c  hi n o l o  g y t r ans  f er to  
P a k i s t a n .  The w a r s  w i t h  I n d i a  and t h e  s e c e s s i o n  o f  t h e
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erstwhile East Pakistan had a telling effect on Pakistan’s
economy due to dive.sion of resources to meet the national 
emergency. Moreover, they also caused the stoppage of aid by 
the donor countries. Overall resource constraints therefore 
also affected the energy sector adversely. Pakistan’s 
refusal to agree to the terms dictated by the USA in respect 
of nuclear programme also caused the stoppage of US aid for 
extended periods, which affected the implementation of 
energy policy adversely due to resource constraints 
(Chapter IV).
Bureaucratic Corruption. A significant finding of the 
present study is that bureaucratic corruption affected the 
implementation of energy policy adversely. The study pro­
vides strong evidence for bureaucratic corruption in the 
form of embezzlement of public funds and fraud in the col­
lection of revenues. The theft of electricity with the 
connivance of WAPDA staff, use of substandard material and 
equipment, kick-backs from the contractors, and paper con­
nections', all prove the contention (Chapter IV). The case of 
the New and Renewable Sources of Energy Project demonstrates 
that bureaucratic corruption is rampant in the DGNER 
(Chaptei VI).
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Corruption in some form exists in all political and
administrative systems. However, it is wide-spread in the
7 0  T ~Zdeveloping countries, My r daiwt and many other writers00 con­
tend that there is a well entrenched process of corruption 
in the political and administrative systems of the develop­
ing countries and the presence of corruption retards devel­
opmental processes. There are multi-factor reasons given for 
the continuation of corrupt practices in Third World nations
__ not the least is that public officials are paid very
small salaries and must seek extra funds to support their 
families. Whatever the reasons, bureaucratic corruption is a 
situation-specific factor which affects the implementation 
of public policies in Third World countries. The present 
study provides evidence to support this contention.
The foregoing discussion of the factors influencing 
the implementation of energy policy in Pakistan demonstrates 
that these factors can be classified into two categories; 
core factors; and contingent factors. There are some factors 
winch have universal relevance and affect public policy 
implementation m  any sector and system or situation. They 
may be called the "core factors". These factors must be 
considered in implementation success calculi of any policy 
in any system. Pram the present study, the "core factors"
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are; formal policy; project formulation, implementation
strategy; institutional structure and procedures, 
organizational capacity, interorganizational coordination, 
or ganizationa1 control and accountability; and the affected 
interests. The "contingent factors" are situation specific 
and vary from situation to situation. A factor belonging to 
tins category may have critical importance in a particular 
situation, but be of no consequence in another. From trie 
present study, the "contingent factors" are. technology, 
bureaucratic politics; bureaucratic apathy and resistance to 
change; political support/influence; the related issues; the 
timing; personality interplay; in ternational agencies; 
international politics/events; and bureaucratic corruption. 
The categorization of factors has an analytic value for 
implementation analysts and practitioners allowing them to 
make intelligent decisions when planning implementation.
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ANNEXURE I
SANCTIONING POWERS OF THE VARIOUS AUTHORITIES 
(OPERATIVE FROM 1 JULY, 1988)
Au thorltv Powe r
1. ECNEC All schemes costing above Rs. 60.00 
million (Non-recurring),
2. CDWP Federal schemes costing between 
Rs.20,00 million and Rs.60.00 mil­
lion (Non-recurring) subject to the 
condition that the Ministry of
Finance does not disagree.
3. Provincial All schemes costing up to and in-
Governments eluding Rs.60.00 million (Non­
recurring). The power will be
subject to the following condi­
tions : -
a) The schemes sanctioned by the
Provincial Governments are in
line with the objectives of the 
National Plans and there is no 
deviation from the principles and 
policies laid down in the Plan.
b) The schemes do not have economic 
or other repercussions beyond the 
P rovinee.
c)A copy of PC-1 form of the scheme 
will be furnished to the Plan­
ning Commission at least 10 days 
before the meeting of the Provin­
cial Development Workshop Party 
at which it is proposed to con­
sider the scheme to enable the 
Planning Commission to furnish 
their views, if they so desire. 
The Planning Commission will also 
have the right to attend the 
meeting of the Provincial Develop 
merit Working Party,
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4. Azad 
Government 
of the State 
of Jammu & 
Kashmir
5, Northern 
A reas 
Council
d)A copy of the scheme finally 
approved by the Provincial Devel­
opment Working Party will be 
promptly furnished to the Plan­
ning Commission, the Ministry of 
Finance and other agencies con­
cerned.
All schemes costing up to and 
including Rs.60.00 million (Non­
recurring). The power will be sub­
ject to the conditions as mentioned 
against S.No.3 above.
All schemes costing up to and 
including Rs.60.00 million (Non­
recurring). The power will be sub­
ject to the following conditions:-
a) The schemes sanctioned by the 
Northern Areas Council are in 
line with the objectives of the 
National Plans and there is no 
deviation from the principles 
and policies laid down in the 
Plan.
b) The schemes do not have economic 
or other repercussions beyond the 
Northern Areas.
c) A copy of PC-I form of the 
scheme will be furnished to the 
Planning Commission at least 10 
days before the meeting of the 
Northern Areas Council at which 
it is proposed to consider the 
scheme to enable the Planning 
Commission to furnish their 
views, if they so desire. The 
Planning Commission will also 
have the right to attend the 
meeting of the Nor them Areas 
Cou nci1.
d) A copy of the scheme finally 
approved by the Northern Areas 
Cou nu i 1 w i .11 be p romp 11 y fur- 
m s f " ie d  t o  t h e  P1 a n n i n g  C o m rn is -
457
6 . Federal
Ministries
/ , C ■o n Irn ere i a 1.
0rgam zations 
havx ng Finance 
M e rn b e r / Director 
appointed in
sion, the Ministry of Finance and 
other agencies concerned.
All schemes costing below Rs.2G.0Q 
million (Non-recurring). The power 
will be subject to the following 
conditions:-
a ) T he Minist ry co neer ned shall 
create a proper planning and 
monitoring unit within the organ­
ization and set up a Departmen­
tal Development. Working Party in 
which a representative of the 
Ministry of Finance should also 
be included.
b) The Ministry of Finance does not 
disagree with the decision of the 
Departmental Development Working 
Party. In case there is any disa­
greement, the scheme will be sub­
mitted to the CDWP/ECNEC.
c) A copy of PC-I of the scheme 
shall be furnished to the Plan­
ning and Development Division 
at least 1G days before the 
meeting of the Departmental 
Development Working Party. The 
Planning and Development Division 
will also have the right to 
express their views on the PC-I 
and to attend the meeting of the 
Departmental Development Working 
Par ty.
d) A copy of the scheme finally 
approved by the Departmental De- 
ve1opment Working Pa r ty will be 
promptly furnished to the Plan­
ning and Development Division and 
Ministr y of Finance (Dev. Wing).
All schemes costing below Rs. 2G.0G 
rn1 11ion (Non-recu r ring) and/o r 
Rs. 4.00 million (Recurring) with 
the concur renee of the Min istiy o f 
Finance. The power is subject to
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consultation with the conditions mentioned against
the Finance S.No.6 above.
Division.
8 . Co rporations/
Non-Comma rcial 
0 rganiz a tions 
h a v m g  a Director/ 
Member Finance 
approved by the 
F i nance D i v i s i o n .
All schemes costing below R s . 8.00 
million (Non-recurring) and/or R s . 
2.00 mi11ion (Recu rring). T he powe r 
is subject to the conditions men­
tioned against S.No.6 above,,
9. Northern 
Areas
Development 
Work!ng 
Party.
All schemes costing below Rs.20,00 
million (Non-recurring) and/or R s . 
4.00 million (Recurring). The power 
is subject to the conditions ment­
ioned against S.No.6 above.
10. Islamabad
Development 
Wo rking 
Par ty.
All schemes costing below Rs. 20.00 
million (Non-recurring) and/or Rs. 
4.00 million (Recurring). The power 
is subject to the conditions men­
tioned against S.No.6 above.
11. Federally
Administered 
TIibal Areas 
Development 
Co rporation.
All schemes costing below Rs.20.00 
million (Non-recurring) and/or Rs. 
4.00 million (Recurring). The power 
is subject to the conditions men­
tioned against S.No.6 above.
12. Federally
Adrni niste red 
Tribal Areas 
(FATA)
Governor NWFP is empowered to 
sanction FATA schemes to the extent 
permissible in respect of Provin­
cial schemes I.e. all FATA schemes 
costing up to and including Rs.60.00 
million (Non-recur ring) after they 
have been processed by the PDWP.
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning and Develop
merit Division, Notification N o . 20 (1) DA/PC/87 , 
15 November, 1987, Islamabad.
4 59
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
Planning Commission 
Ll.2.55~.60J., Islamabad.
The First Five Year- Plan
P1 a n n 1 n g Commission, The. Second
(1960-65), June I960, Karachi.
Five Year Plan.
P 1 a n n i n g Co rn m i s s i o n , The Third Five Year Plan
11965-70.1, June 1965, Revised Phasing..,.. Sectoral. 
Priorities and A llocations of the Third Five Year. Plan 
(1965-70), Ma rc h 1967.
Planning Commission, The. Fourth Five Year 
(1970-75) (aborte d ), Islamabad, July 1970.
Plan
Planning Co rn mission, The Fifth Five
(1970-35 ) , Islamabad, June 1978.
Yea r Plan
Planning Commission, The Sixth Five Year Plan
(1983- 8 8 ), Islamabad.
Planning Commission, 7 th. Five Year Plan
(1988-93) and. Perspec tive Plan 1988-2005. Vol II, 
Islamabad.
P 1 a n n 1 n g Commission, Annual Plan, 1972-75 ,
October 1972.
Planning Commission, Annual Plan. 1975-74 , I s 1 a rn a b a d ,
Planning Commission Annual Plan 1974-75, Islamabad.
P1 anning Comrn ission , Working Papers for .the. Development 
Pr ogramme (1977-78 ) , Islamabad.
F i r I a n ce Oivi s I o n , Economic Su rvev 1987-88, I s 1 a m a b a d .
Finance 0 ivision, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Economic 
Survey;..,. 1985-86 , Is 1 amabad , May 1936,
Finance Division, Economic Advisor's Wing, Government
460
Sponsored Co.r.p,g.r a t.ions 1.533.-84 , Is 1 amabad .
Summary for the President on the Energy Survey of 
Pakistan by Minister for Finance, Planning & 
Development, 1979,
President's Directive Nos 603 of 1982 to Federal 
Inspection Commission.
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Energy 
Resources Cell, Energy. Data Book., Islamabad, 1978.
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Off.ice 
Order No. DP - 18 ( 5.4 ) /82 , Islamabad, 26 May, 1985.
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Office 
Order No.DP-18(54)/82, Islamabad, 26 May 1985; and
Interviews in Islamabad, (May 1985).
Minutes of the First Meeting of National Energy Policy 
Committee, 27 November, 1980.
Minutes of the Second Meeting of the National Energy 
Policy Comrni 1 1 e e 22 April , 1981.
Minutes of the Third Meeting of the National Energy 
Policy Committee, 22 October.1981.
Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the National Energy 
Policy Committee 1.7. January . 1981.
Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the National Energy 
Policy Committee 29 February , 1984 .
Water and Power Development Authority, WAPDA 
Then . . . Now ...... Tomorrow. Lahore, n.d.
Water and Power Development Au thority , Power System
Statistics, Ninth Issue, November 1984,
WAPDA Power System Statistics, Fifteenth Issue, 
October, 1990,
Water and Power D e v e 1 opment Authority, WAPDA Annual
Report., 1983-84 .
Waber- and Power Deve 1 opmen t Au thori ty , W A P DA : Then
461
Now .... Tomorrow, n .d .
Water and Power Development Authority, Office of the 
Chief Engineer (Rural Electrification Organization), 
Brief on Rural Electrification Pro.iects in Pakistan, 
July 1985.
Water and Power Development Authority, Power Wing, 
Planning D e par t m e nt, Power System Statistics (Fifteenth 
Issue), October 1990.
W A P D A , Public Relation Division, WAP DA. Pro.iects - In. 
Brief , Lahore, October 1984.
W A P D A , Public Relations Division, WAP DA. In Br. ie .f., 
Lahore, n.d.
WAP DA. Annual Report 1984-85.
WARD A. Annual Report 1986-87.
WARD A Annual Report 1987-88.
WAPDA Annual Report 1988-89.
WAPDA, Power Wing, Rural Electrification Organization, 
Proforma. PC-1. (Rural Electrification) , October 1981.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Power 
Planning Study for Pakistan , Vienna, Austria, 1975.
Inter nationa1 Atomic Energy Agency, Mar ket Su rvey 
for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries , Vienna, 
Austria, 1973.
Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator 
Pakistan, Martial Order No. 8.5, Rawalpindi,
May 16, 1981.
The Constitution of. the Islamic Republic of. Pakistan, 
[Ai t i d e  7ö(4)] Fourth schedule, Legislative Lists 
(Federal Legislative List, Part I & 11 and Government 
Legislative List).
The Oil. and Gas. Development Corporation Ordinance..^ .. 
1961: Ordinance N o . XXXVII of 1961 (20 September 1961. 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Directorate
4o2
of films and Publications, Pakistan 1964: An Official 
Handbook (Islamabad Barqsons Printers Ltd,, 1985).
Ministry of 1 nformatio11 and Öroadcasting, Twenty Years 
of Pakistan 1947-67 (Karachi Pakistan Publications), 
1967 .
Pakistan 1953-54 (Karachi, Pakistan Publicationsj.
Pakistan 1955-56 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications 1956),
Pakistan 1957-58 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications),
Pakistan Year Book. 1969 (Karachi: National Publishing 
House, 1969).
0&M Division, KESC O&M Study, Islamabad, 1984.
Ministry of Production, Expert Advisory Cell, State 
Enterprises Telephone Pi rectory. 1984.
Telephone Pirectory. Offices of. the Government of 
Pakistan in Rawalpindi and Islamabad, July 1988.
Planning and Development Division, Report No.13 of 
1932-83, Islamabad.
Planning & Division, Five Years of Project Monitoring 
in Pakistan (1978-83) , Report No.13 of 1982- 83,
Islamabad, June, 1983.
Planning a n d Developmen t Division, Notification
No..,..20.1.1..).. DA/PC/87, Islamabad, 15 Nov., 1987.
Report of the Working Group Set Up by the Planning 
Commission of Pakistan on Development and Conservation 
of Energy, Mar.c.h 1983.
C abinet Secretariat (Cabinet Division) Notification 
No.71/CF/85/(NEC), Islamabad, 8 May, 1985.
Cabinet Secretariat (Cabinet Division), Notification 
N Q.7.I./ C.F.Z s 1 am a b a d , 25 Apr i 1 , 1985 .
G o v e I' n m ent of B a 1 u c i i i s t an, PI a r \ n i n g and Developüi e n t 
Department, Sixth. FI ye. Year Plan. (1983-1988) , Quetta, 
December, 1983 .
463
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS’ REPORTS
I FAD, Economic and Pianni rig Deß.a.rtmetil:, Agricultural 
Policy and Rural Poverty in Pakistan, Report of the 
Special Pr ogramming Mission to Pakistan, January .1984 ,
Asian Development Bank, Pro.iect Performance Audi t 
Report on the. Power Generation, Transmission and 
Distribu tion Project in. Pakistan, December 1982,
Asian Development Bank, Pro.iect Completion Repot t of 
the Power. Generation. T iansmission and Distribu tion 
Project, in. (Loan Nos 99 and. 100 (SF) : 150 and 151 (SF) 
Pakistan, November 1981.
The World Bank, Appraisal Mission, AIDE-MEMOIRE: ENERGY 
SECTOR LOAN, Islamabad, November 27, 1984.
I ED Consultants SA, Report on the Sixth Plan (1983-88) : 
Energy (Vol. I), Prepared for the Planning Commission, 
Government of Pakistan, April 1983.
NEWSPAPERS. BULLETINS AND PERIODICALS
Pakistan and Gulf Economist. Karachi. 
Ihe Morning News, Karachi.
The. Nida (Urdu) Lahore.
The. Jang., (Urdu) Karachi.
The Jang (Urdu) Lahore.
The Aman (Urdu) Karachi.
The Safeer(Urdu) Hyderabad.
The Nation, Lahore.
Business. Recorder , Karachi .
The Musi..im , Is 1 amabad .
MAG.HRA.BI PAK.IS.I.AN., Lahore.
464
The C.anber ra Times.
The New York Times..
NAIaIA- I-WAQAT (Urdu) R a w a 1 pi nd 1 . 
The. KY.hb.er Mail, Peshawer .
The Pakistan Times, Rawalpindi» 
T h e D a w n., K. a r a c h i ,
Economic Review , Karachi .
Asian Recorder.
Petroleum Economist.
The Washington Post.
BOOKS AND ARTICLES
Abdullah, M. Energy Use in Transrort System . Study- 
conducted for the National Transport Research Centre, 
Planning and Development Division, Government of 
Pakistan. No. NRTC-49, February 1981.
Ahmed Shahid, (Director, Ministry of Petroleum and 
Natural Resources), Role of Private Sector in
Petroleum Explora tion and Development in
Pakistan . (..Unpub 1i.shed internal paper of. the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Natural Resou rces, Islamabad), 
February 1985.
Akram, A.I. (Lt.Gen.(Retd), "The Nuclear Awakening", 
The. Muslim, 28 March, 1987.
All, Mohsin, "Pakistan’s case for nuclear energy 
development", The Dawn Karachi, 11 May, 1987.
Alterrnan, R., "Implementation analysis m  urban and 
regional planning: Toward a research agenda", in
P, Healey et .al . (eds), Planning Theory Perspectives for 
the 19.8.0 s (Oxford: P e r g anion, 198 2 ) .
465
A n d e r s o n ,  J . E . ,  P u b l i c .  P o l i c y  M a k i n g  (New Y o r k ;
P r a e g e r ,  1 9 7 5 ) ,
Ain j a d  H u s s a i n ,  "No Power  S h o r  t a g e  i n  1 9 8 5 ! " ,  P a k i s t a n .  
E c o n o m i s t , D e ce m be r  19,  1 9 8 1 .
B a r d a c h , E . ,  T he I m p l e m e n t a t i o n  Game ( C a m b r i d g e : MIT
P r e s s ,  1 9 7 7 ) .
B a r r e t t , 5 ,  a n d  C , F u d g e ( e d s , ) ,  P o l i c y  a n d  A c t i o n : 
E s s a y s  i n  t h e  Imp.lern.en t a t  i o n  o f .  Pu b l i c  P o l i c y ( L o n d o n ;  
M e t h u e n ,  1 9 8 1 ) .
B e g ,  D a u d ,  E n e r g y  Loss.  R e d u c t i on  i n  WAPDA P ow er 
D i s t r i b u t i o n  S y s t e m , , ( A C a s a  S t u d y  p r e s e n t e d  a t  
P a k i s t a n  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  S t a f f  C o l l e g e ,  L a h o r e ,  
F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 8 5 .
B e r m a n ,  P , ,  " T h i n k i n g  a b o u t  p r o g r a m m e d  a n d  a d a p t i v e  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  M a t c h i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  s i t u a t i o n s "  i n  
H . I n g r a m  a n d  D.  Mann ( e d s .  ) Why. P o l i c i e s  S u c c e e d  o r  F a l l  
( B e v e r l y  H i l l s ,  C . A :  S a g e ,  1 9 8 0 .
B e r m a n ,  P a u l ,  "T h e  S t u d y  o f  M a c r o  a nd  
M i c r o - I m p l e m e n t a t i o n " , P u b l i c  P o l i c y , 26  ( S p r i n g ) ,
pp  1 5 7 - 1 8 3 .
B h u t t o ,  Z u l f i q a r  A l i ,  The  Myth .  o f .  I n d e p e n d e n c e  
( K a r a c h i ;  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 6 9 ) .
B o w d e n ,  P e t e r ,  " P r o b l e m s  o f  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n " ,  P u b l i c  
Adrni  n i s  t  r a . t . i p n  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t , Vo 1 . 6  N o . l ,
1 9 8 6  .
B u t t  N . M . ,  a n d  K.  Y a l d r a m ,  " R e s e a r c h  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  a t  
P IN S T E C H " , The P a k i s t a n  T i m e s , D e c e m b e r  2 4 ,  1 9 8 5 ,
s u p p l e m e n t , P . I .
G a s s e n ,  R . H . ,  e t . a l . ,  The  E f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  A i d  t o  
P a k i s t a n , I n t e r n a t i o n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  C e n t r e ,
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  O x f o r d ,  J a n u a r y  1 9 9 0 ,
E b i n g e r , C h a r l e s  K . ,  P a k i s t a n : E n e r g y  P l a n n i n g  i n  a 
S t r a t e g i c .  V o r t e x  ( B l o o m i n g t o n  I n d i a n  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  
1 9 3 1 )  .
E d w a r d s ,  G . C , I I I , I m p l e m e n t i ng P u b l i c  P o l i c y
466
(Washington D.C: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980).
Elmore, R.F., "Organizational models of social program 
implementation", Public Poli.cy 26 (spring), 1978.
Fudge, C. and S. Barrett, "Reconstructing the Field of 
Analysis", in S. Barrett and C.Fudge (eds.) Policy 
and Action : Essays in the Implementation of Public
Policy (London:Methuen, 1981).
Grindie, M. (ed), Poll tics and Policy Implementation in 
the Thi.rd. World (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1980).
Hanf, K. and F.W. Scharpf, Intero rganizational Policy 
Making, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publication, 1978).
Hanf, K., F.W. Scharpf (eds.), Inter-organizational 
Policy Making: Limits to Coordination and Central
Control (Beverly Hills, C.A: Sage, 1978).
Jones, C.O. An Introduction to the Study of Public 
Policy (Belmont, C.A: Wadsworth, 1977).
Khan, M, Nawaz, "Factors effecting future demand and 
supply of coal in Pakistan", Pakistan Steel Jou rnal 
Quarterly, January - March, 1987.
Knightley Phillip, "How Pakistan Fooled the World to 
build the H-Bomb", The National Times, 30 June 1979.
Larson, J.S., Why Government Programs Fail: Improving
Policy Implementation (New York: Praeger, 1980).
Lazarus, "Water Accord and NFC Award: The Whole Story" 
in The Natio n , Lahore, 30 April, 1991.
McLaughlin, M., "Implementation as Mutual Adaptation: 
change in class room organization" in W.Williams and 
R .F „ Elmore (eds.), Social Program Implementation 
(New York: Academic, 1976).
Majone, G. and A. Wildavsky, "Implementation as 
Evolution", Policy Studies Review Annual , V o1.2
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979).
Ma j o ne , G . and A . Wildavsky, "I rnp lernen t a t i on as
467
Evolution" in H . £. Freeman (ed) , Policy Studies Review 
A nnual, Vo1.2 (8eve i 1y Mills, C . A : Sage, 1978).
Mayntz, R., "Public bureaucracies and policy 
implementation",Internationa l Social Sc iences Journa l , 
vo 1 , XXXI, No.4,1979,
Mazmanian, D.A. and P.A. Sabotier , "The Implementation 
of Public Policy: A Framework of Analysis", in D.A.
M a z m a n i an and P.A. S a b a t i e r (e d s . ) , Ef fee five Po 1 i..c.y. 
Implementation (Lexington, M .A : D.C. Heath, 1981).
Miller, Judith, "frying harder to Stop the Bomb", The 
National Time s , 17-23 October L982.
liontjoy, R.S. and L.J.O’Toole, Jr., "Toward a of Theory 
of Policy Implementation: An Organizational
Peispective", Public Administration Review
September/October, 1979.
Nakamura, R.. T . and F . S m a 11 w o u d , The. Politics of Policy 
Implementation (New York: St. Martin’s , 1980).
Oberdörfer, D., "Pakistan: The Quest for
Atomic Bomb", The Washington Po s t , 27 August 1979.
O'Toole, L.J. and R.S. Montjoy, "Interorganizational 
Policy Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective",
Public Administration Review, November/December, 1984.
Pressman, J .L . and WiIdavsky, A ., Implementa tion 
(Berkeley : University of California
Press,1973).
Radin, B.A., Implementation, Change , and the
Federal Bureaucracy: School Desegregation Policy in 
H .E . W ., 1964-68 (New York: Teachers College Press,
1977).
Rafe-uz Zaman (ed.), Pakistan Year Book. 1970 
(Karachi. National Publishing House Ltd., 1970).
Rein, M . and F.B. Rabinowitz, "Implementation. A 
theoietical perspective", in W.D. Burnham and M.W. 
Weinberg (eds.) American Poll tics and Pub Lie Policy 
(Cambridge, M .A • MIT Press, 1973).
4ö8
Riggs, F.w. , Admi.n_ist.raJt.ion 1.0. Qev.elo.p.i.n.g Co.u.n.t.r;.ie.s. 
(Boston : Haughton Mifflin, 1964).
Scott, J.C. "Corruption , Machine Politics, and 
Political Change", American Political Science Review , 
63, No.4, December 1969.
Shahzad Sadiq (Chairman, Petroleum Institute of 
Pakistan and Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and 
Natural Resources), Welcome Address to the Delegates of 
the Symposium on * Ene rgy Problems and Options for the 
Third World Countries, Hotel Intercontinental,Lahore, 
December 14-15, 1977.
S .M . Bhutta, "More Nuclear Power to Fill the Yawning 
Gap", The Pakistan Times, 25 September, 1975.
Smith, Thomas B,, "Evaluating development policies and 
programmes in the Third World", Public Administration 
and Development, Vo1.5, No.2, 1985.
Stone, C.N., "The Implementation of Social Programmes: 
Two Perspectives", Journal of. Social Issues, 36(4),
1980.
Shirin Tahir Kheli, "Pakistans Nuclear Option and
U.S. Policy", O rbis, Vol. 22, No. 2, (Summer 1973).
Shujaat Ali Sheikh, "Tarbela Dam", The Daily
NAWA- I-WAQAT (Ur'du Dally), Octobe r 10, 1985.
Soomro, M .L .H . , "Is KESC going down?", Pakistan 
and Gulf Economist , August 31 - September 6, 1985.
Sultan Ali Barq, "Kalabagh Dam: Facts, Fears and
Misconceptions",in The Nation (Friday Ma g a z ine),
14 December, 1991.
Thompson, J.D., 0 rganizations in Ac tion (New York:
McGraw ~ Hill, 1967).
Van Horn, C.D., Policy Implementation in the Federal 
System (Lexington, M .A : D .C . Heath, 1979).
Van Meter, D and C * Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation 
Process: A Conceptua1 Frarnework", Administration and
Soc ietv, 6, No. 4, February 1975.
469
Wade, Robert, "Irrigation Reform in conditions of 
Populist Anarchy", Journal of Development Economics, 
14, 1984,
Weiner, M ., The Politics of Scarcity (Chicago. 
University of Chicago Press,1962).
Weisman, S. & H. Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York: 
Times Book, 1981).
Yusafzai (Engr.) Mehtab Khan, "Is the Water Accord 
equitable?" in The Muslim, Islamabad, 21 April, 1991.
Zahid Malik, D r . Abdul. Qadi r Khan Au r Islami 8omb 
(Urdu) (Islamabad: Matboo-oat-e-Hurmat, 1989).
Zalrnay Khalildaz, "Pakistan: The Making of a Nuclear
Power", Asian Su rvev. Vol. XVI, No.6, June 1976.
Zuberi, Wasirn A., "Pakistan Oilfields Ltd.: The
Pioneers in Petroleum Exploration and Production in 
Pakistan", Hilal A. Raza and Arshad M. Shaikh (eds.) 
Petroleum for the Fu tu re (Islamabad: Hydrocarbon
Development Institute of Pakistan, 1988).
"Overcoming Power Sho rtage", The Pakistan Times, 
Rawalpindi, May 11, 1985.
"Power Dispute", The Pakistan Times, Rawalpindi, 
December 18, 1985.
"Load-Shedding; How Long?", The Pakistan Times,
Rawalpindi, March 28, 1985.
"Power: the final squeeze", The Pakistan Times,
Rawalpindi, January 31, 1983.
4 70
